Filed 2/14/18 Christina C. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



CHRISTINA C.,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA COSTA COUNTY,
Respondent;
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU et al.
Real Parties in Interest.




A153142

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J1600384)


Christina C. (mother) is the mother of five-year-old Brody G. (Brody), who was taken into protective custody in June 2015. In December 2017, the juvenile court held an 18-month review hearing and found that the return of Brody to mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, protection, or well-being within the meaning of section 366.22, subdivision (a)(1) of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court terminated reunification services and set the matter for a permanency hearing under section 366.26. The permanency hearing is scheduled for February 22, 2018.
Mother filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the court’s order, arguing the juvenile court erred by finding the return of Brody to her would create a substantial risk of harm. She also contends the court should have extended reunification services for another six months under section 366.22, subdivision (b). She requested a temporary stay of the permanency hearing.
We deny the writ petition and request for a stay. Substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that Brody was at substantial risk of detriment if returned to mother’s care. The court also did not err in not extending reunification services for six more months. Given our denial of the writ petition, a stay is unwarranted.
BACKGROUND
In June 2015, Brody was two and a half and lived with mother and his father. The Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) received a referral for neglect. Police raided the home and found multiple people under the influence, drug paraphernalia and a propped up mattress and box spring and other items that posed a safety hazard to Brody. Brody was in a diaper that had not recently been changed and was leaking urine. He was obese to a degree that he had trouble walking. The home was filthy, with dirty diapers stacked in the bathroom, stagnant water in the bathtub, stacks of beer cans inside and outside and garbage bags stacked high on the side of the house, and was infested with cockroaches. Mother, who was a cocaine and alcohol addict, was engaged in domestic violence with Brody’s father. Police arrested mother for child endangerment.
When the Bureau requested a safety check two days later, the home had been cleaned up, Brody had on clean diapers and clothes and there was food in the refrigerator. Over the next ten months, the Bureau worked with mother under a voluntary plan of intensive family services (consisting principally of substance abuse treatment, drug-testing and parenting education), in an effort to rectify the serious problems concerning Brody’s care. In April 2016, however, the Bureau filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) in the Contra Costa County Superior Court alleging Brody was at risk of physical harm due to his parents’ chronic substance abuse problems and resultant failure to supervise him. Specifically, as amended, the Bureau alleged mother and father were neglecting Brody by residing in a home with extremely unsanitary conditions and by failing to obtain adequate medical care for him. The petition detailed mother’s failure to engage in past services, including her many positive drug tests and no-shows, repeated absences and eventual discharge from her outpatient program, as well as her having left Brody unattended while she slept. At a detention hearing on April 7, 2016, the juvenile court ordered Brody detained, provided for supervised visits with mother and father and set a jurisdiction hearing for April 28, 2016. Mother entered an in-patient substance abuse treatment program as recommended by the Bureau on April 7, 2016. Within three weeks, however, she had tested positive for cocaine.
At a jurisdiction hearing on April 28, 2016, the juvenile court referred the parties to mediation. On May 9, 2016, both parents pled no contest to the amended petition alleging their chronic substance abuse problems impaired their ability to adequately parent their child, the Bureau dismissed the other allegations and the juvenile court sustained the petition as amended. Brody was placed in foster care. On the same date, the juvenile court adjudged Brody a ward of the court, ordered his continued detention, and ordered continued reunification services consisting principally of substance abuse treatment, alcohol and drug testing, parenting education and counseling. The Bureau’s many reports, which we refrain from summarizing, detailed mother’s efforts over the ensuing many months to overcome her substance abuse problems and improve her parenting skills but painted a mixed picture and only minimal progress, noting numerous relapses into drugs and alcohol, missed appointments, and other concerns.
By September 21, 2017, the Bureau did not believe mother would be able to care for Brody and stay clean of illegal substances, given her extensive history of relapses during the past 28 months, including six positive tests, of which four were for cocaine and two for THC, and nine no-shows. In its status report for the upcoming 18-month review hearing, the Bureau recommended that family reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. It informed the court that mother had a positive test for THC in January 2017, 11 negative tests in February, March and April, 2017, one positive test for alcohol in March 2017, nine negative tests in June and July and a no-show in August 2017. After her second discharge from an inpatient program, this one in March 2017, mother had failed to comply with the Bureau’s recommendation that she enter another inpatient program, opting instead to pursue outpatient treatment. Over the course of the immediately preceding 13-month period, mother had six positive tests, four for cocaine and two for THC, and nine no-shows. Mother had claimed one of the positive tests (for alcohol) had been a false positive and that she had obtained a blood test shortly after testing positive that documented the lack of alcohol, but never provided that documentation to the Bureau.
The 18-month hearing was held on October 26 and December 1, 2017. Mother contested the recommendations, and her counsel called the social worker and mother to testify. At the hearing’s conclusion, the juvenile court judge stated she had come into the hearing “hoping mother could prove to me she’s okay.” But she found mother’s testimony “bureaucratic” and not credible. The court expressed the view that mother had lied about taking a blood test and was in “total denial” about two positive tests. It also found that mother still had no understanding of the conditions the child was found in when the police raided the home, and was in denial about the condition of the home itself and the condition in which Brody was found. The evidence showed violence in the home, and mother was in denial about the fact that Brody had to have witnessed it. The court found that Brody had been put through “so much,” and that mother had no “insight at all to her responsibility in this case.” The court adopted the Bureau’s recommendations, found Brody continued to be a person described by section 300, subdivision (b), found by clear and convincing evidence that the Bureau had provided reasonable services to mother and set a hearing under section 366.26.
