Filed 4/13/18 Forestiere v. Forestiere CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


ANDRE FORESTIERE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

ROSARIO RICARDO FORESTIERE et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

F074218

(Super. Ct. No. 14CECG02771)


OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Kristi C. Kapetan, Judge.
Andre Forestiere, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gilmore Magness Janisse, David M. Gilmore and Ryan M. Janisse for Defendants and Respondents.
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In this dispute involving a property known as the Forestiere Underground Gardens, appellant Andre Forestiere was a party to two actions in superior court: Case No. 14CEGC02771, before Judge Kapetan, and case No. 15CECG01076, before Judge Hamilton. Andre, acting in propia persona, filed a total of three appeals in these two cases, two from the case before Judge Kapetan and one from the case before Judge Hamilton. This opinion addresses Andre’s contentions in the two appeals he filed from the case before Judge Kapetan. These contentions all relate to decisions underlying the final judgment against Andre entered on August 5, 2016.
The trial court resolved the claims in Andre’s complaint partly by demurrer, partly by summary judgment, and partly after a bench trial. He challenges the court’s decisions at each of these stages. We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Complaint
Andre filed a complaint on September 19, 2014, and a first amended complaint (FAC, the operative complaint now) on December 15, 2014. As defendants, the FAC named Andre’s father Rosario Forestiere, and Andre’s siblings, Lyn Kosewski, Valery Forestiere, Nicholas Forestiere, Marc Forestiere, and Juliet Gilkey. It also named Forestiere Underground Gardens, LLC (FUGLLC) as a defendant and alleged that Lyn Kosewski and Valery Forestiere were officers of that company.
The FAC contained factual allegations about relations between the defendants and Lorraine Forestiere, who was Rosario’s wife and the mother of Andre and his siblings, in the years before Lorraine’s death on September 21, 2012. Lorraine was born in 1932 and her health began declining in 2006. “She had difficulty walking, climbing stairs and getting out of chairs. She had episodes of fatigue and forgetfulness. She suffered from high blood pressure. Her declining mental faculties affected her memory and judgment. She became more dependent on her family for support and assistance.” Lorraine had a high-school education and “little or no college level education.”
According to the FAC, Andre and the other siblings met in September 2006 and agreed that a trust should be formed to hold Lorraine’s interest in the Underground Gardens. The siblings would be the beneficiaries. “[A]t all relevant times, Lorraine ‘wanted’ to create such a trust with the assistance of her own counsel.” In July 2007, however, Rosario, Marc, Lyn, Valery and FUGLLC “commenced a conspiracy” by proposing to Lorraine an agreement by which she would lease her interest in the Underground Gardens to FUGLLC. Marc read the lease agreement to Lorraine and she signed it after hearing “threats from Lyn and Valery asserting loss of support” if she did not sign. No attorney or other witness was present.
The FAC alleges that at a “family meeting” held in a hotel in November 2007, with Andre and all defendants except Nicholas in attendance, Lorraine stated she did not remember signing the lease agreement. Valery replied that Lorraine “should be committed.” Lorraine was distressed by this comment and left. Andre said Lorraine should have had an attorney. “Since that time Lorraine was fearful that the defendant children and spouse would later have her committed.”
On an occasion in February 2008, “Rosario subjected Lorraine to verbal abuse and threats causing her fear, severe mental and emotional stress, and loss of sleep.” Rosario threatened to have Lorraine “thrown out of her home.” Rosario had a prior history of verbally abusing Lorraine. About a week after this occasion, on February 15, 2008, Rosario caused Lorraine to sign an interspousal agreement by which he exchanged his interest in the house in which she was living for her interest in the Underground Gardens. Nicholas prepared the agreement for Rosario, and Marc delivered it to Lorraine for her signature. Before signing it, Lorraine sent Nicholas a fax stating that she wanted instead to place her interest in the Underground Gardens in a trust for the benefit of her children. She also told Marc she did not want to sign the interspousal agreement. Nevertheless, she signed it “in a state of mental fear of Rosario … believing that she could keep her home and protect herself from Rosario’s abusive behavior.” Lorraine was not advised by counsel about the interspousal agreement. The value of Lorraine’s interest in the Underground Gardens exceeded the value of her interest in the house “by several hundred thousand dollars” and the transaction deprived Lorraine of the right to income from the Underground Gardens. All of the defendants knew or should have known the transaction was unfair to Lorraine but still supported and promoted it.
