Filed 5/15/18 Marriage of Reed CA4/3





NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re Marriage of LISA J. and JAMES ARMSTEAD REED.

LISA J. REED,

Appellant,

v.

JAMES ARMSTEAD REED,

Respondent.


G050666

(Super. Ct. No. 08D003781)

O P I N I O N
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Renée E. Wilson, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Dismissed in part and affirmed in part. Respondent’s request for attorney fees. Denied.
Holstrom, Block & Parke and Ronald B. Funk for Appellant.
Law Offices of Edward R. Danoff, Jr., and Edward R. Danoff, Jr., for Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Lisa J. Reed (Lisa) and James Armstead Reed (James) were married in 1988 and separated in 2004. A judgment addressing custody, visitation, and other issues was entered in December 2010, and a judgment on reserved issues, including property division, was entered in July 2014.
Lisa filed a notice of appeal from the judgment on reserved issues entered in July 2014. She is challenging: (1) an order, incorporated into the December 2010 judgment, terminating her right to receive spousal support; (2) an order barring her from presenting evidence on issues that could have been covered in her final declaration of disclosure required by Family Code section 2105; (3) attorney fee sanctions of $20,000 imposed against her under section 271 in the July 2014 judgment; and (4) monetary sanctions of $5,000 imposed against her in the judgment entered in July 2014 based on breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, Lisa contends both judgments must be reversed because the trial court was biased against her.
We conclude the trial court’s ruling that terminated Lisa’s right to receive spousal support was directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Because Lisa did not file a timely notice of appeal from the order terminating spousal support or the judgment entered in December 2010, we lack jurisdiction to consider that portion of the appeal and dismiss it.
We otherwise affirm. The trial court was correct to impose an evidentiary sanction against Lisa because she failed to file a final declaration of disclosure after having been ordered no fewer than five times to do so. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing $20,000 in sanctions against Lisa under section 271. The trial court considered Lisa’s ability to pay and properly ordered that the sanctions be paid out of her interest in one of James’s retirement accounts.
The trial court did not err by imposing $5,000 in sanctions against Lisa for breach of fiduciary duty because the record supports a finding that she failed to disclose to James the existence of a community property pension from Presbyterian Intercommunity Hospital (PIH). Lastly, we reject Lisa’s argument that the trial court was biased against her personally.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
Background
Lisa and James were married in 1988. The trial court later found the date of separation was September 9, 2004 and the duration of the marriage was 16 years, three months. In April 2008, Lisa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. At that time, Lisa and James had three minor children—J.R., L.R., and C.R. Lisa and James also had one adult child.
The dissolution petition was assigned to Commissioner Renée E. Wilson. When we refer in this opinion to the trial court, we mean the court with Commissioner Wilson presiding, unless we identify a different bench officer.
Issues of custody, visitation, and support were addressed at a hearing in August 2008. By that time, J.R. was no longer a minor child. The court awarded Lisa and James joint legal custody of L.R. and C.R., awarded Lisa primary physical custody of L.R. and C.R., and granted James visitation rights. In November 2008, James was ordered to pay monthly child support and monthly spousal support.
II.
Lisa’s Interference With James’s Visitation Rights
By May of 2009, Lisa was not permitting L.R. and C.R. to visit James. Lisa had James’s telephone number blocked so that James could not call or text L.R. and C.R. on their cell phones. In May 2009, James’s counsel sent a letter to Lisa’s counsel advising him that Lisa had been denying James visitation rights and had refused to let James spend any time with L.R. and C.R. over the prior Thanksgiving and Christmas holidays. In June 2009, James’s counsel sent a second letter to Lisa’s counsel advising him that Lisa still was not letting James visit L.R. and C.R. and that Lisa had blocked James’s phone number on the children’s cell phones.
In July 2009, the trial court appointed Miriam J. Galindo, Psy.D., to conduct an evaluation of L.R. and C.R. pursuant to Evidence Code section 730. Galindo submitted a report in January 2010 in which she concluded: “Based on a review of the evidence in this case, it can be said with a high degree of psychological certainty that C.R. and [L.R.] are manifesting signs of child alienation. They are also showing signs of Generalized Anxiety Disorder ([L.R.]), and avoidant tendencies ([C.R.]). It can also be said with a high degree of psychological certainty that [Lisa]’s use of inductive reasoning, ongoing exposure of the children to court documents, paranoid processing, and unresolved anger toward [James] is the most likely source of this alienation.” The report stated: “In light of [Lisa’s] paranoid symptomotology and fixed beliefs, it is also unlikely that [Lisa] will comply with any court orders for a psychiatric consult or psychotropic medication. [Lisa] is more inclined to value external rewards and consequences, such as court sanctions. She will not be motivated by education, explanations, warnings, or psychological insight.”
Based on Galindo’s report, the trial court submitted an application under Welfare and Institutions Code section 329 to Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) to commence dependency proceedings. SSA conducted an investigation and prepared a report in March 2010. In the report, SSA noted “there is a documented pattern of [Lisa] cutting off relationships with family members and significant people in her life, if she feels they have wronged her or have upset her” and “[t]his pattern appears to be continuing with regard to [James].” James had told the SSA investigator that he had not seen L.R. or C.R. for nearly a year. The SSA report stated: “[Lisa] does not want contact with [James] and does appear to be cutting off contact with him for his children as well. . . . The undersigned believes that the children fear, maybe subconsciously, that [Lisa] would cut them out if they crossed her. They have chosen [Lisa] to align with over [James]. . . . The children appear to have no reasons to reject [James], except for those that they each parrot almost word for word, as did [Lisa].”
