Filed 10/5/18 P. v. Camphor CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. HENRY L. CAMPHOR, JR., Defendant and Appellant. |
A151488
(Alameda County Super. Ct. No. 178180)
|
A jury convicted defendant of three counts of lewd conduct with a child. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior molestation of another child. He also argues the court failed to grant him good conduct credit. We affirm the trial court’s admission of the prior molestation, but modify the judgment to award defendant conduct credit for presentence confinement.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John Doe 1 and his cousin, John Doe 2, lived with other members of their extended families in a five-bedroom home in Alameda. One of the members of the household, Sergio, is the boys’ uncle. Sergio met defendant at a church, and when Sergio was 13 or 14 years old, he introduced his older brother, Isaac, to defendant. After defendant befriended Sergio, he started “hanging out” with Isaac at the Alameda residence. He also came over to watch “a couple of baseball games,” and attended a few family gatherings.
Over time, defendant became acquainted with other members of the family, including nine-year-old John Doe 1 and eight-year-old John Doe 2. On several occasions defendant came to the Alameda residence for movie nights where he, Isaac, and Does 1 and 2 ate food brought over by defendant and watched movies rented by defendant in Isaac’s bedroom. In addition to movie nights, defendant took Does 1 and 2 to baseball practice, and out to the beach, McDonald’s, Little Caesars, and a sports facility, the Bladium. Occasionally, defendant would take Does 1 and 2 to the old naval base in Alameda and let them drive his car by sitting on the center console or on his lap while turning the steering wheel.
Between late December 2013 and late June 2014, defendant took Isaac, Sergio, and John Does 1 and 2 on camping trips to Lake Chabot. On one or two occasions in either May or June 2014, defendant took only Does 1 and 2 on a camping trip.
Both John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 testified at defendant’s jury trial. According to Doe 1, defendant drove him and his cousin, Doe 2, to Lake Chabot for a camping trip, “[e]stimating” the trip took place during spring break of 2014. When they arrived at the campsite, it was dark. Inside the tent, Doe 1 slept on top of his sleeping bag because the rocks were “hurting” and “bothering” him. After Doe 1 went to sleep, while it was still dark, he woke up because “[s]omething was rubbing [his] bottom” and penis between his “boxers” and “PJs” as he laid on his left side. Doe 1 then “got up,” but as he “went to go turn on the light [defendant] was right behind [him].” And when Doe 1 turned on the light, defendant was next to where Doe 1 had been sleeping, laying down in a position “that would have been to [Doe 1’s] back.” Though Doe 1 felt “[u]ncomfortable” and “wanted to leave,” he instead turned off the light, laid down in a different spot of the tent, and went back to sleep.
John Doe 1 woke up again when he heard John Doe 2 yelling, “Get off me.” After turning on the light, he saw defendant “on top of” John Doe 2, who was on his stomach. Defendant’s clothing on the bottom half of his body was “down to his knees,” and Doe 1 could see his bottom. Doe 2 was “moving around trying to get [defendant] off of him.” Doe 1 kept telling defendant to “get off” Doe 2, and eventually defendant did so.
John Doe 2 described the molestations at trial first testifying that he and John Doe 1 rode with defendant for a camping trip at Lake Chabot. Initially, Doe 2 was in the backseat of the vehicle with Doe 1, but at defendant’s instruction, “crawled over” to the front passenger seat. As Doe 2 was crawling to the passenger seat, defendant pulled Doe 2’s sweatpants down to his thighs. Once he sat in the front passenger seat, defendant told Doe 2 to sit on his lap. Before Doe 2 could sit on defendant’s lap, however, defendant pulled his own pants to his knees, stating he was airing them out. When Doe 2 eventually sat on defendant’s lap to steer the car, defendant was still wearing boxer underwear. While Doe 2 was on defendant’s lap steering the vehicle, he noticed defendant was having an “erection.” Defendant began moving his “thigh part” side to side, and Doe 2 felt defendant’s penis under him. Defendant also put his hand on Doe 2’s penis and rubbed it. In response, Doe 2 used his hands to push defendant’s head against the window and moved back to the passenger seat.
When all three arrived at the campsite, John Doe 2 ate some hot dogs and chips. After he finished eating, he changed into his pajamas, and went to sleep in defendant’s tent. Later, as Doe 2 laid on his stomach asleep, he woke up because he felt defendant’s penis on his bottom. Doe 2’s underwear and pants “were down,” and defendant was laying over him with “with his leg over” Doe 2’s legs. He remembered a light going on “from outside,” and defendant was now next to him, acting like he was asleep. Doe 2 pulled up his pants and went back to sleep, but awoke again, finding his hand on defendant’s penis. Defendant moved Doe 2’s hand back and forth. Next he saw defendant laying on the ground facing the front of John Doe 1, with his hand on Doe 1’s penis outside of his clothing.
