In re Rosemarie Q.

Filed 10/11/06 In re Rosemarie Q. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT^*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Robert Anspach, Judge.

Catherine Czar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.

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Cynthia Q. appeals from a June 2006 order terminating her parental rights (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26 ) to her two daughters.^[1] Appellant’s appointed appellate counsel submitted a letter dated August 8, 2006, advising that no brief would be forthcoming (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952). We have extended time twice for appellant to personally file a letter brief. Appellant has now filed such a letter brief with this court. In it, she disputes for the first time evidence in the record. She also complains her trial attorney should have asked the court to grant long-term foster care, instead of termination of parental rights, based on the progress she has allegedly made.

The juvenile court’s decision is presumed correct unless appellant can establish that the trial court committed prejudicial error. (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)

“An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (E.g., Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564) Hence, the appellant must make a challenge. In so doing, he must raise claims of reversible error or other defect (see ibid.), and . . . ‘present argument and authority on each point made’ (County of Sacramento v. Lackner (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 576, 591; accord, In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278). If he does not, he may, in the court's discretion, be deemed to have abandoned his appeal. (Berger v. Godden [(1985)] 163 Cal.App.3d [1113] at p. 1119.) In that event, it may order dismissal. (Ibid.) Such a result is appropriate here. With no error or other defect claimed against the orders appealed from, the Court of Appeal was presented with no reason to proceed to the merits of any unraised ‘points’--and, a fortiori, no reason to reverse or even modify the orders in question. (See People v. Brigham (1979) 25 Cal.3d 283, 289.)” (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)

Having reviewed her letter brief and the record herein, we conclude appellant raises no arguable issue regarding the trial court’s decision to terminate her rights.

First, the juvenile court, not this court, is the trier of fact. On appeal, all evidentiary conflicts must be resolved in favor of the respondent and all legitimate inferences indulged in to uphold the decision, if possible. We may not reweigh or express an independent judgment on the evidence. (In re Laura F. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 826, 833.)

Second, once the juvenile court terminated reunification services for appellant, the focus shifted to the children’s needs for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) A section 366.26 hearing is designed to protect children’s compelling rights to have a placement that is stable, permanent, and that allows the caretaker to make a full emotional commitment to the children. (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 306.) Because the children were likely to be adopted, adoption was the norm. Indeed, the law required the juvenile court to select adoption as its permanent plan for the children and to order termination of parental rights, unless there was a legally permissible and compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the children. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Whatever progress appellant was making by the time of the section 366.26 hearing, it was not a compelling reason to find termination would be detrimental under California law (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)).

Having found no claim of trial court error in appellant’s letter brief as to matters within the scope of this appeal, we conclude appellant has abandoned the appeal from the order terminating her parental rights and will dismiss this appeal.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed.

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^*Before Levy, Acting P.J., Cornell, J., and Hill, J.

^[1] All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.