Filed 5/11/18 J.S. v. Superior Court CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE


J.S.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAN FRANCISCO COUNTY,
Respondent;
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY ET AL.,
Real Parties in Interest.



A153690

(San Francisco County
Super. Ct. No. JD163256)


J.S. (mother) petitions this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order setting a selection-and-implementation hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for her daughter, 10-year-old A.G. Mother claims that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that there was a substantial risk of detriment to A.G. if returned to her care and that she received reasonable reunification services. We acknowledge that mother loves A.G. and made some progress during the reunification period, but we conclude that substantial evidence supports both challenged findings and therefore deny the petition.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. April to October 2016: A.G. Is Removed from Mother’s Care and Reunification Services Are Ordered.
In the spring of 2016, A.G. came to the attention of the Solano County Health and Social Services Department (Department) based on reports that she was living in a vehicle with mother and mother’s then-husband, who is not A.G.’s biological father, and that both adults were using methamphetamine. A.G. also reportedly came to school “dirty” and “hungry” and was often picked up from school at least an hour late. A.G. stated that mother’s husband often fought with mother and had hit A.G. before. The Department discovered that two other children, A.G.’s half siblings, had been removed from mother’s care and mother had failed to reunify with them. A.G. herself had been removed from mother’s care when she was an infant, but mother reunified with her about a year later.
The Department removed A.G. from mother’s custody on May 19, 2016, after mother called A.G.’s school and said she was not coming to get her daughter. Four days later, the Department filed a petition seeking dependency court jurisdiction over A.G. under section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) on the basis that she faced a substantial risk of physical harm because mother (1) had a history of substance abuse she had not addressed; (2) had a relationship with her husband marked by domestic violence; and (3) was homeless. The petition also alleged jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (g) (no provision for support) on the basis that the whereabouts of mother and A.G.’s biological father were unknown, as well as under subdivision (j) (abuse of sibling) on the basis that mother had failed to reunify with A.G.’s two half siblings. A.G. was placed in foster care, and mother was ordered to receive alcohol and drug testing, substance abuse treatment, parenting education, and mental health services. At the June 2016 jurisdictional hearing, the Solano County juvenile court found the petition’s allegations true after mother failed to appear.
The following month, mother moved to San Francisco to live with her parents, and the case was transferred to San Francisco County. According to the September 2016 dispositional report filed by real party in interest San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency), mother had been physically and sexually abused by her father (grandfather) and had been a dependent child herself. Mother agreed that her parents’ home was “not a good environment for her given the history of sexual molestation and impropriety by her father.” She had also been “involved in a violent relationship with the fathers of all three of her children,” including as the perpetrator.
The Agency gave mother referrals for individual counseling, a substance abuse evaluation, a domestic violence assessment, and random drug testing. As of early September, she was “(mostly) following through with random drug testing, missing two tests out of eight,” but had not pursued the referrals for a substance abuse evaluation or domestic violence assessment. Mother was also visiting A.G. “weekly, missing two scheduled visits out of six.” An addendum report noted that as of late October, mother had missed 15 drug tests out of 33, although all her completed tests were negative. She had not obtained a domestic violence assessment, and she had attended an intake meeting for a substance abuse evaluation but had not completed the evaluation. It was unknown whether she had pursued the referral for individual counseling. She had also missed several other visits with A.G.
The original dispositional report recommended that reunification services be bypassed because mother’s parental rights to one of A.G.’s half siblings had been terminated and mother failed to make “a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to [the half sibling’s] removal.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) In the October addendum report, however, the Agency switched course and recommended that mother receive reunification services because A.G., who was “intelligent” and “mature for her age,” had been “quite verbal” about her desire to live with mother.
In late October 2016, the juvenile court found that mother had made moderate progress toward mitigating the causes of A.G.’s out-of-home placement and adopted the Agency’s recommendation that mother receive reunification services. Mother’s case plan required her to complete a residential drug treatment program, continue to engage in random drug testing, undergo individual counseling, participate in therapeutic visitation with A.G., complete a domestic violence assessment and comply with the assessor’s recommendations, and obtain suitable housing. Mother was also to have weekly supervised visits with her daughter.