The preparer of the SSA report had reviewed Galindo’s report and reached the same conclusion. SSA declined to initiate proceedings because “[t]his matter does not rise to the level to meet the evidence required to sustain a petition in Juvenile Court.”
In August 2010, James filed an order to show cause seeking termination of spousal support on the ground that Lisa “has done everything in her power to ‘frustrate and/or destroy’ my right to visit with our two minor children.” Lisa did not file opposition.
III.
Trial on Custody and Visitation Issues;
Termination of Lisa’s Spousal Support
Trial was bifurcated, and issues of custody and visitation were tried first. Trial commenced in February 2010 and was continued several months to allow the parties to come up with a workable visitation plan. On August 26, 2010, Lisa called the court and said that she could not come to court because both she and her child were ill. The court continued the matter to September 21. On that day an attorney appeared for Lisa and requested a trial continuance. The court denied the request. Trial was conducted on September 21 and 22. On September 22, the court reviewed subpoenaed documents showing that Lisa had reported to work at 6:32 a.m. on August 26 and had called the court that day from work. Trial on custody and visitation issues resumed and was completed in October 2010.
At the end of the first phase of trial, the court, in announcing its decision on the record, stated: “What [Lisa] has done to these children is unconscionable. In all the years I have been on the bench, I don’t believe I have ever seen a case where—we use the term lightly, ‘alienation’ but this is truly a case of alienation. [Lisa] has severely alienated the children from [James]. . . . [Lisa] has attempted to preclude [James] from the children’s lives just about in every avenue.”
The court found that Galindo’s report was sufficient but not necessary to find alienation: “While the report indicates that the 730 evaluator believes this is . . . strong evidence of a case of severe alienation, to be honest with you the evidence that was presented to the court alone stands for the premise these children have been alienated from [James] by [Lisa]. In fact in the report it is stated that [Lisa] is blocking the children’s access to [James] while simultaneously blaming [James] for their problems.”
The court considered remedies, but noted that “[u]nfortunately, these children are in a position that because of their age, intervention by this court is limited.” The court recognized it could not force L.R., who then was 17 years old, to live with James or even communicate with him, so the court awarded joint legal and physical custody to Lisa and James for the remaining nine months until L.R. reached the age of majority. Though inclined to grant James sole legal and physical custody of C.R., the court recognized that would not be feasible in reality, and ordered joint legal and physical custody. Lisa was granted primary physical custody of L.R. and C.R., with the proviso that “in the event that alienation can be overcome, primary physical custody of the minor children will be with [James].”
The court concluded the appropriate remedy was to terminate spousal support due to Lisa’s conduct in alienating L.R. and C.R. from James. A “Bifurcated Judgment re Child Custody and Visitation,” was entered in December 2010, and it states, “[Lisa]’s right to receive any further spousal support payments is hereby terminated.”
IV.
Continuances of Trial on Remaining Issues
At the conclusion of the trial of custody and visitation issues, the trial court set a date of December 21, 2010 for trial of the remaining issues. The court ordered Lisa and James to file income and expense declarations and property declarations no later than December 17, 2010. Lisa had not yet filed her final disclosure declaration. The court ordered her to do so within 20 days. James’s motion for sanctions and attorney fees was continued to the trial date.
On December 21, 2010, the trial court continued the trial to March 17, 2011, apparently because Lisa had not filed her income and expense declaration, property declaration, and final declaration of disclosure. The court ordered Lisa to file and serve those documents, and ordered James to file an updated income and expense declaration.
James timely filed and served an updated income and expense declaration. As of March 17, 2011, Lisa had not filed her declarations and final declaration of disclosure. As a consequence, the trial court continued trial to June 27, 2011, scheduled a status conference for April 15, and ordered the parties to file income and expense declarations, property declarations, final disclosures, trial briefs, exhibit lists, and witness lists. The court referred Lisa, who was self represented, to the Family Law Self Help Clinic for assistance.
Lisa did not file the documents she had been ordered to file. The status conference was continued on the court’s own motion to April 29, 2011 and then to May 6, 2011. Lisa did not appear in court on May 6. The court received an income and expense statement from Lisa that had been slipped under the courtroom door the previous evening or early on the morning of May 6. This income and expense statement had no attachments and did not include a property declaration or final declaration of disclosure. The court continued the status conference to May 20, 2011 “to address the issue of [Lisa]’s failure to comply with the orders to file an income/expense [declaration] with attached paycheck stubs and file any and all final disclosures, declaration re: final disclosures.” The court announced it would consider sanctions if Lisa failed to appear.
Lisa failed to appear at the status conference on May 20 and did not file the documents she had been ordered to file. The court awarded James sanctions against Lisa in an amount and kind to be determined at trial. The court continued the trial date to June 27, 2011. The court commented: “This case is becoming ridiculous. I really don’t know what to do anymore.”
As of June 27, Lisa had not filed the documents she had been ordered to file. On that day, an attorney appeared in court, announced he was making a special appearance on Lisa’s behalf, and asked for a continuance. The court announced it would proceed on James’s request for modification of child support at the end of the calendar. When the matter resumed, Lisa’s counsel was not present. Lisa announced that counsel had to appear in another courtroom, and so she was again self represented. The court scheduled a trial setting conference for September 20, 2011.
V.
