Filed 7/16/18 In re H.M. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gassia Apkarian, Judge. Reversed in part, dismissed in part, and remanded. Request for Judicial Notice. Denied.

Lelah S. Fischer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Jeannie Su, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minor.

* * *

INTRODUCTION

H.M. was taken into protective custody in March 2017, at the age of 10, because he tested positive for benzodiazepine. Six months later, after a lengthy jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the juvenile court made a dispositional order vesting custody of H.M. with his father, A.M. (Father). H.M.’s mother, A.S. (Mother) appealed from the dispositional order. We affirmed the dispositional order in a nonpublished opinion, In re H.M. (G055484, May 18, 2018).

In December 2017, while that appeal was pending, Mother brought a petition to change court order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] alleging a change in circumstance necessitated modifying the dispositional order to vest custody of H.M. with her under a family maintenance plan or with her parents (Maternal Grandparents) with reunification services for her. Mother asserted H.M. had become increasingly alienated from and hostile toward her since being placed in Father’s custody.

The juvenile court denied the section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Mother appeals from the order denying her section 388 petition and also challenges an order, made without appearances by the parties or counsel, that copies of certain of her mental health records be provided to all counsel. Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) has filed a respondent’s brief in support of both orders. Father has not filed a brief in this appeal.

We reverse the order denying the section 388 petition because Mother made a prima facie showing sufficient to afford her an evidentiary hearing limited to the issue of whether any alienation from Mother was caused by Father and, if so, to determine the appropriate remedy. We base our decision in large part on statements made by the conjoint therapist after the dispositional order was made. We conclude Mother’s challenge to the order releasing certain of her mental health records is either moot or forfeited.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

I.

Appointment of Evidence Code Section 730 Evaluator;
Mother’s Case Plan

In In re H.M., supra, G055484, we recounted the background facts and procedural history through September 13, 2017, when the juvenile court made its jurisdictional/dispositional order. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our opinion in In re H.M., supra, G055484. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d); 459, subds. (a), (b) & (c).) We pick up the narrative where In re H.M. left off.

On September 19, 2017, six days after the dispositional order was made, the juvenile court appointed Jennifer Bosch, Psy.D., to conduct an Evidence Code section 730 (section 730) evaluation of Mother. The interview referral stated, under primary reason for referral: “Mother has been psychiatrically hospitalized on prior occasions. Mother reports being treated for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder but SSA has not yet been able to obtain records.” The referral instructed Dr. Bosch to review Mother’s psychiatric/psychological records if available and directed that copies of the section 730 evaluation be delivered to the assigned social worker and all counsel.

In the September 21, 2017 Interim Review Report, SSA submitted a proposed case plan which, for Mother, included the requirement she “sign any and all necessary releases of information for any requested record or agency, including signing all medical consents, releases from any and all medical hospitals, therapist, and psychologist/psychiatrist, so [SSA] and the Court may be apprised of progress in meeting the goals of the case plan.” The case plan also required Mother to participate in conjoint counseling with H.M., submit to a section 730 evaluation, comply with recommendations for treatment, participate in psychotropic medication evaluation and monitoring as recommended by the treating psychiatrist, and participate in parenting education if deemed necessary. Mother was granted four hours of monitored visitation every other week, and one to two hours of visitation in a therapeutic setting on opposite weeks. H.M. was directed not to use his cell phone during visits with Mother in the therapeutic settings, and Mother and Father were directed not to come physically near each other.

At the September 25, 2017 case plan review hearing, the juvenile court adopted the proposed case plan with several amendments that had been discussed in court. Mother was granted one additional hour of visitation before or after each conjoint therapy visit, depending on how H.M. was feeling and whether therapy was successful. As requested by Mother, the court retained the provision allowing both Mother and Father to be present at H.M.’s medical appointments.

II.

SSA’s November 2, 2017 Interim Review Report

In an interim review report dated November 2, 2017 (the November 2 Report), SSA reported that, on October 27, 2017, the social worker was informed by Dr. Bosch that the section 730 evaluation of Mother was completed and the results had been forwarded to the juvenile court. Dr. Bosch reported she had not yet been provided with information about Mother’s “mental health hospitalizations.”

