Filed 9/6/18 Cziraki v. Cilurzo CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| IMRE CZIRAKI et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
VINCENT F. CILURZO, Individually and as Co-Trustee etc., et al.
Defendants and Respondents.
|
E067217
(Super.Ct.No. MCC1300007)
OPINION
|
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Raquel A. Marquez, Judge. Affirmed.
Fitzmaurice & Demergian and David K. Demergian for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Spaulding McCullough & Tansil and Karin P. Beam for Defendants and Respondents Vincent F. Cilurzo, deceased, Audrey T. Cilurzo, Individually and as Co-Trustee.
Manning & Kass Ellrod, Ramirez, Trester, Fredric W. Trester and Nicole M. Threlkel for Defendant and Respondent Rancon Real Estate Corporation.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Two years after plaintiffs and appellants, Imre Cziraki and Gizella Cziraki (plaintiffs), purchased a vineyard and winery from defendants and respondents, Vincent Cilurzo and Audrey Cilurzo, the County of Riverside issued a citation in 2006 for illegally operating the winery without a permit or an approved plot plan. Plaintiffs delayed filing the instant fraud action against defendants[1] until 2013. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground plaintiffs’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.
On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a triable issue of fact exists as to when the statute of limitations accrued. Plaintiffs also argue Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense because plaintiffs justifiably relied on misrepresentations and false assurances by Defendants’ representatives, which lulled plaintiffs into delaying filing their fraud complaint. Plaintiffs thus assert that, because there are triable issues of fact, the trial court erred in finding as a matter of law that plaintiffs’ fraud action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations.
Based on the undisputed facts presented, we conclude as a matter of law that the statute of limitations for filing plaintiffs’ fraud complaint accrued in 2006, and therefore had run by the time plaintiffs filed their complaint in 2013. We also reject plaintiffs’ contention Defendants are equitably estoppel from asserting the statute of limitations defense. In addition, it is undisputed that Defendants’ 2006 and 2010 representations do not support separate actionable fraud claims, because there was no justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations. We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations bar, and affirm the judgment.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following undisputed facts are taken from the evidence cited in Defendants’ summary judgment statement of undisputed facts, plaintiffs’ opposing statements of undisputed and disputed facts, and Defendants’ response to plaintiffs’ opposing statements of disputed and undisputed facts.
- Undisputed Facts and Evidence in Support of Summary Judgment
In April 2004, Defendants sold to plaintiffs property commonly known and operated as the “‘Cilurzo Vineyard & Winery’” (the Property), located in Temecula. Rancon was the listing agent representing the Cilurzos during the sale of the Property. Real estate agent Randy L. Roth of Fairway & Ranch Realty represented plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also retained attorney David Bright of the law firm, White & Bright, to review the Property purchase agreements.
In response to the County’s notice of violation, Mr. Cziraki[2] attempted to meet with County employee Jeff Stone to discuss the matter, but instead spoke to his secretary Olivia Barnes. Mr. Cziraki asked Barnes if the Winery could be grandfathered in as a legal winery, because it had existed for so long as a winery. During Mr. Cziraki’s deposition, Mr. Cziraki said he did not remember what Barnes’s answer was and he never spoke to Stone about the matter.
After receiving the County notice of violation in 2006, Mr. Cziraki requested Roth to investigate the matter. Mr. Cziraki also contacted Bright regarding the matter. Roth contacted Rancon and inquired regarding the County’s position the Winery was not legal. Bright contacted Rancon’s attorney Stephen Lopardo regarding the County’s position the Winery was operating illegally. By a letter dated June 22, 2006, Lopardo responded to Bright’s concerns that the Winery “‘apparently does not have a permit to operate as a winery.’” Lopardo noted that Rancon had also received a letter from plaintiffs’ broker inquiring whether a 1981 correction notice was ever remedied.
Lopardo stated in his June 22, 2006, letter that he reviewed plaintiffs’ concerns and concluded they were unwarranted, based on documents enclosed with his letter. Lopardo further stated that, “under Wine law, it is impossible to obtain a winery bond from the Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms unless there was an approved plot plan.” Lopardo stated he believed the Winery had been “legally bonded for many, many years.”
