Filed 5/31/18 In re J.W. CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re J.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.W.,
Defendant and Appellant.




A151664

(Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. J16-00828)


18-year-old J.W. (appellant) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders finding he committed petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484/488), and committing him to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) for six months. He contends the court violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda) by admitting his incriminating statements into evidence. We reject the contention and affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 12, 2016, a juvenile wardship petition was filed alleging appellant committed petty theft (Pen. Code, §§ 484/488).
On April 22, 2016, a UPS driver drove to Pinole Valley High School to make a delivery. He parked in front of the school and left his iPhone inside his unlocked truck. As he carried the packages to the school security station, he ran into appellant, who said something to the effect of, “those packages don’t look that heavy.” When the driver returned to his truck after delivering the packages, he noticed his iPhone was missing.
Shortly thereafter, Pinole Police Officer Raymond Myovich, who was the School Resource Officer for Pinole Valley High School, entered a classroom to speak to appellant. Myovich was wearing his police uniform and duty belt. Appellant’s teacher and possibly an aide were also in the class. The door was probably closed, as classroom doors are closed while school is in session.
Myovich said to appellant, who was seated at a desk about three to four feet away: “Hey, [J.], I need to talk to you for a second.” Appellant replied, “Okay. About what?” Myovich responded, “About the phone.” At that point, appellant “volunteered basically all the information I was looking for, without any further questions.” Specifically, appellant said, “Oh, you mean the phone I took from the truck?” or “the phone I took from the UPS driver’s truck,” or words to that effect.
Myovich then asked “several follow-up questions.” Appellant said he did not have the phone, but did not identify the person who had it. Myovich estimated that he was in the classroom “8 to 10 minutes at the most.” He did not tell appellant that he was free to leave or advise him of his Miranda rights.
Appellant moved to suppress the incriminating statements, and the juvenile court denied the motion. The court sustained the petition and adjudged appellant a ward of the court, removed him from his parents’ custody, placed him on probation, and committed him to OAYRF for six months.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred in admitting the incriminating statements he made to Myovich into evidence. We reject the contention.
After being taken into custody by police or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner, a person must be given Miranda warnings apprising him of the right to remain silent, that any statement may be used against him, and that he has the right to retained or appointed counsel. (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at pp. 444–445.) Statements elicited in noncompliance with this rule may not be admitted for certain purposes in a criminal trial. (Id. at p. 492, 494.) The purpose of this rule is “to reduce the risk of a coerced confession and to implement the Self–Incrimination Clause.” (Chavez v. Martinez (2003) 538 U.S. 760, 790.)
The Miranda rule applies only to custodial interrogation, which means, “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” (Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444.) In determining whether an individual was in custody, a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, “including the location, length and form of the interrogation, the degree to which the interrogation was focused on the defendant [to his knowledge], and whether any indicia of arrest were present.” (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.) If the suspect is a minor, his status as a minor is relevant to the question of custody. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 564 U.S. 261, 269.) The ultimate inquiry is whether there was a “ ‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (California v. Beheler (1983) 463 U.S. 1121, 1125.) “[C]ustody occurs if the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way or is led to believe, as a reasonable person, that he is so deprived.” (People v. Arnold (1967) 66 Cal.2d 438, 448, disapproved on other grounds in Walker v. Superior Court (1988) 47 Cal.3d 112, 123.)
The question whether the suspect was in custody is a mixed question of law and fact. (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 395.) The first inquiry regarding the circumstance of the questioning is factual and is reviewed under the deferential substantial evidence standard. (Ibid.) The second inquiry, whether a reasonable person would feet at liberty to end the questioning, is decided independently by the reviewing court. (Ibid.)
Here, Myovich contacted appellant in his classroom, a less coercive environment than a police station or even a principal’s office. Appellant had entered the classroom to receive instruction, not to be questioned. He was with people he knew, i.e., his teacher, and possibly an aide. The classroom door was closed, but this was customary while school was in session. There was no evidence Myovich drew his weapon, restrained appellant in any way, or told him he was under arrest, or that he was even a suspect. Rather, he simply asked to speak to appellant “for a second” “[a]bout the phone,” before appellant immediately volunteered that he had taken the phone from the UPS truck.
Moreover, appellant was almost 17 years old at the time of the incident. Nearing the age of majority, he could be expected to react to Myovich’s questions as a typical 18-year-old in comparable circumstances. (J.D.B. v. North Carolina, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 277.) Appellant argues that his status as a special education student with an individualized education program was relevant to whether he was in custody. There is nothing in the record, however, indicating that Myovich was aware of this status. In addition, officers are not required to anticipate the “frailties or idiosyncrasies” of the particular individual they are questioning. (Yarborough v. Alvarado (2004) 541 U.S. 652, 662.)
Based on our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings. Applying the law, we conclude a reasonable person in appellant’s position would have realized he could end the interview and leave. Put another way, Myovich did not do or say “anything that might cause a reasonable person to believe he was in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom. . . .” (People v. Chutan (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1283.) No Miranda warnings were required, and the court did not err in admitting appellant’s statements into evidence.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.
 

_________________________
McGuiness, Acting P.J.*



We concur:


_________________________
Pollak, J.


_________________________
Jenkins, J.

















A151664