Also on October 27, the social worker spoke with Dr. Kenneth Meyer, the conjoint reunification therapist, to obtain an update on conjoint counseling between Mother and H.M. In the November 2 Report, SSA reported that Dr. Meyer said he had completed reunification therapy sessions with Mother and H.M. on October 4 and 18, 2017. Dr. Meyer said that during the first session H.M. had refused to hand over his cell phone and “the issue was very disruptive towards their work in conjoint therapy.” The cell phone issue also arose during the second conjoint therapy session. According to Dr. Meyer, H.M. was often very rude to mother in therapy sessions, watched the clock closely, and appeared anxious for the session to end. Once the session had ended, H.M. ran out of Dr. Meyer’s office to meet the monitor.

The November 2 Report also related the visitation monitor’s comments regarding visits between Mother and H.M. occurring on October 1, 15, and 22, 2017. As to the October 1 visit, the monitor noted H.M. arrived with a scab on his left cheek and a small circular scab on the inner corner of his left eye. When asked how he got the scabs, H.M. replied he did not know and said “[I]’m a boy.” After the visit, the monitor asked Father about the scabs. Father became defensive and said, “Maybe at school. I don’t know! He’s a boy!” The monitor informed Father that during the visit H.M. had not responded well to Mother’s redirection and used his cell phone. Father replied there was no order prohibiting H.M. from using his cell phone during visitations and “[i]f he needs 5 minutes to call me then he should be able to call me.”

As to the October 15, 2017 visit, the monitor noted H.M. kept track of time during his visit and did not listen to redirection from Mother. At times during the visit, H.M. was hostile to Mother. The visit ended a couple of minutes early because once H.M. saw Father’s vehicle approaching, he left in a hurry, without saying goodbye to Mother.

As to the October 22, 2017 visit, H.M. refused to allow Mother to touch him and kept his distance from her when they were sitting near each other. Mother expressed concern over H.M.’s change in behavior. Two days later, H.M. told the social worker he did not like visiting mother, but he gave no reason other than “I just don’t like seeing her.” During the same conversation, H.M. also said he did not want to visit Maternal Grandparents.

III.

Dr. Bosch’s Section 730 Evaluation of Mother

Dr. Bosch’s section 730 evaluation report was filed on October 31, 2017. The report states Dr. Bosch had not received Mother’s medical/psychiatric records. Dr. Bosch’s report provided the following information and conclusions.

After giving birth to H.M., Mother suffered from postpartum depression and, as a consequence, was hospitalized for 10 days under the qualifying condition of being gravely disabled. She was prescribed Seroquel, to which she had an adverse reaction, and was diagnosed as having bipolar disorder. However, Mother explained she did experience depression but never had experienced a manic episode or other symptom of bipolar disorder.

Mother had been hospitalized on two other occasions. In 2014 she was hospitalized for one week under the condition of gravely disabled after H.M. had been taken from her. In March 2017, after H.M. was detained, she was hospitalized at the Royale Treatment and Recovery Center (the Treatment Center) under the condition of gravely disabled after H.M. had been removed after testing positive for benzodiazepine.

Mother is prescribed lithium, which is typically prescribed to treat bipolar disorder, not anxiety. Mother feels slightly depressed, anxious, and uncertain of the future and the outcome of the case with Father. Otherwise, she reported being stable and compliant in taking her medication.

Mother reported she attends therapy without fail and it has been helpful. In December 2016 she started conjoint reunification therapy with Dr. Meyer. Mother reported that while H.M. lived with Maternal Grandparents, the therapy sessions went well and H.M. was loving and receptive to her. But, since H.M. was placed with Father, the therapy sessions are not as productive, and H.M. appears highly agitated and angry with her.

