Filed 12/17/18 In re K.N. CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
| In re K.N. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. |
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MARIN COUNTY HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. T.A., Defendant and Appellant.
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A153286, A153879
(Marin County Super. Ct. Nos. JV26486A, JV26487A)
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T.A., the mother of then 17-year-old K.N. and 13-year-old L.N., appeals from jurisdictional findings and a dispositional order issued after the juvenile court sustained a petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).[1] Mother challenges only the subdivision (c) allegation and finding, contending the court erred in amending the petition to add the allegation and, even if it did not, the finding is not supported by the evidence. Father urges that Mother’s appeal should be dismissed, given the unchallenged subdivision (b) allegation. We agree and dismiss Mother’s appeal.
Background
After receiving a referral that the minors had been left without any provision for support, the Health and Human Services Department filed a section 300 petition alleging failure to protect and support the minors and that there was a substantial risk the minors would suffer serious physical harm due to Mother’s mental illness. (§ 300, subds. (b) & (g).) The Department specifically alleged that Mother’s “erratic behavior[]”—which included statements that her family was being watched, cutting all the wires in her home, disabling smoke and carbon monoxide detectors, and reporting to L.N.’s school that he “was engaged in international illegal trade and [was] being pursued by the FBI”—contributed to the family’s eviction from their apartment and to Mother’s section 5150 mental health hold.
The Department’s detention report recommended the minors be detained and the matter be set for a jurisdictional hearing. The report noted that Mother and the minors had not spoken to the father, in five years, that Mother had stated Father had been “physically and verbally abusive towards her and was physically, sexually and verbally abusive towards” the minors, and that the minors “stated they [did] not wish to be in contact with him.” The social worker further reported that, at the mention of Father, Mother became “angry and upset” and L.N. became tearful.
Mother claimed the behavior underlying her section 5150 hold was the “result of her not practicing self-care and the increased dosage of her Adderall prescription.”
The court ordered the minors detained and placed in foster care, found a prima facie showing had been made that the minors came within section 300 and that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent their removal. The court then set the matter for a jurisdictional hearing and ordered supervised visitation for Mother.
A month after the original section 300 petition was filed, the Department filed an amended petition, again on the basis of subdivision (b) and (g) allegations against Mother. By this time, Father had been located and had asked for the appointment of counsel.
The Department’s jurisdictional report detailed a total of 12 referrals as to Mother, eight of which had been evaluated out (not investigated), one of which was determined to be unfounded, and three of which had been investigated, with two of those—general neglect as to the minors—being substantiated. There had also been multiple referrals as to Father, alleging sexual abuse of the minors in 2005, 2006 and 2012. All of these were investigated and found to have been either unfounded or inconclusive. The Department thus reported “no evidence” had been found that either minor had been sexually abused. Nevertheless, the minors displayed noticeable reactions when asked about Father. K.N. became “lethargic and almost disassociated [from] th[e] conversation,” and stated he no longer wanted to attend court for fear Father would be there. L.N. stated he “would throw up” if he had to see Father, and that by the end of the social worker’s conversation about Father, L.N. “had curled up in a ball on the couch, obviously distressed [about] the discussion.” Both minors expressed “no interest” in attending therapy with Father.
For his part, Father acknowledged he had used “corporal punishment” with the children, stating “he would spank the boys” and that he had “ ‘slapped’ the kids ‘a few times.’ ” However, he “adamantly denied abusing the children.” He thought the minors had been “ ‘completely brainwashed.’ ” And although Mother had been previously ordered, after family court proceedings, to ensure the minors received therapy to facilitate their reunification with Father, he “doubt[ed] she ever did this.”
The Department concluded Mother loved the minors “deeply” and was a “devoted” parent. The minors, in turn, “expressed an unwavering desire and eagerness to return to their mother’s care.” However, the Department was concerned that Mother “continue[d] to downplay or deny” her mental health hold, was unwilling to engage in mental health treatment or unwilling to allow verification that she was receiving mental health services, and continued to exhibit paranoia, i.e., insinuating multiple times that the Department was “in league with her ex-husband.” Nevertheless, Mother was demonstrating an “increasing ability to engage in a more open, coherent conversational style,” although it was unclear if that was due to her having stopped taking Adderall.
