Filed 11/29/18 In re N.V. CA4/2

Opinion following rehearing

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander, Judge. Affirmed.

Brent Riggs, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objectors and Appellants.

Michelle D. Blakemore, County Counsel, Dawn M. Martin, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Pamela Rae Tripp, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent.

The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of defendant and respondent R.V. (Mother) to her son, N.V. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26.)[1] N.V.’s sisters, objectors and appellants S.V. and H.V. (collectively, the sisters), raise three issues on appeal. First, the sisters contend the juvenile court erred by terminating Mother’s parental rights because the court should have applied the sibling relationship exception. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) Second, the sisters contend the juvenile court erred by not requiring plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) to make greater efforts to keep S.V., H.V., and N.V. (collectively, the children) together during the dependency proceedings. (§ 16002.) Third, the sisters assert their juvenile court attorneys were ineffective because they failed to argue that the Department needed to exercise greater diligence in placing the children together or increasing their visits. Mother, as a respondent, joins in the sisters’ contentions. We affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. BACKGROUND

S.V. is female and was born in March 2000. H.V. is female and was born in December 2001. N.V. is male and was born in November 2002. N.V. has been diagnosed with Down Syndrome. Mother is the mother of the children. The children’s presumed father is N.V.1 (Father). Father died in May 2012.

Mother suffers from depression, lupus, fibromyalgia, and five herniated spinal discs. N.V. was homeschooled by Mother. Mother assessed N.V. as being at the level of a kindergartner. In a prior case, in 2010, the children were removed from Mother’s care due to her home being uninhabitable, but they were later returned to her custody.

B. DETENTION

On March 10, 2014, a San Bernardino County Sheriff’s deputy conducted a welfare check on the children. The deputy found Mother’s home, in Daggett, was uninhabitable due to animal feces on “every surface in the house,” an infestation of cockroaches, the only toilet not functioning properly, and the only operable sink being clogged. Mother explained that she could not keep the home clean due to her medical issues.

C. JURISDICTION

N.V. was placed in a foster family agency (FFA) home without his sisters. N.V. was aggressive with an infant in the home; he was then moved to a smaller foster home in the Rancho Cucamonga area. The sisters were placed together in an FFA home in Hinkley. The sisters knew their foster mother from their church youth group. The sisters’ foster mother had a space in her home for N.V.

The Department concluded it would be in N.V.’s best interests for N.V. to reestablish himself as a client of the Inland Regional Center and have an individualized education program (IEP) developed prior to starting overnight visits with the sisters’ foster mother. From those visits, the Department would then assess if the sisters’ foster mother was capable of meeting N.V.’s needs. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court ordered visits with Mother and the children once per week for two hours.

D. SIX-MONTH REVIEW

In October 2014, the sisters continued to reside separately from N.V. due to N.V.’s special needs. The sisters visited N.V. while visiting Mother. The visits were once per week for two hours in Rancho Cucamonga. N.V. appeared to enjoy the visits. His behavior did not change when the visits ended.

N.V. had issues adjusting to school. N.V. was aggressive with school staff and destroyed school property. N.V. was suspended for hitting classmates and for spitting on the school bus. Additionally, N.V. used excessive profanity. The Department expressed hope that N.V. could, at some point, be transitioned into the same foster home as his sisters.

The juvenile court held a review hearing on October 6, 2014. At the hearing, the children’s attorney said, “We did have a few requests. The girls are visiting with mom three days a week and they only get one of those days with [N.V.] There is a substantial distance between them. [N.V.] is in the special needs home in Rancho Cucamonga and the girls are in a home in Hinkley, so—and they are closer to the mom. That’s why they are getting more visits.

“I would just ask the Department to look into the possibility of being able to arrange more than one weekly visit with [N.V.] He is—he does need the special needs home, but he shouldn’t be punished by having to be placed there, by not seeing his siblings, and the girls would like to be able to see him a lot more.”