This writ petition by mother followed.
DISCUSSION
I.
Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding That Return
of the Minor to Mother Would Pose a Risk of Detriment.
At an 18-month review hearing, the child must be returned to the physical custody of the parent unless the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence “that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
“The standard for showing detriment is ‘a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ [Citation.] Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that returning a child to parental custody represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400 (Yvonne W.).)
“In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The court must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.” (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1400.) “The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).)
This court reviews the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that returning the child to the parent would put him at substantial risk of detriment. (Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1400–1401.) We consider the evidence favorably to the Bureau as the prevailing party, and resolve all conflicts in favor of the juvenile court order. (Id. at p. 1401.)
In discussing this issue, mother argues she was in “substantial compliance with her case plan,” focusing on the evidence that favors her position, such as her completion of an outpatient program, attendance at 12-step meetings, living in a sober living environment, having many clean drug test results and obtaining a sponsor. She also points to the fact that her visits with Brody were consistently positive.
But we are obliged to look to the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and affirm the decision if there is substantial evidence that placing Brody in mother’s custody would “create a substantial risk of detriment to [his] safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1); Yvonne W., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1400–1401.) There is no question that mother made significant efforts to engage in services. She enrolled in three inpatient treatment programs and completed one of them and an outpatient program, consistently visited Brody and engaged with him in a positive way, attended 12-step programs and submitted to drug testing. Nonetheless, despite engaging in and benefiting from these services, mother’s many relapses, including recent ones, indicate she has not been able to successfully address her substance abuse issue, which is the primary problem that led to Brody’s removal. Throughout the 20 months of dependency proceedings and the eight months of Intensive Family Services that preceded them, mother repeatedly relapsed, using drugs and alcohol, testing positive for them, failing to show for tests and being discharged from two inpatient programs she had engaged in. Further, after the more recent discharge, she ignored the social worker’s directive to enroll in another inpatient program and instead opted to pursue outpatient treatment. While receiving outpatient care, she again had two tests that were positive for alcohol and a no show. The juvenile court found mother’s contention that the tests were inaccurate was not credible and that mother was in denial about the extent of her substance abuse problem and the harm it posed to, and had already caused, Brody. In her testimony, mother minimized the horrific conditions in her home at the time Brody was detained. She was also in denial of the domestic violence that precipitated the raid on the home and Brody’s removal. Finally, the court found mother’s testimony about her efforts and changes she had made that would lead to her ability to safely parent Brody were not credible. Mother seemed detached and lacked insight into the serious problems she had caused for her son.
Without denying mother’s efforts to engage in services, we cannot conclude the juvenile court erred in finding that returning Brody to mother would pose a substantial risk of detriment to his safety, health or well-being. We agree with the Bureau’s counsel that it went “above and beyond” in providing services to mother and could have terminated mother’s services earlier. Indeed, it proposed a finding, which the court adopted at the 6-month review hearing, that mother’s progress toward alleviating the problems that led to Brody’s placement in foster care was “minimal.” In the end, despite 26 months of services, mother’s efforts fell short of what was needed to create confidence that Brody would be safe and healthy in her care.
II.
Mother Forfeited the Argument That the Juvenile Court Should Have Continued Services Beyond the 18-Month Review, and in Any Event Has Failed to Show Error.
Mother argues the court should have exercised its discretion to continue the 18-month review hearing under section 352, subdivision (a), which authorizes a juvenile court to continue a hearing beyond the time limit for which it is otherwise required to be held so long as doing so is not contrary to the interest of the minor. That subdivision also directs the juvenile court, in addressing any such request, to “give substantial weight to the minor’s need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements” and provides that “[c]ontinuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause.” As Division Five of this court has stated, “[c]ontinuances in juvenile dependency proceedings are disfavored, particularly when they infringe on maximum time limits under the Code.” (In re David H. (2005) 165 Cal.App.4th 1626, 1635.)
Mother acknowledges she never requested a continuance under section 352, subdivision (a) but contends the request was “implied by” her counsel’s argument. The Bureau argues her failure to request a continuance was a forfeiture. We agree with the Bureau. A party who fails to request a continuance generally forfeits any argument that a continuance should have been permitted. (See In re A.B. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1366.) But even if we considered the argument, we would reject it. Denial of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) Mother fails to address the factors the juvenile court must consider in addressing such a motion. Here, Brody was two and a half when detained, had been neglected and was living in squalor. By the 18-month hearing, he had spent the next year and a half of his life in three different placements, which, despite their quality, could not have provided him stability. The changes in visitation due to mother’s relapses caused him to suffer nightmares. After 26 months, Brody’s need for stability far outweighed mother’s interest in receiving further services, particularly given her recent relapses and failure to fully appreciate the gravity of her substance abuse problem and its effects on Brody. As she points out, her bond with Brody was strong. But that bond alone does not outweigh Brody’s need for a stable, healthy and enriching home life.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of mandate and mother’s request for temporary stay of the section 366.26 hearing are denied. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
 




STEWART, J.



We concur.




RICHMAN, Acting P.J.




MILLER, J.






















Christina C. v. Superior Court (A153142)