In the Department’s view, this case was “extremely complicated and confusing” in regards to Father, as “multiple experts from a diversity of professional fields” “unanimously concluded that [Mother’s] claims that [Father] sexually abused [minors] were unsubstantiated.” Nevertheless, the minors “firmly believe” that Father abused them and poses a threat to them, as well as to Mother. The Department noted that in the 2013 family law case, contact with Father was originally assessed as being detrimental to minors’ emotional and psychological well-being, but the court ultimately ordered Mother to place the minors in therapy to work toward reunification with Father. “Five years later and without engaging in therapeutic services to process their feelings and beliefs towards their father,” the Department felt, overall, “any contact with [Father] at this point would continue to be detrimental.”
The Department eventually filed a third amended section 300 petition, solely alleging failure to protect against physical harm under subdivision (b).
In an addendum report, the Department reported that Mother had obtained employment and housing, and was no longer being prescribed Adderall. Mother had also begun unsupervised visits, which were going well.
At the jurisdictional hearing, the parties discussed a recent settlement conference at which they had agreed to the language of the section 300 subdivision (b), physical harm allegation. Father’s counsel had also stated at the conference that she intended to ask the court to further amend the petition to add an allegation of emotional damage under subdivision (c), based on the minors’ continued, but unfounded, belief Father had abused them and Mother’s failure to obtain counseling for them.[2] Accordingly, while Father’s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that the parties had agreed on the language of the subdivision (b) allegation, she “ask[ed] that the Court consider a 300(c) allegation, that the children are suffering from a mental health issue as evidenced by their terror of [F]ather.”
Mother and the Department objected to the request.
Expressing concern about the minors’ obviously troubled emotional health, the court inquired about the previously-issued orders that the minors receive therapy and the fact that, for five years, Mother had not complied with them. Counsel for the Department responded that “by saying we are not in favor of adding that as an item on the petition, that doesn’t mean that we are not concerned about the boys[’] mental health. It is something that certainly would be included in the dispositional plan, but in order to get jurisdiction sometimes we make decisions about getting jurisdiction in a most expeditious manner and dealing, just the fact that there isn’t a specific allegation relating to the boys[’] mental health, doesn’t mean that the disposition plan cannot include information and services that address that.”
The court then asked for clarification as to whether the section 300 subdivision (b) allegation would define, or confine, the scope of the disposition. Counsel for the Department responded that it did not necessarily do so and that the Department could “make recommendations to the Court as to the breadth of the services, so there doesn’t have to be an allegation included in the petition as long as there are facts that the Department can point to and suggest that there’s a basis for making a dispositional recommendation.” The court then pointed out the amended subdivision (b) allegation “only talks about the boys[’] physical safety, it doesn’t address their emotional safety.” Counsel for the Department reiterated that the Department had “concerns about [the minors’ emotional well-being] as well,” and all counsel could say was that the Department was “very concerned and is not limited in its recommendations regarding disposition to the allegations that are specifically stated in the petition.”
Counsel for the minors stated that if the court were inclined to add a section 300 subdivision (c) allegation, the minors “would likely” dispute that Mother was an impediment to their receiving therapy and that “they would say that they themselves chose not to go to therapy and that’s the reason why they didn’t go and so they wouldn’t want their [M]other to be blamed for that.”
The court continued the matter, and three days later, the Department filed a fourth amended section 300 petition, again with only a subdivision (b) allegation.
At a status conference, the court inquired if the parties were able to meet and confer with regards to Father’s request for a section 300 subdivision (c) allegation. However, no agreement had been reached, and counsel for the Department asked for a further continuance of the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing in order to complete discovery, which the court granted.
Thereafter, but before the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, Father filed a motion to require Mother’s visits with the minors to be supervised. The court, “erring on the side of caution” and “to protect the children’s emotional health,” granted the motion and ordered supervised visitation with Mother until the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing.
Mother promptly filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting that “[u]pon being told that his visits would return to supervised by the social worker, [L.N.] immediately curled into a all, hid his head and did not speak. He remained in that position for some time and then went to his room. . . . [K.N.] appeared to dissociate upon hearing about the supervised visitation order. He also did not speak, stared at the ceiling, and eventually left the room without speaking.”
At the hearing on the reconsideration motion, the court heard from counsel for the parties, as well as from the social worker and the court appointed special advocate (CASA) for the minors. Minors’ counsel informed the court the minors were now in therapy and they wanted unsupervised visits with Mother. Counsel stated, however, he was “disturbed by the position that my clients, [the minors], have been put in, vis-à-vis their relationship with their father, and it troubles me greatly that that relationship I believe has been poisoned . . . .”
The court continued to express concern for the minors’ emotional well-being, stating “these boys have been told for many years that they have been sexually abused by their father. [¶] My understanding is that that has been evaluated and investigated by not one but by two different counties and there was an overwhelming finding that that abuse has not occurred. [¶] Mother was ordered to engage the boys in therapy so that some of the damage that had been done could be addressed and that that therapy did not occur until the boys were brought to this Court’s attention with respect to [M]other’s mental health issues and how those compromised the boys physical safety.”