The Department’s lawyer responded, “With respect to the siblings’ visitation issue, I don’t know that I necessarily classify it as a punishment, but the distance is somewhat of a limiting factor. I can have the Department look into that, but I think right now the previous court order is appropriate.”

The children’s lawyer said, “I was thinking if they could even establish some type of Skype or Internet contact with [N.V.], that would be a little bit more than what they are having now.” The Department’s lawyer replied, “That’s something we can look into. I am not sure of the capability of the respective homes, but it can be something to be looked into.” The sisters’ foster mother said their home had the capability for Skype communication.

The juvenile court asked if the sisters were able to call N.V. on the telephone. The children’s attorney responded, “They said they have tried, but the caretaker of [N.V.]—either they are not answering or their phone is connected to . . . the fax machine. It sounds like they have a number of disabled children that they take care of, so it sounds like the home is probably pretty busy. But they have tried, and so we would ask for that as appropriate.” The Department’s attorney objected to the juvenile court ordering telephonic or Internet contact without knowing the communication capabilities of N.V.’s foster home.

The juvenile court said, “I will ask that county counsel and [the Department] look into facilitating visitations between [the children] by Skype or Internet connection, and the guardians have indicated in court they have Skype capability at their home. [¶] I will also ask the Department . . . if possible to arrange more than one visit with [N.V.] between [the sisters], more than what they’re receiving at this time, and also looking into whether or not phone calls would be available with [the children].” The juvenile court did not alter the prior order for the children’s visits, but directed the Department to research whether Skype communication was a possibility.

E. 12-MONTH REVIEW

In April 2015, N.V. continued to reside apart from his sisters. N.V. remained in the small foster home due to his special needs. The sisters remained together in the home of their foster mother. In October 2014, Mother and the children began to have unsupervised visits, but not in Mother’s home. The visits went well and the children’s behavior did not change at the end of the visits. The children visited each other without Mother twice per month. There were no concerns with the children’s interactions during the visits.

S.V. was doing well in school and performing at her grade level. H.V. was diagnosed with “Major Depressive Disorder.” H.V. was taken into custody after she cut her wrist with broken glass. (§ 5150.) H.V. was released. She was given psychotropic medication and counseling services. H.V.’s foster mother was working with H.V. on H.V.’s mental health issues. The sisters had a good relationship with their foster mother.

N.V. “made great improvements” while at his foster home. N.V. was comfortable in the home and interacted well with the other children in the home. N.V.’s behavior at school improved. He interacted well with other students, but still used profanity. N.V. was incontinent and wore diapers. N.V. required assistance with bathing and hygiene, but was able to feed himself. While in the foster home, N.V. learned to throw trash away after eating and to place dishes in the sink. The Department continued to express hope that N.V. would be transitioned into the same foster home as his sisters.

F. 18-MONTH REVIEW

On three occasions when the Department social worker went to Mother’s home in Daggett, the social worker saw trash bags and garbage in the front yard. Mother did not permit the Department to assess the condition of the interior of her home. Mother visited with the sisters, and the visits went well.

The sisters continued to reside together with their foster mother in Hinkley. N.V. continued to reside separately in his foster home in the Rancho Cucamonga area, which addressed his special needs. The sisters visited with N.V. twice per month. Once per month the sisters were driven to the Rancho Cucamonga area to visit N.V., and once per month N.V. and the sisters were transported to the Victorville area for a visit. There were no concerns with the children’s interactions during the visits.

H.V. was taken off of psychotropic medication and was doing well. N.V. continued to do well in school, only using profanity when agitated. In September 2015, the Department recommended a plan of permanent placement for the children. The permanent placement for the sisters would be in their foster home, while N.V.’s permanent placement would be in his separate foster home.

