Filed 5/11/18 P. v. Wynn CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LARRY LEE WYNN,

Defendant and Appellant.
D072878



(Super. Ct. No. SCS291091)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Francis M. Devaney, Judge. Affirmed.
Matthew R. Garcia, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina and Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Larry Lee Wynn contends on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike a prior strike conviction in sentencing him. We reject this contention and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wynn pled guilty to corporal injury on a spouse (count 1) (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a)) and possession of drug paraphernalia (count 2) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364) in March 2017. Through his plea, Wynn admitted that he willfully inflicted corporal injury on his wife, which resulted in a traumatic condition, and that he unlawfully possessed drug paraphernalia. Wynn also admitted having previously suffered a strike conviction. (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12 & 668.)
Wynn thereafter filed a motion requesting that the trial court exercise its discretion under section 1385 to strike his prior strike conviction. Wynn argued that the trial court should exercise its discretion to dismiss his strike because:
 
(1) his prior criminal record stems from his mental health issues and related substance abuse problems; (2) the strike prior is thirty years old; (3) he was employed with the Department of Veterans Affairs; (4) he had been "clean and sober" prior to the charged offenses and had not violated the law since 2005; (5) punishment with the strike sentence would be disproportionate to the actual crime; (6) he was in mental health and drug treatment; and (7) he is not a danger to the public. Wynn attached several exhibits to this motion that related to the mental illness and substance abuse issues discussed in the motion.
The People filed an opposition to the motion, pointing out the severity of Wynn's attack on his wife, and his long and continuous criminal history.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion during which counsel for both parties reiterated arguments made in their respective briefs.
During the hearing, the trial court made remarks indicating that it had considered Wynn's mental illness as well as the seriousness of the current offenses and Wynn's lengthy criminal history. The court ultimately denied Wynn's motion to strike his prior strike, reasoning that Wynn had committed a serious offense, he had a lengthy criminal history, and he had not previously sought adequate treatment for
 
his mental health and substance abuse issues. The trial court stated that under these circumstances, it could not find that Wynn was outside the spirit of the "Three Strikes" law.
At the same hearing, the trial court sentenced Wynn to the low term of two years, doubled, due to the prior strike.
Wynn timely appeals.
III.
DISCUSSION
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to strike Wynn's prior strike
Wynn contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to strike Wynn's prior strike conviction.
A. Governing law and standard of review
In deciding whether to dismiss a prior strike conviction allegation, the trial court "must consider whether, in light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, [he] may be deemed outside the [Three Strikes] scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies." (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
 
A trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss a prior strike conviction is entitled to deference and the party challenging such a ruling has the burden to " 'clearly show' " that the ruling was irrational or arbitrary. (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977–978.)
B. Application
The probation report notes that "[t]he instant matter represents [Wynn's] eighteenth and nineteenth known convictions, with prior arrests involving robbery, battery, assault, criminal threats, burglary, and drug possession." (Italics added.) Wynn's lengthy and serious criminal record, which includes numerous domestic violence related convictions, strongly supports the trial court's refusal to strike Wynn's strike. (See People v. Strong (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 328, 338 ["Following Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th 148, the overwhelming majority of California appellate courts have reversed the dismissal of, or affirmed the refusal to dismiss, a strike of those defendants with a long and continuous criminal career"].)
Wynn contends that the trial court abused its discretion by unreasonably dismissing the significance of Wynn's mental illness as being causally related to Wynn's commission of prior crimes. In support of this contention, Wynn notes that the trial court stated that it was " 'cynical,' " about Wynn's contention that he should not be incarcerated so that he could complete mental health treatment. In light of Wynn's extremely lengthy and serious record, the trial court could reasonably
 
question whether Wynn's plea for mental health treatment was sincere, since he presumably had numerous previous opportunities to request such treatment on the occasions of his prior convictions. The trial court also could have reasonably been skeptical of the efficacy of mental health treatment in addressing Wynn's criminality, in light of evidence that Wynn had been seeing a psychiatrist since 2011, and yet had committed the charged offenses in December 2016. In addition, the court could reasonably determine that Wynn's mental health issues were not sufficiently mitigating so as to warrant striking the strike. Further, there is no merit to Wynn's related contentions that the trial court's purported alleged failure to consider the significance of his mental illness caused the court to fail to exercise informed discretion in ruling on the motion to strike the strike. Finally, the trial court did not violate Wynn's right to federal due process through its refusal to strike his prior strike conviction.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.


AARON, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.