Filed 5/8/18 P. v. Mejia CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ROBERT PATRICK MEJIA et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.
D073113



(Super. Ct. No. INF1402466)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County, Victoria E. Cameron, Judge. Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
Richard Power, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Crystal Nicole Mejia.
Joanna Rehm, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant John Mehia.
Sylvia W. Beckham, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Robert Patrick Mejia.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Police officer John Mejia was convicted of falsely reporting to his department that his personal car had been stolen. (Veh. Code, § 10501, subd. (a).) He, his wife (Crystal Mejia), and his father (retired police officer Robert Mejia) were also convicted of presenting a false claim to an insurance company. (Pen. Code, § 550, subd. (a)(1).) The trial court placed defendants on probation for three years, and imposed various custody terms to be served through work release or electronic monitoring.
On appeal, defendants contend the trial court erred by denying Robert's Batson/Wheeler motion, which he asserted after the prosecutor used four of his first five peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic jurors. Each defendant also contends insufficient evidence supports his or her conviction on the insurance fraud count. We agree insufficient evidence supports Crystal's conviction, and reverse it on that basis. As to John and Robert, we affirm in all respects.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Prosecution Case
April 13, 2014
John was a police officer with the Palm Springs Police Department. He and Crystal lived in Indio. At about 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, April 13, 2014, John called the direct-dial number for his department's dispatch center to report that Crystal had just discovered that their car, a 2012 BMW, had been stolen from a designated parking space at her parents' condo complex in Palm Springs. John reported he had left the car there around 2:30 that morning after finishing an overtime work assignment. When Crystal went to retrieve the car about 4:00 or 5:00 p.m., it was gone. She then notified John by text and phone, which is when he called the police. John said he had both sets of keys to the car, but a "valet key" was in the glove box.
The officer who took the report went to the crime scene to look for evidence (e.g., broken glass or nearby surveillance cameras), but found none. He entered the car into a database known as the stolen vehicle system (SVS). When a car equipped with a LoJack theft-prevention device is entered into the SVS, LoJack sends a text message to members of the Riverside Auto Theft Interdiction Detail (RAID) notifying them of the theft. LoJack has a separate service that broadcasts the location of the vehicle.
Unbeknownst to John, the BMW was equipped with LoJack. When the car was entered into the SVS, it triggered LoJack's reporting function. However, the location function was defective and did not broadcast the car's location. As a result of the reporting function, Detective Abraham Plata of the Indio Police Department, who was assigned to RAID, received a text notification of the theft around 6:00 p.m. on April 13. However, he was on a special assignment at a music festival and was not able to begin working the case until the next day. In the meantime, he notified other local agencies and offered RAID's assistance.
A claim representative from John and Crystal's insurance company, State Farm, testified about the company's claim process. To initiate a claim of theft, an insured can call his or her agent directly, or call a centralized call center. This call triggers the opening of a claim, which is assigned to a claim representative who communicates with the insured and investigates the claim. The State Farm witness testified that the company's electronic claim file indicated someone contacted its call center on April 13 to initiate a total theft claim regarding the BMW.
April 14, 2014
When Detective Plata offered RAID's assistance to the Palm Springs Police Department, he learned John was a fellow law enforcement officer, which motivated Plata "to go look more for the car." He tried to contact John through the Palm Springs Police Department's dispatch center, but John was "strange[ly]" uncooperative.
The State Farm claim was assigned to a claim representative. Using "the contact information provided in the claim file," which "is provided by the insured when the claim is assigned or when it's reported," the representative called to go "over the details of the loss." She reached John on his cell phone. He told her that he last saw the car when he left it at his in-laws' at 2:30 a.m. on April 13, Crystal first discovered it was missing around 4:00 or 5:00 p.m. that day, and he had personally notified the police that the car had been stolen.
April 15, 2014
The State Farm representative testified that on April 15 she sent John and Crystal an Affidavit of Theft form, which had to be completed, signed under penalty of perjury in the presence of an insurance company representative, and notarized before State Farm would issue payment for a loss.
John Rodriguez, a California Highway Patrol (CHP) Investigator assigned to RAID, told Detective Plata about the "BMW Assist" feature installed on newer BMW's. BMW Assist offers various concierge services, and can provide GPS coordinates for the vehicle's current location, which investigators believed would have led to the vehicle being recovered the very night it went missing. When Detective Plata finally got in touch with John, Plata explained the steps needed to get help from BMW Assist. John did not immediately contact BMW Assist.
In the meantime, Investigator Rodriguez contacted a confidential source at a BMW affiliate, who provided the missing BMW's location in Hesperia, over an hour's drive away. The RAID team and local sheriff's deputies deployed to the general area, "but . . . did not act on that information" yet because they first wanted to surveil the area. A police helicopter flew over the target location and observed a car on the property believed to be the missing BMW.
While police were staking out the area, John finally called BMW Assist and learned of his car's location, which he forwarded to RAID. It was the same location RAID had already identified.