The juvenile court held a hearing on September 10, 2015. At the hearing, the children’s lawyer said the children had difficulty communicating with the Department’s social worker, describing the communication as “short or difficult.” Additionally, the children’s lawyer said, “And another significant concern is [the sisters] request longer visits with their brother [N.V.], more frequent and longer visits. There are concerns with gas and [the] cost of the expensive travel. Apparently visits have been getting cut short, and they are one time every two or three weeks at this point. I would ask that those be increased. And apparently [N.V.] is demonstrating sadness at the loss of those visits and also the [sisters] also express the same sense.”

The Department’s lawyer said, “I see that minors wanted the additional visits with [N.V.] back in October of last year, and I believe the Court afforded them an opportunity to have phone and Skype contact in addition to the visits which are not frequent given the fact that the children are placed in different placements and [N.V.] is in [Rancho Cucamonga]. So I am wondering if we can have that order in place which would keep the siblings in contact more often.”

The children’s attorney responded, “Based on [N.V.’s] issues or technology issues, it doesn’t sound like Skype is available or working or functional at this point.” When making its orders, the juvenile court said, “I will also ask that the social worker to look [sic] into increasing the visits between [the children]; that it would be in the best interest of the children if the visits were increased. If Skype is not available or is not meaningful to [N.V.’s] issues, then that would be a reason to increase the visits as well. There is—the Court previously gave permission for Skype if that was available.” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s reunification services, but ordered unsupervised visitation between Mother and the children a minimum of two times per week for two hours, in a community setting.

G. FIRST POSTPERMANENCY PLAN REVIEW

On January 8, 2016, N.V. was removed from his foster home due to allegations that he physically abused another child in the home. On January 11, N.V. was placed in a foster home in Riverside County. N.V.’s new foster mother was unable to transport N.V. for visits with his sisters and Mother. On February 12, N.V. was moved to a foster home in Fontana that was able to facilitate visits with the sisters and Mother. N.V.’s new foster parents were in contact with the sisters’ foster mother concerning “strengthening the sibling relationship through more frequent visits.” Visits between the children were scheduled to resume in March.

N.V. was not placed in the sisters’ foster home because “[t]he caregiver for [the sisters] is not equipped to meet [N.V.’s] needs due to his disability.” N.V.’s new foster parents reported that N.V. was tearing and shredding his clothes, but the shredding activity did not appear to be due to anger. The foster parents were going to research ways to keep N.V.’s hands occupied.

The juvenile court held a hearing on March 10, 2016. At the hearing the juvenile court said, “We had an off-the-record conversation. I would ask the social worker to look into trying to schedule the mother’s visits with [N.V.] around the transportation of the children for their visits with each other. I will note that it appears there had been some slowdown or stall in the visits between siblings while [N.V.] was adjusting to a new foster home, but I would expect those to be regularized again in the very near future.”

The children’s attorney said, “I would just repeat the minors really do want to meet and visit with their sibling [N.V.]. The visits were ordered two times a week for three hours. Minors have reported that they met for three hours just recently, but before that it was—they hadn’t had a visit since November of 2015, and even then, the visits are late. So I would hope that the visits could comply with the order of two times a week for three hours as much as possible in the transition period of [N.V.]” The juvenile court did not alter the prior sibling visitation order. At the end of the hearing, the juvenile court said, “I hope the visits start and are regular very soon.”

H. SECOND POSTPERMANENCY PLAN REVIEW

N.V.’s foster parents did not have a flexible schedule. The children visited each other once per month. N.V.’s foster parents created a Skype account and were coordinating with the sisters’ foster mother to schedule a time for Skype conversations.

The sisters were doing well in their foster placement. They had a good relationship with their foster family. N.V. referred to his new foster mother as “mom.” N.V. was more communicative in his new foster home, as his new foster mother was better able to understand N.V.’s speech and communicate with him.

The Department recommended that the sisters’ permanent plan be a long-term foster placement, and N.V.’s plan be adoption by his new foster parents. The sisters’ foster mother was willing to become the sisters’ legal guardian; however, the sisters declined that arrangement. The sisters preferred to have Mother continue to hold educational and medical rights.