Counsel for the Department responded that the Department had “really looked at the facts of this case, both the current facts and the facts that the Court alludes to in the past. . . . [¶] But where the Department is left right now is that, and we did really wrestle with whether we should recommend to the Court a 300(c) emotional abuse allegation based on the facts that the Court is talking about. [¶] However, the Court will see this when the Court gets the Department’s review report for the hearing that we’re heading toward, all facts that the Department has access to right now, the school, the foster parents, everybody who comes in contact with these kids says they are well adjusted, they’re doing well in school, they have friends, all of the indicia of children who are suffering severe emotional distress, you know, the statutory requirements of severe depression, acting out toward others, acting out toward self, none of that is in existence right now, so that’s where the Department is left. And I think I really take to heart what children’s counsel said. [¶] We’re left with the situation right now which would, if we didn’t have all that stuff in the past that the Court is talking about, which I recognize that we do, but just for sake of argument, there would be no question that there’s not an emotional abuse situation here. [¶] Given that we have that situation, we still have to look at what is in the children’s best interest now, and that’s where it becomes really difficult. And the Department’s evaluation of all of the facts right now suggests that the only thing that is creating enormous stress for the children is their inability to have ongoing contact with their mother.”
The court then asked counsel directly if the “children were led to believe that they had been sexually abused by their father repeatedly,” to which counsel for the Department responded, “Agreed.” The court then asked, “Okay. How can that not have a long term emotional affect on these boys? How could it not affect their perceptions of themselves, their perceptions of other people, their ability to enter into long term relationships? How can it not affect that? [¶] And if I could say, their response to my ordering supervised visits, that’s not normal. There is an indication that there’s some really extraordinary emotional distress going on with these boys.”
At this point, the social worker opined the “boys reaction . . . didn’t seem abnormal,” that she had spoken to L.N. a number of times and his “catatonic like” reaction “seems to be his pattern when he gets upset.” The social worker also seemed to express doubt about the unsubstantiated sexual abuse findings, stating “we do not know what happened” and besides that, there was ongoing domestic violence between Father and Mother, as well as “admitted physical discipline” by Father of minors. The court queried, “so is it your belief that—is it your plan that the boys just go back to mom and we say well, we’re really not sure if this didn’t happen so we’re not going to deal with it?” At this point, a social worker supervisor responded, stating, “Of course our plan is to continue to work with the family. We’re not saying return the boys and goodbye. We totally want to offer six more months of FM services. [¶] And it’s a very challenging case. And it is not our intention in any way to say goodbye to dad. We want to continue to work with dad, as [the child welfare worker] has.” The CASA told the court he was “in agreement” with the social worker.
The court then asked, “[W]hat makes you think that mother will not perpetuate what has been told to the boys for the past many many years?” The supervisor replied, “We believe mother has modified her behaviors, recognizes what she needs to do and she’s done those things, to the extent of addressing what we originally came in for, and now the next step is, you know, the relationship with the children’s father, and that’s not done, that’s something we can keep working with the family about.”
Father’s counsel expressed considerable doubt about the Department’s confidence in [M]other’s changing her behavior and the minors’ accessing therapy, stating, “I think that whatever originally brought the case in[,] a lot of things originally bring our cases in[,] and then we find out other things that are going on in the home and they’re absolutely addressed as should this be. [¶] . . . [¶] And to only look at no acting out, good grades, and then say that by all measures everything is okay is to totally ignore the terror they feel towards their father, the suspicion they have towards him and the anger, and the behavior they exhibit when they don’t get the things that they want. [¶] There is major evidence of high stress with these kids and trauma that needs to get dealt with.”
The court then asked Mother’s counsel if she was ready to have a conversation with the minors that the sexual abuse did not happen. Mother’s counsel replied, “My explanation is that my client needs support professionally in order to go to her children and say I know you reported this to me, but this did not happen. [¶] . . . [¶] She acknowledges that the case file and the evidence from medical professionals see no conclusive evidence of sexual abuse.”
Stating that the court’s ultimate job was “to protect” the minors, the court opined that if it did not “do something here and I let this go by without taking the appropriate action[,] my fear is that I’m letting them down, and this may be their last chance.”
At the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, counsel for the Department began by asking the court as to which petition they were proceeding with, as there was “an original petition and there are up to—there is a fourth, third, second, first amended petition . . . and there has been what I am going to call an agreement, but it’s—without stating what the terms of it are, it’s based on the Department’s recommendation and the Court’s acceptance that we are moving forward on the fourth amended petition.”