The enclosed documents included three letters from plaintiffs’ broker, Fairway & Ranch Realty, regarding the 1978, 1979, and 1981 correction notices; permits obtained through 1981; a plot plan; and a memorandum dated May 12, 2006, from Roth to Rancon regarding the permits.
The 1981 correction notice stated that the owner of the Property was required to obtain a change of occupancy permit from the County for changing the barn to a winery. Lopardo stated in his letter that the matter had been resolved pursuant to permit No. 428754, with a final inspection in August 1981. The permit and inspection notice, however, merely stated that in 1981, the Cilurzos completed an “addition to existing winery.”
With regard to the Winery plot plan, Lopardo concluded in his June 22, 2006, letter that any concern that there was no plot plan for the Winery was unfounded. Lopardo stated there was an approved plot plan, a copy of which was included with his letter. The copy of the plot plan, however, consists of a certificate of accuracy, dated August 10, 1980, approved on February 5, 1981, by the “B.A.T.F.” (the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives).
The May 12, 2006, memorandum from Roth to Rancon stated that plaintiffs had run into serious problems with the County regarding obtaining permits for property improvements, because the County was not recognizing the Property as a winery site. Roth noted that nothing was ever done in response to the 1981 correction notice. Therefore, the County recognized the structure not as a winery, but as a barn.
Roth further noted in her memorandum that the Property was represented as a winery at the time of plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property and had operated as such for a long time. Also, the transfer disclosure statement, at the time of the sale of the Property, stated there were no code violations on the Property. The County, however, was requesting plaintiffs to submit a plot plan for approval to convert the structure designated as a barn to a winery. Roth requested in her memorandum that Rancon find out if the 1981 correction notice was ever remedied. Roth noted that the County had advised that it did not have any record of any such remedy, and therefore was of the opinion there was no legal winery on the Property.
Mr. Cziraki reviewed Lopardo’s June 22, 2006, letter and attached documents, and discussed the letter with Bright. Mr. Cziraki testified that after doing so, he still believed the Winery was not a legal winery. He also questioned whether the Winery was properly permitted and whether there were zoning issues that needed to be addressed regarding the Winery. Mr. Cziraki questioned whether Lopardo’s conclusions in his letter were correct. Mr. Cziraki is an experienced businessman, owning several commercial properties, including a second vineyard in Temecula. In reliance on plaintiffs’ attorney’s opinion in 2006 regarding Lopardo’s letter and enclosed documents, plaintiffs decided not to take any steps to respond to the County’s notice of violation or inquire further.
On February 4, 2010, plaintiffs received another notice from the County (notice of noncompliance) regarding the same violation stated in the 2006 notice of violation regarding the Winery. The 2010 notice of noncompliance stated that the County had begun proceedings based upon the noncompliance consisting of converting a barn to a winery without obtaining the required permits. The County advised plaintiffs to immediately correct the violation to avoid further action by the County.
B. Opposition’s Undisputed Facts
Plaintiffs cited the following facts and evidence in opposition to Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Plaintiffs relied primarily on Mr. Cziraki’s declaration.
When plaintiffs purchased the Property, it had been marketed and described as the “‘Cilurzo Vineyard and Winery,’” which included a “13,780 square foot winery, tasting room and gift shop (winery equipment and inventory), adobe residence, pool & spa, caretaker residence, vineyard, lake, barn & corral on 51 + acres, 10 of which was designated Vineyard Commercial.” The marketing materials and Rancon listing agents described the Property as a fully approved, operational and legal vineyard and winery. After plaintiffs purchased the Property, they continued operation of it as a vineyard and winery.
Defendants specifically warranted that the Property was “‘zoned so that Buyer may operate a commercial vineyard/winery on the property-C.V. Zone.’” The purchase/sale documents, marketing materials, and Rancon’s real estate agents represented to plaintiffs that the Property was zoned to permit operation of a vineyard and winery, and that the sellers (the Cilurzos) were unaware of any government notices or advisements of any impermissible use of the Property or any unpermitted construction on the Property. The sellers represented they were also unaware of any violations of law, government regulation, or codes regarding the Property, and any such previous violations had been remedied by compliance.