The juvenile court held a hearing on September 12, 2016. At the hearing, the following exchange took place:

“[The Children’s Attorney]: Additionally, the minors would like—they indicated that they are not getting their sibling visits as frequently as they [would] like to, so if we can ask that the social worker make more efforts to have the sibling visits more frequently.

“The Court: What is the logistical situation?

“[The Children’s Attorney]: I believe it is—right now they are getting it one time a month with the brother. However, it looks like once a week they are supposed to meet at least.

“The Court: What is the logistical situation?

“[The Children’s Attorney]: They live in the Hinkley area.

“The Court: And the other minor?

“[The Children’s Attorney]: And the other minor lives in Fontana.

“The Court: I have read and considered the reports. [¶] I will start with the findings on [the sisters]. I find notice has been given as required by law.” The juvenile court said, “I will order that sibling visits occur. I am going to order them at once a month, but if it can be arranged more frequently, to have the social worker look into that. But I will make a minimum order of one time a month at this time.”

At the hearing, in N.V.’s case, the juvenile court scheduled a hearing to terminate Mother’s parental rights (§ 366.26). The juvenile court advised Mother of her right to file a writ petition in N.V.’s case. In the sisters’ cases, the juvenile court found it was not in the sisters’ best interests to schedule a hearing to terminate Mother’s parental rights (§ 366.26).

I. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS

N.V. suffered speech and visual impairments. N.V. attended special education classes. “[H]e has difficulty with communication, social skills, self-direction, self-care and academic skills. He has cognitive and processing deficits. His adaptive skills are severely impaired compared to his same age peers.” N.V. did not visit his sisters between mid-November 2016 and mid-March 2017. The visits between the children that did occur went well. N.V.’s foster parents said they were willing to continue the sibling relationship after adopting N.V.

On May 4, 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing in N.V.’s case, concerning terminating Mother’s parental rights to N.V. The sisters’ attorney said the sisters were asserting the sibling bond exception to termination. S.V. testified at the hearing. S.V. said the three children lived together with Mother. The children walked to school and home together, they played in the park together, and played in the backyard of their home together. S.V. helped Mother care for N.V. by helping N.V. to get ready for school.

When the children were previously removed from Mother, in 2010, S.V. and N.V. resided in the same foster home for seven of the eight months. While in that foster home, S.V. continued to help N.V. dress for school, helped to pack N.V.’s lunch, and they played together on a swing set at the foster home. S.V. and N.V. also attended visits with H.V. once per week. During visits they worked on puzzles, played board games, and read books. When the children returned to Mother’s home, they resumed living together. They watched television together and played video games together.

During the removal to foster care in the instant case, the sisters were placed in a separate house from N.V. because the sisters’ foster mother was unable to provide for N.V.’s special needs. Initially, the sibling visits were once per week, then they were reduced to twice per month, and then they were reduced to once per month. The visits were continually reduced because it was a hardship for both sets of foster parents to travel the distance required for the visits.

When N.V. sees his sisters he is excited and says his sisters’ names. During visits the children played games or watched cartoons. When the visits ended, N.V. was upset and said he did not want to leave or he asked the sisters to stay. S.V. disagreed with N.V. being adopted. S.V. explained that she was close to turning 18 years old and she could care for N.V.

In regard to the possibility that sibling contact would continue after N.V.’s adoption, S.V. said that N.V.’s foster parents/potential adoptive parents sometimes did not respond in a timely manner to text messages, which caused visits to be missed. S.V. explained that she feared she would not have consistent visitation with N.V. postadoption because it was already difficult to have consistent visitation with him when visitation was ordered by the court.

The sisters’ attorney offered that if H.V. were to testify, she would also oppose N.V.’s adoption and that H.V. also has memories of spending time with N.V. The sisters’ attorney argued that the juvenile court should apply the sibling bond exception. The sisters’ attorney argued, “[T]hese three young people have been through the wringer together. They lived together continuously for many years, most of their lives. [¶] It’s only been in the last three years that—and [N.V.’s] 14—that they have not lived together . . . . [¶] They have endured two removals from their mom together. They have shared significant experiences together and spent a lot of time together and enjoyable activities, as [S.V.] testified. If ever the sibling bond were to apply, this would be that case.”

