Filed 11/19/19 Aldridge v. Perez-Estrada CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Martha K. Gooding, Judge. Affirmed.

Gary Paul Levinson for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Lawrence Beach Allen & Choi, David D. Lawrence, Christina M. Sprenger and Haiyang Allen Li, for Defendant and Respondent.

* * *

Plaintiff Julie Aldridge appeals from a judgment following an order sustaining a demurrer filed by defendant Pedro Perez-Estrada without leave to amend.[1] Perez-Estrada’s demurrer argued: (1) the operative complaint which named him as a Doe defendant did not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint and was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) the negligence cause of action against him fell outside the scope of the prelitigation claim Aldridge had filed with the County of Orange (County) under the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).

The court agreed the operative complaint did not relate back and was barred by the statute of limitations. Thus, the court did not rule on the alternative argument that the negligence cause of action was outside the scope of the prelitigation claim.

On appeal, Aldridge argues the challenged Doe amendment was proper under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, so the operative complaint did relate back. We do not address that issue, however, because we conclude the judgment should be affirmed on the alternative ground Perez-Estrada raised in the demurrer—Aldridge failed to comply with the prelitigation claim requirement in the Government Claims Act.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit arises out of Aldridge’s incarceration in the Orange County jail after she was arrested by officers from the Newport Beach Police Department. As alleged in the original complaint, Aldridge had a broken right ankle at the time of her arrest and she was supposed to wear a removable cast. The arresting officers purportedly did not allow her to bring it with her to jail. She walked without a cast for the next approximately 10 days until an X-ray confirmed the broken bone.

According to the allegations of the original complaint, one day Orange County Sheriff’s Department (OCSD) personnel transported Aldridge from the jail to a medical center so she could receive treatment on her ankle. They placed her in a jail cell at the facility and shackled her ankles while she waited. While Aldridge was using the sink in her cell, a male OCSD official whom she identified as “Deputy Perez” entered, and startled her. She purportedly caught her ankle shackle on something which caused her to fall and sustain injuries.

Aldridge, through her attorney, filed a claim with the County pursuant to the Government Claims Act. It stated the actions giving rise to her claim took place over a period of seven months and occurred at the women’s jail facility in the City of Santa Ana. She claimed she sustained injuries to her feet, ankles and shoulder, and asserted she was deprived of her civil rights while she was incarcerated.

After the County rejected her claim, Aldridge sued the County, the OCSD, the City of Newport Beach, the Newport Beach Police Department, and Does 1-50. She alleged the first 25 Doe defendants “were the agents or employees of other named defendants and acted within the scope of that agency or employment[,]” and the other 25 Doe defendants were “persons whose capacities [were] unknown to [her].” She alleged two causes of action: general negligence and violation of civil rights. Although she included the factual allegation noted above about “Deputy Perez” being involved in the fall incident, she did not name Perez-Estrada as a defendant in the original complaint.

Following demurrers and motions to strike, Aldridge dismissed the Newport Beach defendants and the County defendants from the case, leaving only the Doe defendants.[2] She then filed a first amended complaint. Among other modifications, Aldridge removed the “Deputy Perez” allegation, leaving simply a reference to “a male Orange County Sheriff official” in the factual allegation about the fall incident.

She eventually filed a second amended complaint, naming Orange County Sheriff Sandra Hutchins, OCSD Captain Bill Baker and Perez-Estrada as new defendants. Unlike the original complaint, the second amended complaint identified Perez-Estrada by his full name. It alleged he transported Aldridge to the medical center, shackled her ankles, and caused her to fall by startling her, and it claimed such conduct was negligent, careless, and reckless.

Baker and Perez-Estrada demurred to the second amended complaint. The basis for Perez-Estrada’s demurrer was the timeliness of the amendment. He argued, based on the “Deputy Perez” factual allegation in the original complaint, Aldridge was aware of his identity and involvement in the incidents at the time she filed her original complaint, so her amended complaint could not relate back to it. Due to other procedural issues, the court never heard Perez-Estrada’s demurrer to the second amended complaint.

After Aldridge filed a fourth amended complaint, naming Perez-Estrada as a Doe defendant rather than a “new” defendant, Perez-Estrada demurred again on timeliness grounds. He also argued the negligence cause of action against him fell outside the scope of the prelitigation claim Aldridge had filed with the County. Aldridge opposed the demurrer arguing her prelitigation claim was sufficiently detailed to apprise the County of her negligence cause of action against Perez-Estrada. In addition, she claimed she was unaware of Perez-Estrada’s full name and scope of his decision making during the incidents described in the original complaint until after she engaged in discovery. Thus, according to her, under Code of Civil Procedure section 474, the fourth amended complaint should relate back to the date of her original complaint.

The court held a hearing, took the matter under submission and eventually issued an order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. Based on allegations in Aldridge’s original complaint, which referred to Perez-Estrada as “Deputy Perez” and alleged he startled her and caused her to fall, it found she “was not genuinely ignorant of Deputy Perez’s name or the facts of his liability.”

Therefore, the court concluded Aldridge knew enough to name Perez-Estrada as a defendant from the outset and the amendment adding him as a Doe defendant did not relate back to the filing date of the original complaint. As a result, the court never reached Perez-Estrada’s alternative grounds for the demurrer concerning the scope of the prelitigation claim Aldridge filed under the Government Claims Act.

DISCUSSION

Aldridge claims the court erred in sustaining Perez-Estrada’s demurrer because it wrongly concluded her fourth amended complaint did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. Perez-Estrada contends otherwise and also asserts the judgment should be affirmed based on the Government Claims Act argument which the court below never reached. We conclude the latter argument is dispositive.

