Filed 2/16/18 In re A.T. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re A.T. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C084646


SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.T.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. Nos.
JD232377, JD237649)



R.T. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders concerning her two oldest children, K.H. (age 12) and A.T. (age four). She contends reversal is required because: (1) substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s assumption of jurisdiction over K.H. or A.T.; (2) the dispositional orders terminating dependency jurisdiction are not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the dispositional order denying reunification services as to A.T. is not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the dispositional order limiting mother’s educational rights was issued without proper notice and is not supported by any legal or factual basis. We affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
At the time of the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in March 2017, mother had given birth to four children: K.H. (born Oct. 2004); A.T. (born Feb. 2012); and K.T. and B.T. (twins born Dec. 2014). Only K.H. and A.T. are the subjects of this appeal; however, the background facts of all four children are discussed where relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
Prior Child Protective Services (CPS) History
The family has multiple CPS referrals dating back to 2005, involving mother’s substance abuse, general neglect, and emotional abuse of the children. We do not attempt to summarize the entire CPS history.
In August 2010, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Resources (the Department) received a referral alleging general neglect and threat of emotional abuse of K.H. It was reported that mother and her boyfriend, T.G. (boyfriend), were using drugs, would fight over Oxycontin pills, and used heroin. In addition, it was reported that there were straws and pieces of foil with black “stuff” on them all over the house, which were easily accessible to K.H. It was further reported that mother would pass out from drug use, K.H. was often left unsupervised, and mother rarely cooked a meal for K.H. Mother agreed to participate in informal supervision services designed to treat her substance abuse issues. However, due to mother’s continued drug use and failure to maintain contact with the Department, mother’s informal supervision case was eventually closed. The maternal grandparents continued as K.H.’s caregivers with the understanding they would seek legal guardianship of him.
In February 2012, the Department received a referral from a mandated reporter alleging general neglect of A.T. It was reported that mother was on a methadone program, and that she had tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) at A.T.’s birth and every time she was tested during her pregnancy. Mother admitted to smoking marijuana all the time and believed that doing so was acceptable because she had a medical marijuana card. Mother also tested positive for methamphetamine, heroin, opiates, and methadone while pregnant.
Mother, again, agreed to participate in informal supervision services designed to treat her substance abuse issues. After mother tested positive for methamphetamine and refused to enter a residential treatment program, a juvenile dependency petition was filed alleging that A.T. came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). In July 2012, the juvenile court adjudged A.T. a dependent of the court, ordered reunification services, and continued out-of-home placement for A.T. with the maternal grandparents. In November 2012, A.T. was returned to the care of her parents. After A.T. was removed from her father’s care due to his relapse and failure to maintain contact with the Department, the juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction in January 2014 with an order granting sole physical and legal custody of A.T. to mother.
In December 2014, mother gave birth to twin boys, K.T. and B.T. The twins were medically fragile and had special feeding needs. They were diagnosed with pharyngomalacia, which is a condition resulting in a narrow esophagus and noisy breathing. On April 7, 2015, the twins were discharged from the neonatal intensive care unit. At that time, both twins had a gastronomy tube (G-tube) inserted for feeding, which allowed nutrition to be delivered directly to their stomach. Mother was told that bottle feeding was not recommended. She was instructed to feed the twins only using the G-tube in a very calm setting with a structured routine.
On April 9, 2015, mother brought B.T. to the emergency room because he was not breathing. Due to his condition, he had to be resuscitated in the parking lot. At the hospital, mother was observed feeding B.T. with a bottle. When she was questioned as to whether the conduct was appropriate, she failed to respond. After a bottle was found in B.T.’s crib and formula was found in his throat, the twins were placed into protective custody.
On April 14, 2015, the Department filed juvenile dependency petitions alleging that K.T. and B.T. came within section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) in that mother had failed to follow medical directives. At the combined jurisdictional/ dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the petitions and adjudged the twins dependents of the court. The court found mother was not entitled to reunification services based on her prior drug use (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(13)), but found clear and convincing evidence that services would be in the best interest of the twins (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2)). Mother was also ordered to, among other things, participate in continued education on how to feed the twins with the G-tube. In November 2015, the twins were returned to mother’s custody. In May 2016, the court terminated dependency jurisdiction with an order granting sole physical and legal custody of the twins to mother.
