Filed 2/27/18 In re B.N. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re B.N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.N.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E068401

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1500883)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Walter H. Kubelun, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed with directions.
Donna L. Harris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Tami Falkenstein Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 5, 2015, defendant and appellant B.N. (Minor) admitted to willfully, unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to a structure and forest land under Penal Code section 451, subdivision (c); and willfully, unlawfully and maliciously setting fire to and causing injury to the person, structure, forest land and property of another under Penal Code section 451, subdivision (d). The trial court deferred entry of judgment and granted Minor probation for a period not to exceed three years, subject to certain terms and conditions.
On May 26, 2016, the juvenile court found that Minor had not complied with the terms and conditions of probation, lifted the order deferring entry of judgment, adjudged Minor a ward of the court, and ordered him to spend no less than five and no more than 10 days in juvenile hall, with credit for one day served. The court also attached new terms of probation to the previously-imposed conditions, including a condition that Minor “attend school, every period, everyday [sic], and obey school rules and staff.”
On June 22, 2016, the juvenile court found that Minor had violated the terms and conditions of parole, adjudged him a ward of the court, and placed his care, custody and control with the probation officer on the condition that Minor serve no fewer than five days and no more than 10 days in juvenile hall, with credit for one day served. The court also ordered the terms of probation to remain in effect.
On March 6, 2017, a subsequent petition was filed alleging Minor robbed John Doe. The juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing on May 9, 2017, and the court subsequently made a true finding on the allegation under Penal Code section 211. Minor was committed to the Riverside County Youth Treatment and Education Center (YTEC) for a period not to exceed one year, with the terms of probation ordered to remain in effect.
On May 31, 2017, Minor admitted to attempting to deter by violence an officer from performing his duties under Penal Code section 69. The juvenile court ordered all conditions previously imposed to remain in full force and effect.
On May 24, 2017, Minor filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
A. PROBATION CONDITION
At the disposition hearing, the court adjudged Minor a ward of the court and granted him probation subject to certain terms and conditions, including that he must “attend school, every period, everyday [sic], and obey school rules and staff.” Minor contends that the part of this condition requiring him to obey school rules and staff is unconstitutionally vague because it does not reference any specific set of rules by which he must abide and it permits arbitrary enforcement by school staff.
When a minor is made a ward of the juvenile court and placed on probation, the court “may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730, subd. (b).) “ ‘In fashioning the conditions of probation, the juvenile court should consider the minor’s entire social history in addition to the circumstances of the crime[s].’ ” (In re R.V. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 239, 246.) The court has “broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation.” (In re Josh W. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
“A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890.) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) Moreover, as a juvenile, Minor is “deemed to be more in need of guidance and supervision than adults, and [his] constitutional rights are more circumscribed. The state, when it asserts jurisdiction over a minor, stands in the shoes of the parents [and] may ‘curtail a child’s exercise of the constitutional rights.’ ” (In re Antonio R. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 937, 941; see In re Binh L. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 194, 204 [the United States Supreme Court has long recognized that the State has broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults].) For guidance we look to the abuse of discretion standard set forth by the California Supreme Court for adult probationers, which found a probation condition valid if it “is reasonably related to the crime of which the defendant was convicted or to future criminality.” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1084.) We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re J.B. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 749, 754.)
Here, Minor argues that the probation condition that requires him to obey school rules and staff is impermissibly vague and overbroad because “it does not provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what conduct is prohibited and ‘it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.’ ” We disagree. The challenged terms are sufficiently precise to inform Minor what is required of him and to allow the court to determine when a violation has occurred. (In re Jason J. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 710, 719, overruled on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.) Minor argues that the condition that he obey school rules are vague on its face “because it does not reference any specific set of rules by which [Minor] must abide.” However, minor can easily request from the YTEC or any school he attends what the rules of the school are. There is nothing that would discourage him from obtaining the school’s rules. Although Minor contends that “there is nothing in the record that establishes the existence of a student handbook for the school [Minor] was to attend,” there is nothing preventing Minor from obtaining the rules from any school he attends.
Moreover, Minor must comply with all directives and must obey anyone who is charged with the responsibility of caring for him at his school. This is a simple and straight-forward condition. However, Minor complains that the condition “may be interpreted to mean [Minor] must obey all school rules, including rules arbitrarily imposed or enforced by school staff.” Notwithstanding Minor’s objection, a probation condition should be given “the meaning that would appear to a reasonable, objective reader.” (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 606.) The condition only requires Minor to obey school rules and staff. It does not grant school staff the power to craft new directives or new probation conditions. The condition also does not forbid Minor from withholding obedience from any unreasonable or improper directives. We assume that the probation condition will not be arbitrarily applied or enforced. (In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.)
Furthermore, Minor has been subject to this probation condition since May 26, 2016, and has not alleged that any school staff member has demanded that he obey unreasonable orders, or that there has been any impingement on his constitutional rights. “[I]n the absence of any demonstrated impairment of a constitutional right, this . . . condition is not subject to exacting scrutiny for overbreadth; rather, it is to be accorded deferential review for any abuse of discretion.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 387.)
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, we find that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Minor’s probation condition that he “obey school rules and staff.”
B. PREDISPOSITION CUSTODY CREDIT
Minor contends that the court miscalculated his predisposition custody credits, giving him credit for 160 days when he was entitled to 164 days.
A juvenile is entitled to credit against his maximum period of physical confinement for any time he spends in actual custody prior to disposition. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 536.) In this case, the People do not dispute that Minor is entitled to 164 days of predisposition custody credit. We agree with the parties and order that the judgment be modified accordingly.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court is directed to modify the judgment to reflect the proper calculation of Minor’s predisposition custody credit to 164 days. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS



MILLER
J.


We concur:


McKINSTER
Acting P. J.


SLOUGH
J.