Mr. Cziraki acknowledged in his declaration that, in early 2006, the County advised him that (1) the Winery was permitted only as a barn, not as a wine tasting facility, (2) the Cilurzos had received correction notices in 1978, 1979, and 1981, requiring a change of occupancy permit for conversion of the barn to a winery, but the problem was never remedied, and (3) use of the Property was not permitted as a winery, primarily because there had never been an approved plot plan. The County thus cited plaintiffs for the violations and informed them that the Winery had never operated legally. The County informed plaintiffs that they were required to begin the approval process for conversion of the barn into a permitted winery.
Mr. Cziraki states in his declaration that he relied on Lopardo’s representations in his June 22, 2006, letter believing them to be true, including Lopardo’s statement that there was an approved plot plan for the Property, and that the correction notice had been remedied, with the Winery becoming a permitted winery. However, Mr. Cziraki states in his deposition testimony and responses to requests for admissions that he was not convinced that Lopardo’s statements in his letter were accurate. Mr. Cziraki still believed the Winery was operating illegally and knew that the enclosed copy of the plot plan was not a County approved plot plan for the Winery. Nevertheless, Mr. Cziraki concluded it would cost more to fight the 2006 citation than to pay to remedy the Winery violations.
On January 5, 2010, Roth sent Rancon an e-mail stating that Mr. Cziraki had requested Roth to notify Rancon that County code enforcement had recently notified plaintiffs that there was no permit for converting the barn on the Property to a winery, and that plaintiffs were required to obtain a new plot plan in order for the Property to be designated a winery. Rancon responded in an e-mail stating that the matter had been previously addressed when Rancon obtained all permits on file involving the Property and provided them to Lopardo, who enclosed copies with a letter sent to Bright. Roth responded to Rancon’s e-mail by requesting copies of all the permits, which Mr. Cziraki needed in order to satisfy County code enforcement.
C. Procedural Background
Defendants answered the Complaint and filed a motion for summary judgment.[3] Plaintiffs filed opposition, and Defendants filed a reply. On August 29, 2016, the court heard Defendants’ summary judgment motion and took the matter under submission. Thereafter, the court granted summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Defendants.
III.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW
We independently review the trial court’s ruling on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, “applying the same three-step analysis required of the trial court. [Citations.] First, we identify the issues framed by the pleadings. . . . [¶] Second, we determine whether the moving party’s showing has established facts which negate the opponent’s claim and justify a judgment in movant’s favor. . . . [¶] [T]he third and final step is to determine whether the opposition demonstrates the existence of a triable, material factual issue. [Citations.]” (AARTS Productions, Inc. v. Crocker National Bank (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 1061, 1064-1065; accord, Visueta v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1609, 1613.) “[W]e construe the moving party’s affidavits strictly, construe the opponent’s affidavits liberally, and resolve doubts about the propriety of granting the motion in favor of the party opposing it.” (Szadolci v. Hollywood Park Operating Co. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 16, 19; accord, Mills v. Forestex Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 625, 640.)
“The trial court properly grants a motion for summary judgment ‘if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).)” (Mills v. Forestex Co., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 639.) “Because we review the trial court’s ruling, not its rationale, we are not bound by the explanation the lower court gave in support of its decision.” (Id. at p. 640.)
IV.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in granting Defendants’ summary judgment motion based on plaintiffs filing their lawsuit after the statute of limitations had run. Plaintiffs argue their Complaint is not barred by the statute of limitations because it did not begin running until 2010 or, alternatively, there is a triable issue of fact as to when the limitation period began. Defendants argue it is undisputed the statute of limitations was triggered in May 2006, when plaintiffs received a County notice of violation citing plaintiffs for operating a winery that was not properly permitted or legal. The trial court agreed, as does this court.