Current Dependency Case
On October 13, 2016, the 22-month-old twins were brought to the emergency room with severe injuries. At the emergency room, K.T. was pronounced dead. The treating physician determined that the “obvious” cause of death was strangulation. An autopsy confirmed that K.T. had been strangled. According to the coroner, the injuries to K.T.’s throat were caused by excessive, sustained pressure. K.T.’s throat was completely black with blood and his gastric content contained white particulate that was sent out for testing. K.T. also had other injuries, including petechia on his face (i.e., a red or purple spot on the skin caused by a minor bleed from broken blood vessels), a second degree burn mark on his foot with circular skin peeling (which appeared to have been caused by a cigarette), and a small linear abrasion across the right side of his neck.
An examination of B.T. revealed numerous injuries that were life threatening and consistent with inflicted trauma. Upon his admission to the emergency room, he required continuous positive airway pressure and needed to be connected to a ventilator due to his high white blood count and fever. He was admitted to the Pediatric Intensive Care Unit. Due to his declined mental status, he received packed red blood cells, as he was suffering from severe traumatic pericardial effusion (fluid around the heart) that was causing cardiovascular compromise. He was assessed to have a Glasgow Coma Scale of 8 and tested positive for benzodiazepines and opiates.
B.T.’s visible injuries included a black left eye, petechia on his face, a slap mark on his left cheek, redness on his left ear, subconjunctival hemorrhages (blood blisters) on his left eye, facial bruises, a healing abrasion on his lip, a burn mark on his foot with skin peeling (which appeared to have been caused by a cigarette), circular bruises on his back in different stages of healing, patterned scars on his right leg that were likely caused by cigarette burns, and blood coming out of his mouth. B.T. also had numerous other injuries, including, but not limited to, the following: two liver lacerations, a splenic laceration, pericardial traumatic campenon (blood around the sac of the heart), retinal hemorrhages in both eyes, subretinal hemorrhage in his left eye, diffuse hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy (brain injury caused by oxygen deprivation), multiple acute and subacute rib fractures (some new, some old), fluid in the pelvis, dislocation where the cartilage meets the rib, healing right clavicle fracture, a healing abrasion inside the left cheek, acute and chronic subdural hemorrhages on both sides of the brain, intraparenchymal hemorrhages inside the brain, and intraventricular hemorrhages. The day after B.T. was brought to the emergency room, he was “ ‘very ill’ ” and stopped breathing. A procedure was performed to release the fluid around his heart.
On the day the twins were brought to the emergency room, K.H. and A.T. were with their grandmother. Both mother and her boyfriend denied causing any of the injuries to the twins. Mother explained that she left her apartment to meet up with A.T.’s father, T.S. Around 30 minutes later, she received a phone call from her boyfriend asking if he could feed the twins. Mother told him that he could feed K.T. but not B.T. Mother explained that K.T. was able to eat food through his mouth but B.T. could not and needed to be fed with the G-tube. Around 30 minutes later, the boyfriend called mother again, saying there was something wrong with K.T. He stated that K.T. was taking little breaths and did not seem okay. According to her boyfriend, mother arrived home around 10 to 15 minutes later. After finding K.T. unresponsive on the floor, mother immediately called 911. During the phone call, which occurred at approximately 5:21 p.m., mother claimed that K.T. had sleep apnea and was no longer breathing. When emergency medical personnel arrived, the apartment smelled like marijuana and mother was performing cardiopulmonary resuscitation on K.T. Medical personnel, however, noticed that K.T.’s arms were cold.
When interviewed by law enforcement, mother’s boyfriend was up and down, shaking, and sweating. He said that mother had given the twins melatonin because she did not want to “deal with them.” He also said that mother had relapsed and was using drugs, and that the twins had not been fed all day except for breakfast. The boyfriend admitted that he and mother were both using liquid methadone. He also commented that he would kill himself if K.T. died.