Order Granting James’s Motion for
Evidentiary Sanctions
In July 2011, James filed a motion for evidentiary, issue, terminating, and monetary sanctions against Lisa and for attorney fees and costs pursuant to section 2107 (the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions). The basis of the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions was that Lisa had disobeyed five court orders that she produce and serve a final declaration of disclosure required under section 2105.
On September 20, 2011, the trial court set trial for December 8, 2011. The court ordered the parties to file and serve trial briefs, income and expense declarations (with attachments), proofs of service of final declarations of disclosure, and property disclosures five court days before the trial date.
The Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions was heard on September 30, 2011. Lisa did not file opposition but appeared at the hearing. She claimed she had not been served with the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions and her attorney was out of the country. The court denied Lisa’s request for a continuance, found that service was proper, and granted the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions. The court ordered: “[Lisa] is prevented from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in the Final Declaration of Disclosure pursuant to [section] 2105, including the current Income & Expense Declarations.” The court ordered Lisa to pay James’s attorney fees in the amount of $3,190. A formal, signed order was entered on December 14, 2011.
Lisa retained counsel a week before the scheduled trial date of December 8, 2011. Lisa’s counsel filed and served a property declaration, an income and expense declaration, trial brief, witness list, and exhibit list. In her trial brief, Lisa made this representation: “[Lisa] does not have a retirement plan with [PIH] that she is aware of, and receives no information on same. However, should any such plan exist, then the community property should be equally divided.”
VI.
Lisa’s Bankruptcy Petitions
Lisa filed a petition for Chapter 13 bankruptcy at 7:46 p.m. on December 7, 2011, the day before the scheduled trial date. On Schedule B–Personal Property, Lisa listed her PIH retirement plan as an asset. On December 8, the day set for trial, counsel advised the court that Lisa had filed a bankruptcy petition. The court continued the trial to February 15, 2012 and ordered the parties to file income and expense declarations and property declarations 10 days before that date.
Because, as of February 15, 2012, Lisa’s bankruptcy was ongoing, the court addressed only the issues of status and child support. The court continued the trial on remaining issues to May 17, 2012. A partial judgment setting child support was entered and, in June 2012, a judgment of dissolution was entered.
Lisa’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition was dismissed in April 2012. On May 16, the day before the scheduled trial date, Lisa filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy. On May 17, the trial court scheduled a trial setting conference to August 9, 2012. On August 9, the court continued the trial to September 14, 2012 because Lisa’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy was ongoing. On September 14, trial was continued at the parties’ request to October 26, 2012, and on October 26 the trial was continued pursuant to the parties’ agreement to December 7, 2012.
On October 22, 2012, Lisa obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. Among the debts discharged was the award to James of $3,190 in attorney fees in connection with the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions.
On December 7, 2012, the court set trial for February 11, 2013 and ordered that current income and expense declarations be filed 10 days before that date. Both Lisa and James timely filed their respective income and expense declarations. Later, trial was continued to April. In March 2013, the court granted a motion by Lisa’s counsel to be relieved.
In February 2013, James filed a motion for monetary sanctions and attorney fees. According to the motion, James had incurred $94,408 in attorney fees and costs and paid $73,000 in attorney fees and costs to date in the dissolution proceedings. The motion was made on the grounds, among others, that (1) Lisa’s conduct had resulted in James’s counsel having to make 44 court appearances; (2) Lisa had lied to the court in explaining why she did not show up in court for a hearing; (3) Lisa had concealed the fact she had a vested retirement plan with PIH; (4) Lisa had filed four OSC’s and her conduct had forced James to file 5 OSC’s; (5) Lisa had filed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on the eve of trial without notifying James’s counsel; (6) Lisa had filed her Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition on the eve of trial; and (7) Lisa had never filed her final declaration of disclosure and her property declaration despite being ordered to do so many times.
In June 2013, James filed another motion for monetary sanctions based on those same grounds. According to this motion, James had incurred $99,365 in attorney fees and costs and paid $76,000 in attorney fees and costs to date in the dissolution proceedings. By the time of this motion, James had made 46 court appearances in the matter. He requested $150,000 in sanctions against Lisa.
VII.
Continuances Based on Lisa’s Medical Conditions
Trial was continued to June 28, 2013. Lisa requested a continuance for medical reasons. The court granted Lisa’s request and continued trial to July 19, 2013. The minute order states: “Court advises the parties there will be no further continuances unless [Lisa] has an affidavit from her doctor. [Lisa] must give the [James] 48 hours[’] advance[] notice if she plans on requesting a continuance due to medical injury.”
On July 19, 2013, Lisa appeared in court with a letter from her doctor “recommend[ing]” that trial be postponed due to Lisa’s medical condition. The court found the letter to be insufficient because it did not state that Lisa’s medical condition required a continuance or that proceeding with trial would be detrimental to Lisa’s health. The court gave Lisa one hour in which to have her doctor fax the court a letter stating it would be detrimental to her health to participate in the proceedings.
After a recess, Lisa announced she had called her doctor’s office, her doctor was not in, and she had been informed that her doctor’s office “can’t write medical letters.” In response, the court trailed the matter to 3:00 p.m. on Monday, July 22, 2013, to allow Lisa time to obtain a letter from her doctor indicating: (1) Lisa cannot proceed with trial due to her medical condition; (2) Lisa cannot proceed to trial for the next three months; (3) the doctor was not available on July 19, 2013; and (4) Lisa was not able to proceed at the last hearing due to a rotator cuff injury.
On July 22, 2013, Lisa appeared in court and announced that her doctor’s office had told her the doctor’s letter would be ready for her to pick up the next day. The court trailed the matter to July 23.
