Filed 5/16/18 In re A.H. CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO



In re A.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

A.H.,

Defendant and Appellant.


E069006

(Super.Ct.No. SWJ1700296)

OPINION


APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Sean Lafferty, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Thien Huong Tran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha Cortina, Lynne McGinnis and Amanda E. Casillas, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant and defendant A.H. was declared a ward of the juvenile court after admitting the allegations that she unlawfully possessed a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29610) and unlawfully possessed live ammunition (§ 29650). The court placed her in the custody and control of the probation department, committed her to the Riverside County Youth Treatment and Education Center and, among other conditions, ordered her to submit to warrantless searches of all electronic devices. Appellant now argues that this condition is overbroad because it permits review of her personal information, without regard to its relevancy to any suspected criminal activity or noncompliance with probation conditions. We agree that, as written, the condition is overbroad and must be modified. In all other respects, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On April 14, 2017, the San Bernardino Police Department was conducting an operation in a high crime location, within the boundaries of the criminal street gang known as the Alley Boyz. Officers were driving around the area and observed appellant and three other individuals. Upon seeing the police vehicle, the subjects began walking away at a rapid pace. Officers observed appellant throw a loaded firearm on the ground. The police recovered a double barrel derringer, with two rounds in the chamber. The firearm did not have a record on file. The police detained appellant and searched her. They found two rounds of .22-caliber ammunition in her pants pocket. Appellant was a documented Alley Boyz gang member. Her companions were either documented or self-admitted Alley Boyz members.
ANALYSIS
The Electronics Search Condition is Unconstitutionally Overbroad
The court imposed the following probation condition (the electronics search condition): “That the minor be subject to search and seizure of all personal electronic devices for electronic communication information pursuant to . . . §§ 1546.1, 1546.2, and 1546.4; and must submit to search of all computers, hard drives, flash drives, thumb drives, removable media, computer networks, electronic data storage devices, personal digital assistants, cellular telephones, smart phones, iPads, Notebooks, Chromebooks, and any other electronic devices and the like and their progeny . . . without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night by the probation officer and/or any law enforcement officer. These search terms are to include a waiver of any password or encryption protection. The minor must provide all passwords, logins, access codes or other information necessary to access any such Computers and Electronic Devices and to access all social media accounts the minor may have… when requested by the probation officer and/or any law enforcement officer. . . .”
Appellant argues that the electronics search condition is unconstitutionally overbroad and violates her Fourth Amendment right to privacy since it is not narrowly tailored to the purpose of her reformation and rehabilitation. It allows probation and law enforcement officers to access a variety of private information that is not related to whether she is engaged in gang activity or otherwise complying with the conditions of her probation. We agree.
At the outset, we note the People’s argument that appellant did not object to the electronics search condition below and thus forfeited her claim on appeal. Appellant’s challenge to her probation condition as facially overbroad “presents an asserted error that is a pure question of law, easily remediable on appeal by modification of the condition.” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888 (Sheena K.).) Thus, her claim was not forfeited. (Id. at p. 889.)
A. Relevant Law
Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (b), authorizes the juvenile court to “impose and require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.” (See Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889.) A condition of probation that would be legally impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court. (Ibid.; In re Walter P. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 95, 100.)
“A probation condition that imposes limitations on a person’s constitutional rights must closely tailor those limitations to the purpose of the condition to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad.” (Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) We review constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 723 (Appleton).)
B. The Electronics Search Condition Must Be Modified
The People claim the electronics search condition is constitutional because it is “closely tailored to the compelling state interest in supervising, reforming and rehabilitating appellant and defendants in general.” They assert that it allows the probation officer to monitor appellant’s gang activity, drug use, school activity, and home life. We agree with appellant that the electronics search condition is overbroad. If the condition’s main purpose is to further appellant’s rehabilitative efforts, it should allow monitoring of her involvement with gang-related activity or weapons possession. However, the condition does not limit the type of data that may be searched in light of this purpose. Instead, it authorizes unlimited general searches of “all computers, hard drives, flash drives, thumb drives, removable media, computer networks, electronic data storage devices, personal digital assistants, cellular telephones . . . and any other electronic devices . . . without a search warrant, at any time of the day or night,” as well as “access [to] all social media accounts the minor may have . . . when requested by the probation officer and/or any law enforcement officer.” “[T]he scope of a digital search is extremely wide.” (Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 725.) Thus, “a search of [appellant’s] mobile electronic devices could potentially expose a large volume of documents or data, much of which may have nothing to do with illegal activity. These could include, for example, medical records, financial records, personal diaries, and intimate correspondence with family and friends.” (Ibid.) In other words, the electronics search condition here permits review of all sorts of private information that is highly unlikely to shed any light on whether appellant is complying with the conditions of her probation, related to gang activity or otherwise. (See In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 298.)
We conclude that the condition must be modified to limit authorization of warrantless searches of appellant’s computers, electronic devices, and other items listed in the condition to information that is reasonably likely to reveal whether she is engaging in gang-related activity or weapons possession, or otherwise not complying with her probation conditions.
DISPOSITION
The electronics search condition should be modified to add the following paragraph: The searches are limited to communications or information reasonably likely to reveal whether defendant is engaging in gang-related activity or weapons possession, or otherwise not complying with her probation conditions.
As so modified, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS


McKINSTER
J.


We concur:


RAMIREZ
P. J.


FIELDS
J.