The FAC included several allegations intended to support the proposition that the defendants “exercised undue influence” over Lorraine for the rest of her life, for the purpose of ensuring that Rosario would remain in possession of her former interest in the Underground Gardens. The defendants did this by causing Lorraine to believe “that once she signed the agreement she was bound by its terms.” They also influenced Lorraine “by providing support during the decline of her mental and physical health as she aged.” Further, the defendants influenced Lorraine “in that they controlled the financial disbursement of her community share of Rosario’s teacher’s pension.” The defendants knew Lorraine depended on this pension. Some of them knew Rosario withheld the pension payments from 2000 to 2003 and Lorraine was afraid he would do this again. The defendants discouraged Lorraine from having an attorney. Until her death, she was afraid to assert any interest in the Underground Gardens because she feared that the defendants would withhold her pension income or have her committed to an institution.
After Lorraine’s death, according to the FAC, the defendants continued to conspire to maintain Rosario’s wrongful ownership of Lorraine’s former interest in the Underground Gardens. Acts claimed to further this alleged conspiracy included Rosario and Nicholas entering Lorraine’s house and car and removing documents without permission from the probate court, and Rosario falsely telling the probate court his separation from Lorraine had been amicable. “The last and most recent overt act of the conspiracy” was Rosario’s failure to disclose to the probate court the alleged facts regarding the use of undue influence to obtain the interspousal agreement from Lorraine.
Based on these alleged facts, the FAC asserted two causes of action: conspiracy to commit elder abuse and intentional interference with an expected inheritance (IIEI). It also sought declaratory relief based on these causes of action. The substance of the elder abuse cause of action was the claim that Andre’s father and siblings used intimidation to cause her to exchange her interest in the Underground Gardens for Rosario’s interest in the house, to her financial detriment. The FAC does not expressly say so, but this claim was based on the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15600 et seq.). Further, it was a survivor action. (See, e.g., Fenimor v. Regents of University of California (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1352.) In other words, the cause of action originally belonged to Lorraine, and Andre’s theory was that he was entitled to assert it pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure sections 377.20 and 377.30, as her successor in interest after her death.
The cause of action for intentional interference with an expected inheritance was based on the theory that when the defendants caused Lorraine to transfer her interest in the Underground Gardens to Rosario instead of keeping that interest or placing it in trust for her children, they prevented Andre from receiving a share of it upon Lorraine’s death. This was not a survivor action. It belonged originally to Andre, the party claiming to have been deprived of an inheritance, not the decedent.
In addition to declaratory relief, the remedies sought by the FAC included compensatory damages, punitive damages, creation of a constructive trust, and an order declaring Andre’s father and siblings to have predeceased Lorraine for purposes of distributing assets recovered.
Demurrer
The defendants filed a demurrer to the FAC. Among other things, they argued that Andre’s cause of action for elder abuse was barred by the statute of limitations. The limitations period for financial elder abuse is four years from the date the plaintiff discovered, or should by reasonable diligence have discovered, the facts constituting the financial abuse. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.7.) The defendants argued that, given the allegations in the FAC—and the lack of any allegation that Lorraine was incompetent—Lorraine must have known of the facts constituting the abuse in February 2008, when the defendants allegedly used intimidation to cause her to execute the interspousal agreement. The cause of action therefore accrued at that time and the limitations period expired in February 2012, during her lifetime and years before Andre filed his complaint. The defendants also asserted that the FAC did not allege facts that would show the running of the limitations period was tolled or that they were estopped from relying on the statute of limitations.
In his opposition to the demurrer, Andre averred that the FAC pleaded facts sufficient to support equitable estoppel. He stated that the alleged facts regarding the defendants’ behavior toward Lorraine would, if proved, be sufficient to estop the defendants’ assertion of a limitations defense for the period between the execution of the interspousal agreement and Lorraine’s death. Alternatively, Andre argued that because the FAC alleged a conspiracy, the cause of action accrued at the time of the last overt act of the conspiracy. The FAC alleged that the last overt act took place after Lorraine’s death when Rosario allegedly concealed from the probate court the undue influence he had exercised over Lorraine.
The trial court sustained the demurrer on the elder abuse cause of action. It agreed with the defendants’ view that the FAC failed to allege facts that would support equitable estoppel or any form of tolling. It ruled that if there was a conspiracy to commit elder abuse, the last overt act was the execution of the interspousal agreement, not subsequent acts or omissions by Rosario. The court denied leave to amend the complaint, concluding that Andre could not allege any additional facts that would show the limitations period had not expired.