Lisa submitted two letters to the court. On July 23, the court stated the letters did not contain the information the court had requested. Neither letter stated that Lisa could not participate in trial, and one letter only stated Lisa was on medication. The court set a trial date of August 23.
VIII.
Trial on Remaining Issue Starts; More Continuances
Trial commenced on August 23, 2013. James’s counsel and Lisa gave opening statements; Lisa testified and offered exhibits into evidence. Trial resumed on August 27 and 28, and September 4, and then was continued to September 11. On September 3, 2013, James filed a third motion for monetary sanctions and attorney fees. The motion was made on the same grounds as the prior two such motions. The amount of attorney fees and costs incurred by James had risen to $110,933. The number of court appearances had risen from 46 to 55.
On September 11, 2013, Lisa submitted a letter from her doctor stating: “As a result of her elevated blood pressure and other related issues still being evaluated, she has been instructed not to proce[ed] with her divorce trial for at least 3 months. Proce[e]ding with her divorce trial will be detrimental to her health.” The letter was not written by either doctor who had written the letters presented to the court in July.
The court asked Lisa if she was on disability. Lisa replied that she had been off work for two days but was not on disability. The court expressed suspicion over the veracity of Lisa’s claims of illness. The court stated: “Ma’am, quite honestly the number of times the hearings have been continued far . . . exceed . . . I am not meaning to sound or say you’re not ill, but it is very suspect when we’re ready to go to trial, and you filed for bankruptcy. [¶] Then when we were ready to go to trial, you have blood pressure problems. We start the trial. You’ve never given a letter from the doctor, and I want a letter from the other doctor with the conditions that I previously told you because it’s not impossible if you have blood pressure problems to not take your blood pressure medication, and go to a new doctor today, and to say, no you’re in danger. [¶] I’m not saying that you’re doing that, ma’am, but this case has become so suspect, that I want a letter from both those doctors confirming that you are unable to work or . . . that you are . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . incapable of doing your case or going to work.”
The court trailed the trial to September 16, behind a child support hearing that Lisa had set for that the date. The court told Lisa, “[i]f you could participate in the other case, then you can participate in this one.”
On September 13, Lisa filed a “supplemental declaration” requesting a trial continuance of three months due to her “current health crisis & my inability to be in a courtroom.” Attached to the supplemental declaration was a letter addressed to the court that was purportedly from the same doctor who prepared the September 11, 2013 letter. The September 13 letter, which was not on letterhead stationery, stated “[d]ue to health concerns, Lisa Reed cannot appear in court and will need to delay her divorce trial, child support hearing, and hearing about court fees for at least three months.”
Lisa did not appear on September 16, 2013. James’s counsel stated that Lisa had not appeared for the child support hearing earlier that day. The trial court continued the trial for three months, to December 17, 2013. On that date, the court on its own motion continued the trial to February 27, 2014.
IX.
Lisa’s Motions to Recuse the Trial Court
On February 14, 2014, Lisa filed a motion to recuse Commissioner Wilson on the ground of bias. In response, the court entered an order, supported by a declaration from Commissioner Wilson, striking the motion. The order stated: “The challenge is unclear, but appears to be based on the claim that the assigned commissioner is biased against [Lisa] based on a ruling on spousal support. The [Lisa]’s opinion and dissatisfaction with the court’s rulings demonstrates on its face no legal grounds for disqualification.”
In court on February 27, Lisa presented another motion for recusal. Lisa claimed that she had met three times with an attorney who might have a matter before Commissioner Wilson. The court rejected the motion as premature because Lisa had not filed a substitution of attorney and was still self represented. When the court asked the parties to proceed, Lisa said she was not prepared to go forward in her present physical condition and asked the court to call 911. The court continued the matter to the next day.
X.
The Trial on Remaining Issues Resumes and Is Completed
Trial resumed on February 28, 2014. Lisa appeared and requested a continuance in order for the court to rule on her motion for advancement of attorney fees, which was scheduled for March 24, 2014. The court denied the request for a continuance and commented there were “very few issues left” to be tried. Trial continued with Lisa conducting cross examination of James.
Trial was not completed on February 28 and was continued to March 3, 2014. Trial resumed and testimony was completed on March 3. The court invited the parties to submit written closing argument briefs no later than March 14 and responding briefs no later than March 20. Both Lisa and James presented closing argument briefs.
But the proceedings were far from over. On March 12, Lisa filed a motion for an order to reopen trial. Two weeks later, she filed a request for an order to advance attorney fees and costs. On March 24, Judge Nathan Scott denied Lisa’s motion to advance attorney fees on the ground it was not adequately supported. At some point, Lisa had filed a request for an order to set aside the order terminating spousal support and to reinstate spousal support. The request was denied by Judge Scott on March 28. Lisa also had filed a motion to quash a subpoena. Judge Scott denied that motion.
On April 28, 2014, after a continuance requested by Lisa, the trial court denied Lisa’s request for an order to reopen trial. On May 2, Lisa filed a request for an order to quash subpoenas duces tecum for production of her medical, payroll, and bank records. Commissioner Nealy denied the request.
In November 2013, Lisa had filed a request for an order increasing child support payments, requiring James to pay arrearages of the children’s medical expenses, court ordered fees, and child support, and retroactively modifying child support. Commissioner Nealy denied that request for an order in May 2014.
XI.
