Filed 11/26/18 Marriage of Segers CA6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re the Marriage of SHIKYA A. and ANTHONY SEGERS.	H042877 (Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 1-12-FL-161182)
ANTHONY SEGERS, Appellant, v. SHIKYA A. BELFIELD, Respondent.

In this marriage dissolution action, appellant Anthony Segers, proceeding in propria persona, appeals from a postjudgment order denying his request for an earnings assignment order for support. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

I. Background

Segers and respondent Shikya Belfield married on January 9, 2011 and separated about a year later, on January 31, 2012. On March 22, 2012, Segers petitioned for dissolution of marriage. The court ordered Belfield to pay Segers $600 per month in temporary spousal support, payable by wage assignment, on June 14, 2012. At a hearing on October 15, 2012, Belfield testified that she was unemployed and had applied for unemployment benefits in August but had not yet received any payments. Accordingly, the court terminated the temporary spousal support order, effective September 1, 2012.

The court entered a judgment of dissolution in February 2013. In a Spousal, Partner, or Family Support Order Attachment (form FL-343) attached to the judgment, the court “terminate[d] jurisdiction over the issue of spousal or partner support” for both Segers and Belfield, found “spousal support arrears of $1,398.00 plus $98.63 in interest,” and ordered Belfield to pay Segers “$150.00 per month on the 28th of each month toward arrears until paid in full.” Neither party appealed from the judgment.

On March 28, 2013, Segers filed a request for order form (form FL-300). In the caption portion of the form, he checked boxes indicating that he was requesting “Attorney Fees and Costs” and “Other” relief; he left blank the box next to “Spousal Support” in the caption. On the third page of the form is a section with the heading “SPOUSAL OR PARTNER SUPPORT (An earnings assignment order may be issued.)” Segers left that section blank. He checked the box next to a section with the heading “OTHER RELIEF” and he described the relief he was seeking as an order “[s]et[ting] aside 10/15/12 Order based on Respondent’s Fraud and Perjury” and a “[j]udgment adding Temporary Spousal Support for September 2012 and October 2012 under the 6/14/12 Order, to the Arrears Respondent owes to Petitioner.” In support of that request, Segers declared that Belfield had received $2,250 in unemployment benefits on October 5, 2012, which she had failed to disclose during the October 15, 2012 hearing.

Segers filed a pre-trial statement on September 24, 2014 in which he requested “Arrears for Temporary Spousal Support (2 months x $600 per month of Sep. 2012 and Oct. 2012) evaded by the Respondent through PERJURY and Breach Of Fiduciary Duty under Family Code Section 2100 to disclose a major source of current income.”

Judge Philip Pennypacker held a long cause hearing to determine what reimbursements Belfield owed Segers, after which he issued a written order dated November 12, 2014. That order, under the heading “Spousal Support,” “award[ed] $1200.00 to [Segers] under Family Code Section 1101” based on his showing that “he was deprived of $1200 of Spousal Support” by Belfield’s failure to disclose her receipt of unemployment benefits at the October 15, 2012 hearing. The order did not include an earnings assignment order for support. Segers did not appeal from that postjudgment order.

On June 1, 2015, Segers filed a request for a standing earnings assignment order under Family Code sections 5230 and 5231[1] for any period Belfield is employed. Following a July 20, 2015 hearing, Judge Lori Pegg denied that request in an order filed on August 11, 2015. Judge Pegg concluded that an earnings assignment order was not proper for two reasons. First, she determined that the basis for Judge Pennypacker’s November 12, 2014 award of $1200 to Segers was not spousal support, but breach of fiduciary duty under section 1101. Second, Judge Pegg stated that she could not impose an earnings assignment order because Belfield was unemployed.

Segers timely appealed from that order on October 1, 2015. Belfield submitted a brief consisting only of factual assertions unsupported by citations to the record. This court declined to file that brief because it did not comply with the requirements of Rule 8.204 of the California Rules of Court. Accordingly, Segers’s opening brief is the only brief on file.

II. Discussion

A. Governing Legal Principles

The confidential relationship between spouses is a fiduciary relationship. (§ 721.) Accordingly, each spouse has a fiduciary duty “to make full disclosure to the other spouse of all material facts and information regarding the existence, characterization, and valuation of all assets in which the community has or may have an interest and debts for which the community is or may be liable, and to provide equal access to all information, records, and books that pertain to the value and character of those assets and debts, upon request.” (§ 1100, subd. (e).) Section 1101, subdivision (a), creates a right of action by one spouse against the other for breach of fiduciary duty when the breach “results in impairment to the claimant spouse’s present undivided one-half interest in the community estate . . . .” Section 1101, subdivision (g) sets forth the available remedies for an actionable breach of fiduciary duty that does not constitute fraud, oppression, or malice, which include “an award to the other spouse of 50 percent, or an amount equal to 50 percent, of any asset undisclosed or transferred in breach of the fiduciary duty plus attorney’s fees and court costs.” (§ 1101, subd. (g); cf. § 1101, subd. (h) [setting forth remedies for “when the breach falls within the ambit of Section 3294 of the Civil Code”].)