Summary Judgment
The defendants answered the complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment on the remaining claim for IIEI. Among other things, the motion argued that Andre could not produce evidence that the defendants engaged in conduct that interfered with an inheritance for Andre.
Andre filed a request for a continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. He argued that the defendants had taken too long to respond to his request for production of documents and he had insufficient time to prepare his opposition to the motion. He also asserted that the defendants had made improper objections to his request for production.
The trial court denied the request for a continuance. It stated that Andre had failed to make the required showing of the facts he intended to establish by means of the outstanding discovery requests. It also stated that the documents listed in Andre’s request for production would not have supported his opposition to summary judgment even if they had been produced.
The court granted the motion for summary judgment on the IIEI claim as to the siblings or FUGLLC, but not as to Rosario. It ruled that Andre had not produced evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding tortious conduct by the siblings and FUGLLC that interfered with his expected inheritance. Also, regarding all the siblings except Nicholas, the court ruled that Andre had no evidence that they knew of his expected inheritance. (The question of the statute of limitations for the IIEI claim was not litigated at the summary judgment stage.)
Trial
The IIEI claim against Rosario remained for trial. Before trial, Andre filed a motion for relief from his waiver of the right to a jury trial. The record on this issue is somewhat fragmentary, but what appears to have happened is this: At a case management conference on May 26, 2015, Andre requested a jury trial. The minute order for the case management conference was issued on a court form stating, pursuant to an outdated rule, that jury fees were to be posted 25 days before the trial date. This rule was superseded by a statutory amendment enacted in 2012, which requires jury fees to be posted on or before the date scheduled for the initial case management conference. (Code Civ. Proc., § 631, subd. (c).) Andre did not post jury fees at the time of the initial case management conference, which was in January 2015. Andre later discovered that the fees were due at the time of the case management conference, and on August 3, 2015, he filed an application for a waiver of jury fees. The waiver was granted on August 23, 2015. In an exchange of email messages on July 28, 2016, however, counsel for Rosario wrote to Andre that the trial, which was scheduled to begin on August 3, 2016, was set as a court trial, and that Andre had waived his right to a jury trial by not posting jury fees on time.
The trial court considered Andre’s motion for relief from waiver of jury trial along with the motions in limine on August 3, 2016. It stated that Andre had had over a year to request relief from the waiver that was effected by his failure to post fees at the time of the case management conference and had not done so until the eve of trial. It further stated that the defense would be prejudiced if relief were granted because the defense had not prepared for a jury trial and would be subjected to delay and additional cost if it were required to do so. Neither side had submitted jury instructions. Andre’s motion was denied.
Rosario made a motion in limine to bifurcate the issue of the statute of limitations and try it first. The court granted the motion.
Andre was the sole witness at trial. In response to questioning by defense counsel, he testified about the transaction by which Lorraine transferred her interest in the Underground Gardens to Rosario and Rosario transferred his interest in the house to Lorraine. Andre testified that he knew of this transaction when it happened on February 15, 2008. He also testified that, on the same day, he drafted a letter for Lorraine to Nicholas, in which Lorraine asked for Nicholas’s help in establishing a family trust. Andre prepared this letter when he learned that Marc was coming to Lorraine with papers for the transfer of Lorraine’s interest in the Underground Gardens. Lorraine signed the letter and Andre faxed it to Nicholas. Nevertheless, Lorraine transferred her interest in the Underground Gardens to Rosario instead of placing it in a trust, and Andre knew this at the time. Andre believed the transaction was detrimental to Lorraine at the time, but did not initiate any legal proceedings until he filed his complaint in this case. Testifying on his own behalf, Andre said Lorraine appeared to be tired, distracted and in pain on February 15, 2008.
In his closing argument, defense counsel stated that Andre’s testimony was consistent with the allegations in the FAC, and both stated that Andre knew on February 15, 2008, of the facts constituting the alleged interference with his expected inheritance. The four-year limitations period provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 343 began to run at that time and expired in 2012, more than two years before Andre filed his complaint. There was no requirement that the person claiming to have been deprived of an inheritance wait until the decedent’s death before filing suit. Andre argued that his father and siblings continued influencing Lorraine not to try to reassert her interest in the Underground Gardens for the rest of her life. In his rebuttal argument, defense counsel asserted that because the IIEI claim was Andre’s claim, not Lorraine’s, the question of whether Lorraine was being influenced not to take action was irrelevant to the issue of when the IIEI cause of action accrued. Further, if Andre was claiming his relatives’ conduct between February 15, 2008, and the time of Lorraine’s death constituted an ongoing course of interference, he was mistaken: After the transaction on February 15, 2008, Lorraine no longer had any power to cause Andre to inherit any share of the Underground Gardens, so there was no longer any expected inheritance to be interfered with.