B. November 2016 to June 2017: Mother Makes Progress on Her Case Plan but Concerns Remain.
A new social worker was assigned to the case in late 2016 and prepared a six-month status review report in mid-March 2017. The report stated that mother had recently completed a residential drug treatment program and marked that aspect of her case plan complete. The report noted that “she had tested negative for all drug tests” while in the program and that, if she did not participate in the program’s outpatient services, the Agency would “re-refer [her] to begin random drug testing.” It was “unknown” whether mother had tested since mid-February, and the social worker noted that she was no longer going to be assigned to the case, “which may cause some delays in new referrals to test.”
The report also stated that mother had participated in individual counseling during the residential drug treatment program and had been re-referred to a new therapist. She had completed a domestic violence assessment in January, and ultimately she completed a domestic violence program. She told the Agency that “she ha[d] no current issues with DV,” having left her husband. “A discussion of housing was done on at least two occasions,” and mother stated that the residential program was helping her with housing.
Mother was characterized as “caring and nurturing with her daughter.” The two appeared to have “a very strong bond,” although the report expressed concern that mother acted like “more of a big sister” and A.G. acted “much older than she really is,” leading her to “often ‘parent[]’ . . . mother.” Mother had difficulty attending visits in Solano County, where A.G. was placed in foster care. Visitation had recently been switched from monitored to supervised “due to safety concerns,” which apparently arose out of a report that mother had forcibly pierced A.G.’s ears.
The six-month status review hearing was scheduled for April 2017, but it was continued for a contested hearing on placement and visitation. In a May addendum report prepared by the third San Francisco social worker to be assigned to the case, the Agency indicated it was concerned that mother’s mother (grandmother) was allowed to supervise visits, because it brought A.G. into contact with grandfather. In addition, A.G. had contact with mother’s husband during an April visit. The Agency planned to start providing therapeutic visitation and was working to connect mother with a therapist for individual therapy. In conjunction with the addendum report, the Agency filed a section 388 petition to have it instead of grandmother supervise visitation.
At the June 2017 status review hearing, the juvenile court found that mother had received reasonable reunification services, consistently visited with A.G., and made significant progress in resolving the issues that led to A.G.’s removal. Determining that there was a substantial probability A.G. would be returned to mother’s care within six months, the court ordered that services continue. It also granted the Agency’s section 388 petition to allow the Agency to supervise visitation, and it ordered that “therapeutic visits . . . be implemented ASAP.”
C. July 2017 to January 2018: Mother Still Lacks Stability.
In early October 2017, before the status review hearing set for later that month, the Agency filed a report prepared by a fourth social worker, Protective Services Worker (PSW) Nguyen. According to the report, mother was still living in her parents’ home, which the Agency had rejected as a placement option for A.G. due to grandfather’s sexual misconduct. Mother reported that she was working but could not afford a place to live, and PSW Nguyen gave her a referral for housing assistance. Mother was not drug testing, and she claimed she was told she did not need to test after the six-month status review hearing in June. When PSW Nguyen sought to re-refer her for drug testing, mother said she could not get from her workplace to the drug testing site to randomly test. She also claimed that she had never used drugs and had “lied about her drug use in order to enter into a drug treatment program to comply with the case plan requirements.” In addition, mother denied that she had been in a violent relationship with her husband, whom she had now divorced.
Mother was matched with a therapist to start individual therapy in late September 2017, and therapeutic visitation was set to begin soon after. Visits with A.G. were going well, and mother was reported to be “appropriate at all visits and . . . positively engaged with her daughter throughout the visit.” The Agency continued to be concerned, however, that mother treated A.G. more like a peer and that A.G. often presented as “parentified.” A.G. consistently indicated that she wanted to return to mother’s care.
The report recommended that mother’s reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be set. It identified as concerns mother’s living situation, her failure to drug test and acknowledge her past drug use, and her denial of “any domestic violence history.” The report stated, “Although [mother] has completed most of her case plan requirements, . . . [she] is in complete denial of the safety concerns that brought [A.G.] into child welfare custody.” Questioning whether, “if given more reunification services, [mother] would be able to address her long history with substance abuse, domestic violence[,] and trauma she experienced as a child,” the report concluded it was unlikely A.G. would be returned to mother within six months.
