Filed 4/23/18 In re H.D. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re H.D., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

J.G.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E069208

(Super.Ct.No. J270617)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.
Megan Turkat-Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
J.G. (Mother) has a long history of substance abuse and domestic violence, resulting in her severely beating her 20-month-old son. She was found guilty and incarcerated for the abuse, and her parental rights were terminated as to her son and another son born during her incarceration. Upon her release from custody, Mother returned to her lifestyle of substance abuse and domestic violence. She conceived again, giving birth to H.D., the minor at issue in this case. Mother continued to abuse drugs, resulting in Mother’s arrest for violating her parole and H.D. being detained from parental custody at age five months.
From detention through the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Mother and Robert D. (Father) engaged in substance abuse and domestic violence, and were both arrested. Only just prior to the dispositional hearing did Mother finally begin an outpatient substance abuse program. At the contested dispositional hearing, the juvenile court denied services to Mother based upon the prior termination of her parental rights, the physical abuse she previously inflicted on her son, and finding that services to Mother would not be in H.D.’s best interest. Mother subsequently appealed. On appeal, Mother challenges the juvenile court’s order denying her reunification services, arguing there was clear and convincing evidence reunification services were in H.D.’s best interest. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.
II
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The family initially came to the attention of the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) in August 2010, after Mother’s son, D.S. (age 20 months) was removed from her care. Mother had beaten D.S., causing the child to suffer purple and black bruises and lacerations on his ears, face, and torso. D.S. was assessed and found to have a hairline fracture to the occipital lobe of his skull, which was reported to be the thickest part of the skull and would take great force, such as slamming the child on concrete, to fracture the skull. Additionally, D.S.’s injuries to his ears were described as being caused with great force, such as punching or stomping on the child’s head. Text messages were discovered on Mother’s phone to D.S.’s father stating: “ ‘I fucked up your son and I will do it again. Keep fucking with me while I’m losing it bitch.’ ” Mother was convicted of child abuse, sentenced to prison, and while incarcerated, gave birth to another child, who was removed from her care. Mother’s parental rights as to both children were terminated in 2011.
The family again came to the attention of CFS after two referrals were received regarding then five-month-old H.D. A referral received in February 2017 stated Mother had lost custody of her other children, tested positive for marijuana while pregnant with H.D., and a safety plan had been put in place through Arizona Child Protective Services. CFS responded and found Mother and Father were cooperative with the safety plan and, at that time, there was no known abuse or neglect in the house.
A second referral was received on April 14, 2017, indicating Mother was arrested that morning for using methamphetamine. H.D. had been left with Father but there was concern Father also appeared to be abusing methamphetamine. Father was observed walking down the street to use a neighbor’s phone while he left H.D. home alone. Mother’s parole officer questioned Father about leaving H.D. alone, and inspected the home, reporting the house was trashed and unkempt. Additionally, anonymous relatives reported domestic violence between Mother and Father, stating they had broken up physical altercations between the couple. Mother and Father denied any domestic violence.
The social worker was informed by Mother’s parole officer on April 17, 2017, that he spoke with Mother and learned there was long-term domestic violence between Mother and Father. Mother reported the abuse started while she was pregnant, dissipated while she was further along, and then started again after H.D. was born. During a recent altercation, Father threw Mother down causing her to injure her knee and hip, for which she sought medical care. Mother admitted H.D. was usually present during the fighting. The social worker believed H.D. was at high risk of abuse due to the domestic violence in the relationship, and Mother’s past history of abusing her son in retaliation for the child’s father abusing her and while abusing substances.
After H.D. was detained, on April 21, 2017, a petition was filed on behalf of H.D. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect), (c) (serious emotional damage), (g) (no provision for support), and (j) (abuse of sibling).
Neither Mother nor Father were present at the detention hearing on April 24, 2017. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detention out of the home, and ordered temporary placement of H.D. with CFS.
The jurisdictional/dispositional report dated May 16, 2017, recommended that the allegations in the petition be found true, and that services be denied to Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(11). It was also recommended that services be denied to Father as Father was an alleged father, and not entitled to reunification services. Since the detention hearing, Mother was released from custody and returned to her home with Father. Mother indicated she and Father intended to visit with H.D. and fight for reunification. Visitation was arranged on April 26, 2017. However, neither parent appeared. Thereafter, on May 4, 2017, Mother informed the social worker that she and Father were no longer together, and that he left the state and would not be coming back. The following day, Mother again contacted the social worker and stated she and Father were still together, Father moved to Oregon to accept a job, and she would be joining him there as soon as she obtained custody of H.D. Mother was unclear on whether she would attend substance abuse treatment but indicated she had completed a parenting class, an anger management class, and was getting close to completing 52 weeks of domestic violence classes. According to Mother’s parole officer, he was trying to get her into a substance abuse program that would accept Mother’s Medi-Cal. However, Mother was trying to negotiate having Father enter treatment with her. When her parole officer informed her that he had no authority or ability to help Father get into substance abuse treatment, Mother became upset with him and refused any more assistance with entering an inpatient program.