The court issued an oral ruling in which it agreed with defense counsel’s argument. It denied Andre’s request for a written statement of decision on the ground that no such written statement is required when the trial lasts less than one day.
No issues remained in the case. A defense judgment was filed on August 5, 2016.
Appeals
Andre filed two appeals, case Nos. F074218 and F074484. In case No. F074218, Andre challenged the ruling at the demurrer stage on the statute of limitations for the elder abuse claim. He further averred that he should have been granted leave to amend his complaint. Andre also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment.
In case No. F074484, Andre again argued that the court should have overruled the demurrer on the elder abuse claim or should have granted leave to amend. He added several arguments about the trial on the statute of limitations issue on the IIEI claim: The court should have granted relief from his waiver of the right to a jury trial; the court should have prepared a written statement of decision; the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence; and the decision was “unconscionable.”
We have included our discussion of all these issues in a single opinion (filed in both cases) because the issues overlap and all of them underlie the final judgment filed on August 5, 2016.
DISCUSSION
I. Demurrer
Andre argues that the demurrer on the elder abuse claim was erroneously sustained and leave to amend was erroneously denied. The standard of review is well-established:
“In an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action after a general demurrer is sustained without leave to amend, our Supreme Court has imposed the following standard of review. ‘The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]” [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.’” (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 597, 603.)
As explained above, the court sustained the demurrer on the ground that Andre’s elder abuse cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations. Andre’s contention is that the defendants were equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations because Lorraine’s failure to sue for elder abuse during her lifetime was caused by the defendants’ improper influence.
Equitable estoppel is “[a]n estoppel to set up the defense of the statute of limitations … as a result of some conduct by the defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, that induces the belated filing of an action.” (3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, § 762, p. 993.) The inducement can be in the form of some kind of duress. (Ateeq v. Najor (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1351, 1357 [equitable estoppel applied where defendant caused plaintiff to delay filing action by threatening to have plaintiff deported].) Andre’s equitable estoppel claim is of this general type.
As a preliminary matter, there is some dispute or confusion in the parties’ briefs about which plaintiff or potential plaintiff—Andre or Lorraine—an analysis of equitable estoppel should focus on. As indicated above, Andre’s elder abuse claim was, if anything, a survivor action. This means it was Lorraine’s cause of action until she died, and then her survivor’s. Consequently, the equitable estoppel analysis must focus first on the alleged inducement or duress applied to Lorraine. The focus could then shift to her survivor only if (as a result of the estoppel or otherwise) some time still remained to file the action.
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the facts pleaded showed the four-year limitations period expired in 2012 and would not suffice, if proved, to establish equitable estoppel. The gist of Andre’s argument is that he alleged facts that, if proved, would show the undue influence element of his elder abuse claim, and this proof would also establish the duress necessary to apply equitable estoppel to the entire period between the execution of the interspousal agreement and Lorraine’s death. We do not think this is correct. Assuming the facts pleaded in the FAC would be sufficient to show Lorraine signed the interspousal agreement because of undue influence by the defendants, this alone would not be enough to show she refrained from filing suit for elder abuse during the succeeding four years because of the same undue influence. The FAC does allege that Lorraine continued to be afraid, but it does not state that her ongoing fear was caused by the events surrounding the execution of the interspousal agreement. The FAC does not even allege that Lorraine ever expressed any interest in suing over the interspousal agreement. Instead, it alleges that there was subsequent undue influence because the defendants provided “support during the decline of her mental and physical health as she aged,” “controlled the financial disbursement of her community share of Rosario’s teacher’s pension,” and discouraged her from having an attorney. Proof of facts like these would not be sufficient to show the kind of duress necessary to establish Andre’s theory of equitable estoppel.
We also agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the conspiracy allegations in the FAC would not, if proven, show that Andre’s original complaint was timely filed. When a conspiracy to commit a civil wrong is alleged, the limitations period is determined by the nature of the claimed underlying wrong, and the cause of action accrues at the time of the commission of the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 773, 786; Bedolla v. Logan & Frazer (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 118, 136-137.) As the trial court ruled, the limitations period for the conspiracy claim expired four years after the execution of the interspousal agreement itself, because that was the last overt act alleged. The execution of the agreement accomplished the alleged purpose of the conspiracy. Andre argues that the conspiracy continued thereafter, with the objective of making sure Lorraine did not regain her interest in the Underground Gardens. But the alleged facts he relies on are not of the required character. Lorraine continuing to be afraid and Rosario not alleging wrongdoing against himself in the probate court are not overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.