Mother refused to consent to an alcohol and drug test. However, when she was informed that law enforcement had a warrant to draw her blood, she admitted she would test positive for methamphetamine. Mother also admitted to using marijuana, methadone, and Klonopin—a drug she did not have a prescription to use. When mother spoke to the social worker, she explained that she told her boyfriend to feed K.T. She admitted that he was not trained in how to care for the twins but claimed she had shown him how to feed and take care of them. Mother also admitted that she gave the twins five milligrams of melatonin. She explained that a friend’s pediatrician told her about melatonin, and a visiting nurse who cared for the twins told her it was okay for them to take it. Mother admitted that it was wrong for her to give the twins melatonin without consulting a doctor. Mother, however, denied any abuse in the home and claimed she did not hit or abuse her children. She explained that she had known her boyfriend for about six months and completely trusted him. She described him as kind and very gentle with her children.
When the maternal grandmother was interviewed by a social worker, she reported that B.T. had a black eye two days before the twins were taken to the emergency room on October 13, 2016. When the maternal grandmother asked mother about B.T.’s black eye and told her to take B.T. to the doctor, mother blamed his twin brother for the injury and said that she would not bring B.T. to a doctor because the doctor would think she caused the injury and contact CPS. The maternal grandmother explained that 12-year-old K.H. stays with her during the week and with mother on the weekends. She further explained that four-year-old A.T. went back and forth between her house and mother’s house. She described the arrangement as “somewhat 50/50.”
Following K.T.’s death, the older half siblings, K.H. and A.T., were placed into protective custody on October 14, 2016. On October 18, 2016, the Department filed juvenile dependency petitions alleging that K.H. and A.T. came within the provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect), (f) (death caused through abuse or neglect), and (j) (abuse of sibling). The allegations were based on mother’s substance abuse and the injuries sustained by B.T. and K.T., including K.T.’s death. At the detention hearing, the minors were detained. Twelve-year-old K.H. was released to his father while four-year-old A.T. was placed in the custody of the Department. The juvenile court scheduled a combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.
The jurisdiction/disposition report recommended the juvenile court sustain the allegations against mother, strike the allegations against K.H.’s father under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect), and adjudge K.H. and A.T. dependent children of the court. The report further recommended continued placement of K.H. with his father and continued placement of A.T. with the paternal aunt. It was also recommended that reunification services be denied to mother under multiple bypass provisions (i.e., § 361.5, subd. (b)(4), (5), (6), and (13)), and that dependent supervision services be provided to K.H.’s father.
In support of these recommendations, the jurisdiction/disposition report detailed the numerous injuries suffered by the twins as well as the following additional information: Mother admitted during an interview with a social worker that she would not have taken the twins to the hospital if she had known they were injured out of fear CPS would be contacted. In addition, K.H. and A.T. appeared “ ‘coached’ ” during their respective Special Assault Forensic Evaluation (SAFE) interviews. After observing both interviews, Detective Deborah Bayer-Evans concluded, “ ‘The mother has manipulated those kids and they are definitely fearful to talk about it.’ ”
When K.H. was interviewed, he appeared very loyal to mother. He claimed that her boyfriend did not discipline any of the children, and denied that anything happened in his mother’s home that “ ‘wasn’t ok,’ ” i.e., abuse. K.H., however, admitted that mother and her boyfriend ignored the twins, he would tell the twins to “ ‘shut up,’ ” and mother yelled at A.T. K.H. stated that he “ ‘sort of’ ” believed mother when she told him B.T.’s black eye was caused by K.T. However, he admitted that mother had a history of lying. K.H. further stated that while he was initially mad at his mother about K.T.’s death because he thought mother “ ‘let something happen’ ” to K.T., he forgave her when he found out K.T. had died from taking melatonin.
A.T. refused to reveal anything about the injuries suffered by the twins during her SAFE interview. She made a comment about mother telling her not to disclose anything about how the twins were injured. She denied having any knowledge about how K.T. died, and denied that she or the twins had ever been “ ‘hurt’ ” or that anything had ever happened to them when they got into trouble. In response to a question asking her why she had hair missing from the top of her head, she said, “ ‘[I]t just fell out.’ ”
When mother spoke to Detective Bayer-Evans, she said that B.T. might have caused K.T.’s injuries. As for the injury to B.T.’s eye, mother stated that he must have fallen but indicated that neither she nor her boyfriend saw him fall.