Trial Court’s Ruling and Judgment
On May 22, 2014, the trial court issued a ruling on the remaining issues. The rulings were carried forward into the judgment entered in July 2014. The judgment confirmed the date of marriage was June 4, 1988, the date of separation was September 9, 2004, and the duration of the marriage was 16 years, three months. The judgment divided eight items of property and all household furnishings between Lisa and James, and directed that James’s employment retirement benefits and 457k retirement account and Lisa’s retirement benefits with PIH be divided pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.
Two parts of the judgment are particularly important to this appeal. The first is the court’s award to James of $20,000 as attorney fees sanctions under section 271. The judgments recites: “This court finds that [Lisa] has engaged in conduct which frustrated the policy of the law to settle the matter and reduce litigation cost[s]. [Lisa]’s delaying tactics, her refusal to properly prepare and timely submit even simple forms, such as Income & Expense Declarations, have done nothing but delay the trial and cause needless fees and costs to be incurred by [James]. For example, [Lisa] attached [James]’s paycheck stubs to her own Income & Expense Declaration. Nevertheless, the Court must also consider that [Lisa] has paid a penalty for her part of the action by way of the evidentiary sanctions for [Lisa]’s actions relating to custody/visitation, this was addressed by previous court action. Therefore, this Court will not award [section] 271 attorney fee sanctions for [Lisa]’s actions relating to the issue. Unfortunately, even with prior sanctions, this did not change the course of [Lisa]’s actions as this case labored on months afterwards and more attorney fees and costs were incurred. [¶] [Lisa] is ordered to reimburse [James] as for [section] 271 sanctions the sum of $2,850 as and for costs incurred by [James] for payment to Dr. Mariam Galindo to appear at court for trial. [¶] [Lisa] i[s] further ordered to pay as and for [section] 271 attorney fee sanctions to [James] in the sum of $20,000.00.”
The second is the award to James of $5,000 for Lisa’s breach of fiduciary duty. The judgment recites: “This Court having found that [Lisa] breached her fiduciary duty by failing to inform [James] of the existence of a pension with [PIH] hereby orders sanctions payable by [Lisa] to [James] in the sum of $5,000.”
The judgment orders Lisa to pay the attorney fees and sanctions from her one half interest in James’s 457k retirement plan.
In June 2014 Lisa, now represented by counsel, filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that the trial court was biased. The court denied the motion. In September 2014, Lisa filed a notice of appeal from the July 2014 judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Review Termination of Lisa’s Right to Receive Spousal Support.
By order entered in November 2008, James was ordered pay monthly spousal support to Lisa of $1,776 through “[d]eath of either party, remarriage of [Lisa], time of trial or further order of court.” In August 2010, James filed a motion to terminate spousal support payments based on Lisa’s efforts to “‘frustrate and/or destroy’” James’s rights of visitation with L.R. and C.R.
The trial court granted James’s request to terminate spousal support to Lisa as a sanction for her conduct that alienated L.R. and C.R. from James. The order was incorporated into the judgment entered in December 2010. That judgment states: “The court hereby enters a Judgment terminating [Lisa]’s right to receive any future spousal support, effective immediately, pursuant to In [r]e Marriage of Ciganovich (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 289, 293. The Spousal Support payment that is due on October 15, 2010, and any thereafter, are not to be made to [Lisa]. [Lisa]’s right to receive any further spousal support payments is hereby terminated.”
Lisa did not file a notice of appeal from the December 2010 judgment or from the order terminating spousal support. Lisa did not file a notice of appeal until September 2014, when she filed a notice of appeal from the July 2014 judgment.
On our own motion, we raised the issue of jurisdiction over the appeal from the order and judgment terminating spousal support, and invited the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing two issues: (1) “Was the judgment entered on December 22, 2010 directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine as an order terminating temporary spousal support?” and (2) “Does this court have jurisdiction to consider the issue of termination of spousal support?” Lisa and James each filed a supplemental brief addressing those issues.
“When a court renders an interlocutory order collateral to the main issue, dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral matter, and directing payment of money or performance of an act, direct appeal may be taken. [Citations.] This constitutes a necessary exception to the one final judgment rule. Such a determination is substantially the same as a final judgment in an independent proceeding.” (In re Marriage of Skelley (1976) 18 Cal.3d 365, 368 (Skelley).) In Skelley, the California Supreme Court held that an order reducing temporary spousal support was directly appealable under the collateral order doctrine. (Id. at pp. 367 368; see Greene v. Superior Court (1961) 55 Cal.2d 403, 405 [order granting or denying temporary alimony is directly appealable].)
Many cases since Skelley have concluded that temporary spousal support is a collateral matter, and orders granting, denying, or modifying temporary spousal support are directly appealable as judgments on a collateral matter. (In re Marriage of Tong and Samson (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 23, 26, fn. 2 [“An order regarding payment of temporary spousal support is directly appealable”]; In re Marriage of Gruen (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 627, 639 [order for temporary spousal support is directly appealable]; In re Marriage of Campbell (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 502, 506 [order denying motion to terminate temporary spousal support is directly appealable]; In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 595 [an order for temporary spousal support is in the nature of a final judgment and is directly appealable]; In re Marriage of Maxfield (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 755, 759 [modification of spousal support component of interlocutory judgment is directly appealable].)
The order terminating Lisa’s right to receive spousal support, which was incorporated into the December 2010 judgment, was an interlocutory order and judgment that was dispositive of the parties’ rights on the collateral matter of spousal support. No further action was necessary on that matter. The order and judgment terminating Lisa’s spousal support was in effect the same as an order modifying support and, therefore, was directly appealable under Skelley.