In conducting the section 730 evaluation, Dr. Bosch spoke with Dr. Meyer, who started seeing Mother and H.M. in December 2016, while H.M. was living with Maternal Grandparents. Dr. Bosch’s report states: “[Dr. Meyer] reported when [H.M.] was residing with [Maternal Grandparents] the session[s] went well and [H.M.] was receptive to [Mother]. The two engaged and each demonstrated a caring loving relationship toward one another. Since [H.M.] has been back in [Father]’s care, according to Doctor M[e]yer, [H.M.] has done a 180 in terms of being receptive to [Mother]. [H.M.] often states he hates his mother, that he does not want to see her, that the sessions are boring and is both rude and mean to [Mother]. The Doctor stated on occasion he has to step in and direct [H.M.] to stop being rude and mean to [Mother] but these interventions on the Doctor’s part do nothing to change how [H.M.] treats his mother. The Doctor stated [Mother] does her best to ignore [H.M.]’s behavior and often tells [H.M.] she both misses and loves him.”

Dr. Meyer informed Dr. Bosch of issues with Father over H.M.’s bringing a cell phone to sessions. Dr. Bosch’s report states: “Doctor Meyer stated he has had some struggles with [F]ather[,] who failed to obey the court order which prohibited [H.M.] from bringing a cell phone into session[s] with him. Doctor Meyer said he witnessed [H.M.] with the phone in session with the phone on. [Father] reported it was his right as a father to equip his son with a cell phone. He denied, however, he was listening in on the session. After some continued prompting on Doctor Meyer’s part, [H.M.] left the phone with the individual who was transporting him for sessions.”

Dr. Meyer also expressed concern over Father’s and Stepmother’s influence over H.M. According to Dr. Bosch’s report: “[Dr. Meyer] said in his thirty years of conducting sessions he has never seen a child [who] has the amount of animosity directed at his mother and feels that it is quite possible [Stepmother] and or [F]ather have a vested interest in [H.M.] developing a dislike for [Mother]. [Dr. Meyer] fears [Father] and [S]tepmother are providing [H.M.] with a lot of negative information and or energy directed at [Mother]. He reported [Father] is attempting to control [H.M.] to the extent that he is monitoring and or was attempting to monitor sessions with [H.M.] and [Mother].”

Dr. Meyer had no concerns over Mother’s ability to be a parent to H.M. He saw no signs of Mother having a severe mental illness and did not believe she met the diagnostic criteria for a diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Dr. Meyer stated that, although Mother appeared “overly anxious” and to have “some mild depression,” he considered those conditions to be normal given the long and bitter custody dispute with Father.

Dr. Bosch spoke with Mother’s individual therapist, Dr. Lisa Grajewski, who had been seeing Mother since April or May 2017. Dr. Grajewski saw no indication Mother had bipolar disorder. Mother displayed characteristics of histrionics and borderline personality disorder, but not enough for a diagnosis. Given what Dr. Grajewski understood of the case, she could not understand why Mother’s visits with H.M. had to be monitored. Dr. Grajewski told Dr. Bosch nothing had been revealed in treatment to render Mother incapable of caring for H.M. Mother appeared to love H.M. very much and “uses sessions to process the loss of her son and what she feels is the inequitable decisions the court has made so far.”

Dr. Bosch spoke with Mother’s treating physician, Dr. Nayana Shaw, who reported he is a general practitioner and not a psychiatrist. Beginning in August 2017, Dr. Shaw began prescribing Mother lithium for anxiety, and not for bipolar disorder. Dr. Bosch spoke with Maternal Grandmother, who stated Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was stable and able to function as long as she took her medication. In the past, Mother had gone off her medication, making her “susceptible to hospitalization.”

Dr. Bosch concluded:

1. There was no indication Mother would abuse H.M., who has been the victim of Mother and Father’s inability to get along and coparent him.

2. Neither Dr. Meyer nor Dr. Grajewski had any concern over Mother’s ability to care for H.M.

3. Both Dr. Meyer and Dr. Grajewski believed Mother does not suffer from a severe mental illness, but has anxiety.

4. Results of testing conducted by Dr. Bosch do not indicate Mother suffers from a severe mental illness that would impair her ability to care for H.M. or place him at risk for abuse. Mother suffers from anxiety with obsessive and histrionic traits, and mild depression.

