P. v. Patterson

Filed 10/27/06 P. v. Patterson CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Nevada)

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Defendant Mitchell Alfred Patterson carried his 10-year-old daughter onto Interstate 80 and ran into the path of a semi truck. She was killed and he was seriously injured. A jury convicted him of first degree murder but deadlocked on the issue of sanity. Following a declaration of mistrial, a second jury found him sane. At the sanity trial, the jury was informed that defendant had been found guilty of premeditated murder and that fact was argued by the prosecutor as bearing on defendant’s sanity. This court affirmed the judgment. (People v. Mitchell Alfred Patterson (Nov. 6, 1995, C019177) [nonpub. opn.].) The California Supreme Court denied review.

Defendant filed a petition in federal district court for a writ of habeas corpus. He alleged his due process rights were violated by, among other things, an improper presumption contained in a jury instruction. The petition was denied and defendant appealed. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the trial court denied defendant due process at the guilt phase by giving a non-standard instruction that, “At the time of the alleged offense charged in the Information, you were [sic] instructed to presume that the defendant was sane.” By giving this instruction without also providing the technical legal definition of sanity, the trial court allowed the jurors to presume defendant was “sane” in the broader and commonly understood sense of being “rational” or “mentally sound,” thus undercutting his defense that, due to mental disease, mental defect or mental disorder, he did not form the mental state required for first degree murder. (Patterson v. Gomez (9th Cir. 2000) 223 F.3d 959, 962, 964-967.)

In February 2001, the federal district court ordered that “retrial proceedings shall commence, or the conviction shall be vacated and [defendant] released from custody.”

After proceedings resumed in the trial court, defendant filed a request to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), and the prosecution filed written opposition. The trial court denied the request, explaining that, although the guilt and sanity phases are portions of the same criminal action, a jury deadlock during the sanity phase or the vacation of a sanity verdict does not necessitate retrial of the guilt phase; here, the converse should follow. The court also ruled that relitigation of the sanity phase was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

Jury selection commenced in October 2001. In November 2001, the jury acquitted defendant of first degree murder and convicted him of second degree murder. He was sentenced to state prison for 15 years to life.

Defendant again appealed, contending he should have been allowed to enter his NGI plea because the United States District Court “set aside the judgment of the state court in its entirety,” because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to matters previously determined in the same case, and because the sanity phase was “intertwined with the guilt phase trial” and “cannot be insulated from it.” We reversed the judgment as to the finding of sanity^[1] and remanded the matter with directions to allow defendant to enter a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and for further proceedings on such plea. (People v. Mitchell Alfred Patterson, supra, [nonpub. opn.], mod. Feb. 24, 2004.)

In August 2004, defendant reinstated his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. In September 2004, the trial court appointed two new doctors to examine defendant.

In June 2005, defendant waived his right to a jury trial and opted to have the issue of sanity determined by the trial court. After three days of testimony and argument, the trial court ruled that defendant had failed to prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that he was insane at the time of the offense.

We appointed counsel to represent defendant on appeal. Counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth the facts of the case and requests this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) Defendant was advised by counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing of the opening brief. More than 30 days elapsed, and we received no communication from defendant. Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no arguable error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

ROBIE , J.

We concur:

SIMS , Acting P.J.

HULL , J.

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^[1] The ruling did not affect the guilt phase since no challenge had been made to it. (People v. Mitchell Alfred Patterson, supra, [nonpub. opn.], mod. Feb. 24, 2004, at p. 1.)