At about 10:00 p.m., Detective Plata and Investigator Rodriguez knocked on the front door of the house at the target location. An "elderly couple" answered the door. When Detective Plata explained why the police were there, the husband, William B., led them to the missing BMW, which was parked behind another vehicle along the back wall of his large detached garage. A standard key (i.e., not valet key) was in the dashboard area under the radio. Inside the trunk, police noticed a hatch door was opened, and the module housing the car's GPS function had been removed and all of its wires cut. The car was otherwise intact.
William told the authorities that his longtime friend, Robert Mejia, had brought the car to the property a few days earlier due to marital problems. William then phoned Robert and handed the phone to Detective Plata. Robert told Plata he took the car to William's house as a prank on his son, John, whose birthday was coming up. Robert said he took the car a "couple" or a "few" evenings ago from a street near John's house in Indio, and drove it to William's house that same night. Robert also said his friend, Carl V., had given him a ride to John's house to get the car.
Sometime on April 15, John notified State Farm that the BMW had been recovered. State Farm had not yet received—and never would receive—a completed Affidavit of Theft from John or Crystal. Therefore, the company never paid them any money on the claim; it did, however, make a payment on their behalf to "Insurance Auto Auctions" (presumably an impound yard where police stored the BMW).
April 21, 2014
Just under one week later, on April 21, Detective Plata interviewed Crystal. She told him she had discovered the BMW missing about 5:00 p.m., at which point she texted John to let him know.
April 22, 2014
On April 22, police executed several search warrants. At William's Hesperia residence, officers noticed several surveillance cameras connected to a computer. Recorded footage from April 13 showed that at about 11:48 a.m.—about nine hours after John reportedly had last seen the BMW—John and Robert arrived at the property in separate cars, with John driving the BMW. The footage shows John removing the rear license plate as Robert and William stand nearby. The footage shows that, about 20 minutes later, John and Robert leave together in a different car.
At John and Crystal's house, officers found both of the BMW's license plates. The rear plate was face-down on top of the refrigerator; the front plate was on a shelf in the garage. On the kitchen counter, officers found a letter from State Farm to Crystal dated April 15, and a partially completed Affidavit of Theft.
An extraction of data from John's cell phone showed that around 5:00 p.m. on April 13, Crystal texted him several naked photographs of herself. There were no messages from Crystal in this timeframe indicating the BMW was missing.
At Robert's house, officers interviewed him while they executed a search warrant. Robert initially said that on April 13, he and William had driven to John's house in Indio, took the BMW to William's house in Hesperia, and then William drove Robert home. When Investigator Rodriguez pointed out to Robert that John had reported the car was stolen from Palm Springs (not Indio), Robert responded that he had taken the keys from John's house in Indio, and the car from John's in-laws' in Palm Springs. Robert claimed he took the car as a prank because he was going to fill it with gifts (such as an amplifier for the car and a humidor for cigars) for John's birthday on April 29. Police did not find an amplifier or humidor during their search of Robert's house. They did, however, find handwritten notes on a piece of paper with crossed-out entries for "got the car" and "[p]ut the car in the garage." Robert admitted the notes made it look like he was "getting his story straight."
May 1, 2014
On May 1, Detective Plata and a CHP investigator interviewed Crystal when she arrived at work. She repeated what she had earlier told Detective Plata—that on April 13 she discovered the BMW was missing and notified John around 5:00 p.m. She admitted she filled out the partially completed Affidavit of Theft found in her kitchen. The form was admitted as a trial exhibit, and shows Crystal wrote that the BMW had "been recovered" on April 15 in "good" condition.
The officers seized Crystal's cell phone pursuant to a search warrant. As they drove away, one officer noticed within five or ten minutes that a "green . . . task bar came across the center of the phone and it basically said [']erasing.[']" The officer testified this meant "[s]omeone logged into the phone remotely and was conducting a complete erase of the phone." Subsequent examination of the phone indicated it had been restored to its "factory settings."
The Defense Case
The defendants called two witnesses. John's maternal grandmother (and, therefore, Robert's mother-in-law), Evelyn V., testified that in April 2014, while visiting her daughter and Robert, she and Robert discussed what to get John for his upcoming birthday. Robert showed her a box that had "a design like a speaker or something like that" on it. She never saw the box again, and never "hear[d] of a new stereo going in any of [John]'s cars." She claimed she had never spoken to anyone about this case for nearly two years, until after trial had already begun.
Crystal's father, Fred R., also testified. He said he saw John in the early morning hours of April 13, when John was "very beat" from working during the festival season. John had finished work and was dropping off his son's swim shoes at Fred's condo because Fred was going to take the grandchildren on a Hawaiian vacation the next day. Fred learned that John and Robert planned to take the BMW to Hesperia later that day to the home of a family friend who fixed scratches on their cars. Fred had seen cosmetic scratches on the "center trunk area bumper," as if one "were sliding . . . a piece of luggage." Because John was so tired from working, Fred offered to drive to Hesperia later that same day (before leaving to spend the night in Long Beach prior to heading to LAX the next morning) to pick up the car when it was fixed, around 2:00 or 3:00 p.m.
Fred testified he "got too busy" preparing for his vacation, so he asked his son, Jeremy, to do it instead. Jeremy had a history of theft (including Fred's wedding band). When Jeremy had not returned with the car by 5:00 p.m., Fred went to see John to break the bad news to him. Fred pleaded with John not to report the car stolen. John did, but made no mention of Jeremy in his report.
Fred acknowledged he first spoke with defense counsel about two weeks before he testified, after trial had already begun.