Our Supreme Court has articulated the “well settled” standard of review in an appeal from the dismissal of an action after sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend. “The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however, assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. [Citation.]” (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 966-967.) In addition to considering properly pleaded factual allegations, “[t]he [reviewing] court ‘must also consider judicially noticed matters’ [citation], and [it] may itself take judicial notice under Evidence Code sections 452 and 459. [Citation.]” (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 358.)

“The judgment must be affirmed ‘if any one of the . . . grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment. [Citation.]” (Aubry, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 967.)

The Government Claims Act “requires that ‘all claims for money or damages against local public entities’ be presented to the responsible public entity before a lawsuit is filed.” (City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 734 (City of Stockton).) Because “‘[n]o suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon . . . or has been deemed to have been rejected[,] . . . failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity[.]’” (Id. at p. 738.) The same is true for such actions against a public agency employee acting in the scope of his or her employment. (Gov. Code, § 950.2 [suit against public employee acting in the scope of employment barred if the plaintiff fails to comply with claim filing requirements applicable to the employer].)

“The purpose of the claims statutes is not to prevent surprise, but ‘to provide the public entity sufficient information to enable it to adequately investigate claims and to settle them, if appropriate, without the expense of litigation. [Citations.] It is well-settled that claims statutes must be satisfied even in face of the public entity’s actual knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the claim.’ [Citation.] The claims statutes also ‘enable the public entity to engage in fiscal planning for potential liabilities and to avoid similar liabilities in the future.’ [Citations.]” (City of Stockton, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 738.)

To that end, among the details a claim must contain are the following: (1) “[t]he date, place and other circumstances of the occurrence or transaction [giving rise] to the claim asserted[;]” (2) “[a] general description of the indebtedness, obligation, injury, damage or loss incurred so far as it may be known at the time of presentation of the claim[;]” and (3) “[t]he name or names of the public employee or employees causing the injury, damage, or loss, if known.” (Gov. Code, § 910.) Although a claim need not contain the same level of detail as a pleading, and it need not specify each particular act or omission which allegedly caused injury, it must “‘fairly describe what [the] entity is alleged to have done’” so the agency may “investigate and evaluate the claim[.]” (Stockett v. Association of Cal. Water Agencies Joint Powers Ins. Authority (2004) 34 Cal.4th 441, 446-447 (Stockett).) If a later filed complaint “‘alleges a factual basis for recovery which is not fairly reflected in the written claim[,]’” it is vulnerable to a demurrer. (Id. at 447.)

Here, the operative fourth amended complaint’s factual allegations against Perez-Estrada all concern actions he took, or failed to take, while transporting Aldridge to a medical facility for treatment and while she awaited treatment at the facility. Based on those facts, the complaint sets forth three alleged “theories” of negligence against him (i.e., ways in which he breached a purportedly applicable duty): (1) shackling her ankles knowing that she had a broken ankle, (2) keeping the shackles on her even after placing her in a locked down secure jail cell at Western Medical Center, and (3) failure to give Aldridge due warning before entering the jail cell at Western Medical Center.

In contrast, the prelitigation claim Aldridge presented to the County made no mention of any medical facility.[3] Rather, it listed the “Orange County Women[’]s Jail facility” in Santa Ana as the exclusive “[e]xact location of the occurrence or transaction which gave rise to [her asserted] claim[.]” The jail location was further emphasized in Aldridge’s description of the “damage/injury/loss:” “In October 2014, while Ms. Aldridge was shackeled [sic], she fell, severfly [sic] injuring herself at the Women[’]s jail facility in Santa[] Ana, CA. When she submitted grievances for the lack of medical treatment, as well as other complaints, the guards retaliated against her. [R]etaliation included, but was not limited to putting her in isolation and withdrawing all privileges.”

Given the different focus, it is unsurprising the prelitigation claim said nothing about any preexisting injury or any exacerbation of it. This simply is not a situation where the “complaint is ‘predicated on the same fundamental facts’ as those in the claim.” (Dixon v. City of Livermore (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 32, 40.) The pre-litigation claim and the fourth amended complaint concern alleged incidents at entirely different locations, and the minimal facts in the prelitigation claim are unrelated to the theories of negligence alleged against Perez-Estrada in the fourth amended complaint.

Under these circumstances, we cannot say the prelitigation claim “fairly reflect[s]” the cause of action eventually brought against Perez-Estrada. (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 447; see, e.g., ; Fall River Joint Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 431, 435 [complaint’s allegations of failure to stop student “horse-play” not fairly reflected in claim’s facts concerning poor maintenance of school door which caused injuries]; Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 804 [complaint’s allegations of negligent supervision of drivers during exam not fairly reflected in claim’s facts concerning negligently allowing uninsured motorists to take exam]; Connelly v. State of California (1970) 3 Cal.App.3d 744, 753 [complaint alleging negligence in operation of dam not fairly reflected in claim alleging property damage due to erroneous information about anticipated rise in river].)

Because Aldridge failed to comply with the prelitigation claim requirement as to the cause of action at issue, the order and judgment sustaining Perez-Estrada’s demurrer to the fourth amended complaint without leave to amend was proper. (Stockett, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 447.) Having reached this conclusion, we need not reach the alternative basis upon which the court sustained Perez-Estrada’s demurrer.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to his costs on appeal.

THOMPSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

ARONSON, J.