The social worker also learned that on the day of the detention hearing, Mother and Father were involved in an altercation at their home. Father grabbed Mother by the ankle and was twisting it when the couple’s roommate (Mother’s former stepfather) hit Father in the head with a bat. Father grabbed the bat, hitting the roommate in the head. The two shook hands and then tended to their wounds. Law enforcement was summoned and observed the injuries to Father, however, the roommate had since left the property. No charges were filed at the request of the parties. Additional criminal history was provided as to Mother, including that since her release from custody in 2016 for the injuries she inflicted on her son D.S., she had violated her parole twice. The first violation was for being found in a vehicle with a felon who was in possession of a controlled substance. The second violation was due to her failing a drug screening. During the drug test, Mother was observed pulling out a vial of some kind, and it was discovered she had attempted to stash someone else’s urine. She admitted using methamphetamine and was arrested for violating her parole.
The social worker reported concerns with Mother and her desire to maintain her relationship with Father over her relationship with H.D. The social worker believed Mother appeared to be bonded to H.D. Mother reported that she desperately wanted the opportunity to reunify. However, the social worker did not believe Mother was motivated to get and stay sober, or make the substantive lifestyle changes needed to show she would benefit from reunification services. Mother failed to demonstrate she was able to put her children’s safety and welfare above that of her substance abuse and violent domestic relationships. Mother did not appear to be motivated to get and stay sober for any reason other than to keep her relationship with Father. She refused to enter an inpatient substance abuse program unless she could do it conjointly with Father. Mother provided completion certificates for numerous programs that she had completed while in prison in 2014, 2015, and 2016. However, her behaviors immediately reverted back to substance abuse and violent relationships upon release. Meanwhile, H.D. was placed with a foster family and was doing well.
On August 17, 2017, in an additional report to the court, the social worker informed the court of Father’s recent arrest relating to a violent altercation with a friend. According to the report, Father held a female friend hostage, threatened to kill her, and assaulted her with a large metal hook. Father resisted arrest when deputies responded. Initially, Mother called the social worker and stated she did not want to have Father in H.D.’s life and was done with him. Thereafter, on July 19, 2017, the social worker received a call from Father and Mother stating that they wanted to visit H.D., and the facility needed verification that they could visit together. The social worker continued to recommend no reunification services be provided to Mother.
A contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was scheduled for August 18, 2017, but it was continued due to Mother being in custody at the county jail and not having been transported to court.
The contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing was held on September 6, 2017. The detention report, the jurisdictional/dispositional report, and the additional report to the court were admitted into evidence. Neither Mother nor Father presented affirmative evidence. The court found the section 300, subdivisions (b), (g) and (j) allegations true and dismissed the subdivision (c) allegation.
As to disposition, Mother provided a letter from Gibson House for Women indicating her enrollment into the program on August 24, 2017, a certificate for exceptional servitude from Gibson House dated August 31, 2017, and a September 1, 2017 drug test. Mother’s counsel argued section 361.5, subdivision (b)(6), should not apply due to the length of time since the previous abuse findings. With respect to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (11), Mother’s counsel asserted Mother had made subsequent remedial efforts to alleviate the issues that led to the prior termination of services and parental rights, and that it would be in H.D.’s best interest for her to receive services. Minor’s counsel argued against providing Mother services, explaining the circumstances surrounding the entirety of this case as “truly heinous.” Minor’s counsel also laid out the prior injuries to D.S., and argued that although Mother may have completed some programs, she continued to engage in a domestic violence relationship with Father and continued to use drugs. Counsel for CFS joined in minor’s counsel’s arguments, and further argued Mother had not shown she made any subsequent efforts. Therefore, providing reunification services to Mother would not be in H.D.’s best interest.
