[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
[1] The court also terminated the parental rights of A.Y.’s presumed father (Father). Father is not a party to this appeal and facts pertaining to him will be included to the extent they are relevant to Mother’s appeal.
[1] The relevant factual background prior to Mother’s filing of a petition for extraordinary writ, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, is set forth in this court’s December 28, 2017 opinion, in which we denied the petition based on our conclusion that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s “finding that, in light of Mother’s dishonesty, lack of insight, and willingness to endanger A.Y. by exposing her to Father, there was not a substantial probability that A.Y. may be returned to Mother’s care if she were to receive an additional six months of reunification services. [Citations.]” (D.Y. v. Superior Court (Dec. 28, 2017, A152665) [nonpub. opn.].)
[1] A.Y. had initially been placed with Father after her birth in early January 2017, but was removed in early February and placed briefly in a foster home before being placed with the current caregiver on February 17.
[1] At the conclusion of the October 5, 2017 six-month review hearing, the court had explained its reasons for terminating Mother’s reunification services and setting the matter for a section 366.26 hearing despite the significant progress Mother had made in achieving sobriety. The court stated that Mother was “deceptive and manipulative” and a “pathological liar” who intentionally exposed A.Y. to danger by repeatedly allowing Father to have contact with her. The court concluded that it “would never trust her not to keep [lying and exposing A.Y. to danger] in another way or form even if I give her more time.”
[1] Mother argues that evidence of changed circumstances includes the permanent restraining order she obtained against Father in the months between the termination of her reunification services and the hearing on the section 388 petition. However, Mother presented no evidence regarding or discussion about the restraining order at the hearing. Moreover, when the court terminated her reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing, its concerns about Mother’s dishonesty, judgment, and manipulative behavior went beyond her relationship with Father and included the court’s belief that it “would have a hard time believing anything else she tells the court.”
[1] Because we have found that the court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Mother’s section 388 petition, we need not address Mother’s contention that “[b]ecause the juvenile court erred in denying [her] section 388 petition, all subsequent orders of the juvenile court must be vacated, including the order terminating [her] parental rights. [Citation.]”
[1] Although the Bureau had recommended posttermination visitation between Mother and A.Y. at the discretion of the prospective adoptive parent, the court declined to order visitation, stating that she did not “trust the mother and her discretion as to what she would do with a visit at this time,” describing her as being “incredibly manipulative.” The court further stated that it was “not trying to control this for the future, but I want the caregiver to know that.”