The attorney for N.V. argued against applying the sibling bond exception. N.V.’s attorney explained that N.V. had special needs that cannot be served by every home, e.g., the sisters’ foster mother could not provide care for N.V. N.V.’s attorney asserted that N.V. was doing well in his current foster placement/prospective adoptive home. The attorney argued, “I do recognize that they love their brother very, very much. I’m sure he loves them too. But we have to—but does the benefit of continuing a relationship actually outweigh the benefits of adoption for [N.V.]? I don’t think so. [¶] He deserves a permanency that these prospective adoptive parents are going to give him. They’ve proved they can take care of all of his needs. It’s the first home he’s been in that has been so stable.”

The Department argued that N.V.’s best interests would be served by adoption. The Department asserted that the sisters failed to prove the sibling bond exception should be applied, and therefore, the juvenile court should terminate Mother’s parental rights.

The juvenile court found the children shared a beneficial relationship, but that the relationship did not outweigh the benefit N.V. would receive from adoption. The juvenile court said, “I can’t find that terminating parental rights with the parents would so detrimental that it would outweigh the benefits of this particular child’s long-term needs. Probably due to his special needs, he may be even more so than another child of his same age—need[ing] stability. [¶] It obviously is much more difficult for someone with these types of needs and his mental abilities, even as described by [S.V.], as a three- to four-year-old to have multiple placements. Adoption would assure him permanency, which is the preferred preference [sic] under the law, and this Court is giving great weight to that, in light of the needs. So I can’t find that the relationship that he has in return [sic] to the sisters outweighs the benefits of a lifetime of stability. I find there is insufficient evidence to apply the exception.” The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights.

DISCUSSION

A. SIBLING BOND EXCEPTION

The sisters contend the juvenile court erred by not applying the sibling bond exception.

If a juvenile court finds a dependent child is adoptable, then it will terminate parental rights unless one of the statutorily enumerated exceptions is applicable. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) One of the enumerated exceptions is the sibling relationship exception, which provides, “There would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

The juvenile court found the children have a beneficial relationship. Therefore, the issue on appeal is whether the court erred in weighing the detriment caused by termination, due to the sibling relationship, against the benefit N.V. would receive from legal permanence through adoption. The abuse of discretion standard of review applies when reviewing the juvenile court’s determination that the benefit of adoption outweighs the detriment of terminating parental rights. (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)

At the time of the termination hearing, N.V. was 14 years old. Due to N.V.’s limited language skills, he could not express his feelings concerning adoption, and it was believed that N.V. did not understand the concept of adoption due to limited comprehension. N.V. was “diagnosed with Down[] Syndrome and is severely delayed in most areas. He has limited language ability and relies on his foster parents for most daily living activities including hygiene and toileting needs.” N.V. had been in six placements since his removal from Mother’s home in March 2014.

Due to N.V.’s limited abilities, he has a strong need for permanence. In particular, N.V. needs people who can provide him with long term care and support. While the children share a beneficial relationship, N.V.’s need for permanence is greater than the harm that may result from the lack of sibling contact. In other words, the record supports a finding that the benefit N.V. would gain from permanence through adoption outweighs the detriment N.V. may suffer due to the termination of parental rights. Accordingly, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion.

The sisters explain that S.V. is now 18 years old and employed, and, therefore, S.V. could be N.V.’s legal guardian. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A).) “ ‘If the dependent child is adoptable, there is strong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans.’ ” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) N.V.’s foster parents are willing to adopt N.V. Given the preference for adoption, the trial court did not err by selecting adoption rather than legal guardianship as N.V.’s permanent plan.