Following arguments, the juvenile court declared H.D. a dependent of the court and denied services to Mother pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6), (b)(7) and (b)(11). The court explained: “I do find by clear and convincing evidence that the (b)(6) does apply. I do find that such intentional severe injuries still present a risk to this young child, that those injuries constituted severe physical harm, and were horrific in nature. I adopt the arguments of both minor’s and county counsel in regard to those injuries. I don’t find that there is any likelihood that the child—this child could be safely returned within 12 months with no continuing supervision to the mother. There would need to be a lot of intervention regarding the prior cases and the issues that led to that. [¶] But since that time I also concur that mother has found herself in a very similar situation. She is again in a domestic violence relationship and through the beginnings of this case seemed to prioritize that relationship over the child and there was continued substance abuse. [¶] The circumstances under which she harmed the sibling are also shocking and horrific in nature. [¶] I find by clear and convincing evidence that (b)(7) also applies, and I don’t find that there is any evidence that reunification would be in the child’s best interest. [¶] I find that (b)(11) applies, and I don’t find that there is any evidence that there has been reasonable efforts to treat the issues that led to the removal. Again the circumstantial situation regarding violence in the home and substance abuse remains the same.” The court struck the section 361.5, subdivision (b)(12) ground for denial of service, declared H.D. a dependent of the court, removed her from parental custody, found Father to be a presumed father, and ordered services for Father. This appeal followed.
III
DISCUSSION
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in denying her reunification services under section 361.5 because providing her with services was in H.D.’s best interest. We disagree.
Generally, the juvenile court is required to provide reunification services to a child and the child’s parents when a child is removed from parental custody under the dependency laws. (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) The purpose of providing reunification services is to “eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478 (Baby Boy H.).) It is also the intent, however, of the Legislature “that the dependency process proceed with deliberate speed and without undue delay.” (Marlene M. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1151.) “Thus, the statutory scheme recognizes that there are cases in which the delay attributable to the provision of reunification services would be more detrimental to the minor than discounting the competing goal of family preservation. [Citation.] Specifically, section 361.5, subdivision (b), exempts from reunification services ‘ “those parents who are unlikely to benefit” ’ [citation] from such services or for whom reunification efforts are likely to be ‘fruitless’ [citation].” (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1120 (Jennifer S.).)
When the juvenile court concludes reunification efforts should not be provided, it “ ‘ “fast-tracks” ’ ” the dependent minor to permanency planning so that permanent out-of-home placement can be arranged. (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.) The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are commonly referred to as “ ‘ “bypass” ’ ” provisions. (Ibid.)
The juvenile court denied reunification services to Mother under section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(11). Under bypass section 365.1, subdivision (b)(6), reunification services need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there was “the infliction of severe physical harm to the child, a sibling, or a half sibling by a parent or guardian, as defined in this subdivision, and the court makes a factual finding that it would not benefit the child to pursue reunification services with the offending parent or guardian.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(6)(A).) Under bypass section 361.5, subdivision (b)(7), reunification services need not be provided if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence “the parent is not receiving reunification services for a sibling or a half sibling of the child” due to physical abuse. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(7).) And, under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), the court is authorized to bypass reunification services if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that “the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, and . . . , according to the findings of the court, this parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from the parent.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) This subdivision “recognizes the problem of recidivism by the parent despite reunification efforts.” (Baby Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 478.) Only one valid ground is necessary to uphold the juvenile court’s bypass decision. (See Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)
“We review an order denying reunification services under [section 361.5] for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, we do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, we ‘review the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.’ [Citation.] In doing so, we are mindful of the higher standard of proof required in the court below when reunification bypass is ordered.” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1121-1122.)
Once it has been determined one of the situations enumerated in section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, “ ‘ “ the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.]” (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227 (William B.); in accord, In re A.G. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 276, 281 (A.G.).) Thus, if the juvenile court finds a provision of section 361.5, subdivision (b), applies, the court “shall not order reunification for [the] parent . . . unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) “The burden is on the parent to . . . show that reunification would serve the best interests of the child.” (William B., at p. 1227; in accord, A.G., at p. 281.) We review the court’s best interest determination for abuse of discretion. (In re G.L. (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1164-1165 (G.L.).)
Here, it appears Mother concedes that the bypass provisions, section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(6), (b)(7), and (b)(11), were applicable. Mother, however, argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that reunification services for Mother were not in the best interest of H.D. The best interest determination requires consideration of (1) the parent’s current efforts, (2) the parent’s fitness, (3) the parent’s history, (4) the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency, (5) the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds, and (6) the child’s need for stability and continuity. (A.G., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 281.) “A best interests finding also requires a likelihood that reunification services will succeed. [Citation.] ‘In other words, there must be some “reasonable basis to conclude” that reunification is possible before services are offered to a parent who need not be provided them. [Citation.]’ ” (Ibid., quoting William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1228-1229.)