Although William was technically a prosecution witness, he also offered testimony favorable to the defense (if believed). For example, he testified he asked John to remove the rear license plate of the BMW so he would not get paint on it when fixing the scratched bumper. William worked on the bumper "immediately after" John and Robert dropped off the car, and it took "[a]bout a half hour [to] an hour" to complete. William testified he also cut the wires on the GPS module in the trunk so he could install a new amplifier in the car. However, John's brother-in-law and "somebody else" William had never met picked up the car "a couple hours or so after [William] did the bumper," before William had a chance to install the amplifier. They returned the car the next day, which struck William as "weird." William admitted he did not tell the police about any of the work he did (or planned to do) on the car.
Other testimony showed both Crystal and John had regular income, had not filed for bankruptcy, had recently serviced the BMW, and were current on their car payments.
Jury Verdicts and Sentencing
Each defendant was charged with one felony count of presenting a false claim for payment of a loss under a contract of insurance. (§ 550, subd. (a)(1); count 1.) John was also charged with one misdemeanor count of making a false report of a vehicle theft to a law enforcement agency. (Veh. Code, § 10501, subd. (a); count 2.) And Crystal was charged with one felony count of preparing a false document in support of a fraudulent insurance claim. (§ 550, subd. (a)(5); count 3.)
The jury found all the defendants guilty of insurance fraud, and John guilty of filing a false vehicle-theft report. The jury found Crystal not guilty of preparing a false document in support of a fraudulent insurance claim.
The trial court placed all three defendants on three years' formal probation, and sentenced them to various terms in local custody, to be served in a work release program or through electronic monitoring. The court also ordered each defendant to pay restitution and fines, and to perform community service.
DISCUSSION
I. Prosecutor's Use of Peremptory Challenges
Defendants contend the trial court erred by denying Robert's Batson/Wheeler motion challenging the prosecutor's use of four of his first five peremptory challenges to strike Hispanic prospective jurors. The Attorney General counters that there was no error because the prosecutor articulated genuine race-neutral justifications for each peremptory challenge. We agree there was no error.
A. Background
1. The Voir Dire Questioning
Voir dire was lengthy—over the course of three days, two venires consisting of more than 80 total jurors were examined regarding availability and financial hardship. These screened jurors were then substantively examined. The prospective jurors whom the prosecutor challenged testified as follows:
R.J.
The prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge on prospective juror R.J. This juror's last name appears to be Hispanic in origin.
R.J. is a receptionist in a medical office and lives with his father, who is a security supervisor at a resort. R.J. had no prior jury experience, and misspoke when he was asked about it. He was hesitant when asked about the presumption of innocence, explaining he viewed the situation as "50/50" because "[t]here has to be a reason why these people come here . . . ." When the presumption of innocence was further explained, R.J. was still "not sure" about applying it because he had "never done it before."
R.J. has two cousins who are sheriff's deputies, and he felt he had "[s]omewhat," but "not too much," of a "duty or loyalty to" them that could "[p]ossibly" influence his deliberations.
R.H.
The prosecutor used his second peremptory challenge on prospective juror R.H. The parties agree he is not Hispanic.
R.H. is a retired firefighter who worked closely with law enforcement personnel. He acknowledged this would likely influence his decisionmaking, though he thought he could put aside any bias and judge the facts impartially.
A.G.
The prosecutor used his third peremptory challenge on prospective juror A.G. This juror's last name appears to be Hispanic in origin.
A.G. had never served on a jury. Regarding the degree of proof, he said he "would have to have no doubt in [his] mind to come up with a conclusion of guilty." (Italics added.)
F.A.
The prosecutor used his fourth peremptory challenge on prospective juror F.A. This juror's last name appears to be Hispanic in origin.
F.A. described herself as "a stay-at-home mommy." She was initially confused about the presumption of innocence, and had never heard the term "burden of proof."
When asked by Crystal's counsel if she had had "really good, or . . . really bad experiences with insurance companies," F.A. responded, "Neither good nor bad, just they did what they were supposed to do. But I have other people who have had trouble with them, but each person is different with how they process their claims." F.A. said these people's negative experiences would not "affect how [she] view[s] things here."
E.F.
The prosecutor used his fifth peremptory challenge on prospective juror E.F. This juror's last name appears to be Hispanic in origin.
E.F. initially sought to be excused during the hardship screening because she felt her English comprehension was inadequate. After the court observed that she was able to respond to the court's questioning, the court declined to excuse E.F., saying, "I think you understand better than you think you do."
During substantive questioning, E.F. disclosed that she is a preschool teacher, her husband owns a landscaping business, and one of her adult sons is in the Marines. She previously served on three juries, all of which reached verdicts. When questioned by Crystal's counsel about her experiences with insurance companies, E.F. responded, "Good. [¶] . . . [¶] We haven't had any problems with my insurance."
2. The Batson/Wheeler Proceedings Below
After the prosecutor exercised his fifth peremptory challenge, Robert's counsel, Aimee Mendoza, requested a sidebar conference. In proceedings held in chambers, Mendoza argued:
"[T]he defendants are Hispanic and . . . four of the five jurors appear to be Hispanic and also have Hispanic surnames. From the questioning that was elicited from those four individuals, there was nothing that appeared to be anything that was an obvious means of which to exclude them . . . . In fact, on a few of them, I was actually quite surprised that the D.A. chose to exclude them. So I do think that there should be some prima facie explanation of why those individuals are being released."