5. Mother’s hospitalizations all appeared to have occurred after H.M. was taken from her, not while he was in her care.

6. Mother appeared very responsible in meeting H.M.’s unique and chronic medical needs.

In Dr. Bosch’s opinion, Mother should be allowed liberal visitation with H.M. in order to begin to restore the mother/son relationship. Dr. Bosch saw no need for monitored visitation and indicated Mother did not appear to be any more responsible for the ongoing custody dispute than Father. Dr. Bosch recommended that Mother continue reunification therapy and weekly individual therapy and that reunification therapy increase in frequency from every two weeks to every week to facilitate a quick reunification.

On November 2, 2017, the juvenile court directed Dr. Bosch to prepare an updated section 730 evaluation report after reviewing Mother’s psychiatric records.

IV.

November 9, 2017 Order and SSA’s December 4, 2017 Interim Review Report

On November 9, 2017, the juvenile court issued a minute order releasing Mother’s records from the Treatment Center to county counsel “with the agreement that a copy will be provided to all counsel.” The order was made “Off record” with no appearances.

On December 4, 2017, SSA submitted an interim review report (the December 4 Report). It reported H.M. had no reported health concerns and was about to start individual therapy. The December 4 Report did not mention an updated report from Dr. Bosch. The report states: “In reference to [Mother]’s mental health records, there appears to be a prescription for Lorazepam, a benzodiazepine, which [M]other previously claimed she had never been prescribed, and there is an additional [section] 5150 [hold] in December 2015 that [M]other had omitted.” The December 4 Report does not give the date of the prescription or indicate whether it had been filled.

The December 4 Report addressed visitations between Mother and H.M. occurring on November 5 and 16, 2017. Visits continued to be strained. Before H.M. arrived at the visit on November 5, Mother became emotional and told the monitor H.M. had changed his behavior since being placed with Father. H.M. arrived 10 minutes late and had a pocket knife with him. When the social worker spoke to Father about the pocket knife, both he and H.M. denied H.M. had one. During the visit on November 16, H.M. asked what time it was six minutes before the visit was to end. When Mother tried to give him a hug, H.M. pulled away from her. Mother said to H.M., “I can get in a car accident and you’ll never see me again. That’s very unkind.” Mother tried to give H.M. a kiss on the cheek, but he moved away. At the end of the visit, Mother asked for a hug and kiss, but H.M. told her, “I have to go. I have to go” and walked away.

V.

Mother’s Section 388 Petition

On December 4, 2017, Mother filed her section 388 petition to change the dispositional order awarding custody of H.M. to Father. The petition sought a new order returning H.M. to Mother’s custody under a plan of family maintenance or, in the alternative, returning H.M. to Maternal Grandparents’ custody with reunification services for Mother. As change of circumstance or new evidence, Mother alleged “parental alienation from [M]other.”

The section 388 petition was supported by a declaration from Mother in which she stated H.M., since being placed with Father, had begun “a negative pattern of behavior towards me, including questioning my parenting and my personal finances.” Mother declared both she and the monitor had noticed a drastic change in H.M.’s behavior after the dispositional order was made and after H.M. had been placed in Father’s custody. In her declaration, Mother made these points:

1. On October 1, 2017, Father “deliberately and maliciously interrupted my visitations with constant contact with [H.M.] on his cell phone. Father texted [H.M.] asking to have the monitor call him during the visit, which the monitor refused.”

2. Father allowed H.M. to bring a cell phone to the first conjoint therapy session and argued with Mother and Dr. Meyer for 30 minutes, insisting H.M. have his cell phone with him during the session.

3. Father was 25 minutes late in bringing H.M. to the second conjoint therapy session and allowed H.M. to bring a cell phone.

4. Father allowed H.M. to bring a cell phone to every visit between Mother and H.M. and allowed him to bring a pocket knife to the visit on November 5, 2017.

5. Father failed entirely to bring H.M. to a scheduled visit with Mother on November 18, 2017, causing H.M. to miss visitation with Mother for three weeks. Father refused to accommodate a visit during that three‑week period.