The status review hearing originally set for October 2017 was continued twice and set for January 2018. At that time, mother failed to appear, and the juvenile court continued the matter to February for a contested 12-month status review hearing. Meanwhile, a fifth social worker, PSW Yim, was assigned to the case in January after PSW Nguyen resigned.
PSW Yim prepared an addendum report in early February 2018. Mother was renting a room in a house but planned to move into a studio apartment where A.G. could live with her. Mother said she was welcome to stay in her current housing for a year, but PSW Yim learned that mother’s landlord was in the process of evicting her. The landlord also told PSW Yim that mother’s ex-husband helped her pay her first month’s rent the previous November.
Mother had recently begun drug testing again after PSW Yim submitted a new referral, and mother had completed one test whose results were negative. She now acknowledged that she had a substance abuse problem but claimed to have been clean for over a year. She had one visit for individual therapy in September 2017, but she did not like the therapist and did not appear for the next appointment. Mother did not respond to PSW Nguyen’s attempts to contact her to discuss a new therapist, and PSW Yim provided mother with a new referral for individual therapy in early February 2018.
Mother and A.G. had engaged in weekly therapeutic visitation since early October 2017, and the therapist reported that the visits were going well and mother was meeting most of her treatment goals. The therapist also observed that mother and A.G. had more of a peer relationship than a mother-daughter relationship, and mother “need[ed] to continue to work on being able to set firm and consistent healthy boundaries and limits” with her daughter, including not discussing “serious topics” like the dependency case. The Agency still recommended that mother’s reunification services be terminated, reaffirming its concerns about her unstable housing situation, her failure to drug test and denial of a substance abuse problem, her minimizing of her domestic violence history and recent contact with her ex-husband, and her lack of progress in addressing her issues through individual therapy.
D. The February 2018 18-month Status Review Hearing.
The juvenile court treated the February 2018 contested status review hearing as an 18-month status review hearing, because by the time it occurred over 20 months had passed since A.G.’s removal. Four witnesses testified: PSW Nguyen’s supervisor, PSW Yim, the therapeutic visitation therapist, and mother. PSW Nguyen’s October 2017 status review report, PSW Yim’s February 2018 addendum report, the supervised visitation notes, the therapeutic visitation notes, and mother’s certificates from the residential drug treatment program were admitted into evidence.
1. The Agency’s witnesses.
For the most part, the Agency supervisor’s testimony addressed what had happened between early October 2017 and late December 2017, when PSW Nguyen left the Agency. The supervisor testified that as far as she knew, mother had not drug tested, engaged in individual therapy, or maintained suitable housing during that period. The supervisor acknowledged that she had never met mother or A.G. and that her testimony was based on her review of the case file.
PSW Yim testified that although mother was originally ordered to complete a residential drug treatment program, which she did, she did not participate in subsequent outpatient services as recommended. In addition to confirming other details in the addendum report, including that mother had not drug tested between October 2017 and late January 2018, PSW Yim testified that mother had not engaged in any individual therapy between October and the present. PSW Yim opined that mother needed individual therapy because she had a “long history of substance abuse, mental health, domestic violence relationship. And so even though she completed an inpatient program for about three months, . . . there are also issues that [she] need[s] to continue[] to address, to go . . . deeper . . . on her personal internal healing.” Of particular concern was that mother minimized her domestic violence history and its impact on her and her daughter.
Summarizing the Agency’s reasons for recommending that mother’s reunification services be terminated and a section 366.26 hearing be scheduled, PSW Yim pointed to the instability of mother’s living situation and personal finances, her failure to participate in outpatient drug services and consistently drug test, her failure to participate in individual therapy to address her substance abuse and domestic violence issues, and her contact with grandfather and her ex-husband, which called into question whether she could keep A.G. safe. PSW Yim also had concerns about mother’s difficulty taking a parental role with A.G.
On cross-examination by mother’s counsel, PSW Yim testified that PSW Nguyen had provided mother with a referral for drug testing that was good between July and October 2017. PSW Yim could not confirm whether mother had a referral that covered the period between April and June 2017, however, and no referral was submitted between late October 2017 and January 2018.