The trial court stated it "can't respond to whether or not" the defense has made "a prima facie case until [the court] hear[s] the reason[s]" from the prosecutor. Although the prosecutor disagreed this was the correct procedure for determining whether the defense has made a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, he said he "no problem giving [his] reasons."
Before the prosecutor proceeded, Mendoza elaborated on her showing. She noted E.F.'s English comprehension appeared adequate. John's counsel added that E.F. also appeared to hold pro-insurance views, which theoretically favored the prosecution inasmuch as the victim in this case is an insurance company.
John's counsel also addressed R.J., noting he appeared to hold pro-law-enforcement views, and his misunderstanding of the burden of proof actually favored the prosecution.
The prosecutor then offered his reasoning as to each Hispanic prospective juror he challenged.
R.J.
As to R.J., the prosecutor explained, "I think he was very timid, and he struck me as a person who, one, didn't understand the law, and, two, if anything, was already ready to vote guilty on a better than 50 percent chance. Now, whether the defense might think that's a negative, as the People, I still do believe it's my job to make sure . . . it's a fair trial for both sides. So that's the reason I kicked him. But mostly, I've got to be honest, it's mostly his inexperience and the fact that he was very nervous every time he held a microphone."
A.G.
As to A.G., the prosecutor explained, "[E]ven after I explained to him the reasonable doubt standard, he still said yes, he wanted no doubt, and I think, for obvious reasons, that's a burden I can't possibly make. I don't think there's any case that has no doubt in it. So that was the reason I kicked him." (Italics added.)
F.A.
The prosecutor explained that F.A. "indicated that she had friends who had had negative experiences before with insurance companies, and clearly, it's an insurance company here. That's the main reason why I got rid of her."
E.F.
The prosecutor offered extensive thoughts on E.F.:
"I will be honest, I do take great pause for anybody who asks for a hardship in the very beginning . . . [.] [R]egardless of what the hardship is, that's a person who's already thinking one foot out the door.