Lisa argues in her supplemental brief that the trial court terminated her right to receive permanent spousal support, not temporary spousal support. This difference is significant, Lisa argues, because temporary spousal support awards have no bearing or effect on the trial court’s jurisdiction to award permanent spousal support under section 4320. Lisa argues the order terminating spousal support was incorporated into a bifurcated judgment which itself was not directly appealable.
As a general principle, interlocutory judgments on bifurcated issues in marital dissolution proceedings, except for marital status issues, are not directly appealable, but may be appealed only from the final judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1); In re Marriage of Loya (1986) 189 Cal.App.3d 1636, 1638 1639; In re Marriage of Fink (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 357, 360.)
Termination of spousal support in this case, however, was not such an interim ruling. The court entered a judgment terminating spousal support and Lisa’s right to receive spousal support, and that judgment was in the nature of a final judgment dispositive of the rights of the parties on the collateral matter of spousal support. The judgment was all the more final, dispositive, and appealable to the extent it terminated Lisa’s right to permanent spousal support. The portion of the December 2010 judgment that terminated spousal support, “‘[e]ven if it is technically interlocutory,’” was “‘dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to a collateral matter,’” and therefore was subject to a direct appeal. (In re Marriage of Campbell, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 505.)
Our conclusion that the order and judgment terminating spousal support were directly appealable not only is correct under the law but is sound policy. A spouse aggrieved by an order terminating spousal support need not wait until entry of a final judgment (which in this case was nearly four years later) in order to file an appeal and obtain appellate review. Had Lisa timely filed a notice of appeal from the judgment entered in December 2010, her right to spousal support almost certainly would have been resolved before entry of the July 2014 judgment.
Lisa had, at most, 180 days from the date of entry of the December 2010 judgment in which to file a notice of appeal from the portion of that judgment terminating her right to receive spousal support. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1)(C).) Lisa did not timely file a notice of appeal from either the October 2010 order terminating spousal support or from the December 2010 judgment incorporating that order. If a timely appeal is not taken from a directly appealable order, then the issues determined by the order are res judicata (In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 393) and the order may not later be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment (In re Baycol Cases I & II (2011) 51 Cal.4th 751, 761, fn. 8). Thus, Lisa cannot obtain review of the issue of termination of spousal support by her appeal from the July 2014 judgment.
“The time for appealing a judgment is jurisdictional; once the deadline expires, the appellate court has no power to entertain the appeal.” (Van Beurden Ins. Services, Inc. v. Customized Worldwide Weather Ins. Agency, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 51, 56.) Accordingly we lack jurisdiction to consider Lisa’s challenge to the order and that portion of the December 2010 judgment that terminates Lisa’s right to spousal support.
II.
Evidentiary Sanctions Under Section 2107
Lisa argues the trial court erred by granting the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions and preventing her from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in her Final Declaration of Disclosure.
Section 2105 requires each party to file a final declaration of disclosure no later than 45 days before the first assigned trial date. (Id., subd. (a).) The final declaration of disclosure must include the information listed in section 2105, subdivision (b). If a party fails to serve a final declaration of disclosure, section 2107, subdivision (a), authorizes a complying party to request that the noncomplying party prepare a final declaration of disclosure. If the noncomplying party fails to comply with a request under subdivision (a) of section 2107, the complying party may bring a motion “for an order preventing the noncomplying party from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in the declaration of disclosure.” (Id., subd. (b)(2).) We review an order for sanctions under section 2107, subdivision (b) under the abuse of discretion standard. (See In re Marriage of Feldman (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1478.)
At the conclusion of the trial of custody and visitation issues, the trial court set a date of December 21, 2010 for trial of the remaining issues. The court ordered Lisa to file her final declaration of disclosure within 20 days.
Lisa did not file a final declaration of disclosure. On the day set for trial, the court continued the trial to March 17, 2011 and ordered Lisa to file a final declaration of disclosure by noon on March 4, 2011. On March 17, the court again ordered Lisa to file to file a final declaration of disclosure and referred her to the Family Law Self Help Clinic for Assistance. The court continued the trial to June 27 and scheduled a status conference for April 15 (later continued to April 29).
Lisa still did not file a final declaration of disclosure. On April 29, the trial court ordered Lisa for a fourth time to file a final declaration of disclosure and continued the status conference to May 6, 2011.
Lisa did not appear at the status conference on May 6 and did not file a final declaration of disclosure. The court issued an order to show cause re sanctions against Lisa to be heard on May 20, 2011 and for a fifth time ordered her to file a final declaration of disclosure. Lisa did not file a final declaration of disclosure and did not appear in court on May 20.
As of June 27, 2011, the then scheduled trial date, Lisa had not filed a final declaration of disclosure. In July 2011, James filed the Motion for Section 2107 Sanctions, which sought evidentiary, issue, terminating, and monetary sanctions against Lisa under section 2107, subdivisions (b) and (c). Lisa did not file opposition to the Motion for Section 2017 Sanctions. The court granted that motion and ordered that “[Lisa] is prevented from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in the Final Declaration of Disclosure pursuant to [section] 2105, including the current Income & Expense Declarations.”
The trial court did not err by granting the Motion for Evidentiary Sanctions. By the time the court granted the motion, Lisa had disobeyed five court orders to file a final declaration of disclosure. Lisa never filed a declaration of disclosure required by section 2105 and has never offered an explanation for why she did not do so. The evidentiary sanction ordered by the court was precisely the one authorized by section 2107, subdivision (b)(2).
III.