The following day, defendant took both boys home. According to John Doe 1, defendant told him and John Doe 2, when he dropped them off, not to tell anyone what he had done the previous night. Several days later, John Does 1 and 2 talked to Isaac about what happened on their camping trip. Doe 1 did most of the talking, but Isaac “kind of believed [them] but he kind of at the same time he thought [they] were lying.” Isaac, in turn, reported this conversation to his foster mother, who did not believe him.
John Does 1 and 2, along with Isaac and his friend, Gabe, subsequently went on anther camping trip with defendant. Doe 1 felt safe because Isaac was “very brave and strong and would protect us.” Neither Doe 1 nor 2 described any inappropriate touching during that trip.
On July 4th, there was a family gathering. At some point, John Doe 1’s mother mentioned that a friend of hers stated a man, who the family knew from “fishing at the rock wall,” was a pedophile. A family member then showed Doe 1’s father, a picture on his cell phone of defendant whose face appeared on a Megan’s Law or similar Web site. After Doe 1’s father saw defendant’s picture on the Web site, he summoned Does 1 and 2 to his mother’s room and asked each if defendant had ever touched them sexually or inappropriately. Does 1 and 2 indicated defendant had touched them inappropriately.
Following his conversation with John Does 1 and 2, Doe 1’s father called the Alameda Police Department. When the Alameda police arrived at the residence, Doe 1’s father was told he needed to contact the East Bay Regional Parks police. Later that day, defendant came over to the house and Doe 1’s father hit him several times.
A few days later, John Does 1 and 2 were interviewed at CALICO (Child Abuse, Listening, Interviewing, and Coordination center). Both boys said defendant had sexually molested them during a camping trip. Doe 2 exaggerated and even lied about some of the details of defendant’s actions because he wanted people to take him seriously.
As we will discuss in more detail later in the opinion, Roger R. testified at trial that in 2001, when he was seven years old, defendant sexually molested him.
Several other witnesses also testified during the trial. We briefly summarize their testimony. Child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome expert, Dr. Anthony Urquiza, testified for the prosecution, explaining the common reactions of children to sexual abuse. Dr. Bradley McAuliff, a professor of psychology, testified for the defense as an expert on the suggestibility of children in cases of alleged sexual abuse.
Other witnesses testified that they had no reason to believe defendant was a child molester, the interior of defendant’s car and the interior of a tent discovered inside the car showed no sign of human fluid, and defendant’s car had been registered at the Lake Chabot campground on multiple occasions between December 2013 and late June 2014, but not during March or April 2014.
In March 2017, the Alameda County District Attorney filed a second amended information charging defendant with three counts of lewd act upon a child, in violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a). The information further alleged defendant’s crimes had involved multiple victims (Pen. Code, § 667.61) and defendant had previously been convicted of lewd act upon a child (id., §§ 667, subds. (a)(1) & (e)(1), 667.5, subd. (c), 667.61, 667.71, subd. (b), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1), 1192.7, subd. (c)). The information further alleged defendant had served a prior prison term and had not remained free of prison custody for five years as of the time he committed the charged crimes. (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).)
In April 2017, a jury convicted defendant as charged.
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 110 years to life with pretrial custody credits of 1,105 days.
This timely appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Propensity Evidence
Defendant moved in limine to exclude Roger R.’s testimony that he was molested by defendant in 2001. Pursuant to Evidence Code[1] section 1108, the trial court decided to admit the evidence after engaging in the weighing process under section 352 to determine if the probative value was outweighed by the prejudicial impact. Defendant challenges this ruling arguing the prejudice from Roger R.’s testimony far exceeds any probative value.
1. Background
During trial, the court allowed Roger R. to testify that in 2001, he was molested by defendant. When he was seven years old, he lived in a one-bedroom apartment with his mother, brothers, and sister. Defendant did not live in the apartment complex, but knew someone who lived there, and he would “show up around the complex.” Through his friends who also lived at the complex, Roger had contact with defendant. According to Roger, defendant “would take a couple of us in his car and just drive around and put us out to sell candy and stuff.” In February 2001, defendant drove Roger to a toy store where he bought fake paper money and gave it to Roger. Following the stop at the toy store, defendant drove to a park. It was already dark outside, but the lights were on inside the car. Defendant took off Roger’s top and bottom clothing, after which defendant took off his own pants and underwear. Next, defendant, who was on the driver’s side, placed Roger on his lap. He touched Roger’s legs, thighs, and “privates” and moved his penis against Roger’s “bottom, torso” in a “[w]obbly” manner. While defendant and Roger were in the car, the police made contact with them.