"Second, she's a preschool teacher, and for my own personal reasons, even with a wife who is a kindergarten teacher, I sometimes feel that they can be overly sympathetic when there's a . . . defendant that may have some kind of sympathy. [¶] You know, I don't think Mr. Mejia is a serial killer. He's a person—any of the Mejias, I think they made a bad choice in this case. [¶] So the fact that she's a preschool teacher I think would tend to be a person who is more forgiving of mistakes and would make it difficult. [¶]

"And lastly, her son was a Marine. And every time [John's counsel] has spoken about her client and about what type of punishment he deserves or what he's done, the fact that he's a Marine has come up numerous times. [¶]

"I have concerns based on all that, that you put all those things together, you're going to have somebody who's going to be very sympathetic toward the defendant."

In concluding, the prosecutor noted he found it "disheartening" and "offensive" that he—himself Hispanic, and married to another Hispanic—would be accused of improperly using race as a disqualifying factor. Mendoza responded that she had not intended for her challenge to be construed as a personal attack. Rather, she acknowledged "reasonable minds may differ as to whether a juror is good for one side or good for the other."
The court denied Robert's Batson/Wheeler challenge, and explained why it found the prosecutor's justifications were genuinely race-neutral:
"I find his reasons are race neutral, and I find that many of the comments he gave are similar comments to what I have on there, particularly as it pertains to [R.J.] and [A.G.]. In fact, I personally thought they would be the two that were excused for the reasons he gave and they weren't, and [non-Hispanic prospective juror R.H.] was in the middle. I find it to be race neutral. I think the reasons he gave . . . lays out his reasons for doing it.

"I also, for the record, because I don't know who may ever read this again in the future, Indio is very heavily populated with Hispanic people, so it is not unusual that our jury pool will have a lot of Hispanic people on it, and this is similar to many of the others. Both sides have excused Hispanic[-]appearing people. Nonetheless, I believe that you have an obligation to bring that up when it's a concern of yours, and I believe he has given race neutral reasons to have excused them. . . . [¶] . . . [¶]

"I'm denying the motion. I believe the reasons he gave were race neutral and legitimate reasons, many of which I had the very same things written on my notes."