Attorney Fees and Costs Under Section 271
In the final judgment, the trial court ordered Lisa to pay attorney fees and costs to James in the amount of $20,000 under section 271. Lisa contends the attorney fees and costs were unwarranted and excessive and, in imposing them, the trial court did not consider her ability to pay.
Section 271, subdivision (a) authorizes a family court to award attorney fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction” when the conduct of a party or attorney “frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” (§ 271, subd. (a).) “Sanctions under section 271 are appropriate whenever a party’s dilatory and uncooperative conduct has frustrated the policy of promoting settlement of litigation and cooperation among litigants. [Citation.] There is no requirement that a party suffer any actual injury as a prerequisite to requesting an award of attorney fees as sanctions under section 271.” (In re Marriage of Tharp (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1295, 1317.)
“‘We will not interfere with the order for sanctions unless the trial court abused its broad discretion in making it.’” (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Sanctions under section 271 must be scaled to the sanctioned party’s ability to pay and must be made in light of both parties’ financial condition. (Ibid.) Section 271 is not a need based statute and therefore does not require a correlation between the conduct for which sanctions are imposed and the attorney fees incurred by the party seeking them. (In re Marriage of Corona (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1226 1227.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing $20,000 in attorney fees sanctions against Lisa under section 271. In making the award, the court found: “[Lisa] has engaged in conduct which frustrated the policy of the law to settle the matter and reduce litigation costs[s]. [Lisa]’s delaying tactics, her refusal to properly prepare and timely submit even simple forms, such as Income & Expense Declarations, have done nothing but delay the trial and cause needless fees and costs to be incurred by [James].”
Substantial evidence supported those findings. Starting no later than trial on custody and visitation issue, Lisa engaged in delaying tactics that drove up the cost of litigating what should have been a straight-forward division of personal property. Lisa’s conduct, which is recounted in detail in the Facts and Procedural History section of this opinion, supports an award of sanctions against her. Lisa requested numerous continuances of trial. Trial scheduled for December 21, 2010 was not completed until March 2014. Not all continuances were at her request, but many if not most of them were. Lisa failed to appear on May 6, 2011 and at the OSC re sanctions on May 20, 2011. Lisa did not appear for the hearing on September 16, 2013 and did not notify James she would not be appearing. Lisa requested and received continuances for medical reasons but did not comply with the court’s order to produce a letter from her doctor to justify the continuances.
The many continuances, delays, and no shows by Lisa meant that James had to repeatedly submit income and expense declarations and his counsel had to prepare for and appear in court dozens of times for no reason. In March 2014, James’s counsel filed a declaration in support of a request for attorney fees under section 271 stating “[t]he hearing on March 24, 2014 will be about the 63rd appearance on this case.” As of March 3, 2014, James had incurred about $135,000 in attorney fees and costs.
Although Lisa was self-represented through most of the proceedings, that does not excuse her conduct. “[M]ere self representation is not a ground for exceptionally lenient treatment. Except when a particular rule provides otherwise, the rules of civil procedure must apply equally to parties represented by counsel and those who forgo attorney representation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984 985.)
The award of $20,000 was well within the trial court’s discretion. The court did consider Lisa’s ability to pay and found that Lisa could pay the $20,000 in attorney fees (and the $5,000 sanctions for breach of fiduciary duty) “without undue hardship.” Instead of ordering Lisa to pay cash out of hand, the court ordered her to pay the sanctions out of her interest in James 457k plan with Great Western Financial, which had an estimated value in excess of $200,000 at the time final judgment was entered.
IV.
Sanctions for Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The trial court found that Lisa had breached her fiduciary duties by failing to disclose to James the existence of her PIH retirement plan. As a sanction, the final judgment orders Lisa to pay James $5,000.
Section 721, subdivision (b) creates a fiduciary relationship between spouses in their transactions with each other and subjects the relationship to general rules regarding fiduciary relationships. (In re Marriage of Simmons (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 584, 590.) Section 1100, subdivision (e) sets forth fiduciary obligations governing management and control of property. Those duties include “the obligation to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest . . . and to provide equal access to all information, records, and books that pertain to the value and character of those assets . . . upon request.” The duties imposed by section 1100, subdivision (e) apply during dissolution proceedings. (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1475.)
In addition, section 2102, subdivision (a) confirms that, from the date of separation to the date of the distribution of a community or quasi community asset, each spouse is subject to the fiduciary duties imposed by section 721, including the duty to make “accurate and complete disclosure of all assets and liabilities in which the party has or may have an interest or obligation.” (§ 2102, subd. (a)(1).)
Sanctions for breach of a spouse’s fiduciary duties of disclosure during dissolution proceedings are authorized in at least three sections of the Family Code. First, section 2107, subdivision (c) requires the trial court to impose monetary sanctions and award reasonable attorney fees against a party who fails to comply with any portion of the chapter of the Family Code dealing with a spouse’s fiduciary duty of disclosure during dissolution proceedings. Second, section 1101, subdivision (g) provides that “[r]emedies for breach of the fiduciary duty by one spouse, including those set out in Sections 721 and 1100, shall include, but not be limited to, an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney’s fees and court costs.” Third, as explained above, section 271, subdivision (a) gives the trial court authority to base an award of attorney fees and costs “on the extent to which the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation.”