6. Father failed to bring H.M. to his scheduled therapy session on November 29, 2017.

7. Father has refused to provide Mother with H.M.’s medical appointment information and school sports schedule.

8. Mother has not had telephone calls with H.M.

9. Stepmother has been present at visit drop offs.

10. Before H.M. was placed with Father in September 2017, H.M. had a “happy demeanor” when with Mother. Since H.M. was placed with Father, H.M.’s demeanor and attitude had “changed significantly and [now] is negative or extremely guarded, at best.”

11. At the end of a visit on December 3, 2017, when Mother tried to hug H.M., he told her, “[t]hat’s assault.” Mother had previously heard Stepmother refer to Mother hugging H.M. as assault.

12. H.M. has told Mother she tried to kill him. In a therapy session, H.M. demanded Mother take a lie detector test and called her a liar.

13. “The order placing [H.M.] with [F]ather has resulted in parental alienation of [H.M.] to me and the relationship only continues to deteriorate through the efforts of [F]ather.”

The juvenile court denied Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing on the ground it did not make a prima facie showing of a change of circumstance or new evidence. The court stated Mother could make the appropriate motion once an updated section 730 evaluation report was received.

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the order denying her section 388 petition. We later issued an order granting Mother’s motion to construe her notice of appeal as including the November 9, 2017 order concerning release of Mother’s Treatment Center records.

DISCUSSION

I.

Mother’s Request for Judicial Notice

Mother has filed a request for judicial notice asking us to take judicial notice of (1) a petition for protective custody warrant for H.M. filed on July 26, 2016, and (2) a protective custody warrant for H.M. signed on July 26, 2016. Mother contends those documents are relevant to showing Father has “a pattern of alienating [H.M.] from [Mother].” We agree with SSA those documents are irrelevant to whether the juvenile erred by denying Mother’s section 388 petition without an evidentiary hearing. Mother’s request for judicial notice is therefore denied.

II.

Order Denying Mother’s Section 388 Petition.

A. Legal Standards

Section 388 allows a parent to petition the juvenile court to change or set aside a prior order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence.” (Id., subd. (a)(1).) The court must order a hearing on the petition “[i]f it appears that the best interests of the child . . . may be promoted by the proposed change of order.” (Id., subd. (d).) “Thus, the parent must sufficiently allege both a change in circumstances or new evidence and the promotion of the child’s best interests.” (In re G.B. (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1157.)

A parent need only present a prima facie showing of a change in circumstance, or new evidence, and of the child’s best interests to obtain the right to a full hearing. (In re Aljamie D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 424, 432.) “A prima facie case is made if the allegations demonstrate that these two elements are supported by probable cause. [Citations.] It is not made, however, if the allegations would fail to sustain a favorable decision even if they were found to be true at a hearing.” (In re G.B., supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 1157.) The allegations of a section 388 petition must be liberally construed in favor of its sufficiency. (Ibid.) We review a juvenile court’s order denying a section 388 petition without a hearing under the abuse of discretion standard. (Id. at p. 1158.)

B. Mother Presented a Prima Facie Case of Changed Circumstances.

Mother argues she made a prima facie showing that, since H.M. was placed with Father, H.M. has become further alienated from her and this was a new circumstance justifying a change in the dispositional order. According to Mother, a comparison of reports of visits between Mother and H.M. from before his return to Father with reports from after H.M.’s return to Father “show a drastic difference in [H.M.]’s attitude and approach to [Mother].” SSA argues the juvenile court could have reasonably found there was no change in circumstances because “[t]he court could reasonably judge Mother’s 388 petition’s examples of more hostile visits to be more of the same, rather than showing significant change.”

We conclude Mother made a showing of parental alienation and this was a change in circumstance which, if proven, might justify a change in the dispositional order. In the first few months after H.M. was detained, his visits with Mother were indeed rocky. For example, as reported by SSA, during a visit on April 6, 2017, H.M. stepped away from Mother and did not look at her or greet her during a visit a week later, behaved rudely and sarcastically to her, and, during a visit on May 31, pushed Mother’s hand away when she tried to touch him. The quality of visits did improve, however. SSA reported that, during a visit on June 9, 2017, H.M. engaged in conversation with Mother more than he had during prior visits and was less rude to her. At the outset and the end of a visit on June 30, H.M. hugged Mother and, during a visit July 5, walked with her instead of ahead of her. During a visit on July 25, H.M. talked openly with Mother about football and home life, and, during a visit on July 26, H.M. and Mother played games together at a Dave and Buster’s.

