Filed 11/1/18 In re Marriage of Sandford CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re Marriage of DOUGLAS and JESSICA SANDFORD.	2d Civil No. B287900 (Super. Ct. No. D384488) (Ventura County)
DOUGLAS SANDFORD, Respondent, v. JESSICA SANDFORD, Appellant.

Jessica Sandford, appearing in propria persona, appeals from a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against her pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.). Jessica[1] contends the DVRO, which was issued in a marital dissolution proceeding between herself and respondent Douglas Sandford, must be reversed because (1) she was not properly served with documents Douglas submitted in support of the order; and (2) the trial judge who issued the order “abused his position as a judicial officer.” We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Douglas and Jessica were married in 2001 and have five minor children. On October 16, 2017, Douglas filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. The trial court initially ordered that the four youngest children were to reside with Douglas and that the eldest child was to reside with Jessica. On October 24, 2017, the court ordered that the four youngest children were to continue residing with Douglas “with one weekly professionally supervised visit with [Jessica] for a period of up to two hours.” The oldest child was to also reside with Douglas “and have daily contact and visits with [Jessica] as coordinated between the minor and [Douglas].” Both parents were also ordered to submit to and fully participate in a custody evaluation.

On January 2, 2018, Douglas, on behalf of himself and his children, submitted an application for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against Jessica. After a hearing the following day, the court granted a DVTRO against Jessica, ordered her to move herself and her belongings out of the family residence, and set the matter for a DVRO hearing on January 29, 2018. On January 29, Jessica submitted an application for a DVTRO against Douglas on behalf of herself only. At the January 29 hearing, Douglas did not oppose Jessica’s application and the court granted it. The court also granted Douglas’s request to continue his DVRO hearing to January 31, 2018, to be heard in conjunction with the hearing as to Jessica’s requested DVRO.

At the conclusion of the January 31 hearing, the court issued both of the requested DVRO’s. The five-year DVRO against Jessica enjoins her, inter alia, from harassing or contacting Douglas or having any contact with the couple’s five children except as provided in the accompanying child custody and visitation order. The one-year DVRO against Douglas enjoins him, inter alia, from harassing or contacting Jessica except as required for the court-ordered visitation of the children.

On February 1, 2018, Jessica filed her notice of appeal from the DVRO issued against her the previous day. In conjunction with her notice of appeal, she also filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. The disqualification motion was denied as untimely.

DISCUSSION

Jessica contends the five-year DVRO issued against her on January 31, 2018, must be reversed. Although numerous factually unsupported complaints are peppered throughout her brief, she specifically identifies only two arguments for reversal of the order. First, she contends that Douglas did not properly serve her with the documents he offered in support of the DVRO and “filed a fraudulent proof of service.” This contention is not supported by any citations to the record, and our review of the record discloses no evidence to support it.

Jessica’s second contention relates to a document that Douglas attached to a declaration he filed in support of his request for a DVRO. The document, which was described as “one page . . . consisting of . . . 35 thumbnail photographs of a very personal nature of . . . Jessica,” was removed from Douglas’s declaration and placed under seal after the trial judge deemed the photographs “not relevant to any issue that’s currently before the Court.” Jessica claims that “y allowing [Douglas] to submit private, intimate photographs of me, and by watching him hand these documents to [the] bailiff, and to display them to various members of the audience,” the trial judge “abused his position as a judicial officer, and an officer of the court, by being complicit in allowing ‘revenge porn’ to be bandied about in public, in violation of [Penal Code section] 647(j)(4).” Again, no citations are offered in support of these assertions and no such support can be found in the designated record on appeal.

We conclude that Jessica’s claims are forfeited because her brief does not comply with the controlling rules of appellate procedure. “On appeal, a party challenging an order has the burden to show error by providing an adequate record and making coherent legal arguments, supported by authority, or the claims will be deemed forfeited. [Citations.] The rules of appellate procedure apply to [Jessica] even though [she] is representing [herself] on appeal. [Citation.] A party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. We treat such a party like any other party, and he or she ‘“is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]”’ [Citation.]” (Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co. (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 590, 595.)

Jessica’s brief is procedurally deficient in several respects. Most notably, none of her factual assertions are supported by citations to the record, as required by rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court. (See Doppes v. Bentley Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 967, 990.) Moreover, the designated record on appeal, which we have reviewed, contains no evidence that Douglas filed a fraudulent proof of service, or that the trial judge allowed anyone else to view the objectionable photographs. Because Jessica’s claims are premised upon these unsupported assertions, the claims are forfeited. (Scholes v. Lambirth Trucking Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.)

[b]DISPOSITION

The judgment (January 31, 2018 DVRO issued against Jessica) is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

PERREN, J.

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

TANGEMAN, J.