B. SECTION 16002

1. CONTENTIONS

The sisters contend the juvenile court erred by not requiring the Department make greater efforts to keep the children together during the dependency proceedings. The Department contends the sisters have forfeited this issue. The sisters are attacking the juvenile court’s alleged errors throughout the dependency proceedings. The sisters assert the juvenile court should have required greater diligence on the part of the Department to (1) place the children together, or (2) increase the frequency and/or duration of the children’s visits. (§ 16002.) The sisters contend those issues have not been forfeited because the juvenile court failed to advise them of their appellate rights. We choose to address the merits of the issue.[2]

2. LAW

Section 16002, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part, “The responsible local agency shall make a diligent effort in all out-of-home placements of dependent children . . . to place siblings together in the same placement, and to develop and maintain sibling relationships. If siblings are not placed together in the same home, the social worker . . . shall explain why the siblings are not placed together and what efforts he or she is making to place the siblings together or why making those efforts would be contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings. When placement of siblings together in the same home is not possible, a diligent effort shall be made, and a case plan prepared, to provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings until family reunification is achieved, or, if parental rights are terminated, as part of developing the permanent plan for the child.” The facts are undisputed, therefore, we apply the de novo standard of review. (Kayla W. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 409, 416.)

3. ANALYSIS

a. Visitation

In regard to increasing the frequency or duration of the visits, section 16002, subdivision (b) requires the Department to make “a diligent effort . . . to provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among siblings” who are placed in different foster homes. Throughout the case, the juvenile court pushed the Department to increase the children’s visits.

At the time of the six-month review, the juvenile court asked the Department and county counsel to research whether more frequent sibling visits could take place via Skype. Thus, the juvenile court sought to increase the children’s visits via Internet communication. At the time of the 18-month review, on September 10, 2015, the juvenile court again directed the Department to find a means of increasing the visits between the sisters and N.V. On March 10, 2016, the juvenile court said, “I would ask the social worker to look into trying to schedule the mother’s visits with [N.V.] around the transportation of the children for their visits with each other.” The juvenile court’s comment reflects it was trying to find a solution to the children’s desire for greater interaction, despite the distance between the Hinkley area and N.V.’s various foster homes.

In sum, the juvenile court continually pushed the Department to make diligent efforts “to provide for ongoing and frequent interaction among [the] siblings.” (§ 16002, subd. (b).) Because the juvenile court pushed to increase the children’s interaction throughout the case, we conclude the juvenile court did not err.

b. Placement

In regard to placing the children together, section 16002, subdivision (b) requires the Department “make a diligent effort . . . to place siblings together in the same placement.” The children were not initially placed together because the Department concluded it would be in N.V.’s best interests for N.V. to reestablish himself as a client of the Inland Regional Center and have an IEP developed prior to starting overnight visits with the sisters’ foster mother. Thus, the sisters were not initially placed with N.V. because placing the children together would have been contrary to N.V.’s best interests.

At the six-month review hearing, N.V. was suffering issues adjusting to school. N.V. was aggressive with school staff and destroyed school property. N.V. was suspended for hitting classmates and for spitting on the school bus. It can be inferred from this section of the record that N.V. needed more time to adjust to his IEP, and thus it was contrary to his best interests to introduce another change, in the form of staying overnight with the sisters’ foster mother.

At the 12-month review hearing, H.V. had been diagnosed with major depressive order and had attempted suicide. The sisters’ foster mother was working with H.V. on H.V.’s mental health issues. It can be inferred from this section of the record that the sisters’ foster mother was busy caring for the sisters, especially H.V., and would be unable to provide for N.V.’s special needs if he were placed in her home.

At the 18-month review hearing, the children were doing well. It is not explicitly reflected in the record why, at this point, the children were not placed together. One can infer that it was because (1) N.V. was doing well, so the Department did not want to risk harming his progress by changing his foster home; and/or (2) H.V. was doing well, and the Department did not want to harm her progress by having her foster mother care for a third child, who had special needs. Given that H.V. and N.V. both suffered periods of difficulty after removal from Mother’s house, one can infer the Department decided to not change the children’s home environments immediately upon the children making progress.

