Filed 4/24/18 P. v. Esparza CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ALEXANDRIA ESPARZA,

Defendant and Appellant.
H044839
(Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. C1757986)

Defendant Alexandria Esparza was granted probation after she pleaded no contest to use of personal identifying information without authorization (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a) - count 1) and possession of a forged driver’s license (Pen. Code, § 470b - count 4). On appeal, she contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed probation conditions relating to substance abuse. We affirm the order.

I. Statement of the Case
In March 2017, defendant was charged by felony complaint with three counts of felony use of personal identifying information without authorization (Pen. Code, § 530.5, subd. (a) - counts 1, 2, 3); three counts of felony possession of a forged driver’s license (Pen. Code, § 470b - counts 4, 5, 6); two counts of misdemeanor forgery of a check (Pen. Code, § 470, subd. (d) - counts 7, 8); and misdemeanor concealment or withholding of stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a) - count 9).
In April 2017, defendant and the prosecution entered into a negotiated disposition. Defendant agreed to plead no contest to one count of felony use of personal identifying information without authorization and one count of felony possession of a forged driver’s license in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts, imposition of probation for up to three years on condition that she serve four months in county jail, and the opportunity, after one year, to petition for a reduction of the convictions to misdemeanors. Defendant also agreed to enter into a Harvey waiver, which permitted the trial court to consider the facts underlying the dismissed counts in sentencing defendant. Defendant waived her rights and entered her no contest pleas.
In June 2017, the trial court placed defendant on probation for two years. The trial court imposed, among other things, substance abuse conditions and that she serve 120 days in county jail.

II. Statement of Facts
On January 8, 2017, a police officer stopped the vehicle driven by defendant. During the stop, the officer detected the odor of marijuana coming from inside her vehicle. Defendant was also in possession of identifying information belonging to three individuals, forged checks, stolen property, and 31 grams of marijuana.
Defendant had previously been convicted of: possession of narcotics for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) in 2008; and use or being under the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11550) in 2008 and 2010.
The probation report stated: “Due to 31 grams of marijuana being found in the defendant’s vehicle, at the time of her arrest for the present matter, further noting her somewhat recent drug-related criminal history and refusal for treatment, substance abuse conditions will be included to provide a positive period of rehabilitation and to deter future criminal conduct.”

III. Discussion
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed substance abuse conditions.
At the sentencing hearing, defendant objected to the imposition of four probation conditions: “[s]ubmit to chemical tests as directed by the probation officer”; “[d]o not knowingly possess or knowingly consume alcohol or go to places where you know alcohol is the primary item of sale”; “[d]o not knowingly possess or knowingly use any drugs, narcotics, or controlled substances, or narcotic paraphernalia for which you do not have a valid prescription or go to places where you know drugs, narcotics, or controlled substances are illegally used or sold”; and “[e]nter and complete a substance abuse treatment program as directed by the probation officer.”
“Trial courts have broad discretion to impose such reasonable probation conditions ‘as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done . . . and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .’ ” (People v. Chardon (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 205, 217; Pen. Code, § 1203.1, subd. (j).) “A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486.) “This test is conjunctive—all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a . . . term.” (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) We review the probation conditions under the abuse of discretion standard. (Ibid.) This standard is violated when the trial court’s “determination is arbitrary or capricious or ‘ “ ‘exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ ” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
Defendant argues that there was no evidence that she was under the influence of marijuana while she was driving, possessed the marijuana illegally, was in possession of any drug paraphernalia, or currently had a substance abuse problem. Thus, she claims the substance abuse conditions were not reasonably related to the crime of which she was convicted or to future criminality. We disagree.
Here, the officer smelled marijuana coming from inside defendant’s vehicle and found her in possession of marijuana during the traffic stop. Though defendant was not charged with driving under the influence of marijuana, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the odor indicated that she had recently smoked marijuana while driving and thus presented a danger to others. Defendant also had two drug-related convictions in 2008 and one drug-related conviction in 2010 and she had refused substance abuse treatment. Moreover, though she did not admit that her use of another’s personal identifying information and her possession of a forged driver’s license supported a substance abuse problem, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that these are the types of crimes that can “provide income sources for those who are using drugs.” Thus, the substance abuse conditions had some relationship to the crimes of which defendant was convicted and required or forbade conduct which was reasonably related to future criminality. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed substance abuse conditions.
IV. Disposition
The order is affirmed.


























_________________________________
Mihara, J.



WE CONCUR:






______________________________
Premo, Acting P. J.






______________________________
Elia, J.