In the present matter, there is substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s determination that offering reunification services to Mother was not in H.D.’s best interest. The court explained that it found Mother inflicted severe physical injuries to H.D.’s half sibling, that H.D. was at risk of similar abuse, that H.D. could not safely be returned to Mother within 12 months without supervision, that Mother would require a lot of intervention to alleviate the issues that led to H.D.’s removal, and that Mother had “found herself in a very similar situation” in continuing to abuse drugs and in a domestic violence relationship. The court also found by clear and convincing evidence that providing reunification services to Mother would not be in H.D.’s best interest. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. There was no evidence in the record showing H.D. was bonded to Mother. H.D. was only five months old when she was detained and removed from Mother’s custody. Furthermore, Mother missed visits with H.D. and prioritized her relationship with Father over H.D. Moreover, as in the prior dependency case, Mother continued to abuse drugs and engage in a violent domestic relationship with Father. The record contains scant evidence of a bond between Mother and H.D., and affords no basis from which to conclude that granting Mother reunification services would serve H.D.’s need for stability and continuity.
Further, although Mother had recently begun substance abuse treatment about two weeks before the September 7, 2017 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the record demonstrates Mother’s problems with drug abuse were long-standing, resulted in the termination of her parental rights over her other children, and posed an ongoing and serious risk of harm to H.D. Except for the periods when she was incarcerated, Mother continued to abuse methamphetamine, resulting in her violating parole twice, and continuing to engage in violent domestic relationships. Mother points to the job training programs and a parenting class she completed, yet fails to point out Mother took part in those activities during 2014, 2015, and 2016, while she was incarcerated and prior to H.D.’s birth. There was clear evidence Mother had not changed her ways and was not fit to have H.D. in her care. In addition, the record demonstrates the severity of the issues that led to Mother’s loss of custody of her other children. The court accurately described the abuse Mother inflicted upon D.S. as horrific in nature, and correctly recognized Mother subsequently found herself in a similar situation as that which led to D.S.’s abuse. This showed lack of change on Mother’s part. Under such circumstances, the juvenile court was not compelled to find, by clear and convincing evidence, that offering reunification services to Mother would be in H.D.’s best interest. (See § 361.5, subd. (c)(2).)
Mother argues that reunification services were in H.D.’s best interest because she had a bond with H.D., she “desperately” wanted to reunify with H.D., she had cared for H.D. for five months, and she had enrolled herself in substance abuse services. Mother also cites to Father’s receipt of reunification services, the order for supervised visitation for Mother, and her attempts to address her domestic violence issues. Contrary to Mother’s arguments, the evidence in the record does not compel a best interest finding.
As previously noted, a parent bears the burden of demonstrating that reunification is in the best interest of the child. (William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) This requires the parent to give the court “some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’ that reunification is possible . . . . [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 1228-1229.) Mother fails to provide “some ‘reasonable basis to conclude’ that reunification is possible . . . . [Citation.]” (Ibid.) There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that reunification with H.D. was likely given Mother’s history of domestic violence and drug abuse. Mother therefore fails to show reunification services are in H.D.’s best interest.
This case is unlike G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 1153, upon which Mother relies. In that case, the mother, who despite a long-term substance abuse problem, lengthy criminal history, and failure to reunify with four older children, was offered services in the minor’s best interest. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision based on “multiple” factors, including the mother’s current efforts to get treatment and the strength of bond between the mother and her child. (Id. at pp. 1156-1157, 1162-1163, 1165-1166.) Unlike G.L., here the court did not find any factors that weighed in support of reunification. Further, although there was evidence Mother made recent efforts to treat her substance abuse, she continued to engage in a domestic violence relationship with Father, despite being offered services to address that issue, and there was no evidence showing a bond between Mother and H.D. Moreover, as the G.L. court noted in upholding the trial court’s best interest determination, the fact “[t]hat there is evidence in the record supporting the opposite finding . . . does not mean the court abused its discretion in finding it was in G.L.’s best interests to reunify with [his mother].” (G.L., supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166.) “Similarly, the contrary evidence [M]other marshals in this case does little to persuade us that the juvenile court abused its discretion in reaching the opposite conclusion from that which she seeks.” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.) G.L. does not support Mother’s claim that the court below abused its discretion when it found that reunification services would not be in H.D.’s best interest.
We conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother reunification services pursuant to section 361.5 because substantial evidence supported its finding that offering reunification services was not in H.D.’s best interest.
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:



MILLER
Acting P. J.



FIELDS
J.