“While resolution of the statute of limitations issue is normally a question of fact, where the uncontradicted facts established through discovery are susceptible of only one legitimate inference, summary judgment is proper.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1112; accord, Mills v. Forestex Co., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 640.) Here, the uncontradicted facts establish that the statute of limitations began running in 2006 and ran in 2009, before plaintiffs filed their fraud action in 2013.
Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (d)[4] provides that the statute of limitations for fraud or mistake is three years. Generally, a cause of action accrues “‘when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,’ or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent ‘liability arises.’” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397; Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797 [“Generally, a plaintiff must file suit within a designated period after the cause of action accrues. [Citation.] A cause of action accrues ‘when [it] is complete with all of its elements. . . .’”].)
It is undisputed that the statute of limitations did not begin running in 2004, when Defendants made the alleged misrepresentations in connection with the sale of the Property to plaintiffs. At that time, plaintiffs were unaware the Winery was operating illegally and had no reason to believe Defendants had made any misrepresentations regarding the legality of the Winery. The primary issue here is when did the statute of limitations begin running.
Because plaintiffs did not file their fraud lawsuit until more than three years after Defendants’ alleged misrepresentations in 2004 and 2006, plaintiffs attempt to save their claims by invoking several doctrines that, if applicable, postpone the normal deadline for filing their fraud complaint. Those doctrines include the delayed discovery rule, equitable estoppel, the fraudulent concealment doctrine, the continuing violation doctrine, and the continuous accrual doctrine. The California Supreme Court has described each of these doctrines as follows: “These doctrines may alter the rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running of the limitations period, or both. The ‘“most important”’ of these doctrines, the discovery rule, where applicable, ‘postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.’ [Citations.] Equitable tolling, in turn, may suspend or extend the statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reasonably and in good faith chosen to pursue one among several remedies and the statute of limitations’ notice function has been served. [Citation.] The doctrine of fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limitations where a defendant, through deceptive conduct, has caused a claim to grow stale. [Citation.] The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of them. [Citations.] Finally, under the theory of continuous accrual, a series of wrongs or injuries may be viewed as each triggering its own limitations period, such that a suit for relief may be partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those within the applicable limitations period. [Citation.]” (Aryeh v. Canon Bus. Sols., Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192.) The only doctrine that applies here is the delayed discovery rule, and we conclude it is undisputed that, based on that rule, plaintiffs’ fraud claims accrued in 2006, when plaintiffs received the County notice of violation.
- Delayed Discovery Rule and Continuing Concealment Doctrine
Under section 338, subdivision (d), an action for relief based on fraud or mistake “is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” Discovery occurs, and the section 338 limitation period begins to run under the delayed discovery rule when a plaintiff suspects or should suspect that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by wrongdoing or that someone has done something wrong to the plaintiff. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1110; Mills v. Forestex Co., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 646.) The limitations period begins once a plaintiff has notice or information to put a reasonable person on inquiry. (Jolly, supra, at pp. 1110-1111.) “A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific ‘facts’ necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Id. at p. 1111; see also Mills, supra, at pp. 642-643.)
Defendants met their initial burden of establishing that plaintiffs discovered facts constituting fraud or mistake sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations in 2006, upon receiving the County’s notice of violation advising them that the Winery was not properly permitted or legal. The County’s notice of violation contradicted Defendants’ representations in 2004, that all required permits had been obtained for the Winery, that there had never been any citations or notices of any violations, and that the Winery was operating legally. Because the statute of limitations began running in 2006, plaintiffs’ fraud action is barred by the three-year statute of limitations, which ran in 2009, before plaintiffs filed their action.
Plaintiffs contend they provided evidence raising a triable issue of fact as to when the statute of limitations began running under the delayed discovery rule. Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint that on February 4, 2010, they became aware of the false representations by Defendants and their counsel upon receiving a notice of noncompliance from the County in 2010. Plaintiffs argue that they presented evidence that the statute of limitations did not begin running under the delayed discovery rule until February 4, 2010, when they received a County notice of noncompliance.
