Filed 2/27/18 In re G.K. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re G.K., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

C.Y.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E068859

(Super.Ct.No. RIJ1600074)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jacqueline C. Jackson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, Carole A. Nunes Fong, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Terence M. Chucas, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor.
Defendant and appellant C.Y. (Father) is the father of G.K., who was 18 months old at the time of the challenged order. Father appeals from the court’s order that G.K. remain placed in a foster home instead of moving him to the paternal aunt’s home in Tennessee. The aunt came forward when G.K. was one year old and G.K. had been in the foster home since he was one month old. At that time, the mother’s reunification services had not yet been terminated; Father did not receive reunification services. Father argues the court erred when it applied a generalized best interest standard and failed to consider the factors set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3.
After looking at the factors set forth in section 361.3, which includes a consideration of G.K.’s best interest, we affirm the court’s ruling.
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
G.K. was born in January 2016, tested positive for methamphetamine, and suffered from withdrawal symptoms that required he remain in the neonatal intensive care unit for 17 days. On January 28, G.K. was taken into protective custody based on the positive drug tests for G.K. and his mother (Mother), Father’s apparent drug use, the fact that Father was incarcerated until two days after G.K.’s birth, Father’s criminal record, his lack of a stable place to live, and lack of cooperation with the social worker regarding drug testing and his criminal history. Also on January 28, 2016, the child was placed with a non-related extended family member (NRFM) Angelique S. Before that placement, Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) had evaluated two people suggested by Mother, Alesia P. and Michael M., and a paternal aunt, Kimberly W., but none could be approved.
The detention hearing was held on February 2, 2016. The court found a prima facie case for detention, authorized twice-weekly supervised visits for the parents, but ordered them to drug test before each visit. Father was arrested on February 4 and charged with kidnapping, carjacking, false imprisonment, and force with a deadly weapon, along with violating his parole. Neither Father nor Mother had attended any of the twice-weekly visits scheduled at a set time on Mondays and Wednesdays.
On February 19, 2016, Angelique S. stated she was no longer able to care for G.K.. On that date G.K. was placed in a licensed foster home, where he would remain through the date of the challenged order in this case.
On July 1, 2016, Father was sentenced to prison for eight years for assault with a deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1).) His earliest discharge date was set for September 2020.
The jurisdiction and disposition hearing was continued numerous times, in part because Father was moved around after he entered state prison in June 2016, and counsel had difficulty contacting Father in custody. The hearing was finally held on September 22, 2016. At the hearing, the court took jurisdiction over G.K., found Father to be G.K.’s presumed father, granted Mother six months of reunification services, denied Father reunification services, set the six-month status review hearing for March 22, 2017, and directed the social worker to inquire of the foster parents whether they were interested in adopting G.K., and if not to find a foster-adopt placement for G.K. The foster parents told the social worker they were interested in adopting G.K., and later submitted a formal adoption application.
On January 30, 2017, paternal aunt Kimberly W. again stepped forward, stating she was willing to adopt G.K. However, she was unable to attend the first two visits scheduled with G.K. and asked that no further visits be scheduled until she had time available to visit.
In January 2017, paternal aunt Lynette C. first contacted DPSS to express her willingness to adopt G.K. if reunification efforts with the parents were not successful and if he could be placed with her in Tennessee. On February 17, 2017, the social worker spoke with Lynette C. and put in a referral for an interstate compact on the placement of children (ICPC), which would require a court order. Lynette C. stated she had just been made aware by maternal relatives that G.K. would be adopted out of the family.
At the six-month review hearing on March 22, 2017, the court terminated Mother’s reunification services because she did not visit G.K. and did not participate in any services after attending intake and one drug treatment session in January 2016. The court authorized an expedited ICPC for Lynette C., but stated G.K. was not to be moved without notice to minor’s counsel and the opportunity to return to court. The court also authorized visits with Lynette C. by Skype. The court set the section 366.26 hearing for July 27, 2017.