B. Relevant Legal Principles
"Peremptory challenges are a long-standing feature of civil and criminal adjudication. But the exercise of even a single peremptory challenge solely on the basis of race or ethnicity offends the guarantee of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. [Citations.] Such conduct also violates a defendant's right to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the state Constitution." (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1150, 1157 (Gutierrez); see People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 433 (Winbush).)
"At issue in a Batson/Wheeler motion is whether any specific prospective juror is challenged on account of bias against an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. [Citation.] Exclusion of even one prospective juror for reasons impermissible under Batson and Wheeler constitutes structural error, requiring reversal." (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158.)
"When a party raises a claim that an opponent has improperly discriminated in the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court and counsel must follow a three-step process. First, the Batson/Wheeler movant must demonstrate a prima facie case by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. The moving party satisfies this first step by producing ' "evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred." ' " (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158; see Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 433.)
"Second, if the court finds the movant meets the threshold for demonstrating a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent of the motion to give an adequate nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenges. To meet the second step's requirement, the opponent of the motion must provide 'a "clear and reasonably specific" explanation of his "legitimate reasons" for exercising the challenges.' [Citation.] In evaluating a trial court's finding that a party has offered a neutral basis—one not based on race, ethnicity, or similar grounds—for subjecting particular prospective jurors to peremptory challenge, we are mindful that ' "[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation," ' the reason will be deemed neutral." (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158; see Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 433.) The prosecutor's " ' "justification need not support a challenge for cause, and even a 'trivial' reason, if genuine and neutral, will suffice." [Citation.] A prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.' " (Winbush, at p. 434.)
" 'At the third stage of the [Batson/Wheeler] inquiry, "the issue comes down to whether the trial court finds the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations to be credible. Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, the prosecutor's demeanor; by how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are; and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy." [Citation.]' [Citation.] Implausible or fantastic justifications offered at the second stage may not be sufficiently credible to pass muster at stage three. [Citation.] 'In assessing credibility, the court draws upon its contemporaneous observations of the voir dire.' [Citation.] This assessment may also take into account 'the court's own experiences as a lawyer and bench officer in the community, and even the common practices of the advocate and the office that employs him or her.' " (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 434; see Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158-1159.) "This portion of the Batson/Wheeler inquiry focuses on the subjective genuineness of the reason, not the objective reasonableness." (Gutierrez, at p. 1158, italics added.) "When they assess the viability of neutral reasons advanced to justify a peremptory challenge by a prosecutor, both a trial court and reviewing court must examine only those reasons actually expressed." (Id. at p. 1167.) "[T]he trial court enjoys a relative advantage vis-à-vis reviewing courts, for it draws on its contemporaneous observations when assessing a prosecutor's credibility." (Id. at p. 1159.)
"When a reviewing court addresses the trial court's ruling on a Batson/Wheeler motion, it ordinarily reviews the issue for substantial evidence." (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1159.) " 'We review a trial court's determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor's justifications for exercising peremptory challenges " 'with great restraint.' " [Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court's ability to distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to deference on appeal. [Citation.]' " (Winbush, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 434; see Gutierrez, at p. 1159.)
C. Analysis
1. Prima Facie Showing
Because the trial court did not make an express prima facie finding, but instead required the prosecutor to provide at the outset his reasons for exercising his peremptory challenges, the Attorney General concedes we may " 'skip' " to the third step of evaluating the trial court's determination of the genuineness of the prosecutor's stated justifications.
Were it not for this concession, the limited record before us regarding the composition of the jury pool, venire, and selected jury would give us pause in concluding the defense made a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 614 ["The defendant 'should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible.' "].) Although four of the first five prospective jurors challenged by the prosecutor apparently were Hispanic, the trial court noted its locale "is very heavily populated with Hispanic people." This observation is borne out by census data. Moreover, the majority of prospective jurors examined for availability or hardship have Hispanic-sounding surnames. Finally, the record shows that three trial jurors are naturalized citizens, suggesting that some trial jurors likely were Hispanic. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 362 [" 'the fact that the jury included members of a group allegedly discriminated against' " is relevant to the prima face and genuineness steps of the Batson/Wheeler analysis].)
In any event, because the Attorney General concedes we may proceed to assessing the trial court's determination of the genuineness of the prosecutor's proffered race-neutral explanations for exercising his peremptory challenges, we do so now without assessing whether the defense made an adequate prima facie showing of discriminatory intent.
2. Genuineness of the Prosecutor's Justifications
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the prosecutor had genuine, race-neutral justifications for exercising his peremptory challenges.
R.J.
The prosecutor excused R.J. because he was timid, misunderstood the law, and "was already ready to vote guilty on a better than 50 percent chance." These are all race-neutral justifications.
None of the defense counsel rebutted the prosecutor's observations about R.J.'s timid demeanor. (See People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1052 ["the prosecutor's demeanor observations, even if not explicitly confirmed by the record, are a permissible race-neutral ground for peremptory excusal, especially when they were not disputed in the trial court."].) To the contrary, the trial court noted it made many of the same observations as the prosecutor had.
John's counsel noted below that certain of R.J.'s responses indicated he was pro-law-enforcement. However, the prosecutor explained that his heightened burden of ensuring a fair trial overcame R.J.'s potential pro-prosecution disposition and misunderstanding of the applicable evidentiary burden.
A.G.
The prosecutor challenged A.G. due to this prospective juror's rejection of the reasonable doubt standard in favor of a "no doubt" standard. (Italics added.) Defendants accept that this "might be [a] valid reason for the prosecutor to exercise a peremptory challenge." We conclude it is.
F.A.
The prosecutor said the "main reason" he challenged F.A. was because she "indicated that she had friends who had had negative experiences before with insurance companies, and clearly, it's an insurance company here." This is a race-neutral justification. Crystal asserts on appeal that "[t]he prosecutor's reference [citation] to [insurance] is . . . not at all logical." This is an odd assertion, given that it was Crystal's trial counsel who first asked prospective jurors about their views of insurance companies. In any event, we see the race-neutral logic in exploring prospective jurors' attitudes toward insurance companies in a criminal case in which the victim is an insurance company. The fact that it was F.A.'s friends (and not F.A. herself) who had had negative experiences with insurance companies does not undermine the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's justification was genuinely race-neutral. It is reasonable to conclude that a person may be influenced by her friends' experiences.
E.F.
The prosecutor excused E.F. because she initially requested to be excused for hardship, her occupation as a preschool teacher suggested she may be overly sympathetic to the defense, and her son is in the Marines (as was John). These justifications are race-neutral.
Crystal contends the prosecutor's hardship justification was mere pretext because E.F. understood English well enough to have successfully served on three juries. However, this fact also supports the prosecutor's rationale that E.F. was "already thinking one foot out the door"—her English proficiency was clearly good enough to have enabled her to serve on three prior juries, yet she still used it as a basis to be excused in this case.
Defendants acknowledge E.F.'s occupation "comes close" to justifying the prosecutor's decision to excuse her. We find it is close enough. "A prospective juror's occupation may be a permissible, nondiscriminatory reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, and a prosecutor is entitled to believe that people involved in particular professions or with particular philosophical leanings are ill-suited to serve as jurors because they are not sympathetic to the prosecutor." (People v. Arellano (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1165.) Indeed, one court found (albeit in dicta) that a prosecutor sufficiently articulated his experience that " 'many teachers have somewhat of a liberal background and are less prosecution oriented." (People v. Barber (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 378, 394.) The teaching of Barber is that the prosecutor must provide more than an "unsatisfactory vague explanation" about his concern over a prospective juror's occupation. (Ibid.) Here, the prosecutor provided a sufficiently specific explanation of his concern about the link between E.F.'s occupation and the circumstances of this case.
Finally, defendants argue "that excusing a juror based on possible sympathy for someone having served his country should never be accepted by the courts as any kind of valid reason for a peremptory challenge." As the Attorney General points out, defendants have not supported this proposition with any legal authority. Moreover, the sympathy to which the prosecutor alluded is not necessarily inherent to military service but, rather, could arise from virtually any common, meaningful life experience.
Conclusion
In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the prosecutor's justifications for exercising each peremptory challenge were genuinely race-neutral.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Each defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his or her conviction for insurance fraud. Only Crystal's contention has merit.
A. Relevant Legal Principles
Each defendant was charged with one count of insurance fraud under section 550, subdivision (a)(1), which states:
"(a) It is unlawful to do any of the following, or to aid, abet, solicit, or conspire with any person to do any of the following:

"(1) Knowingly present or cause to be presented any false or fraudulent claim for the payment of a loss or injury, including payment of a loss or injury under a contract of insurance."

The prosecutor argued John was guilty as the primary perpetrator, and Robert and Crystal were guilty as aiders and abettors. The trial court instructed the jury as follows regarding the underlying insurance fraud count:
"To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove that:

"1. The defendant presented or caused to be presented a false or fraudulent claim for payment for a loss;

"2. The defendant knew that the claim was false or fraudulent;

"AND

"3. When the defendant did that act, he or she intended to defraud.

"Someone intends to defraud if he or she intends to deceive another person [including an insurance company] either to cause a loss of money or to cause damage to, a legal, financial, or property right. [¶] . . . [¶]

"It is not necessary that anyone actually be defrauded or actually suffer a financial, legal, or property loss as a result of the defendant's acts.

"A person claims, makes, or presents a claim for payment by requesting payment under a contract of insurance for a loss."

(See CALCRIM No. 2000; People ex rel. Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Cruz (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1193 ["The elements generally necessary to find a violation of . . . section 550 are (1) the defendant's knowing presentation of a false claim, (2) with the intent to defraud."].)
The court instructed the jury as follows regarding the elements required to establish aiding and abetting liability:
"To prove that the defendant is guilty of a crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the People must prove that:

"1. The perpetrator committed the crime;

"2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime;

"3. Before or during the commission of the crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime;

"AND

"4. The defendant's words or conduct did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator's commission of the crime."