A court sustaining a demurrer must grant leave to amend the complaint if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility of curing the defect by amendment. (Genesis Environmental Services v. San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Pollution Control Dist., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 603.) Andre did not offer in the trial court, and does not offer on appeal, any factual allegation he could add to his complaint that would, if proved, show that the defendants actually caused Lorraine to refrain from suing them from February 2008 until her death. Andre also offers no facts he could allege which, if proved, would establish a conspiracy of which the last overt act took place within four years before the filing of the complaint.
We need not separately address the demurrer on the claim for declaratory relief, as that claim falls with the substantive causes of action on which it is based.
II. Motion for Summary Judgment
Andre’s IIEI claim against his siblings and FUGLLC was decided against him on summary judgment. He contends that he was unable to develop evidence necessary to oppose the motion for summary judgment successfully because the trial court denied his motion for a continuance to allow him to complete his discovery efforts. Andre maintains that the motion for a continuance was denied in error.
Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), addresses the granting of a continuance to allow the gathering of facts for the purpose of opposing a motion for summary judgment:
“If it appears from the affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make any other order as may be just. The application to continue the motion to obtain necessary discovery may also be made by ex parte motion at any time on or before the date the opposition response to the motion is due.”
A party seeking a continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), for the purpose of carrying out discovery, must show all of the following:
“‘“(1) the facts to be obtained [via discovery] are essential to opposing the [summary judgment] motion; (2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist; and (3) the reasons why additional time is needed to obtain these facts.”’” (Lerma v. County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 715 (Lerma).)
If the party seeking the continuance makes this showing, the granting of a continuance is mandatory under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). (Lerma, supra, 120 Cal.App.4th at p. 714.) If this showing is not made, the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the motion, based on its determination of whether or not the party has shown good cause. (Id. at p. 716.)
Andre’s request for a continuance was supported by his declaration and a copy of the request for production of documents he had served on the defendants. The request asked for eight categories of documents: (1) documents indicating the value of the Underground Gardens; (2) documents indicating the value of the house; (3) any estate planning documents prepared for Lorraine; (4) documents supporting the defendants’ claim that Lorraine withdrew certain money from joint accounts; (5) documents supporting the defendants’ claim that Lorraine gave money to Andre; (6) documents supporting the defendants’ claim that Lorraine received pension checks from Rosario during a stated period; (7) documents supporting the defendants’ claim that Andre physically attacked Rosario; and (8) documents supporting the defendants’ claim that Lorraine wanted sole ownership of the house for her peace of mind.
According to Andre’s declaration, the defendants served a response in which they made several objections to each category of documents requested, but stated they would provide responsive, non-privileged documents. The response also stated, however, that the documents would be produced at the offices of defense counsel, not at a copy center as previously agreed, and that the previously agreed time of production would have to be renegotiated. Because defense counsel had not responded to Andre’s request to meet and confer as of the date responsive documents were due, Andre declared that he would have insufficient time to inspect and copy the documents before his opposition to the motion for summary judgment was due.
Neither Andre’s declaration nor his memorandum of points and authorities in support of his request for a continuance explained what facts he intended to establish by means of the documents requested or why those facts were essential to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Instead, the memorandum of points and authorities merely stated that responsive documents existed, and the declaration asserted that the fact that documents had not yet been produced deprived Andre of an “opportunity to challenge the material facts alleged by the Defendants.”
We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Andre did not make the showing necessary for a mandatory continuance under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h). Andre’s submissions showed only that he requested production of certain documents and defendants did not make an adequate timely response. He did not show what facts the documents would establish or how those facts were essential to his opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
The trial court also properly denied a discretionary continuance. As the court stated, the requested documents had little bearing on the points at issue in the summary judgment motion. The relative values of the Underground Gardens and the house were not controverted by the motion. The existence and content of the estate planning documents—which pertained to establishment of a trust by Lorraine and were never signed—also was not in dispute. Documents relevant to defense claims about money withdrawn by Lorraine, money given to Andre, Lorraine’s receipt of pension checks from Rosario, Andre attacking Rosario, and Lorraine’s desire for the house would not have enabled Andre’s IIEI claim against his siblings and FUGLLC to withstand summary judgment. The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Andre failed to show good cause for a continuance.