In the context of marriage dissolution actions, courts are authorized to award both temporary and permanent spousal support. Temporary support is authorized by section 3600, which provides: “[d]uring the pendency of any proceeding for dissolution of marriage . . . , the court may order (a) either spouse to pay any amount that is necessary for the support of the other spouse, consistent with the requirements of subdivisions (i) and (m) of Section 4320 and Section 4325 . . . .” “ ‘Temporary spousal support is utilized to maintain the living conditions and standards of the parties in as close to the status quo position as possible pending trial and the division of their assets and obligations.’ ” (In re Marriage of Murray (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 581, 594.) By contrast, permanent spousal support is meant “ ‘to provide financial assistance, if appropriate, as determined by the financial circumstances of the parties after their dissolution and the division of their community property.’ ” (Ibid.) Section 5230, subdivision (a) requires all orders requiring “a party to pay an amount for support or . . . [modifying] the amount of support to be paid” to include “an earnings assignment order for support that orders the employer of the obligor to pay to the obligee that portion of the obligor’s earnings due or to become due in the future as will be sufficient to pay an amount to cover both of the following: [¶] (1) The amount ordered by the court for support. [¶] (2) An amount which shall be ordered by the court to be paid toward the liquidation of any arrearage.”

“The meaning of a court order or judgment is a question of law within the ambit of the appellate court. [Citation.]” (In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1429.) “We review questions of law presented on undisputed facts de novo.” (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 267, 276.) “ ‘The true measure of an order . . . is not an isolated phrase appearing therein, but its effect when considered as a whole. [Citations.] In construing orders they must always be considered in their entirety, and the same rules of interpretation will apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court’s order as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing. If the language of the order be in any degree uncertain, then reference may be had to the circumstances surrounding, and the court’s intention in the making of the same.’ [Citations.]” (In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases, supra, at pp.1429-1430.)

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing to Issue an Earnings Assignment Order for Support Under Section 5230, Subdivision (a)

The trial court was statutorily required to enter an earnings assignment order for support only if the November 12, 2014 order required Belfield “to pay an amount for support or . . . [modified] the amount of support to be paid” by Belfield. (§ 5230, subd. (a).) It did not.

The order’s operative language reads: “The court will award $1200.00 to [Segers] under Family Code Section 1101.” While that language is unambiguous, we must look beyond that “ ‘isolated phrase’ ” and consider the order as a whole to determine its meaning. (In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1429.) The November 12, 2014 order did not include an earnings assignment order for support. The absence of such an order, which section 5230, subdivision (a) requires be included in every spousal support order, suggests the court did not intend the $1200 award to be construed as spousal support. Nevertheless, a degree of uncertainty does exist in the order, as the court awarded the $1200 to Segers in a section with the heading “Spousal Support.” Accordingly, we may look to the circumstances surrounding the order to determine its meaning. (In re Ins. Installment Fee Cases, supra, at pp. 1429.)

Segers argues he was entitled to the $1200 because Belfield’s lack of candor at the October 2012 hearing regarding her receipt of unemployment benefits caused the court to terminate its prior temporary spousal support order effective September 1, 2012. Under that prior order, Segers was to receive $600 per month in temporary spousal support. Segers has characterized Belfield’s lack of candor as a breach of fiduciary duty under the Family Code. Segers asserted his entitlement to the $1200 in his March 28, 2013 request for order and his September 24, 2014 pre-trial statement. Neither filing unambiguously characterized the $1200 as spousal support. In the request for order, Segers left blank the section entitled “SPOUSAL OR PARTNER SUPPORT.” In the pre-trial statement, Segers characterized the $1200 as “Arrears for Temporary Spousal Support (2 months x $600 per month of Sep. 2012 and Oct. 2012) evaded by the Respondent through PERJURY and Breach Of Fiduciary Duty under Family Code Section 2100 to disclose a major source of current income.”

Considering the order as a whole and the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that Judge Pennypacker intended the November 12, 2014 award of $1200 to Segers to be a remedy under section 1101 for a breach of fiduciary duty by Belfield, and not spousal support. We acknowledge that issuing an award to Segers under section 1101 may have been error. “[A] breach affecting the claimant’s community property interest is required to support [a section 1101, subdivision (a)] claim . . . .” (In re Marriage of Schleich, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 280, italics added.) It is not apparent that there was evidence to support a finding that Belfield impaired Segers’s community property interest by failing to disclose unemployment benefits she received months after their separation. (See § 771, subd. (a) [“The earnings and accumulations of a spouse and the minor children living with, or in the custody of, the spouse, after the date of separation of the spouses, are the separate property of the spouse”].) But the propriety of the November 12, 2014 order is not before us. What is before us is the court’s characterization of that order in the appealed-from August 11, 2015 order. For the reasons stated above, that characterization was correct, as was the court’s denial of Segers’s request for a section 5230, subdivision (a) earnings assignment order for support.

III. Disposition

The postjudgment order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover her costs on appeal, if any.