A jury convicted defendant as charged on May 30, 2002.
2. Applicable Legal Principles
Generally, evidence of a person’s character, including evidence of a person’s character in the form of specific instances of uncharged misconduct, is inadmissible to prove conduct on a specific occasion. (People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 393, citing § 1101, subd. (a) (hereafter section 1101(a)).) Thus, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is generally inadmissible when it is offered to show a defendant had the criminal disposition or propensity to commit a charged crime. (Ewoldt, at p. 393.)
An exception to this rule, however, is set forth in section 1108, which provides: “In a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (§ 1108, subd. (a) (hereafter section 1108(a)); People v. Nguyen (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1096, 1115–1116.)
As the Supreme Court explained in People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 911 (Falsetta), “[T]he Legislature enacted section 1108 to expand the admissibility of disposition or propensity evidence in sex offense cases. . . . [¶] Available legislative history indicates section 1108 was intended in sex offense cases to relax the evidentiary restraints section 1101[(a)] imposed, to assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.”
Thus, section 1108 allows admission, in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of one of a list of sexual offenses, of evidence of the defendant’s commission of another listed sexual offense that otherwise would be made inadmissible by section 1101(a). (See § 1108, subds. (a), (d)(1).)
Furthermore, the uncharged and charged offenses are considered sufficiently similar if they are both sexual offenses enumerated in section 1108. (People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 41.) Frazier explained, “The charged and uncharged crimes need not be sufficiently similar that evidence of the latter would be admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, otherwise Evidence Code section 1108 would serve no purpose. It is enough the charged and uncharged offenses are sex offenses as defined in section 1108.” (Id. at pp. 40–41.)
Accordingly, evidence here that defendant committed a prior lewd or lascivious act upon a child under the age of 14 years was admissible to prove he had a propensity to commit the relevant charged offenses of which he was ultimately convicted (three counts of Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)) in this case, unless the prior sexual molestation was inadmissible under Evidence Code section 352. (§ 1108, subd. (a).)
3. Analysis
Defendant contends his trial was constitutionally tainted because the court allowed the prosecutor to present evidence defendant had sexually molested Roger R. in 2001, when Roger was seven years old. Specifically, defendant argues Falsetta is inconsistent with controlling authority of the United States Supreme Court, and in any event, the trial court should have excluded the Roger R. molestation under section 352. We first address his constitutional challenge to section 1108, then his claim of evidentiary error.
a. Section 1108 Is Facially Constitutional
Defendant maintains his due process rights have been violated because prior to Falsetta, propensity evidence was frowned upon by United States Supreme Court cases. (See Michelson v. United States (1948) 335 U.S. 469, 475–476 [courts following common-law tradition almost unanimously have disallowed resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant’s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt]; Dowling v. United States (1990) 493 U.S. 342, 353 [judges are not free in defining due process; they determine only whether the action complained of violates fundamental conceptions of justice at the base of our civil and political institutions and which define “ ‘ “the community’s sense of fair play and decency” ’ ”]; Spencer v. Texas (1967) 385 U.S. 554, 560–561 [prior offense evidence has a potentiality for prejudice and is usually excluded except when particularly probative of intent, identity, malice, motive, a system of criminal activity, when a defendant has raised the issue of his or her character, or when a defendant has testified and state seeks to impeach his or her credibility].)
Defendant’s argument lacks merit because his citations to United States Supreme Court cases predate Falsetta, and the United States Supreme Court has yet to overturn Falsetta. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected a due process challenge to section 1108, and allowed routine admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior sex crimes under circumstances like those presented here. (See, e.g., People v. Cordova (2015) 62 Cal.4th 104, 132; People v. Merriman (2014) 60 Cal.4th 1, 58; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1288–1289.) We are bound by decisions of the California Supreme Court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) Therefore, we must reject defendant’s challenge to section 1108.
b. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Admitting the Evidence of Prior Sexual Misconduct Under Section 352
In the instant matter, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing the court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence defendant previously molested Roger R.