A forensic pathologist concluded that it was not possible for B.T. to have caused K.T.’s injuries, explaining that the injuries to K.T.’s neck “were worse than that of a hanging as it appeared pressure was applied to cause his death.” Additionally, child abuse expert, Julia Magana, M.D., concluded that it was extremely unlikely that K.T. caused the injury to B.T.’s eye. In reaching this conclusion, Dr. Magana noted that it is very suspicious when a person accuses a young child of causing injuries when that child has no history of trauma or aggression. Dr. Magana also concluded that it was impossible for K.T. to have caused the other injuries suffered by B.T. She explained, “ ‘No other injuries that [B.T.] had could have been caused by a twenty-two month old. There was so much trauma to [his] chest that the cartilage on top of the bone on the front rib had fractured in one spot and dislocated in multiple others. I’ve only read about injuries this severe a couple times before. [B.T.] also had a pattern bruise on his left cheek and an abrasion on the inside of his mouth that a twenty-two month old could not have done. [B.T.] was slapped so hard it caused those injuries and the slap mark imprint was left.’ ” According to Dr. Magana, “ ‘There are child abuse cases that are a lot harder to detect or figure out, but this case is not one of them. This is child abuse.’ ” Dr. Magana noted that B.T. had healing posterior rib fractures, “ ‘which only happen in abuse cases.’ ”
When mother was asked about the multiple burn marks on the twins, she indicated that the marks appeared to have been caused by a cigarette. According to Detective Bayer-Evans, it would have been “ ‘physically impossible’ ” for mother not to have seen the burn marks on the twins.
Prior to the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, mother and her boyfriend were arrested. Mother was charged with murder and child endangerment.
At the outset of the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court struck the allegations against K.H.’s father under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect). As for jurisdiction, mother denied the allegations in the petitions and argued there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations. She admitted that the injuries to the twins could have been caused by her boyfriend but denied that she caused the injuries or that she knew or should have known the twins had been injured or were at a risk of being injured by him. Mother argued that there was no evidence the melatonin caused any harm, and that, while there was evidence she had been suffering from a substance abuse problem, she was not using “at that specific time” and denied that her substance abuse impacted her ability to care for the children. As for disposition, mother objected to placement of A.T. with the paternal aunt and requested reunification services. She argued that the bypass provisions cited in the jurisdiction/disposition report did not apply and, even if one or more of those provisions did apply, services should be ordered under the exception found in section 361.5, subdivision (c). Mother did not present any evidence at the hearing.
At the conclusion of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court sustained the remaining allegations with regard to K.H., adjudged him a dependent of the court, removed him from mother’s custody, placed him with his father, bypassed services for mother, ordered visitation for mother but limited visitation to contact by letter and telephone while mother was in custody, and terminated dependency. The court sustained the allegations with regard to A.T., adjudged her a dependent of the court, removed her from mother’s custody, placed her with her paternal aunt, bypassed services for mother, and ordered visitation with mother but limited visitation to supervised letter and phone contact while mother was in custody. The court also ordered that mother’s boyfriend have no contact with K.H. or A.T. The court found that it was appropriate to change the educational rights for K.H. and A.T. and indicated that it would sign the relevant forms upon their submission by the Department. Without elaboration, mother objected to a limitation of her educational rights.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1.0 Jurisdictional Findings
Mother contends the jurisdictional findings as to K.H. and A.T. are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Section 300 begins: “A child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: . . .” Then follow several subdivisions describing children who may be adjudged dependents of the court. The Department alleged that the older half siblings of the injured twins (i.e., K.H. and A.T.) came within four of these subdivisions: (1) subdivision (a) (“The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child’s parent . . . .”); (2) subdivision (b)(1) (“The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left, . . . or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . substance abuse. . . .”); (3) subdivision (f) (“The child’s parent . . . caused the death of another child through abuse or neglect.”); and (4) subdivision (j) (“The child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.”).
