Filed 12/6/18 In re E.R. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re E.R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. E.R., Defendant and Appellant.	A152996 (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J17-01000)

The juvenile court found that 17-year-old E.R. committed one count of felony assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)) and one count of misdemeanor battery on a school employee (Pen. Code, §§ 242/243.6). The court adjudged E.R. a ward of the court, found his welfare required his removal from the custody of his parents pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 726, subdivision (a)(3), and ordered he be committed to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) for nine months. E.R. now challenges the dispositional order removing him from his parents’ custody and placing him at OAYRF. We affirm.

FactS

The victim, the vice-principal at E.R.’s high school, heard over the school radio that a “big” fight occurred on campus and that the three minors involved were running toward the school parking lot. The victim went to the parking lot and saw E.R. and two other students he recognized, who matched the description of the minors involved, get into a car. With E.R. in the driver’s seat, the three minors sped through the crowded parking lot toward the exit, where their car became stuck in traffic. The victim approached the car and stood in front of it, stopping the minors from leaving. The minors responded by cursing and yelling at the victim to get out of the way. Realizing the minors were not going to get out of the car, the victim took a picture of the car’s front license plate. E.R. then twice drove the car into the victim’s legs going less than five miles per hour to try and get him out of the way. The car struck the victim hard enough to break skin and cause soreness. The victim tried to avoid the second hit by jumping on the car’s hood, at which point the minors got out of the car and approached the victim in a menacing manner, cursing at him to move. E.R. then pushed and punched the victim, who pushed and punched him back.

Discussion

The juvenile court has broad discretion in determining what is an appropriate disposition for juvenile offenders. (See § 202; In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507.) “[J]uvenile placements need not follow any particular order under section 602 . . . , including from the least to the most restrictive. [Citations.] Nor does the court necessarily abuse its discretion by ordering the most restrictive placement before other options have been tried.” (Eddie M., at p. 507.) When imposing a disposition on minors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a consequence of delinquent conduct, the juvenile court must consider public safety and ensure the minor receives “care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances.” (§ 202, subd. (b).) Guidance can include punishment that is consistent with rehabilitative objectives. (Ibid.; see also § 202, subd. (e) [listing ranch commitments as a permissible punishment].)

We review a commitment decision for abuse of discretion. (In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) “An appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them.” (Ibid.)

In this case, the juvenile court found, given the circumstances of his case, E.R.’s welfare required his removal from his parents’ custody pursuant to section 726, subdivision (a)(3),[2] and committed him to OAYRF for nine months. E.R. argues the court’s finding that his welfare required his removal from his parents’ custody was unsupported by substantial evidence.

We begin by noting “[i]t is not the responsibility of this court to determine what we believe would be the most appropriate placement for a minor. This is the duty of the trial court, whose determination we reverse only if it has acted beyond the scope of reason.” (In re Khamphouy S. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1130, 1135.) In this case, it cannot be said the juvenile court acted beyond the scope of reason. Moreover, we find the record contains substantial evidence supporting the court’s finding that E.R.’s welfare required the commitment imposed.

E.R.’s offenses involved violence and a serious danger to the victim. These offenses occurred immediately after E.R. had been involved in a fight with another student. E.R. knew the victim was the school vice-principal investigating that prior fight. E.R. minimized responsibility for his conduct. He stated he simply “ ‘let go of the brake for a quick second, and tapped him with the car.’ ” He claimed, after he hit the victim with his car, and then got out of the car to confront the victim, the victim made a “ ‘provoking’ remark,” causing E.R. to swing at and hit the victim.

The probation department’s dispositional report stated that, about a year before the incident, E.R. started smoking marijuana twice a week. Further, E.R.’s grades had progressively and starkly declined: he went from receiving As, Bs and Cs, to Cs, Ds and Fs, and then straight Fs in his last semester at school. There is no evidence in the record that E.R.’s parents addressed this scholastic decline or were capable of doing so.

The probation department’s dispositional report and testimony at disposition indicated it considered the possibility of an in-home placement, but ultimately recommended the OAYRF where E.R. would be assigned a juvenile institution officer to provide guidance, get a treatment plan and a reentry plan to ensure a successful return to the community, and be provided aftercare services.

Given this record, the juvenile court could reasonably find E.R.’s welfare required his removal from his home and placement in an environment that offered him more structure, a plan and treatment for successfully coming back to the community and completing school, and a firm consequence for his dangerous behavior.

Finally, we reject E.R.’s argument that the juvenile court failed to consider or make a finding that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. “[T]here is no requirement that the juvenile court expressly state on the record the reasons for rejecting less restrictive placements. [Citations.] Rather, ‘if there is evidence in the record to show a consideration of less restrictive placements was before the court, the fact the judge does not state on the record his [or her] consideration of those alternatives and reasons for rejecting them will not result in a reversal.’ [Citation.] On the other hand, ‘there must be some evidence to support the judge’s implied determination that he [or she] sub silentio considered and rejected reasonable alternative dispositions.’ ” (In re Nicole H. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1159.)

Here, the juvenile court made its dispositional order after hearing from E.R.’s counsel, who argued for probation and discussed E.R.’s lack of criminal history, his remorse, grades, and behavior at school, behavior in juvenile hall “on the gold level,” and solid home life. The probation department’s dispositional report indicated it considered the possibility of an in-home placement, but ultimately recommended the OAYRF given the nature of the “violent offenses” and the minor’s need for “structure.” The prosecutor concurred with probation’s OAYRF recommendation, believing it would be “the wake‑up call” that E.R. needs, help him get back on track at school, and make him understand the severity of his conduct. Thus, the record supports the conclusion the juvenile court considered and rejected less restrictive alternatives.

Disposition

The order is affirmed.