P. v. Bakker

Filed 10/25/06 P. v. Bakker CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Defendant Steven Bakker has appealed a postjudgment order, in which the trial court denied his motion for relief from the registration requirements of Penal Code section 290.^[1] We affirm the order.

Background

In January 1995, the trial court found defendant not guilty by reason of insanity on one count of misdemeanor sexual battery (§ 243.4, subd. (a)) and two counts of felony battery against a custodial officer (§ 243.1). Following a referral to CONREP for a placement recommendation,^[2] the court committed defendant to confinement in a state hospital for a period of four years eight months.

Over 10 years after the judgment, on May 2, 2005, defendant filed a motion informing the trial court that, upon his initial release from the state hospital, he had been “informed that he was required to register” as a sex offender under section 290. His motion sought relief from that requirement. His appeal is from the order of June 22, 2005, denying that motion.^[3] (See § 1237, subd. (b).)

Discussion

Persons subject to the registration requirements of section 290 include one “who, since July 1, 1944, has been or is hereafter convicted in any court in this state . . . of a violation of . . . Section 243.4 . . . .” (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(A), italics added.) Persons subject to these requirements also include one “who, since July 1, 1944, has been or hereafter is determined to be a . . . person who has been found guilty in the guilt phase of a trial for an offense for which registration is required by this section but who has been found not guilty by reason of insanity in the sanity phase of the trial.” (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(C), italics added.)

Defendant argued below that he was never “found guilty” of violating section 243.4 “in the guilt phase of a trial,” within the meaning of section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C). Rather, he withdrew his plea of not guilty and proceeded solely on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. He reasoned there was consequently no actual “guilt phase of a trial“ and no actual finding of guilt, but only a trial on the issue of his sanity. The prosecution contended that the necessary finding of guilt was included in defendant’s plea. That is, when a “defendant . . . pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, without also pleading not guilty” he or she “admits the commission of the offense charged.” (§ 1016.) The trial court accepted the latter argument in denying defendant’s motion.

Defendant renews his argument before this court. He argues further that the language of section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C), should be construed consistently with that of subdivision (a)(2)(A), which refers to persons “convicted” of specified offenses. His position is that a person who enters only a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and who thereby foregoes the guilt phase of the trial, should not be deemed to have been “convicted” within the meaning of subdivision (a)(2)(A). The legislature could have specified in section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C), that the registration requirements apply to a person who admits guilt, as well as to a person who is found guilty. In defendant’s view, the fact that the legislature did not make such a specification renders the statutory language ambiguous as to whether it includes a defendant who, like him, relied solely on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. Because it is ambiguous he urges that we construe the language of section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C), in his favor.

A person is generally “convicted” when he or she is “adjudicated guilty,” and this may occur either through a verdict or through a plea. (See People v. Mendoza (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1034.) Nothing indicates that the term “convicted,” as it is used in section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(A), has a different meaning. Section 1016 is likewise clear: a person who relies on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, without also relying on an alternate plea of not guilty, admits the commission of the offense charged. (See People v. Stewart (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 992, 997; see also People v. Hernandez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 521 (“ ‘[c]ommission of the overt act is conceded’ but punishment is avoided ‘upon the sole ground that at the time the overt act was committed the defendant was [insane]’ “).) When section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C) is read together with these provisions, it is plain that a person may be “found guilty” within the meaning of that subdivision when he or she has relied solely on a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. We see no ambiguity, and when there is none, the plain language governs. (See People v. Smith (2004) 32 Cal.4th 792, 797-798 (Smith).)^[4]

We conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion.

Disposition

The minute order of June 22, 2005, is affirmed.

______________________

Marchiano, P.J.

We concur:

______________________

Stein, J.

______________________

Swager, J.

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^[1] Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

^[2] “CONREP” refers to the Conditional Release Program administered through the state Department of Mental Health, serving specified patients that include persons committed pursuant to a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity. (See Pen. Code, § 1026; see also [as of Oct. 25, 2006].)

^[3] Within one week after the completion of briefing in this appeal, defendant filed a separate petition for writ of habeas corpus. The petition also seeks relief from the registration requirements of section 290, relying on matters outside the record in this appeal. (In re Steven Bakker on Habeas Corpus, A114271.) We deferred consideration of the petition pending this appeal, and have this date filed an order denying the petition.

^[4] Defendant cites to Smith, supra, 32 Cal.4th 792, and People v. Franklin (1999) 20 Cal.4th 249, in support of his request that we construe section 290, subdivision (a)(2)(C), in his favor. These decisions applied such an interpretation only when the statutory language was ambiguous. Moreover, both decisions involved particular registration requirements set out in section 290. In such instances, it is proper to construe ambiguities in a defendant’s favor. Otherwise, registrants might be convicted for noncompliance with the requirements without having received adequate notice of how they were to comply. (See Smith, supra, at pp. 797-798; Franklin, supra, at pp. 253-255.) The language at issue here, however, does not relate to how individuals are to comply, but rather who must comply.