But it is undisputed that in 2006, plaintiffs discovered sufficient facts to know or suspect Defendants committed the fraudulent conduct alleged in their Complaint, thus triggering the statute of limitations in 2006, long before the County notice of noncompliance in 2010. The 2010 notice of noncompliance did not provide any new facts underlying plaintiffs’ Complaint allegations, other than that the County intended to take immediate action based on the same violations previously noticed.
It is thus undisputed that in 2006 and thereafter, Plaintiffs suspected or knew Defendants had made misrepresentations in 2004 regarding the legality of the Winery. Therefore, under the delayed discovery rule, the statute of limitations began running in 2006, not in 2010, and ran in 2009. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Weatherly v. Universal Music Publishing Group (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 913 is misplaced because, in the instant case, it is undisputed that, after the County’s notice of violation in 2006, plaintiffs did not believe Defendants’ representations that the Winery was legal or that there was a County approved plot plan.
Plaintiffs’ opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is based almost entirely on statements in Mr. Cziraki’s declaration which contradict his deposition testimony. We are required to disregard his contradictory declaration statements and reject any contention of disputed fact, based on the well-established doctrine that, “Where a declaration submitted in opposition to a motion for summary judgment clearly contradicts the declarant’s earlier deposition testimony or discovery responses, the trial court may fairly disregard the declaration and ‘“conclude there is no substantial evidence of the existence of a triable issue of fact.”’” (Whitmire v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1078, 1087; see also Visueta v. General Motors Corp., supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at p. 1613 [“Admissions or concessions made during the course of discovery govern and control over contrary declarations lodged at a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.”]; Benavidez v. San Jose Police Dept. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 853, 860 [“[W]e are constrained by the well settled rule that ‘[a] party cannot create an issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior [discovery responses].”]; Whitmire, supra, at p. 1087 [“It is well-established that ‘a party cannot create an issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior discovery responses.’”]; Thompson v. Williams (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 566, 573 [“[A] party cannot rely on contradictions in his own testimony to create a triable issue of fact.”].)
B. Continuing Violation and Accrual Doctrines
Plaintiffs also attempt to salvage their fraud claims by extending the statute of limitations under the continuing violation and accrual doctrines, reasoning that Defendants made misrepresentations regarding the Winery, not only during plaintiffs’ purchase of the Property in 2004, but also in 2006 and 2010. Plaintiffs argue those additional instances of Defendants making misrepresentations in 2006 and 2010 regarding the Winery constitute separate actionable acts in and of themselves. Plaintiffs contend the statute of limitations as to those additional separate claims did not begin running until discovering those misrepresentations were false in 2010, upon receipt of the notice of noncompliance.
But it is unrefuted that there was no continuing fraud or new and independent fraud after plaintiffs received the 2006 notice of violation, because at that time, and thereafter, plaintiffs knew or had a reasonable suspicion that the Winery was illegal and that Defendants’ representations to the contrary were not correct. Plaintiffs also knew the plot plan provided by Lopardo was not a County approved plot plan for the Winery. Mr. Cziraki testified that, after receiving the County citation in 2006, he knew or suspected the Winery was illegal, and he knew that the copy of the plot plan provided by Lopardo was not a County approved plot plan for the Winery. It is thus undisputed plaintiffs did not rely on Defendants’ representations the Winery was legal. Therefore, the continuing violation and accrual doctrines are inapplicable as a matter of law.
C. The Equitable Estoppel Doctrine
Plaintiffs argue Defendants are equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense, because Defendants made misrepresentations lulling plaintiffs into believing the Winery was legal even after the 2006 notice of violation. After plaintiffs received the County’s 2006 notice of violation triggering the statute of limitations, Lopardo and Rancon real estate agents provided plaintiffs with copies of permits and a plot plan, along with Lopardo’s letter stating that the enclosed documents showed that the Winery was legal, there was an approved plot plan, and the County was incorrect in concluding otherwise. Defendants’ real estate agents made similar representations to plaintiffs again in 2010, shortly before plaintiffs received the 2010 notice of noncompliance.