These three provisions—section 1101, subdivision (g), section 2107, subdivision (c), and section 271, subdivision (a)—“collectively give the trial court authority to order sanctions and pay attorney fees for breach of a party’s fiduciary duty of disclosure and for conduct which frustrates the policy of promoting settlement.” (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1474.) The judgment cites only section 271, as the basis for the sanctions imposed on Lisa for failure to disclose the PIH pension fund. We may, however, affirm the sanctions on any ground supported by the record. (In re Marriage of Feldman, supra, at p. 1478, fn. 6.)
Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Lisa breached her fiduciary duties to James by failing to disclose the existence of her PIH retirement plan. James served Lisa with Family Law form interrogatories which asked, among other things, whether Lisa had an interest in any retirement plan. Lisa did not identify her PIH pension in her written responses to those interrogatories or in the schedule of assets and debts attached to them. On December 1, 2011, Lisa, represented by counsel, filed a trial brief stating “[Lisa] does not have a retirement plan with [PIH] that she is aware of, and receives no information on same.” Six days later, Lisa filed her Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and listed her PIH retirement plan as an asset on Schedule B–Personal Property and as exempt property on Schedule C. In July 2006, Lisa was mailed a document from PIH regarding the value of her benefits under her PIH retirement plan. This letter was received into evidence during the second phase of trial.
From the evidence, the trial court was justified in drawing the inference that Lisa knew of her PIH retirement plan but intentionally failed to disclose its existence to James. Failure to disclose to James the existence of the PIH retirement plan constituted a breach of fiduciary duty of disclosure under sections 1100, subdivision (e), and 2102, subdivision (a), and warranted sanctions under section 271, subdivision (a), section 1101, subdivision (g), and/or section 2107, subdivision (c). Under section 1101, subdivision (g), the trial court could have awarded James 50 percent, or an amount equal to 50 percent, of Lisa’s PIH retirement plan, and James had requested 100 percent of the plan value. Lisa’s PIH retirement plan had an estimated value of $82,800 as of March 2011. The court was lenient in imposing sanctions of $5,000 for Lisa’s breach of fiduciary duty.
IV.
Judicial Bias
Lisa argues that “the abuses of discretion,” in particular the order terminating her right to receive spousal support, were evidence that the trial court was biased against her personally.
“‘A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.’” (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1000.) Reversal of the judgment in a civil case based on judicial bias is required where there exists “‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker [that] is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’” (Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. (2009) 556 U.S. 868, 877; see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. State Water Resources Control Bd. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 731, 737.) Bias is determined under the objective standard of whether a reasonable member of the public would fairly entertain doubts about the judge’s impartiality. (People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 446.)
“‘Bias or prejudice consists of a “mental attitude or disposition of the judge towards [or against] a party to the litigation. . . .”’ [Citations.] Neither strained relations between a judge and an attorney for a party nor ‘[e]xpressions of opinion uttered by a judge, in what he conceived to be a discharge of his official duties, are . . . evidence of bias or prejudice.’” (Roitz v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 716, 724.) Thus, a party cannot premise a claim of bias on a judge’s statements made in an official capacity (Jack Farenbaugh & Son v. Belmont Construction, Inc. (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1031), a judge’s substantive opinion on the evidence (Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 312), a judge’s ruling (even erroneously) against him (McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. (1916) 172 Cal. 6, 11), or a judge’s expression of a view on a legal or factual issue presented in the proceedings (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.2, subd. (b)).
Lisa argues the trial court’s abuse of discretion in making the challenged rulings “casts doubt on all of the court’s rulings in connection with the Judgment.” We lack jurisdiction to review the decision to terminate Lisa’s right to spousal support. Even if that decision were erroneous, it would not be enough to establish bias amounting to a due process violation warranting reversal. (Brown v. American Bicycle Group, LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 665, 674 [trial court’s adverse rulings do not reflect personal bias]; Blakemore v. Superior Court (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 36, 59 60 [erroneous rulings without more do not establish judicial bias].) In the three rulings that we have reviewed on the merits (the evidentiary sanction, the attorney fees sanction under section 271, and the sanction for breach of fiduciary duty) we have found no abuse of discretion. As we have not found abuse of discretion in any of the challenged rulings, we reject Lisa’s claim of judicial bias.
V.
James’s Request for Appellate Attorney Fees
James requests an award of attorney fees incurred on appeal. His request is made under sections 271, 2030, and 2032. We deny the request.
The purpose of an attorney fees award under section 2030 is to ensure that both sides have sufficient resources to retain counsel and litigate the matter. (Id., subd. (a); In re Marriage of Cryer (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1056.) Section 2032, subdivision (a) requires that an award of attorney fees award and the amount be “just and reasonable under the relative circumstances of the respective parties.” James has not provided any information about his or Lisa’s financial condition that would enable us to consider an award of appellate attorney fees under section 2030.
Section 271, subdivision (a) authorizes a family court to award attorney fees and costs “in the nature of a sanction” when the conduct of a party or attorney “frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys.” Appellate sanctions against Lisa under section 271 are not warranted. The single most important issue on appeal, and the one to which James devoted over 23 pages of his respondent’s brief, was the propriety of the trial court’s order terminating Lisa’s right to spousal support as a sanction for her conduct in alienating L.R. and C.R. from James. We are dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, Lisa’s appeal from that order. We raised the matter of jurisdiction on our own. James did not raise the matter of appellate jurisdiction in his respondent’s brief and never filed a motion to dismiss that part of Lisa’s appeal, which would have lessened his litigation costs.
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed as it pertains to the order terminating Lisa’s right to spousal support and the December 2010 judgment. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover costs on appeal.



FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:



ARONSON, ACTING P. J.



THOMPSON, J.