(See CALCRIM No. 401; People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 ["proof of aider and abettor liability requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reus—a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens rea—knowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reus—conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime."].)
"In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, the reviewing court's role is a limited one. ' "The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]" ' [Citations.] [¶] ' "Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness's credibility for that of the fact finder. [Citations.]" [Citation.]' " (People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 738-739; see People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 (Campbell) [" 'Whether [a] defendant aided and abetted the crime is a question of fact, and on appeal all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment.' "].)
B. Analysis
1. John
John contends we must reverse his conviction for insurance fraud because there is insufficient evidence on the first element—that he presented a "claim for the payment for a loss." (CALCRIM No. 2000; see § 550, subd. (a)(1).) We disagree.
John and the Attorney General both cite People v. Teitelbaum (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 184 (Teitelbaum) to support the proposition that the word "claim," as used in section 550, subdivision (a), "is to be given its common meaning, which is 'to ask for' or 'demand as due.' " Applying this definition, the Teitelbaum court affirmed an insurance fraud conviction arising from a fur dealer's presentation to his insurer of an unsigned list of allegedly stolen furs with a specific value assigned to each, together with a grand total. (Teitelbaum, at p. 213.)
Likewise, the jury here could reasonably have concluded that John intended that his presentation of false information to State Farm about the theft of the BMW constitute a claim—that is, a request for payment of a loss under his insurance policy. First, substantial evidence supports the finding that John presented false information to State Farm. On April 13, someone (likely John) falsely reported to State Farm that the BMW had been stolen. On April 14, John provided demonstrably false information to State Farm about the circumstances of the supposed theft—he claimed he had last seen the car at 2:30 a.m. on April 13 at his in-laws' condo complex, but video evidence showed him in that car (and removing its rear license plate) about nine hours later and at a different location.
Second, the jury could reasonably infer John's intent in presenting this false information was to induce State Farm to pay him for a loss. That is how State Farm interpreted it—the claim representative called to go "over the details of the loss," and mailed an Affidavit of Theft. And John does not suggest for what other purpose he would have given State Farm this false information. The fact that he never expressly demanded payment from State Farm does not preclude the jury from drawing the eminently reasonable conclusion that he was reporting the car stolen so that State Farm would pay him for a loss under his insurance policy. Thus, substantial evidence supports his conviction.
2. Robert
Robert contends insufficient evidence supports his conviction for insurance fraud because "[t]he only evidence against [him] amounted to his assisting John with delivering the BMW to [William], then lying to Detective[] Plata and [Investigator] Rodriguez about who Robert was with when the BMW was delivered to [William]." This evidence is sufficient to support Robert's conviction as an aider and abettor.
The first element of aiding and abetting insurance fraud is supported by substantial evidence because, as we have already explained, substantial evidence supports the finding that "[t]he perpetrator"—John—"committed the crime." (See CALCRIM No. 401.)
Substantial evidence also supports the second and third elements—Robert's knowledge of John's intent to commit the crime, and Robert's intent to aid and abet John "[b]efore or during the commission of the crime." (See CALCRIM No. 401.) Because knowledge and intent are rarely established by direct proof, a jury may infer them from circumstantial evidence. (See People v. White (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 305, 319.) Relevant factors include "presence at the scene of the crime, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense." (In re Lynette G. (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1087, 1094.) The court also instructed the jury that making knowingly false statements or suppressing or fabricating evidence can indicate a defendant's consciousness of guilt, subject to the limitation that evidence of such conduct "cannot prove guilt by itself." (CALCRIM Nos. 362 and 371, italics added.)
Robert's repeated lies to law enforcement constitute abundant circumstantial evidence of his knowledge and intent. The record supports the finding he lied to the police on April 15 by falsely stating he took the BMW from Indio (it was reported stolen from Palm Springs) as a prank to surprise John (who is seen on video driving the car during the alleged surprise prank) with transportation assistance from Carl (who was medically unable to drive at the time). The record supports the finding Robert lied to the police again on April 22 by falsely stating William had driven him to get the BMW in Indio, and then gave him a ride home from Hesperia. Moreover, the search of Robert's house did not yield any of the gifts he claimed he was going to put in the BMW. The search did, however, yield Robert's checklist, which he acknowledged made it look like he was "getting his story straight."
Robert maintains his lies "seemed to be motivated by a desire to protect his son John rather than to deflect blame from himself." However, under the applicable standard of review, " 'reasonable inferences must be resolved in favor of the judgment.' " (Campbell, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 409.) And, in any event, the jury rejected a similar argument Robert presented at trial.
Finally, substantial evidence supports the fourth element of aiding and abetting John's insurance fraud because the jury could reasonably conclude that Robert's "words or conduct did in fact aid and abet [John's] commission of the crime." (See CALCRIM No. 401.) Robert (1) caravanned with John for the approximately 90-minute drive to William's residence in Hesperia, (2) observed John remove the rear license plate from the BMW, and (3) left together with John in a different car. Robert's transportation assistance enabled John to ensure the BMW would not be readily located when he reported it stolen to the police and State Farm.
Robert relies heavily on People v. Jenkins (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 579 (Jenkins) to support his contention that the circumstantial evidence against him is insufficient to support his conviction. There, the defendant was convicted of manufacturing PCP and possessing PCP precursors with the intent to manufacture PCP. (Id. at p. 581.) His conviction was based primarily on his fingerprints being on a vial and containers recovered from a PCP lab in his brother's garage, his denial of ever having touched the paraphernalia, and his giving a false name to police when he was arrested for another offense. (Id. at p. 582.) In reversing, the Jenkins court explained the fingerprint evidence was insufficient because it showed only "that sometime, somewhere [the] defendant touched the containers." (Id. at p. 584, italics added.) The court explained the defendant's use of a false name was "of no probative value" because the "defendant had supplied that false name when he was earlier arrested on an unrelated offense." (Id. at p. 583.)
Jenkins is distinguishable. In contrast to the "sometime, somewhere" fingerprint evidence there, the video evidence here shows Robert was with John and the BMW mere hours before John reported the car stolen, at the location where police eventually recovered it. And unlike the Jenkins defendant's use of a false name in connection with "an unrelated offense" (Jenkins, supra, 91 Cal.App.3d at p. 583), Robert's repeated lies related directly to the issues in this case, and he began making them before he was even a suspect (see People v. Duran (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 923, 932 [unlike the Jenkins defendant, the Duran "defendant began lying before he was charged with anything"]).
Without explaining why he did not cite it in his opening brief, Robert discusses Juan H. v. Allen (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1262 (Juan H.) for the first time in his reply brief. For obvious reasons of fairness, we will not consider this newly cited, nonbinding authority. (See People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 122, fn. 8; People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26.)
Even if we were to consider Juan H., we would find it distinguishable. There, a federal appellate court reversed a 15-year-old's conviction for aiding and abetting murder, where the conviction was based on his (1) presence at the scene, where he stood unarmed behind his brother while the brother shot at rival gang members who had presumably shot at their home about 90 minutes earlier; (2) flight from the crime scene; and (3) lying to the police about his presence at the crime scene. (Juan H., supra, 408 F.3d at pp. 1266, 1267, 1277.) By contrast, Robert's conduct in helping John conceal the BMW in a neighboring town—conduct of an adult, retired police officer—was more calculated and culpable than that of a 15-year-old who merely stood unarmed behind his brother during a spontaneous retaliatory gang shooting, and then "r[a]n home from the scene of shooting." (Id. at p. 1277.) Moreover, the Juan H. court surmised the prosecution may have unfairly pursued the defendant because the brother (the actual shooter) "may not have been brought to justice." (Id. at p. 1279, fn. 16.) No similar motivation is at issue here.
In sum, substantial evidence supports Robert's insurance fraud conviction on an aiding and abetting theory.
3. Crystal
Crystal contends insufficient evidence supports her insurance fraud conviction because none of her conduct that allegedly aided and abetted John—partially completing the Affidavit of Theft, repeatedly lying to police, and erasing the contents of her seized cell phone—occurred "[b]efore or during the commission of the crime." (CALCRIM No. 401.) We agree.
John's commission of the underlying offense (presenting a false insurance claim) presumably ended when he reported to State Farm on April 15 that the car had been recovered. However, the record shows that Crystal's earliest alleged act of aiding and abetting—partially completing the Affidavit of Theft—occurred after April 15. Her other conduct occurred even later (allegedly lying to Detective Plata on April 21 and May 1, and allegedly erasing her cell phone on May 1).
Crystal's only pre-April 15 conduct was her sending of intimate text messages to John around 5:00 p.m. on April 13. This is insufficient to support an inference of Crystal's requisite knowledge of John's intent to defraud State Farm, and her intent to aid and abet his fraud. In the abstract, nothing about her sending of these text messages relates directly to the underlying offense. The messages only became relevant when John cited them on April 13 and 14 as his means of having learned the BMW had been stolen. Crystal's perpetuation of that lie on April 21 and May 1 may have implicated her as an accessory after the fact (§ 32), with which she was not charged, but not as an aider and abettor. Without more, it is unreasonable to infer that Crystal intended that her April 13 text messages would be used in the insurance fraud scheme.
Because the record does not contain sufficient evidence showing Crystal aided and abetted John before or during his commission of the underlying insurance fraud offense, we must reverse her conviction.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed as to Crystal. The judgment is affirmed as to John and Robert.



HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:



McCONNELL, P. J.



HUFFMAN, J.