2. Mother’s witnesses.
The therapist who supervised mother and A.G.’s therapeutic visitation testified that she had been conducting weekly sessions since early October 2017. The sessions had gone very well, and mother and A.G. had a warm, caring relationship. The goals of the therapy, which mother and PSW Nguyen had set, were that mother: (1) “remain drug-free, mentally stable, and not be in any domestic violent relationships, and that will be evidenced by her ability to attend to [A.G.’s] emotional and physical needs”; (2) treat A.G. in an age-appropriate manner; (3) act in a parental role; (4) be “physically affectionate” with A.G.; (5) give A.G. “positive affirmations”; and (6) be consistent with visits and not discuss the dependency case with A.G. Mother had consistently met these goals for at least six weeks, which was sufficient to mark them as accomplished, except for the goal of not discussing the case with A.G., which was “in progress.” On cross-examination, the therapist agreed that she had judged mother’s progress based on her own observations of what occurred during the sessions, not talking to mother about her circumstances.
Mother testified that she had two jobs and was set to move into a studio apartment in Vallejo within the next week, and she denied being evicted from her current housing. She admitted to having used methamphetamine but said she had been sober for almost 18 months. She claimed that she had never been told that an outpatient drug treatment program was a requirement of her case plan and had never received a referral for such a program. She also claimed that she had received a referral for drug testing in 2017 and, contrary to the Agency’s reports, had tested with negative results for “almost a year.”
Mother denied receiving a referral for individual therapy after leaving the residential drug treatment program until PSW Nguyen provided one several months later. Mother believed the abuse she had experienced in childhood played a major role in causing her to stay in a relationship marked by domestic violence and to otherwise neglect A.G., and she recognized the importance of engaging in individual therapy to address her emotional issues. Yet despite the Agency’s reports to the contrary, she claimed that she had acknowledged being in a violent relationship with her ex-husband, and she maintained she had not seen him for over a year.
3. The juvenile court’s findings and order.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court found that a return to mother’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment to A.G. The court recognized that mother had a traumatic childhood and the system had failed her by not ensuring that she got help when she was a dependent. It also recognized that mother loved A.G. and found that mother had made “moderate” progress in addressing the issues that led to her daughter’s removal. But the court observed that, as mother herself agreed, she still needed significant therapy to address her issues. In addition, her housing situation was not settled, and it was unclear whether she had remedied her substance abuse problem. The court found that mother had made significant progress in understanding domestic violence’s effect on A.G., but it also found credible the Agency’s evidence that mother had recently had contact with her ex-husband and observed that “[e]ven the physical presence of an abuser has an impact” on a child.
The juvenile court also found that mother had received reasonable reunification services. The court observed the conflict between her claim that she had not received necessary referrals and her claim that she had sufficiently addressed her problems, and it specifically found credible the Agency’s evidence that mother had received sufficient referrals for individual therapy. Over 20 months had passed since A.G.’s removal, and the court found there was not enough time left for mother to address these issues and assuage its concerns about A.G.’s “emotional safety.” The court stated, “[I]f I could extend this case for another year of services, I would, but I can’t.” It then terminated mother’s services and set a section 366.26 hearing.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that A.G.’s Return to Mother Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment.
Mother contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that A.G. would face a substantial risk of detriment if returned to mother’s care. Although we recognize that mother made progress on certain aspects of her case plan, we conclude that the finding was supported by substantial evidence.
“Until services are terminated, reunification is the goal,” and there is a “ ‘ “strong preference for maintaining the family relationships if at all possible.” ’ ” (David B. v. Superior Court (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 768, 788.) Thus, at the 18-month status review hearing, the juvenile “court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent . . . unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent . . . would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) The detriment standard, “ ‘while vaguely worded to be sure, must be construed as a fairly high one. It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal, did not benefit from the reunification services as much as we might have hoped, or seems less capable than an available foster parent or other family member.’ It must mean what it says: that return presents a substantial risk of detriment to the child.” (Rita L. v. Superior Court (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 495, 505.) “We are looking for passing grades here, not straight A’s.” (David B., at p. 790.)
