Filed 3/20/18 In re J.A. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re J.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.A.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E068145

(Super.Ct.No. J266705)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Winston S. Keh, Judge. Reversed in part; affirmed in part.
Erica Gambale, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A. Swenson and Felicity Senoski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A juvenile court ordered defendant and appellant J.A. (minor) committed to the Gateway Program (Gateway). Minor now contends that the court’s order that the probation department continue to dispense psychotropic medications “as determined necessary” was unconstitutionally overbroad. He also argues that the court did not have authority to order him to submit to blood testing under Penal Code section 1202.1. The People concede, and we agree, that the order for blood testing should be reversed. Otherwise, we affirm.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On August 9, 2016, the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that minor came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for possession of burglar’s tools (Pen. Code, § 466, count 1) and possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610, count 2). Minor admitted the allegation in count 2. The court found that allegation true and dismissed the allegation in count 1. The matter was continued until a later date, pending the outcome of a case for minor in Los Angeles County. The court in San Bernardino subsequently accepted the transfer of the Los Angeles County matter on September 9, 2016, declared minor a ward, and maintained him in his parents’ home on probation, pending a further hearing on both cases.
On January 12, 2017, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that minor came within Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 for fleeing a pursuing peace officer causing serious bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 2800.3, subd. (a), count 1) and causing bodily injury while driving under the influence (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (e), count 2). The petition also alleged that minor personally inflicted great bodily injury, within the meaning of Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (a). Minor admitted the allegation in count 2 and its accompanying enhancement allegation. The court dismissed count 1 and ordered the matter transferred to San Bernardino County for disposition. The San Bernardino court accepted the transfer, since minor was a resident of San Bernardino County.
The Los Angeles County Probation Department filed a report that included minor’s criminal history. It was alleged that minor previously committed seven counts of burglary (§ 459), conspiracy (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)), attempted burglary (§§ 664/459), and possession of a concealed weapon (§ 29610). Minor had been declared a ward in San Bernardino County, and was ordered to placement on two separate occasions.
On January 17, 2017, the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office filed a juvenile wardship petition alleging that minor committed burglary. (§ 459.) The following day, minor admitted the allegation. The court ordered the matter transferred to San Bernardino County for disposition. The court accepted the transfer.
On March 13, 2017, the San Bernardino County Probation Department (the probation department) filed a disposition memo. The probation officer noted that minor’s mother said minor had been diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and that he was emotionally disturbed. He was previously prescribed Ritalin, Prozac, Concerta, and Abilify. It was reported that the last time he took psychotropic medications was in October 2015, when he was released from Los Angeles County Camp. The probation officer further reported that a referral to Gateway was received on February 7, 2017. The probation officer recommended that minor be ordered to Gateway, since it appeared that he needed a highly structured environment. The probation officer noted that minor had failed two placements while on probation in Los Angeles County. Moreover, his mother did not want him at home, since she did not feel she could control him. The probation officer gave a list of recommended “Gateway Findings and Orders.” One recommendation stated: “The court orders Gateway to perform the blood test pursuant to [P]enal [C]ode 1202.1 and the [G]ateway medical staff shall advise the court of the results.” Another recommendation stated: “The court authorizes the probation department to continue dispensing psychotropic medications for this minor as determined necessary.”
The court held a contested disposition hearing on April 4, 2017, with regard to the original San Bernardino County case and the cases that were transferred in. In consideration of minor’s history and the totality of the circumstances, the court followed the probation officer’s recommendation for Gateway. The court noted minor’s numerous felonies, his two failed attempts at placement in Los Angeles, and his mother’s statement that she had no control over him. It then adopted all the recommended Gateway findings and orders listed in the probation report. The court further stated: “In terms of the psychotropic meds, the Court is going to authorize Gateway to continue dispensing psychotropic meds for this minor for a period up to 90 days after his delivery to Gateway. If the minor is not taking prescribed psychotropic meds, the Court will not order an evaluation at this time but authorizes Gateway to do so if Gateway determines an evaluation is necessary.” Thus, the court continued minor as a ward, placed him in the custody of the probation officer, detained him in juvenile hall, and committed him to Gateway.