“The Department has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the children are dependents of the court under section 300.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) “ ‘In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile court’s protection, the court may consider past events.’ ” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on another ground by Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
“ ‘In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings and disposition, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” [Citation.] “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate].” ’ ” ’ ” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
“ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) Here, the allegations in the section 300 petitions are based on mother’s substance abuse, the death of K.T., and the severe injuries sustained by K.T. and B.T. We will focus on the allegations under subdivisions (b) and (j) of section 300.
“[Section 300,] [s]ubdivision (j) applies if (1) the child’s sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in specified other subdivisions and (2) there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in those subdivisions.” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) “Unlike the other subdivisions, subdivision (j) includes a list of factors for the court to consider: ‘The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.’ [Citation.] ‘The “nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling” is only one of many factors that the court is to consider in assessing whether the child is at risk of abuse or neglect in the family home. Subdivision (j) thus allows the court to take into consideration factors that might not be determinative if the court were adjudicating a petition filed directly under one of those subdivisions. [¶] The broad language of subdivision (j) clearly indicates that the trial court is to consider the totality of the circumstances of the child and his or her sibling in determining whether the child is at substantial risk of harm, within the meaning of any of the subdivisions enumerated in subdivision (j). The provision thus accords the trial court greater latitude to exercise jurisdiction as to a child whose sibling has been found to have been abused than the court would have in the absence of that circumstance.’ ” (Ibid.)
“[T]he more egregious the abuse, the more appropriate for the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over the siblings. [Citation.] ‘Some risks may be substantial even if they carry a low degree of probability because the magnitude of the harm is potentially great. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Conversely, a relatively high probability that a very minor harm will occur probably does not involve a “substantial” risk. Thus, in order to determine whether a risk is substantial, the court must consider both the likelihood that harm will occur and the magnitude of potential harm . . . .’ [Citation.] In other words, the more severe the type of sibling abuse, the lower the required probability of the child’s experiencing such abuse to conclude the child is at a substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300. If the sibling abuse is relatively minor, the court might reasonably find insubstantial a risk the child will be similarly abused; but as the abuse becomes more serious, it becomes more necessary to protect the child from even a relatively low probability of that abuse.” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 778.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s dependency findings. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings, the record supports the conclusion that K.H. and A.T. came within section 300, subdivision (j). There was sufficient evidence demonstrating that their half siblings, twins K.T. and B.T., were children described in section 300, subdivision (b) in that the twins suffered severe physical harm as a result of mother’s failure to adequately protect them. There was also sufficient evidence demonstrating that there was a substantial risk that K.H. and A.T. would be abused or neglected as defined by section 300, subdivision (b) if they were returned to mother’s care. The record shows that mother has a history of substance abuse and a history of abusing and neglecting her children. She also has a history of dating men who are violent and/or abuse drugs. With respect to the current dependency proceedings, mother, after relapsing, refused to bring B.T. to the doctor to treat his black eye because she feared the doctor would think she caused the injury and contact CPS. Two days later, mother left her 22-month-old medically fragile twins in the care of her boyfriend, who had a criminal record and a history of substance abuse. Mother had known her boyfriend for only six months and knew he did not have any training from medical personnel on how to meet the special needs of the twins. Mother left the twins in the care of her boyfriend after giving them five milligrams of melatonin without consulting a doctor because she did not want to “deal with them,” and after there were clear signs the twins were being physically abused. The evidence in the record shows that B.T. had numerous visible physical injuries that could not have been caused by his 22-month-old brother prior to October 13, 2016, including a black eye, multiple patterned scars on his legs and foot that appeared to have been caused by a cigarette, and multiple bruises on his back that were in different stages of healing. The evidence shows that K.T. also had marks on his body and foot that appeared to have been caused by cigarette burns.