“ ‘In evaluating detriment, the juvenile court must consider the extent to which the parent participated in reunification services. [Citations.] The court must also consider the efforts or progress the parent has made toward eliminating the conditions that led to the child’s out-of-home placement.’ ” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960, 966; § 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) “[T]he decision whether to return a dependent child to parental custody is not,” however, “necessarily governed solely by whether the parent has corrected the problem that required court intervention,” so long as the detriment at issue is “ ‘a manifestation of the original basis for dependency.’ ” (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1344.)
We review a finding of substantial risk of detriment for substantial evidence. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400-1401.) “In so doing, we consider the evidence favorably to the prevailing party and resolve all conflicts in support of the [juvenile] court’s order. [Citation.] ‘Substantial evidence’ means evidence that is reasonable, credible[,] and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case.” (Id. at p. 1401.)
We agree with the Agency that sufficient evidence supports the finding of a substantial risk of detriment. Mother had recently brought A.G. into contact with her ex-husband and lied about it, raising legitimate concern about A.G.’s safety. Mother had also failed to drug test for the Agency for almost a year. Although some of the gaps may have been due to the turnover in social workers and consequent delay in referrals, mother did not test even when referrals were active and did not complete outpatient care as she was advised to do. Thus, it was unclear whether mother’s substance abuse continued to be a problem. Mother herself acknowledged that she still needed therapy to address the emotional issues underlying her neglect of A.G. Finally, mother still did not have stable housing, which had been a major precipitating factor in A.G.’s removal. Although mother claimed she had procured a studio apartment, she lied about having been evicted from the room she was renting. The evidence of ongoing instability in mother’s life in all these areas called into question her ability to keep A.G. safe and adequately supported the detriment finding.
Mother argues that she substantially complied with her case plan and made substantive progress in addressing the problems that led to A.G.’s removal, which are “ ‘indic[ia] of progress toward family preservation.’ ” (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1345.) She summarizes the progress she made, which included completing a residential drug treatment program, testing clean when she drug tested, divorcing her ex-husband and completing a domestic violence program, and successfully engaging in therapeutic and regular visitation with A.G. She also points out that a finding of detriment cannot be based on a lack of suitable housing alone. (See In re G.S.R. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1214.) But the juvenile court based its finding on more than mother’s living situation, and mother fails to address the other evidence discussed above that supported a finding of detriment, particularly that related to domestic violence. Although mother made undeniable progress on many aspects of her case plan, this is not enough to justify reversal of the court’s finding. There was sufficient other evidence that A.G. would face a substantial risk of detriment if returned to mother’s care.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that the Agency Provided
Reasonable Services.
Mother also claims that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that she was provided with reasonable reunification services. She contends that she should therefore receive additional services. We are not persuaded.
At the 18-month status review hearing, the juvenile court is required to determine whether reasonable reunification services have been provided to a parent. (§ 366.22, subd. (a)(3).) The court may not set a section 366.26 hearing “unless there is clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been provided or offered to the parent.” (§ 366.22, subd. (b)(3)(C).) We review a finding that reasonable services were provided for substantial evidence, which requires us to view “the evidence in [the] light most favorable to the prevailing party and indulg[e] in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the court’s ruling.” (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.)
A social services agency is required to “make a good faith effort to develop and implement a family reunification plan. [Citation.] ‘[T]he record should show that the . . . agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult.’ ” (Amanda H. v. Superior Court (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1340, 1345.) “The adequacy of reunification plans and the reasonableness of [the agency’s] efforts are judged according to the circumstances of each case.” (Ibid.) “ ‘The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’ ” (In re T.G. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 687, 697.)