On appeal, we review the trial court’s admission of section 1108 evidence, including its section 352 weighing process, for abuse of discretion. (People v. Dejourney (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1091, 1104–1105; People v. Miramontes (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1097.) “We will not find that a court abuses its discretion in admitting such other sexual acts evidence unless its ruling ‘ “falls outside the bounds of reason.” ’ ” (Dejourney, at p. 1105.) Alternatively stated, we will not reverse a trial court’s exercise of discretion under sections 1108 and 352 unless its decision was “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd [and] resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.” ’ ” (People v. Lewis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 1286; People v. Nguyen, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1116.) Under section 352, evidence is properly excluded if its probative value is “substantially outweighed” by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time, or create a substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury. (§ 352; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609.) A decision to exclude evidence under section 352 comes within the trial court’s broad discretionary powers and “will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion.” (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070.)
In Falsetta, the Supreme Court stated that, in determining whether to admit section 1108 propensity evidence of a defendant’s prior sexual offense, the trial courts “must engage in a careful weighing process under section 352” by “consider[ing] such factors as its nature, relevance, and possible remoteness, the degree of certainty of its commission and the likelihood of confusing, misleading, or distracting the jurors from their main inquiry, its similarity to the charged offense, its likely prejudicial impact on the jurors, the burden on the defendant in defending against the uncharged offense, and the availability of less prejudicial alternatives to its outright admission, such as admitting some but not all of the defendant’s other sex offenses, or excluding irrelevant though inflammatory details surrounding the offense.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th 903, 916–917.) The Falsetta court held that section 1108 does not violate due process principles, and, thus, is constitutionally valid, because it subjects evidence of uncharged sexual misconduct to the weighing process of section 352 in sex crime prosecutions. (Falsetta, at pp. 907, 917–918, 922.)
Here, the trial court was aware of its obligation to evaluate the proffered testimony under section 352. Initially, as acknowledged by defendant, the trial court considered the motion to exclude evidence of the prior sexual molestation of Roger R. “at some length” before allowing his testimony. The court first noted similarities between the underlying incidents and the uncharged offense, and then engaged in the section 352 weighing process, determining there was not a substantial danger of undue prejudice because the jurors were going to be able to view the witnesses and evaluate whether their testimony was fabricated. In other words, the court clearly understood it was required to weigh the probative value of Roger R.’s testimony versus its prejudicial impact and, in fact, did so.
The question then becomes whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Roger R.’s testimony. We conclude it did not. First, as the trial court explained, there were definitive similarities between the charged offenses and the 2001 offense, finding all the victims were boys under the age of 10, each excursion appeared to be planned, defendant drove the victims to a park, some of the molestations occurred in defendant’s vehicle, and defendant gained a level of trust with the victims and the victims’ families to such an extent that the families let the victims “go off in these excursions away from them.” Second, defendant’s sexual molestation of Roger R. was relevant to show defendant had a propensity to commit molestation of boys under the age of 10. Third, the central issue in this case, according to defendant, “was whether [John Does 1 and 2] were telling the truth.” As noted in the legislative history, section 1108 was intended in sex offense cases to relax the evidentiary restraints of section 1101(a) “to assure that the trier of fact would be made aware of the defendant’s other sex offenses in evaluating the victim’s and the defendant’s credibility.” (Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 911.) Because defendant challenged the credibility of John Doe 1’s and John Doe 2’s testimony, Roger R.’s evidence of a prior sexual molestation committed by defendant was highly probative with respect to credibility. Finally, Roger R.’s testimony was not confusing, misleading, or time consuming, nor did it distract the jurors from their main inquiry. In fact, his testimony only consumed 21 pages of transcript, and defense counsel declined to cross-examine.[2]
Though arguing generally that “section 352 cannot protect against the unfairness of propensity evidence,” defendant also maintains that even if section 1108 provides the court with the discretion to admit Roger R.’s testimony concerning the prior 2001 sexual misconduct, the court erred in admitting this evidence because the molestation was too remote in time. We disagree. Here, defendant molested Roger R. in 2001, and both the Attorney General and defendant agree he was in jail or prison from 2001 to 2008. His molestations of John Does 1 and 2 occurred in 2014.
A six-year delay, however, is not particularly long in this context, and the remoteness of a prior bad act in any event does not necessarily require exclusion of the evidence under section 1108. In People v. Cordova, supra, 62 Cal.4th 104, 133, for example, our Supreme Court held the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting evidence of two prior sex offenses, occurring 13 and 18 years earlier. Although the court observed remoteness of prior sex offenses is a relevant factor for a trial court to consider in exercising its discretion to compel exclusion of the evidence, “[n]either Evidence Code section 352 nor Evidence Code section 1108 contains rigid requirements.” (Ibid.) Citing to People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 285, the court noted “ ‘significant similarities between the prior and the charged offenses may “balance[] out the remoteness.” ’ ” (Cordova, at p. 133; see People v. Robertson (2015) 208 Cal.App.4th 965, 992 [where the defendant was charged with kidnapping for rape and other related offenses, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidence of the defendant’s similar crimes that occurred approximately 34 years earlier].)