ANALYSIS
I. The Term Concerning Psychotropic Medications is Not Unconstitutionally Overbroad
One of the Gateway terms adopted by the court authorized the probation department “to continue dispensing psychotropic medications for this minor as determined necessary.” Minor contends that this term (the psychotropic medications term) is unconstitutionally overbroad since it fails to specify which medications should be dispensed or which medical conditions are to be treated. He specifically claims the term fails to identify who should make the determination whether medications were necessary, but then argues that it “grants the probation department the power to dispense all psychotropic medications without identifying the medications nor identifying the medical condition to be treated.” We conclude the term is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
At the outset, we note that minor did not object to the psychotropic medications term below. In general, a minor’s failure to make a timely objection to a probation condition forfeits the claim of error on appeal. (People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 234-235.) However, a minor may challenge for the first time on appeal whether a condition is facially overbroad, so long as the claim presents a pure question of law without reference to the particular sentencing record in the trial court. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875.) Here, minor’s claims that the psychotropic medications term fails to specify which medications should be dispensed or which medical conditions are to be treated does not appear to present a pure question of law, since this court would need to refer to the record to resolve these claims. Nonetheless, we will consider the merits of his claims.
Welfare and Institutions Code section 727, subdivision (a)(1), provides: “If a minor or nonminor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 601 or 602, the court may make any reasonable orders for the care, supervision, custody, conduct, maintenance, and support of the minor or nonminor, including medical treatment, subject to further order of the court.” Similarly, Welfare and Institutions Code section 730 provides: “(a) When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by Section 602, the court may order any of the types of treatment referred to in Section 727 . . . . [¶] (b) When a ward described in subdivision (a) is placed under the supervision of the probation officer or committed to the care, custody, and control of the probation officer, the court may make any and all reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward . . . . The court may impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.”
Here, the record shows that minor was previously diagnosed with ADHD and ODD, was emotionally disturbed, and was prescribed Ritalin, Prozac, Concerta, and Abilify. It was reported that the last time he took psychotropic medications was in October 2015. The court here stated that it was adopting the Gateway orders in the probation report, including the psychotropic medications term, and it added that it was going to “authorize Gateway to continue dispensing psychotropic meds for this minor for a period up to 90 days after his delivery to Gateway.” The court was specific in authorizing Gateway to continue dispensing psychotropic medications. Moreover, the court’s order directing Gateway to “continue” dispensing psychotropic medications impliedly limited the medications to those he was already taking for his ADHD, ODD, and emotional disturbance (i.e., Ritalin, Prozac, Concerta, and Abilify). The court also added that if minor was not taking prescribed psychotropic medications, it would not order an evaluation at that time, but it “authorize[d] Gateway to do so if Gateway determine[d] an evaluation [was] necessary.” The record shows that minor had not taken psychotropic medications since October 2015. In such case, the court was authorizing Gateway to order an evaluation if it deemed one necessary.
In view of the record and the court’s specific orders concerning psychotropic medications, we conclude that the psychotropic medications term is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
II. The Court Lacked Authority to Order Blood Testing Under Section 1202.1
Minor argues, and the People concede, that the court did not have authority to order him to submit to blood testing under section 1202.1. We agree.
Section 1202.1 requires blood testing for any adult or juvenile offender convicted of an enumerated sexual offense. (§ 1202.1, subd. (a).) None of minor’s cases involved the commission of a sexual offense enumerated in section 1202.1, subdivision (e). Therefore, the court’s order for blood testing under section 1202.1 must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The court’s order for blood testing under section 1202.1 is reversed. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


McKINSTER
J.


We concur:


RAMIREZ
P. J.


FIELDS
J.