Filed 5/10/18 P. v. Sherman CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----




THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

KEITH WARREN SHERMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.
C080009

(Super. Ct. No. 14F03926)



A jury found defendant Keith Warren Sherman guilty of two counts of committing a lewd and lascivious act upon a child under 14 years (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), with a special finding that he engaged in substantial sexual contact with the victim within the meaning of section 1203.066, subdivision (a)(8), and one count of sexual penetration with a child 10 years of age or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 25 years to life in prison.
On appeal, defendant’s sole contention is that the trial court improperly admitted expert testimony. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In light of the limited issue raised on appeal, we dispense with a detailed recitation of the facts and procedure. We briefly summarize the underlying facts:
Defendant is the victim’s stepfather. He adopted her when she was four or five years old.
At the time of trial, the victim was 16 years old. She testified that defendant molested her on a regular basis from when she was six years old until she was 11 or 12 years old, i.e., from 2004 until 2009 or 2010. However, she only provided the details of three incidents of abuse. She explained that she got mixed up about the details of the incidents because there were so many times when defendant put his mouth, tongue, finger, and/or penis inside her vagina. The victim further explained that she did not immediately disclose the abuse or tell defendant to stop or physically do anything to make him stop because she was afraid and thought the abuse was her fault. She also believed that she would get into trouble or ruin her family if she disclosed the abuse.
In the summer of 2011, the victim told a close friend, S.E., that defendant had raped her. Around a year or so later, S.E. told her mother, Ruth, about the molestation. When Ruth spoke with the victim, she explained that defendant had forced her to have intercourse with him since she was about seven years old and had forced her to masturbate him. After Ruth spoke with the victim, she told the victim’s mother to report defendant. The mother failed to do so.
In the spring of 2014, Ruth told the victim’s high school counselor she was concerned that defendant had sexually abused the minor. The victim subsequently told the counselor, a social worker, and the police that defendant had sexually molested her. During a Special Assault Forensics Evaluation (SAFE) interview in May 2014, the victim described numerous instances of sexual abuse. A recording of the interview was played for the jury.
Defendant testified on his own behalf at trial. During his testimony, he described an incident in which he “mistakenly” touched his stepdaughter’s vagina when he was drunk. He insisted that he had no sexual interest in her and denied that he had sexual intercourse with her or touched her vagina with his mouth.
DISCUSSION
Prior to trial, the People moved for an order permitting the admission of expert testimony on child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS) for the limited purpose of disabusing jurors of misconceptions they might have concerning how children react to sexual abuse. The prosecutor indicated that he anticipated the defense would attack the victim’s credibility, and that he intended to focus on the aspects of CSAAS that would explain why children delay in disclosing sexual abuse. Specifically, the prosecutor represented that he intended to elicit testimony on three components of CSAAS: helplessness, entrapment/accommodation, and delayed and unconvincing disclosure.
Over defense counsel’s objections, the trial court granted the People’s motion but placed limits on the scope of the expert testimony and indicated that it would give a limiting instruction on the proper use of CSAAS evidence pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1193. At trial, psychologist Dr. Blake Carmichael testified for the prosecution as an expert witness on CSAAS. He explained that CSAAS is a group of concepts used to describe common characteristics of sexually abused children. He described CSAAS as an educational tool developed to dispel common misconceptions about the behavior of children who have been sexually abused. As he explained, the five components of CSAAS are: (1) secrecy; (2) helplessness; (3) entrapment (sometimes called accommodation); (4) delayed disclosure; and (5) retraction (sometimes called recanting). Dr. Carmichael testified regarding three of the components as the prosecutor had previously represented. Among other things, he explained that it is common for sexually abused children to delay in disclosing the abuse.
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial court improperly admitted CSAAS evidence. He does not argue that the CSAAS evidence was inadmissible based on the facts of this case or that the CSAAS evidence exceeded the limits California courts have placed on the use of such evidence. Instead, he asks us to rule that CSAAS evidence is categorically “inadmissible” for all purposes in every case because it violates a defendant’s constitutional rights to due process, to present a defense, and to receive a fair trial. We reject defendant’s claim based on well-settled California precedent.
As defendant acknowledges, California courts have long recognized that expert testimony on CSAAS is admissible in child sexual abuse cases for the limited purpose of disabusing the fact finder of common misconceptions it might have about how child victims react to sexual abuse. (See, e.g., People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1063, 1069; People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 245; People v. Sandoval (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 994, 1001-1002; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 418; People v. Wells (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 179, 188; People v. Patino (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744; People v. Housley (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 947, 955-956; People v. Bowker (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 385, 393-394.) Our Supreme Court has also touched on this issue under analogous circumstances. (See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 905-907 [stating that expert testimony on CSAAS was similar to expert testimony on the behavior of domestic violence victims and, on that basis among others, concluding that the expert testimony on the behavior of domestic violence victims is admissible in cases involving domestic violence]; People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1299, 1300-1302 [discussing the admissibility of CSAAS evidence in the course of ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony about the failure of the parents of a child victim to report molestation].)
Relying on case law from other states, defendant urges us to disregard California authority and hold that CSAAS evidence is inadmissible for all purposes in every case. We decline defendant’s invitation to do so. We see no reason to depart from well-settled authority in this state. Indeed, to the extent our Supreme Court has approved the admissibility of CSAAS evidence to rebut misconceptions about the behavior of child sexual abuse victims in Brown and McAlpin, we are required to follow that precedent. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.




/s/
Duarte, J.



We concur:



/s/
Robie, Acting P. J.




/s/
Murray, J.