Filed 5/3/18 S.D. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


S.D.,
Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA,
Respondent;
CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,
Real Parties in Interest.



A153943

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. Nos. J1700739, JI700742)




S.D., a mother with a history of chronic drug abuse, petitions for extraordinary relief to overturn an order entered at a six-month review hearing terminating reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 concerning her two young sons, one-year old J.D. and two-and-a-half year old B.E. She contends the juvenile court’s finding that she was provided reasonable services is not supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that it is, and deny her petition.
BACKGROUND
In January 2017, S.D. tested positive for cocaine the day her younger son, J.D., was born and so did the newborn. This prompted an emergency referral to Contra Costa County Children and Family Services (“the Agency”) which resulted in S.D. voluntarily participating in a residential drug treatment program under a plan of intensive family services.
These proceedings were commenced thereafter, on June 23, 2017, when the Agency filed two section 300 dependency petitions concerning S.D.’s children, alleging that their mother had relapsed into cocaine use shortly after having completed her three-month residential drug treatment program. At that point, J.D. was approximately four months old and his brother B.E. was nearly two years old. The petitions alleged that S.D. had tested positive for cocaine three weeks after leaving the program and then missed two more drug tests after that, and also failed to register for follow-up outpatient care. Her chronic substance abuse was alleged to impair her ability to safely parent the children. The history and details of her cocaine use are recounted in the various reports the Agency filed in this case, with which we presume the parties’ familiarity and which are unnecessary to repeat.
S.D.’s infant and toddler sons were removed from her custody and eventually placed together in a licensed foster care home. At a combined contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on August 28, 2017, the juvenile court adjudged the two children dependent wards of the court and ordered the reunification services the Agency had recommended in its case plan. The services entailed individual counseling, parenting education classes, additional inpatient substance abuse treatment followed by treatment in an out-patient 12-step program, and random drug testing.
By the time of the six-month review hearing on March 12, 2018, S.D. had proved unable to stay off drugs despite having completed three more months of inpatient drug rehabilitation treatment, and the Agency recommended terminating reunification services. The Agency reported that S.D. had completed her second round of inpatient care in December 2017, but that thereafter, on January 10, 2018, had tested positive for methamphetamines and cocaine. S.D. had provided no proof that she was engaged in any outpatient drug treatment as required by her case plan nor was she engaged in individual counseling as required, despite the fact the Agency four times had provided her with resources to get those services. According to the Agency, S.D. was exhibiting a recurring pattern: she would participate in a drug rehabilitation program “but not utilize[e] her supports to be successful” after completing the program.
According to the social worker who testified at the hearing, in addition to S.D.’s one actual positive drug test result, S.D. also had skipped eight other random drug tests during the reunification period; under her case plan, those eight “no-shows” counted as positive drug results too (i.e., for a total of nine positive drug tests since receiving the additional inpatient services). The social worker testified that S.D., who claimed her positive test result had been due to some over-the-counter medications, was taking no responsibility for her actions. And when the juvenile court ordered S.D. to submit to a random drug test during a break in the hearing (since she hadn’t been drug tested in several months), S.D. claimed she was unable to do so.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court made extensive findings, terminated reunification services, and set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. This petition by S.D. followed.
DISCUSSION
Where, as here, a child is under the age of three on the date of initial removal from parental custody, the juvenile court “shall” continue the case to a 12-month hearing if “reasonable services have not been provided.” (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(3); see also § 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(C).) This determination requires the court to decide “whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian,” and the court must either order them initiated, continued or terminated. (§ 366.21, subd. (e)(8).)
We review the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were offered and provided for substantial evidence. (Patricia W. v. Superior Court (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 397, 419.) This standard is deferential: we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the order. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598 (Katie V.).) Furthermore, we do not approach this question as if we are free to conduct a trial de novo; “our sole task on review is to determine whether the record discloses substantial evidence which supports the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided or offered.” (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762 (Angela S.).)
This record does. S.D. not only was enrolled in an additional three months of inpatient drug rehabilitation treatment, she was referred to both individual therapy and outpatient drug treatment care. These services were reasonable, and designed to address the substance abuse issues that had led to the initiation of these proceedings. In arguing these services were not sufficient, S.D. contends the Agency should have referred her to a different inpatient program rather than to the same one she had previously attended, and then should have referred her to a program with transitional housing after that so she could live in a “sober living environment with support.” But the juvenile court’s minutes from the August 28, 2017 jurisdictional hearing reflect that S.D. had agreed to go into residential treatment again, without qualification, and so at that juncture, at least, even she did not think the same program could not meet her needs if she seriously committed herself to the goal of living drug-free on pain of losing her two children. As for transitional housing, the Agency points out that it did at one point refer S.D. to a sober living environment option (in Pittsburg), but S.D. turned it down because she didn’t want to live there. Of even greater import, S.D. fails to explain why only a transitional housing program would be reasonable after her inpatient treatment ended, whereas individual therapy combined with outpatient drug treatment services—both of which S.D. refused to avail herself of—were not. In any event, we do not need to decide which among these various hypothetical options might have offered S.D. the best possible hope for overcoming her struggle with substance abuse. “ ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (Katie V., supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 598–599.) For whatever reason, it appears S.D.’s “real problem was not a lack of services available but a lack of initiative to consistently take advantage of the services that were offered.” (Angela S., supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 763; Katie V., at p. 599.)
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court., rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
 




STEWART, J.



We concur.




RICHMAN, Acting P.J.




MILLER, J.






















S.D. v. Superior Court (A153943)