Given the nature and severity of the physical harm inflicted on the twins, mother’s ongoing substance abuse, mother’s history of dating men who were violent and/or substance abusers, and mother’s behavior regarding the injuries suffered by the twins, there was a substantial risk that K.H. and A.T. would be abused or neglected if they were returned to mother’s care. Mother never took responsibility for her role in the severe injuries suffered by the twins and made no showing she could adequately protect K.H. or A.T. or provide regular care for them due to her substance abuse. Indeed, despite clear evidence of severe physical abuse that could not have been inflicted by 22-month-old children, mother implausibly blamed the twins for causing the injuries. In addition, there was evidence that mother declined to seek medical treatment for B.T.’s black eye prior to K.T.’s death out of fear she would be blamed and CPS would be contacted. There was also evidence that mother told a social worker that she would not have sought medical assistance for the twins if she knew they had been injured out of fear CPS would be contacted, mother falsely informed K.H. that K.T. died from taking melatonin, and mother coached K.H. and A.T. not to disclose how the twins were injured. At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, mother denied that she knew or should have known the twins had been injured or were at a risk of being injured by her boyfriend. She also denied that her substance abuse impacted her ability to care for her children.
Mother contends we should exercise our discretion to consider her challenges to the juvenile court’s other jurisdictional findings because the findings impacted the court’s dispositional order denying reunification services under the bypass provisions in section 361.5. We decline to do so. “[W]hile misconduct can result in a denial of reunification services, any finding must be by clear and convincing evidence (§ 361.5, subd. (b).) Because a jurisdictional finding need only be made by a preponderance of the evidence, it cannot support a denial of reunification services under section 361.5.” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1494.) Therefore, “[w]e find no potential impact of the challenged jurisdictional finding[s] on the present dependency proceedings.” (Ibid.)
2.0 Dispositional Orders
2.1 Termination of Dependency
Mother initially contends the juvenile court’s dispositional orders terminating dependency must be reversed because substantial evidence does not support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. Since we have found that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction, we find no error on this basis.
2.2 Reunification Services
Mother further contends that, even if the juvenile court properly sustained the juvenile dependency petitions, the dispositional order denying her reunification services as to A.T. must be reversed. She argues that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s determination that several reunification bypass provisions apply. We disagree.
As a general rule, reunification services are offered to parents whose children are removed from their custody, in an effort to eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and to facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible. (Raymond C. v. Superior Court (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 159, 163.) But recognizing that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services, the Legislature has enacted statutory exceptions to providing reunification services under section 361.5, also known as reunification “bypass” provisions. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(1)-(15); Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845-846 (Tyrone W.).) We review the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.)
Here, the jurisdiction/disposition report states that mother is not entitled to reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4), (5), (6), and (13). At disposition, the juvenile court found it appropriate to bypass mother for services and that reunification would not be in the best interest of A.T. In making these findings, the court stated as follows: “The Court makes the latter finding by clear and convincing evidence and specifically finds that the risk of reunification to [A.T.] lies in the fact that in mother’s care and custody, mother, through her relationships and otherwise, has created a circumstance for her children such that two of her children suffered very substantial physical injuries which led to the death of one of those children. [¶] And irrespective of whether mother injured the children or whether her boyfriend injured the children, the mother’s conduct in the matter put the children in jeopardy. And for that reason, the Court finds by clear and convincing evidence it would be against [A.T.’s] interest to reunify with mother.” The minute order issued following the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing indicates that the juvenile court relied on subdivision (b)(4), (6), and (13) of section 361.5 to bypass reunification services to mother.
Since only one valid ground is necessary to uphold the juvenile court’s bypass decision, we will focus here on subdivision (b)(6) of section 361.5, under which reunification services must be denied to a parent when “the child has been adjudicated a dependent pursuant to any subdivision of Section 300 as a result of . . . the infliction of severe physical harm to . . . a half sibling by a parent . . . and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Infliction of severe physical harm includes, but is not limited to, “deliberate and serious injury inflicted to or on . . . the body of a . . . half sibling of the child by an act or omission of the parent . . . .” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(C).) In determining whether services will benefit the child, the court must consider any information it deems relevant, including the specific act or omission comprising the severe physical harm, the circumstances under which the abuse or harm was inflicted, the severity of the emotional trauma suffered, any history of abuse of other children by the offending parent, the likelihood the child could be safely returned to the parent’s care within 12 months without continuing supervision, and whether or not the child desires to be reunified with the offending parent. (§ 361.5, subd. (i)(1)-(6).)