Finally, any error in denying the continuance was harmless. The court ruled after the trial that the limitations period for the IIEI claim had expired by the time Andre filed his complaint. As detailed below, we affirm that ruling. Had the siblings and FUGLLC still been in the case when this ruling was made, it would necessarily have ended Andre’s IIEI claim against them at that point even if the claim had survived the summary judgment stage.
III. Trial
Andre makes four arguments on appeal related to the trial on the statute of limitations for the IIEI claim against Rosario: (1) the court erred when it denied his motion for relief from his waiver of the right to a jury trial; (2) the court was required to grant his request for a written statement of decision; (3) the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) the verdict was “unconscionable.” We reject these contentions.
A. Jury Waiver
The trial court ruled that Andre waived his right to a jury trial by failing to post jury fees at the time of the initial case management conference; it also denied his motion for relief from the waiver. Andre claims this was error.
We need not decide whether the ruling was erroneous. When—as is usually the case—there is no way of showing that a litigant was prejudiced because the facts were found at trial by a judge, not a jury, it is not possible on appeal to establish that denial of a jury trial was reversible error. Andre has not attempted to show that judicial factfinding worked to his detriment here, and we do not see how he could. Under these circumstances, a party seeking relief from denial of a jury trial must file a petition for a writ of mandate prior to trial; an appeal is not the proper remedy. (Gann v. Williams Brothers Realty, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1698, 1704 (Gann); Winston v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 600, 603 (Winston); McIntosh v. Bowman (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 357, 363-364; Byram v. Superior Court (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 648, 654.)
If we were to reach the merits of the jury waiver issue, we would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. A trial court should grant relief from an inadvertent waiver of a jury trial if no prejudice to the opposing party or the court will result. (Winston, supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at p. 602.) There is little doubt here that the waiver was inadvertent, but the trial court could reasonably find that granting relief would work hardship for the defense. Relief was requested on the eve of trial and defendants had not prepared for a jury trial. (See Gann, supra, 231 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1704-1705 [no abuse of discretion in denying relief requested five days before trial where granting relief could reasonably be found to impose hardship on defense in its trial preparation].)
B. Written Statement of Decision
Andre contends that the court was required to grant his request for a written statement of decision after the trial. He is mistaken. When a litigant requests a statement of decision after a bench trial, and the trial lasted one day or less, the court is required to give only an oral statement of decision. (Code Civ. Proc., § 632.) In this case, no opening statements were given; the sole witness began and finished testifying and the court rendered its verdict on August 4, 2016. The trial court fulfilled its obligation by giving an oral statement of decision on the record in the presence of the parties.
C. Sufficiency of Evidence
Andre maintains the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment, we review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment and decide whether it contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable finder of fact could make the necessary finding under the applicable standard of proof. The evidence must be reasonable, credible and of solid value. We presume every inference in support of the judgment that the finder of fact could reasonably have made. We do not reweigh the evidence or reevaluate witness credibility. We cannot reverse the judgment merely because the evidence could be reconciled with a contrary finding. (People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th 257, 293.)
In this case, the evidence presented at trial amply supported the verdict. Andre acknowledged that he was aware of the basis of his claim—the execution of the interspousal agreement, which rendered Lorraine unable to leave any portion of her interest in the Underground Gardens to Andre—in February 2008. By the time Andre filed his complaint in 2014, the four-year limitations period (Code Civ. Proc., § 343) had long since expired.
Andre devotes a substantial portion of one of his briefs to the arguments that Rosario was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations until after Lorraine’s death and that Rosario engaged in ongoing actions during Lorraine’s lifetime to discourage her from attempting to reassert her interest in the Underground Gardens. These arguments are irrelevant to the IIEI cause of action, however. As we have explained, that cause of action never belonged to Lorraine; it belonged to Andre, as he is the party asserting that defendants interfered with his inheritance. He does not contend that anything done by any of the defendants caused him not to file suit during the limitations period.
D. “Unconscionable”
We reject Andre’s claim that the verdict on the statute of limitations issue for the IIEI cause of action against Rosario was “unconscionable.” Andre cites no authority for the notion that a verdict may be overturned on appeal on the basis of the losing party’s mere averment that it is unconscionable. In any event, we do not find the result to be unconscionable.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Costs on appeal are awarded to respondents.



SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:



HILL, P.J.



DETJEN, J.