In sum, the record reflects that H.V. and N.V. needed special care. Finding a single home that could provide for H.V.’s mental health needs as well as N.V.’s daily care would likely be challenging. It can be inferred that, despite diligent efforts, the Department was unable to place the children together in one home due to the differing special needs of H.V. and N.V. Accordingly, given the circumstances of the case, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in the amount of diligence it required the Department to exert in placing the children together. (§ 16002, subd. (b).)

The sisters contend the juvenile court should have required the Department to do a better job of documenting the Department’s efforts to place the children together and increase the children’s visits. “If siblings are not placed together in the same home, the social worker . . . shall explain why the siblings are not placed together and what efforts he or she is making to place the siblings together or why making those efforts would be contrary to the safety and well-being of any of the siblings.” (§ 16002, subd. (b).)

The social worker explained that the children were not placed together because the Department concluded it would be in N.V.’s best interests for N.V. to reestablish himself as a client of the Inland Regional Center and have an IEP developed prior to starting overnight visits with the sisters’ foster mother. From those visits, the Department would then assess if the sisters’ foster mother were capable of meeting N.V.’s needs. Ultimately, the sisters’ foster mother was not equipped to provide for N.V.’s special needs.

The Department provided few details of what efforts it made throughout the case to place the children together or to increase their visitation. Assuming the Department erred, we examine the issue of prejudice. When the juvenile court considered the sibling bond exception, it found the children shared a beneficial relationship. Thus, despite the Department not providing detailed documentation of the efforts it made to keep the children together, the juvenile court still found that the children shared a beneficial bond. Ultimately, the sibling bond exception was not applied because the benefit of continuing the sibling relationship was outweighed by the benefit N.V. would receive from the permanence gained through adoption.

Because the juvenile court found the existence of a beneficial sibling bond, we conclude that the sisters were not prejudiced by the Department’s lack of detailed documentation. In other words, if greater documentation had been provided, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the sisters would have occurred.

The sisters contend that if the juvenile court had ordered the Department to provide greater explanation of the Department’s efforts to increase sibling interaction, then “it is reasonably probable [N.V.] would have been placed with his sisters.” The sisters were placed in a foster home with a foster parent they knew from church, and the foster home was near Mother, which permitted visits with Mother three times per week. The sisters’ foster Mother was not able to provide for N.V.’s special needs. The sisters did not want to be adopted or have a legal guardian; they preferred long-term foster care, with Mother continuing to hold their educational rights.

Thus, the ideal foster home would have been (1) willing to accept all three children; (2) near Mother; (3) willing to provide for N.V.’s special needs; (4) willing to monitor H.V. for future suicide attempts; and (5) willing to adopt N.V., while keeping the sisters in long-term foster care.

The sisters’ assertion that it is reasonably probable that they would have been placed in the same home as N.V. if their attorneys had presented more vigorous arguments is not persuasive because another important piece of the sisters’ care would most likely have needed to give way in order to accommodate living with N.V. For example, if the sisters moved to N.V.’s foster home, then there would have been a large distance between the sisters and Mother, likely decreasing their visits with Mother. Also, if N.V. had been moved into the sisters’ foster home, then the foster parent may not have had as much time to monitor H.V. for signs of her major depressive disorder.

In sum, the issues of placement and frequency of visitation were complex in that a variety of factors needed to be considered. We are not persuaded the situation was so simple that if the juvenile court had ordered the Department to provide greater explanation of the Department’s efforts to increase sibling interaction, then it is reasonably probable all three children would have been placed together.