Mother argues that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) does not apply because there was no evidence that she had actual knowledge that her boyfriend inflicted B.T.’s injuries. In support of her argument, mother relies on Tyrone W. In that case, after an infant died of sudden infant death syndrome, the medical examiner discovered she was suffering from several two-week-old rib fractures that were deemed suspicious and “ ‘likely indicative of child abuse.’ ” (Tyrone W., supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at p. 844.) After the infant’s sibling was found to be a child described by section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), the juvenile court denied reunification services to the parents pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6). (Tyrone W., supra, at p. 845.) In reversing the juvenile court’s order denying reunification services, the court noted that the dead child’s “injuries, although severe, were not obvious. There was no bruising or other marks on [the dead child] and no reports that [the child] had been in distress.” (Id. at p. 852.) The court also noted that there was no evidence to show that, if one parent had inflicted injury on the infant, the other parent knew about it. (Ibid.) The appellate court stated: “We do not believe section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6) applies to a parent who ‘reasonably should have known’ of the abuse because that parent was not complicit in the infliction of physical harm by act, omission or consent. As defined in subdivision (b)(6), omission and consent both require actual knowledge, if not of the physical harm itself, then of another’s abusive acts. We hold that subdivision (b)(6) applies to the parent or parents who inflicted severe physical harm to the child whether by act, omission or consent, and does not apply to a negligent parent.” (Tyrone W., at p. 851.) The court further held that “where there is no evidence to show both parents knew the child was abused or injured, the court must identify the parent who inflicted the child’s injuries before denying reunification services to that parent . . . .” (Id. at p. 852.) However, the court expressly commented that it did “not quarrel with the proposition that when the child’s injury or injuries were obvious to the child’s caretakers and they failed to act, the court is not required to identify which parent inflicted the abuse by act and which parent inflicted the abuse by omission or consent. In such a case, the evidence supports a conclusion that both parents knew the child was injured or being abused.” (Ibid.)
Mother’s reliance on Tyrone W. is misplaced. Here, by contrast, there was substantial evidence showing clear signs of physical abuse. As set forth above, prior to the day K.T. died, the twins had suffered numerous visible injuries, including B.T.’s black eye, numerous scars on B.T.’s legs and foot that appeared to have been inflicted by cigarette burns, multiple bruises on B.T.’s back that were in different stages of healing, and an abrasion on his lip that was healing. In addition, K.T. also had marks on his body and foot that appeared to have been inflicted by cigarette burns. There was no evidence plausibly suggesting the injuries were the result of an accident. The record shows that mother, at best, was willfully indifferent to the physical abuse. The juvenile court could have reasonably inferred that mother knew about the abuse prior to October 13, 2016, based on the following: (1) her failure to take B.T. to the doctor to treat his black eye out of fear she would be blamed for the injury and CPS would be contacted; (2) her failure to offer a credible explanation suggesting the visible injuries suffered by the twins prior to October 13, 2016, were accidentally caused; (3) her failure to explain how she would not have seen the visible injuries; (4) her conduct in falsely informing K.H. that K.T. died from taking melatonin; (5) her conduct in coaching her children not to disclose how the twins were injured; and (6) her statement to a social worker indicating that she would not have sought medical attention for the twins on October 13, 2016, had she known they were injured out of fear CPS would have been contacted. On this record, substantial evidence supports the denial of reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6).
2.3 Educational Rights
In her opening brief, mother argued that the juvenile court’s order limiting her educational rights as to K.H. and A.T. must be reversed because it was issued without proper notice and lacked any factual or legal basis. However, in her reply brief, mother agrees with the Department’s assertion that this issue has been rendered moot by a subsequent order issued by the juvenile court. Given mother’s abandonment of her claim, it need not be considered.  
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.



BUTZ , J.



We concur:



RAYE , P. J.



ROBIE , J.