In her section 388 petition, Mother made a prima facie showing that after custody of H.M. was vested with Father, H.M.’s behavior toward her became significantly worse. As recounted in Mother’s declaration, H.M.’s demeanor and attitude “changed significantly” and has become “negative or extremely guarded, at best,” H.M. refused to let Mother hug him, calling it an “assault,” told Mother she had tried to kill him, and demanded she take a lie detector test. Mother’s declaration also showed Father had become disruptive of the relationship between H.M. and Mother. Father interrupted a visit with text messages to H.M., allowed H.M. to bring a cell phone to a conjoint therapy session (in violation of a court order), argued with Mother and Dr. Meyer during a therapy session, failed to bring H.M. to a scheduled visit with Mother, failed to bring H.M. to his scheduled therapy session, and refused to provide Mother with H.M.’s medical appointment information and school sports schedule.

The SSA reports also support a prima facie case of changed circumstances. SSA reported that during the October 15, 2017 visit, H.M. kept track of time, did not listen to redirection from Mother, and at times was hostile to her. H.M. left the visit without saying goodbye. During the October 22 visit, H.M. refused to allow Mother to touch him and kept his distance from her when they were sitting near each other. During the November 16 visit, H.M. did not let Mother hug him, asked what time it was before the end of the visit and, at the end of the visit, when Mother asked for a hug and kiss, told her, “I have to go” and walked away. SSA reported that Mother had expressed concern over H.M.’s change in behavior and that in late October 2017, H.M. told the social worker he did not like visiting Mother and did not want to visit Maternal Grandparents.

Particularly strong evidence of H.M.’s change in behavior comes from Dr. Meyer’s comments related in the section 730 evaluation report. Dr. Bosch spoke with Dr. Meyer after H.M. had been placed in Father’s custody in September 2017. Dr. Meyer told Dr. Bosch that, when H.M. resided with Maternal Grandparents, the conjoint therapy sessions went well, H.M. was receptive to Mother, and H.M. and Mother had demonstrated a caring and loving relationship. Dr. Meyer also told Dr. Bosch that, since H.M. had been in Father’s custody, H.M. “has done a 180 in terms of being receptive to [Mother],” H.M. often states he hates Mother, does not want to see her, and is rude and mean to her.

Dr. Meyer told Dr. Bosch that in his 30 years of conducting therapy sessions he has never seen a child having the amount of animosity directed at his mother as H.M. directs at Mother. Dr. Meyer believed “it is quite possible” Father or Stepmother was influencing H.M. to form a dislike for Mother.

The allegations of the section 388 petition and supporting evidence, if proven, would support an inference of parental alienation starting when custody of H.M. was vested with Father. We disagree with SSA that Mother showed only “more of the same” rather than a change in circumstance. H.M.’s relationship with Mother had been slowly but steadily improving since H.M. was detained in March 2017. Evidence was presented showing once H.M. was placed with Father in September 2017, the relationship between H.M. and Mother changed by taking a significant turn for the worse, and Father had engaged in conduct disruptive of that relationship.

To obtain an evidentiary hearing, Mother’s burden was only to make a prima facie case of changed circumstances and of H.M.’s best interests. We agree the information about H.M.’s new hostile attitude and actions toward Mother constituted a prima facie case. If there was parental alienation, that fact would affect H.M.’s best interests and might warrant a change in the dispositional order. We emphasize we are not deciding the issue of parental alienation. Indeed, we do not know the other side of the story and there is no direct evidence of any parental alienation. Nonetheless, we believe there was sufficient evidence to make a prima facie case on this disputed issue. An evidentiary hearing is required.

III.