As an initial matter, mother fails to recognize that the remedy she seeks—additional reunification services—is not authorized. A juvenile court may order additional services at the 18-month status review hearing only for a parent “who is making significant and consistent progress in a court-ordered residential substance abuse treatment program,” who was a minor or nonminor dependent at the time of the detention hearing, or who was recently discharged from custody, and only if the court finds there is a substantial probability of the child’s return within 24 months of removal. (§ 366.22, subd. (b).) In addition, some cases have held that reunification services can be extended beyond the 18-month limit when certain exceptional circumstances are present. (See, e.g., In re J.E. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 557, 563-564.) But even assuming that mother might have qualified to receive additional services after the 18-month hearing, she identifies no authority for extending services past 24 months. (See § 366.26, subd. (b); J.E., at p. 564.) It has now been over 23 months since A.G. was removed, and thus, as the Agency points out, “[t]he time for mother to receive further reunification services has expired.”
In any event, mother’s claim fails on the merits. She argues there were three main deficiencies in the reunification services provided to her. First, she claims the Agency failed to inform her “that she was required to complete a separate outpatient program,” which “was not specifically included in the . . . case plan.” It is true that the case plan did not specify that mother complete an outpatient drug treatment program, but it did require her to “complete a residential drug treatment program which includes counseling and testing” and which could “not be terminated without the [social worker’s] approval.” Even though the April 2017 status review report checked off a box marking this requirement as “[c]omplete,” it also noted directly underneath that the residential program had offered mother the opportunity “to stay with the program as an outpatient participant so that she could easily transition back, [but mother] declined this service in February when she finished the inpatient portion.” The report also noted that mother’s refusal to participate in the outpatient program was an “[i]mpediment[] to [c]ompletion” of the drug treatment portion of the case plan. Thus, not only was an outpatient program made available, mother was aware that the Agency viewed her failure to participate in it as an obstacle to completing her case plan. The latter circumstance distinguishes this case from the main decision on which mother relies, which concluded that reasonable services were not provided where the social worker incorrectly informed the mother that she had enrolled in all required services and did not reveal otherwise until almost a year later. (Amanda H. v. Superior Court, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1346-1347.)
Second, mother claims that the Agency failed to provide her with sufficient referrals for drug testing and individual therapy. She has waived this challenge to the extent she complains about deficiencies that arose before the June 2017 status review hearing. The juvenile court made a finding of reasonable services at that time, and mother did not appeal from that order. As a result, that finding is final and cannot be challenged in this appeal. (See In re S.B. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 529, 531-532.) Specifically, we will not consider mother’s claims to the extent they are premised on the Agency’s purported failure to provide her with referrals for drug testing or individual therapy between February and June 2017.
As for the post-June 2017 absence of referrals for drug testing or individual therapy, mother fails to demonstrate that the Agency’s efforts were unreasonable under the circumstances. She points out that even though there was a referral for drug testing that was active between July and October 2017, she told PSW Nguyen that she could not miss work to test, and there was apparently no referral between October 2017 and late January 2018. Mother’s failure to test between July and October, when a referral was active, does not establish that the Agency failed to provide reasonable services. And it appears that PSW Nguyen may have not submitted another referral in October based on mother’s representation that she could not miss work to test. Mother does not argue that the Agency could have arranged more convenient testing.
As for individual therapy, the October 2017 status review report indicates mother was given a referral in August 2017, even though the first appointment was not until late September. We cannot conclude that a delay of a couple months in making a referral rendered the Agency’s efforts unreasonable, and the Agency cannot be faulted for mother’s dislike of the therapist she was referred to and failure to attend individual therapy after the first appointment. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414 [“ ‘The requirement that reunification services be made available to help a parent overcome those problems which led to the dependency of his or her minor children is not a requirement that a social worker take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions’ ”].)
Finally, mother complains that although the juvenile court ordered in June 2017 that therapeutic visitation begin as soon as possible, the sessions did not begin until almost four months later. A new social worker was assigned to the case sometime between May and October 2017, and it is unclear from the record what other factors may have accounted for the delay. Ideally, therapeutic visitation would have begun earlier. Viewed in the context of the overall provision of reunification services, however, this gap does not undermine the court’s finding that the Agency provided reasonable services.
III.
DISPOSITION
Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. The decision is final in this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).) Mother’s request for a stay of the juvenile court’s June 6, 2018 hearing is denied as moot.
 

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Humes, P.J.


We concur:


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Margulies, J.


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Dondero, J.
















J.S. v. Superior Court A153690