C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The sisters contend their juvenile court attorneys were ineffective because they failed to argue that greater diligence was needed in placing the children together or in increasing their visits. (§ 16002.) The sisters’ argument alleges ineffective assistance from the disposition hearing through the scheduling of the hearing to terminate parental rights. For example, the sisters assert, “[F]or a period of more than two years, the children’s lawyers permitted the government to separate children who had lived happily . . . together and who wanted to continue living together.” The sisters do not raise a specific issue concerning their attorney’s performance at the termination hearing. For example, the sisters write, “Up until the section-366.26 hearing, the [sisters’] trial counsels failed in their duty to their clients.”

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the sisters “must show that [their] trial counsel’s performance fell below the standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable if counsel had provided adequate representation.” (In re Merrick V. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 235, 254-255.)

At the six-month review hearing, the children’s attorney said, “We did have a few requests. The girls are visiting with mom three days a week and they only get one of those days with [N.V.] There is a substantial distance between them. [N.V.] is in the special needs home in Rancho Cucamonga and the girls are in a home in Hinkley, so—and they are closer to the mom. That’s why they are getting more visits.

“I would just ask the Department to look into the possibility of being able to arrange more than one weekly visit with [N.V.] He is—he does need the special needs home, but he shouldn’t be punished by having to be placed there, by not seeing his siblings, and the girls would like to be able to see him a lot more.” The juvenile court directed the Department to research whether the sisters could communicate with N.V. via the Internet.

At the 18-month review hearing, the children’s attorney said, “And another significant concern is [the sisters] request longer visits with their brother [N.V.], more frequent and longer visits. There are concerns with gas and [the] cost of the expensive travel. Apparently visits have been getting cut short, and they are one time every two or three weeks at this point. I would ask that those be increased. And apparently [N.V.] is demonstrating sadness at the loss of those visits and also the [sisters] also express the same sense.” The juvenile court again directed the Department to research whether visits could occur more frequently with Internet communication.

At the first postpermanency hearing, after an off-the-record discussion, the children’s attorney said, “I would just repeat the minors really do want to meet and visit with their sibling [N.V.]. The visits were ordered two times a week for three hours. Minors have reported that they met for three hours just recently, but before that it was—they hadn’t had a visit since November of 2015, and even then, the visits are late. So I would hope that the visits could comply with the order of two times a week for three hours as much as possible in the transition period of [N.V.]” The juvenile court said, “I hope the visits start and are regular very soon.”

At the second postpermanency hearing, the children’s attorney said, “Additionally, the minors would like—they indicated that they are not getting their sibling visits as frequently as they [would] like to, so if we can ask that the social worker make more efforts to have the sibling visits more frequently.” The juvenile court again urged the Department to determine whether sibling visits could occur on a more frequent basis.

The children’s attorneys’ performances throughout the case were reasonable, in regard to requesting more frequent visitation, because the attorneys repeatedly raised the issue with the juvenile court, and the juvenile court agreed with the children’s position. Because the attorneys repeatedly brought the issue to the attention of the juvenile court, they acted reasonably.

Although we have concluded the attorneys acted reasonably, we briefly address the issue of prejudice. Under the prejudice prong, the sisters must show that “there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been more favorable if counsel had provided adequate representation.” (In re Merrick V., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at pp. 254-255.)

When the juvenile court considered the sibling bond exception, the juvenile court found the children shared a beneficial relationship. Therefore, despite the children’s requests for more frequent visits not having been met, the juvenile court still recognized the sibling bond. Ultimately, the sibling bond exception was not applied because the juvenile court concluded the benefit N.V. would gain from the legal permanence provided by adoption outweighed the benefit that would be gained from continuing N.V.’s sibling relationships. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)

Given that visits are meant to maintain sibling bonds, and the juvenile court found that the children shared a bond when considering the sibling relationship exception, it is not reasonably probable that a more favorable outcome would have occurred if the children’s attorneys had pushed more frequently or adamantly for increased sibling visits or for more thorough documentation of the children’s bond. In sum, the children’s attorneys did not render ineffective assistance of counsel.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MILLER

Acting P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON

J.

FIELDS

J.