November 9, 2017 Order Releasing Records

In March 2017, after H.M. was detained, Mother was placed on a section 5150 hold at the Treatment Center. The dispositional order, entered on September 13, 2017, states: “Court orders 730 evaluation for [Mother]. Mother is to sign medical releases and SSA is to forward all reports to the evaluator. County Counsel to forward medical records upon receipt.”

On November 2, 2017, the juvenile court directed Dr. Bosch to prepare an updated section 730 evaluation report after reviewing Mother’s records from the Treatment Center. On November 9, 2017, the juvenile court issued this order: “Off record—[¶] Court releases record[s] from Ro[y]ale Treatment Facility to County Counsel with the agreement that a copy will be provided to all counsel.”

Mother and SSA argue at length whether the juvenile court erred by allowing copies of the Treatment Center documents to be produced to SSA and all counsel. Mother argues the November 9 order violated her psychotherapist‑patient privilege by ordering disclosure of her mental health records to SSA, county counsel, Father’s counsel, and Minor’s counsel. She contends the records from the Treatment Center were to be seen only by the section 730 evaluator and SSA was to act only as the intermediary of the documents. SSA argues the records were properly released because they were needed for Mother’s section 730 evaluation and for SSA to tailor and implement Mother’s case plan, and because the court’s order reflects some sort of agreement to release the records to counsel.

Under the physician‑patient privilege and the psychotherapist‑patient privilege, a patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, “a confidential communication between patient and physician” (Evid. Code, § 994) and “a confidential communication between patient and psychotherapist” (id., § 1014). Welfare and Institutions Code section 5328, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part, “[a]ll information and records obtained in the course of providing services under . . . Division 5 (commencing with section 5000), . . . to either voluntary or involuntary recipients of services shall be confidential,” subject to 25 listed exceptions in which disclosure is permitted. “Thus, all information, records, and services provided pursuant to section 5150 involuntary psychiatric holds are confidential.” (In re M.L. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1457, 1469.)

Mother’s records from the Treatment Center therefore would appear to be subject to the physician‑patient privilege or the psychotherapist‑patient privilege and confidential under section 5328. However, eight months have elapsed since the order was made, Mother has taken no steps to stay it, and the Treatment Center records have been provided to SSA and counsel. The matter is moot. “[A] case becomes moot when a court ruling can have no practical effect or cannot provide the parties with effective relief.” (Lincoln Place Tenants Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 425, 454.) “‘[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed.’” (People v. Herrera (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1198.) Because the Treatment Center records were produced to counsel months ago, a reversal of the court’s order, if warranted, would have no practical effect.

Mother contends she never had the opportunity to object to the release of the Treatment Center records because the court issued the November 9, 2017 order without notice to the parties or counsel. But at least by December 4, 2017, Mother knew the records had been released to SSA. The December 4 Report refers to Mother’s mental health records in reporting Mother had a prescription for a benzodiazepine and was placed on a section 5150 hold in December 2015. At the hearing on December 4, 2017, Mother did not object to the November 9 order and did not object to receiving the December 4 Report into evidence. Until Mother filed her opening brief in this appeal, she did not object to the November 9, 2017 order and, to our knowledge, has never taken any action to stay it. “As a general rule, a party is precluded from urging on appeal any point not raised in the trial court.” (In re Richard K. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 580, 590.)

In addition, except for the one mention in SSA’s December 4 Report, the record does not reveal whether, how, or by which party the Treatment Center records have been used. We do not know whether an updated section 730 evaluation has been prepared or whether information from the Treatment Center records have been used by SSA in reports or in formulating Mother’s case plan.

The disclosure of privileged records is different from their admissibility. (In re M.L., supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 1467.) “Once disclosure had been deemed appropriate, the proponent has the additional burden of proving the admissibility of such records into the trial record.” (Ibid.) Here, we do not know whether (except for the December 4 Report) the Treatment Center records or information from them have been offered into evidence, whether Mother has objected, or whether any objections have been overruled or sustained. Although Mother did not object to the December 4 Report, she retains her right to object to the admission into evidence of the Treatment Center records or information from them.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Mother’s section 388 petition is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. The appeal from the November 9, 2017 order is dismissed as moot.

FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.