In the report for the section 366.26 hearing filed July 18, 2017, DPSS recommended G.K. be placed with Lynette C. in Tennessee. The home evaluation was favorable and DPSS received ICPC approval on June 8, 2017. At the Team Decision Meeting, minor’s counsel notified DPSS that she would file an ex parte communication recommending G.K. not be removed from his current placement pending further hearing. G.K. was having Skype visits with Lynette C. three times a week beginning in June. However, it was reported that the foster parents did not initially facilitate the Skype visits in late March, April and May, despite the court authorization and complaints from Lynette C. to the social worker. The social worker reported that G.K. had a strong bond with the foster parents.
The section 366.26 hearing was held on July 27, 2017. Lynette C. and her husband were present. DPSS argued G.K. should be placed with Lynette C. and her husband so he could maintain a relationship with his family, and that this was what Father wanted. Minor’s counsel argued that, although Lynette C. and her husband “appear to be very nice people,” G.K did not have a pre-existing relationship with them. Minor’s counsel argued that it was in G.K.’s best interest to remain with the people that he knew as his family and with whom he was bonded. In making its ruling, the court noted that Father had not previously suggested Lynette C. when asked at the beginning of the dependency and so there was no dereliction of duty by DPSS. The court ruled that it would not be in G.K.’s best interest to remove him from the only home he had ever known, and so ordered G.K. to remain placed with the foster parents. The court set the section 366.26 hearing for December 4, 2017. The court also ordered an in person visit between G.K. and Lynette C. and her husband.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Father argues the court was overly focused on a general best interest analysis for G.K. and did not properly consider the many factors set forth in section 361.3 for determining whether a dependent child should be placed with a relative. We conclude the court gave the proper weight to the statutory factors.
Section 361.3 is the general statute governing a relative request for placement of a dependent child. When a child is removed from the parents, the juvenile court is required to give preferential consideration to relatives when deciding where to place the child. (§361.3, subd. (a).) “Preferential consideration” means the relative requesting placement is required to be the first placement investigated and considered. (§361.3, subd. (c).) “The intent of the Legislature is ‘that relatives be assessed and considered favorably, subject to the juvenile court’s consideration of the suitability of the relative’s home and the best interests of the child.’ ” (In re Isabella G. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 708, 719 (Isabella G.).) The child welfare agency “is required to assess those relatives seeking placement according to the factors described in section 361.3, subdivision (a).” (Ibid.)
These factors include the child’s best interest, the wishes of the parent and relative, placement with siblings, the moral character of the relative and people living in the home, the nature and duration of the relationship between the relative and the child, the ability of the relative to provide a safe home and properly care for the child, and the relative’s willingness to provide permanency for the child. (§ 361.3, subd. (a).)
However, the relative placement preference is not a guarantee of placement. (In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 798.) The juvenile court “must apply the placement factors, and any other relevant factors, and exercise its independent judgment” when considering whether to place the child with a requesting relative. (Isabella G., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 719.)
The standard of review for the juvenile court’s decision is abuse of discretion, that is whether the court exceeded the bounds of reason. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
Looking at the above standards, we note that Father now wishes G.K. to be adopted by his relative, Lynette C., but he did not provide DPSS with her name at any time during the first year of G.K.’s life. Instead, Father suggested another paternal aunt, Kimberly W., and even an NRFM, Angelique S., with whom G.K. was initially placed. G.K. has no siblings on Father’s side of the family that would be a consideration in Lynette C.’s favor. We do note that the record reflects Lynette C. is of good moral character, and even minor’s counsel commented that she and the paternal uncle “appear to be very nice people.” In addition, Lynette C.’s home was approved during the ICPC and she had expressed a willingness to adopt G.K. However, the court also considered the quality and duration of the relationship between Lynette C. and G.K., and G.K.’s best interest, which in this case tipped the scales against placing G.K. with Lynette C. The court concluded that it was not in G.K.’s “best interest to remove him from a home that has had him essentially snice his birth, a year and a half now, and these are the only people he knows as mother and father.” In addition, 18-month-old G.K. had not yet met Lynette C. in person, and could hardly have formed a bond with her over Skype. For these reasons, we conclude that the juvenile court did not act outside the bounds of reason when it declined to remove G.K. from his foster-adopt home to place him with Lynette C.
DISPOSITION
The court’s ruling is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:


McKINSTER
J.


MILLER
J.