Filed 3/13/18 P. v. Ramirez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

HERACLIO CASTREJON RAMIREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.
H044746
(Santa Cruz County
Super. Ct. No. 16CR03235)
Defendant Heraclio Castrejon Ramirez appeals from a four-year prison sentence imposed for possessing a controlled substance for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), with a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subds. (b)–(i)). Upon defendant’s timely appeal, we appointed counsel to represent him in this court. Appellate counsel filed a brief stating the case and facts but raising no arguable issues. We notified defendant of his right to submit written argument on his own behalf. Defendant filed a letter that repeats, largely verbatim, arguments from his trial counsel’s unsuccessful suppression motion. (Pen. Code, § 1538.5.)
We have reviewed the entire record to determine if there are any arguable appellate issues. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 440–441.) We include here a brief description of the facts and procedural history of the case, the conviction and punishment imposed (People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 123–124), and address the contentions defendant raised in his letter. Finding no arguable issue, we will affirm the judgment.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Evidence was presented at a combined preliminary examination and suppression hearing. A police officer testified that he was driving his unmarked patrol car at around 7:00 p.m. one night in May 2016. He noticed a silver sedan driving next to him and “observed that the front windows were both tinted, which is a violation of the Vehicle Code.” Before the officer could initiate a traffic stop, the sedan made a U-turn and then a quick right turn into a gas station. The officer followed and blocked in the sedan, and then activated the patrol car’s lights and siren. Defendant was identified at the hearing as the driver of the sedan.
As the officer started talking to defendant, defendant reached under the driver’s seat. Defendant also scrolled through two cellular phones that he had on or near his lap until the officer told him to stop. The officer learned from questioning defendant that he was on postrelease community supervision. Upon verifying defendant’s status with a dispatcher and confirming that defendant was subject to warrantless searches as a condition of his release, the officer searched the car.
The officer found a clear plastic resealable bag under the driver’s seat containing multiple bindles. Four bindles in the bag contained a black tar-like substance the officer believed was heroin (total gross-weight: 51.2 grams). Three other bindles in that bag contained a white powder-like substance that the officer believed was methamphetamine (total gross weight: 49.9 grams). And additional pieces of plastic in the bag appeared to the officer to be “street level packaging material.” In addition to the bag, the officer found a piece of aluminum foil under the seat with black streaks that he recognized as burned heroin, which he believed indicated someone had used the foil to smoke heroin. In the rear right seat, the officer located a spiral notepad with “handwritten names or monikers with monetary amounts” that he opined was a pay/owe sheet. A third cell phone and a purse containing $240 in cash was found on the front seat. Defense counsel did not cross-examine the officer.
Defense counsel argued that the traffic stop was illegal because tinted windows are not per se illegal in California; he noted that tinting is legal if it follows certain requirements in the Vehicle Code. The prosecutor argued that the traffic stop was legal based on the officer’s testimony, and alternatively requested that the court hear additional testimony from the officer about the traffic stop. The court reopened testimony over defense counsel’s objection.
The officer explained during the additional testimony that “when I stop a vehicle for tinted windows, it’s not only because it’s got -- I don’t only stop it because it’s got tinted windows and it’s a violation, it’s because I cannot clearly see into the vehicle.” He testified that he could not see clearly into the sedan despite there still being “a little bit” of remaining daylight. And he testified that he believed the driver’s side window and front passenger window were tinted by the application of a tint film.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and held defendant to answer on the following charges: transporting heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)); possessing heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351) with a weight enhancement allegation (Pen. Code, § 1203.07, subd. (a)(1)); transporting methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)); and possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378). The filed information also alleged a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)) and a prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (b)–(i)).
As part of a negotiated disposition, defendant pleaded no contest to possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and admitted the prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (b)–(i)). The court granted the prosecutor’s request to dismiss the remaining counts and the prior prison term allegation. Defendant was sentenced to four years in prison, consisting of a two-year middle term for possessing methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378), doubled because of the prior strike conviction (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (e)(1)). The court imposed a $1,200 restitution fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)) and a suspended $1,200 parole revocation fine (Pen. Code, § 1202.45); a $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8); and a $30 court facilities funding assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373). Defendant received 469 days of presentence credit, based on 235 actual days and 234 days’ conduct credit (Pen. Code, § 4019).
II. DEFENDANT’S CONTENTIONS
Defendant filed a letter essentially reasserting the arguments in his trial counsel’s supplemental motion to suppress filed after defendant was held to answer. Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by allowing additional testimony from the arresting officer, and that the traffic stop was illegal even if the officer’s additional testimony could be considered. But even were we to assume the initial traffic stop was illegal, defendant’s status as an individual on postrelease community supervision subject to warrantless search made the car search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (See Utah v. Strieff (2016) 579 U.S. __, __ [136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061–2063] [any illegality in initial detention was attenuated by officers’ discovery of a valid arrest warrant before searching the defendant, making search incident to arrest reasonable under the Fourth Amendment].)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

____________________________________
Grover, J.




WE CONCUR:




____________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P. J.




____________________________
Greenwood, J.