Additionally, defendant did not lead an entirely blameless life between 2001 and 2014, because he was incarcerated during that period of time. And while his molestation of John Does 1 and 2 occurred six years later, the striking similarities between the prior molestation and later sexual molestations in conjunction with the other Falsetta factors balance out the temporal remoteness.
In sum, the relevant factors delineated in Falsetta, as applied here, far outweigh the prejudicial impact of admission of evidence concerning the 2001 molestation.
B. Custody Credits
Defendant claims the trial court erred in declining to grant him 165 days of good conduct credit for the time he served in jail from the date of his arrest until the date of his judgment.
1. Background
At the sentencing hearing, held on May 19, 2017, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 110 years to life. Consistent with the probation report, the court also awarded defendant credit for time served of 1,049 days. Defense counsel inquired whether defendant was entitled to receive “credits” for “half time.” The court stated defendant was not entitled to half-time as a matter of law. Defense counsel did not comment further. Additionally, neither the probation report nor defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum mentioned defendant’s eligibility or qualification for conduct credits for his time in pretrial custody. The prosecutor’s sentencing memorandum asserted defendant was not entitled to receive conduct credits.
The clerk’s minutes reflect defendant next appeared on July 14, 2017 for execution of sentence.[3] As reflected in the minutes, in addition to the 1,049 days of credit defendant received as of May 19, 2017, he received another 56 days covering the period between May 19 and July 14, for a total of 1,105 days of credit for time served. The minutes, however, do not mention credits for good conduct. The abstract of judgment, dated July 26, 2017, similarly shows defendant was awarded 1,105 days of “actual credits,” based on the sentencing date of July 14, 2017.
2. Defendant Is Entitled to Good Time Credit
Defendant contends he is entitled to presentence conduct credits under Penal Code section 2933.1, which provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, any person who is convicted of a felony offense listed in subdivision (c) of [Penal Code] section 667.5[[4]] shall accrue no more than 15 percent of worktime credit, as defined in Section 2933.” (Id., subd. (a), italics added.)
In response, the Attorney General posits defendant forfeited this contention by failing to make any reference to conduct credit under Penal Code section 2933.1 at the time of sentencing. “To the contrary, only challenges to discretionary sentencing choices are forfeited by failure to object.” (People v. Goldman (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 950, 961, citing People v. Aguirre (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.) “Awarding conduct credits under section 2933.1 is not a discretionary matter.” (Goldman, at p. 961.)
The Attorney General secondarily argues there was no evidence produced at sentencing describing defendant’s jail behavior while awaiting trial. On the other hand, the prosecutor failed to present evidence of any bad behavior during defendant’s presentence confinement, and while the trial court was correct that defendant was not entitled to half-time credit, the court never gave any reasons why any conduct credit under Penal Code section 2933.1 should be denied.
Because we reject the Attorney General’s arguments, we agree with defendant that he is entitled to 15 percent presentence conduct credits under Penal Code section 2933.1. (See People v. Brewer (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 457, 460, 462 [“Notably, neither section 2933.1 nor section 4019[[5]] contains any express provision making defendants ineligible for presentence conduct credit if they receive an indeterminate life sentence.”]
Accordingly, because defendant served 1,105 days in presentence custody, he is entitled to 165 days of presentence conduct credit.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to award defendant 165 days of presentence conduct credit under Penal Code section 2933.1. As modified the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and send a copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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Margulies, J.
We concur:
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Humes, P.J.
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Dondero, J.
A151488
People v. Camphor
[1] All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code unless otherwise indicated.
[2] Defendant also acknowledges his prior conviction for molesting Roger R. “was likely to come in, since the conviction led to the family’s discovery that [defendant] was a registered sex offender.”
[3] There is no transcript of this proceeding included in the record.
[4] Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (c) lists violent felonies including “Lewd or lascivious act as defined in subdivision (a) or (b) of [Penal Code] section 288.”
[5] Penal Code section 4019 provides a criminal defendant may earn additional presentence credit against his or her sentence for willingness to perform assigned labor and compliance with rules and regulations. (Id., subds. (b), (c).)