Filed 3/21/18 P. v. I.R. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

IN RE I.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. H044496
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. JV42034)


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.R.,

Defendant and Appellant.

The juvenile court found that I.R. committed a forcible rape and committed him to a ranch program at the county juvenile rehabilitation facility for one year. I.R. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering the ranch commitment instead of a less restrictive means of rehabilitation. We find no error and will affirm the order.
I. BACKGROUND
After a contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that 17-year-old I.R. raped a 16-year-old girl. I.R. met the victim at a mall, invited her to his mother’s car in the parking lot, and raped her in the backseat. The victim told him to stop three separate times, and tried to cover her genital area with her hand. I.R. continued despite her protests, using his bodyweight to hold her down. When he completed the act, he told her that as soon as he saw her at the mall he knew she would be his “next victim.”
Having found I.R. committed a forcible rape (Pen. Code, § 261), the juvenile court took evidence regarding the options for disposition at a contested disposition hearing. A probation officer who recommended a six to eight-month commitment at the ranch program testified that a statistical modeling tool showed I.R. to have a low risk of reoffending. He believed that I.R. could be rehabilitated while remaining in the community, but because of the nature of the offense and I.R.’s unstable home environment he recommended the ranch commitment. A probation counselor testified that while there were no on-site treatment providers for sex offenders at the ranch, outside providers were available to provide sex offender treatment services for I.R. if he were sent there.
The juvenile court acknowledged I.R.’s low risk of reoffending, but also found that he selected the victim because she was vulnerable and that he posed a danger to society. The court voiced particular concern about “how lightly” I.R. appeared to be taking the situation, and about how he was minimizing it and blaming the victim. It found that I.R. would benefit from the ranch program, and ordered a one-year commitment.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a juvenile court’s decision committing a minor to a detention facility for abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1154.) An abuse of discretion occurs when a decision falls outside the boundaries of what is allowed by the applicable law or when there is no reasonable basis for the court’s action. (Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California (2012) 55 Cal.4th 747, 773.) If factual findings critical to the court’s decision are not supported by substantial evidence, that would constitute an abuse of discretion. (In re Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.) But “[a]n appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court.” (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.)
We evaluate the propriety of a juvenile placement decision in light of the purpose of the Juvenile Court Law, which is set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code section 202 (unspecified statutory references are to this code). (In re Jose T. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1142, 1147.) Section 202, subdivision (a) states that the purpose “is to provide for the protection and safety of the public and each minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and to preserve and strengthen the minor’s family ties whenever possible, removing the minor from the custody of his or her parents only when necessary for his or her welfare or for the safety and protection of the public.” Minors must be provided with the care, treatment and guidance that is in their best interest, but any such services must also be “in conformity with the interests of public safety and protection.” (§ 202, subd. (b).) Juvenile courts are required to “consider the safety and protection of the public” when administering the juvenile court law (§ 202, subd. (d)), and the allowable sanctions for punishing a minor include commitment “to a local detention or treatment facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp or ranch.” (§ 202, subd. (e)(4).)
Applying those standards, we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s decision to commit I.R. to the ranch program. Having found based on substantial evidence that I.R. forcibly raped the 16-year-old victim and seemed to be minimizing his culpability for that behavior, the court was within its discretion to conclude that confinement at the ranch was required to protect the safety of the public. (See In re Nicole H., supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156 [reasonable to infer based on the nature of the offense and minor’s lack of remorse that she was a danger to the community and required treatment in a structured setting].)
I.R. argues that the juvenile court did not make the necessary findings under section 726, subdivision (a), which allows a minor to be removed from parental custody only if (1) the parent has failed to provide proper maintenance, training, and education; (2) the minor has failed to reform while on probation; or (3) the welfare of the minor requires that custody be taken from the parent. But the juvenile court did find that I.R. would benefit from the ranch program and that placing him there was necessary for his rehabilitation. That is a sufficient finding under section 726, subdivision (a)(3) that the welfare of the minor requires custody be taken from the parent. The finding is supported by the evidence because the probation officer testified that due to an unstable home environment it was important to I.R.’s rehabilitation that he be placed in the ranch program.
I.R. also argues that his low risk of reoffending means he is not a threat to public safety. That argument ignores the seriousness of the offense and his present inability to fully appreciate the consequences of his actions, factors which justify the juvenile court’s finding that a one-year confinement is necessary to protect public safety, even considering a low recidivism risk. I.R. asserts that the juvenile court improperly relied on his demeanor on the witness stand to conclude he was not taking responsibility, and points to other evidence in the record suggesting he was apologetic for his actions and understood they were wrong. Of course, there is nothing improper about the juvenile court using its observations of I.R.’s demeanor to assess the degree of his remorse––the ability to observe witness testimony firsthand is the primary reason appellate courts defer to a lower court’s factual findings and determinations of credibility. (See also Evid. Code, § 780 [“[T]he court or jury may consider in determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing, including … [h]is demeanor while testifying and the manner in which he testifies.”].) And the court did not rely exclusively on I.R.’s courtroom demeanor to conclude he had not grasped the extent of his culpability. It also pointed to I.R.’s statement that he and the victim “both did stupid things” during the encounter. That alone is substantial evidence to support the finding that I.R. was not taking full responsibility for his conduct, even if there was other evidence to the contrary.
I.R. urges us to find an abuse of discretion because the juvenile court failed to consider the negative impact a ranch commitment will have on him, specifically, that being in custody will cause him increased anxiety. But there is no indication from the record that the court failed to consider the negative impact of confinement on I.R. in making its decision––it simply considered other factors as well, including the overall benefit he might receive from the ranch program. The juvenile court considered the recommendations of the probation department, the services available to those confined at the ranch, the nature of the offense, and I.R.’s failure to completely accept responsibility, and concluded that a ranch commitment was necessary to protect the public and provide the best chance of rehabilitation. That decision was not an abuse of discretion.
III. DISPOSITION
The disposition order is affirmed.

____________________________________
Grover, J.




WE CONCUR:




____________________________
Elia, Acting P.J.




____________________________
Premo, J.







H044496 - The People v. I.R.