“The doctrine of equitable estoppel applies only after the limitations period has run to preclude a party from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an untimely action where the party’s conduct has induced another into forbearing to file suit.” (McMackin v. Ehrheart (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 128, 142.) The equitable estoppel doctrine is reflected in Civil Code section 3517, which provides, “No one can take advantage of his own wrong.” As our Supreme Court has stated in keeping with this maxim, “The statute of limitations was intended as a shield for [the defendant’s] protection against stale claims, but he may not use it to perpetrate a fraud upon otherwise diligent suitors. Thus, . . . the ‘defendant, having, by his own wrongdoing, prevented the plaintiff from instituting his suit, will not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong by setting up the statute as a defense.’” (Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co. (1944) 25 Cal.2d 226, 231-232; accord, McMackin, supra, at p. 142.)
Normally determination of whether the equitable estoppel doctrine precludes application of the limitations period is determined by the finder of fact. (McMackin v. Ehrheart, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 142.) However, here, where the material facts are undisputed, the trial court and this court may decide whether equitable estoppel applies as a matter of law.
An estoppel against a statute of limitations defense “‘arises as a result of some conduct by the defendant, relied on by the plaintiff, which induces the belated filing of the action.’” (Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 689-690; accord, Spray, Gould & Bowers v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267-1268.) The elements required to prove equitable estoppel include: “‘“(1) The party to be estopped must know the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had the right to believe that it was so intended; (3) the party asserting the estoppel must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and, (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury.”’ [Citation.]” (Spray, Gould & Bowers, supra, at p. 1268, italics added.)
But plaintiffs failed to provide any evidence supporting the third and fourth elements of equitable estoppel. There is unrefuted evidence that plaintiffs were not ignorant of the true state of facts in 2006 and thereafter, and did not rely on Defendants’ alleged misrepresentation to their injury. The evidence establishes that plaintiffs reviewed Lopardo’s June 22, 2006, letter and attached documents. Mr. Cziraki still believed the Winery was operating illegally and knew that the enclosed copy of the plot plan was not a County approved plot plan for the Winery. Mr. Cziraki continued to question the legality of the Winery and whether it was properly permitted. He also questioned whether there were zoning issues that needed to be addressed regarding the Winery. Mr. Cziraki testified that, after discussing Lopardo’s letter with his attorney, he questioned whether Lopardo’s conclusions were correct. It is further undisputed that Mr. Cziraki is an experienced businessman and owns several commercial properties and a vineyard in Temecula, in addition to the subject vineyard.
The unrefuted evidence establishes that plaintiffs did not delay filing their fraud lawsuit against Defendants based on Defendants’ representations in 2006 or thereafter. It is undisputed, based on Mr. Cziraki’s deposition testimony and plaintiffs’ responses to requests for admissions that plaintiffs did not believe Defendants’ representations that the Winery was legal, that the Winery had been properly permitted, or that the copy of the plot plan provided by Lopardo was a County approved plot plan for the Winery. It is further unrefuted that in 2006 and thereafter, plaintiffs knew or suspected that the Winery was illegal, despite Defendants’ representations to the contrary in 2004, 2006, and 2010.
We therefore conclude as a matter of law that Defendants are not equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense. Plaintiffs have not provided any competent evidence establishing that, after receiving the 2006 notice of violation, they were ignorant of the true state of facts triggering the statute of limitations or that plaintiffs justifiably relied on facts provided by Defendants in delaying filing their lawsuit.
V.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are awarded their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ
P. J.
SLOUGH
J.
[1] The defendants include Vincent F. Cilurzo, Audrey T. Cilurzo, Vincent F. Cilurzo and Audrey T. Cilurzo, as trustees of the Cilurzo Family Trust, and Rancon Real Estate Corporation (Rancon), referred to herein collectively as Defendants.
[2] As Imre and Gizella Cziraki share the same last name, in the interests of clarity we refer to Imre Cziraki individually as Mr. Cziraki. We intend no disrespect by referring to the other individual solely by their last names.
[3] The Cilurzos filed the motion for summary judgment and Rancon joined in the motion.
[4] Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