The court, in turn, asked “if I find that the evidence before me presents an additional subsection of 300, are you suggesting that the Court cannot sustain findings on those additional subsections?” Counsel replied there would be submission on the section 300 subdivision (b) allegation, but that Father’s counsel “is going to . . . continue her recommendation to the Court that a [subdivision] C allegation be included in the petition, and that would be the only thing that we would be moving forward on today by means of a contest.” Mother’s counsel confirmed that Mother was “prepared to submit on the B1 allegation,” however “[t]hat in no way should be construed that she believes it would be appropriate, or that the father would even have standing considering that he is not the petitioner to then seek a [subdivision] C allegation.” Father’s counsel then stated that she was “presenting a C count,” but was prepared to “submit on the B count of any petition.” The court then asked all parties if they were proceeding on Father’s “request that a C subsection be considered by this court,” to which the Department’s counsel replied, “Correct.” Counsel also asked the court to continue the dispositional hearing, which the court agreed to do, over Mother’s objection.
Accordingly, after sustaining the agreed-upon section 300 subdivision (b) allegation, the court moved forward with a hearing on the suggested subdivision (c) allegation.
Mother’s counsel initially asserted Father did not have standing to add allegations to the petition. Counsel then stated that even if the court were to find that Father did have standing, there was insufficient evidence to support the proffered section 300 subdivision (c) allegation. Counsel noted the “requirements required to satisfy a 300(c) finding including specific parental conduct, causation, and serious emotional harm demonstrated by specific requirements, anxiety, depression, or aggressive behavior of the children.”
Counsel for the Department opened by stating the “allegations of ongoing emotional abuse simply do not apply at this point”—there was no risk, or any anxiety or depression minors were currently experiencing was due to living away from Mother, and the minors would be safe to return to Mother. Minors’ counsel joined in the Department’s assessment. Counsel “just [did not] think that the evidence shows the severe damage that is needed for a C count.”
The social worker testified that, after her investigation, she did not find there was “enough evidence to plead a C count,” because the minors, at the time, were doing well in school, receiving good grades, had friends and were not isolated. The child welfare worker testified that she had “seen some suggestion . . . that the mother has intentionally or unintentionally divided the boys—like made the boys [] fearful of [F]ather.” The minors also told her they were sexually abused by Father, but she acknowledged there was no evidence of such. She had not talked to Mother about the minors’ belief, but she had “reviewed the detention report” which reported Mother as claiming the minors’ had been abused. The social worked also testified that any time Father was mentioned to the minors they had physical reactions, L.N. would “get very fidgety and he kind of like curls up and he can kind of cover his head,” and K.N. “kind of zones out.”
Mother testified that she and Father separated in mid-2012, and since then she has encouraged the minors to contact him. The minors had recently been given Christmas cards from Father, and she encouraged them to open the cards. Mother further testified she had had a meeting with Father and facilitators at the Transitioning Families Program in order to “reintroduce the children to their father and to help them process out their emotions.” She made no formal commitments with the program, but said she “was committed to co-parenting” with Father. She stated K.N. was in therapy through school. Additionally, she testified the minors had both seen a custody evaluator over the course of a year, though she stated they had only attended “maybe two or three” sessions. On cross-examination, Mother admitted the reports showed the minors had attended only one session. Mother also admitted she had failed to sign a release with the program so that “they could discuss treatment with the social workers.” She claimed she was “planning on signing the releases.”
In closing, counsel for the Department told the court the Department “strongly” believed “there has been no evidence of either [minor] suffering serious emotional damage.” That was not to say that the minors did “not have emotional issues due to their experience under both [Father’s] and [Mother’s] care, but rather to assert that the boys have not exhibited symptoms of emotional abuse under [Mother’s] care in Marin County.” Counsel further asserted the minors’ troubled emotional health could also be explained by their “witnessing domestic violence” and Father’s role as the “physical disciplinarian.” Accordingly, the Department maintained the evidence did not support a section 300 subdivision (c) allegation.
The court then asked, since the Department was willing to acknowledge the minors’ had certain “issues,” what was “the harm in including the 300(c)?” Counsel responded that the court could order any services necessary to protect the minors without the addition of the allegation. Mother’s counsel then interjected that “the goal of dependency court is not to include every possible allegation and [that] allowing the Father to . . . potentially become the petitioner is circumventing the purpose and the public policy reasons for dependency.” Minors’ counsel in closing stated that describing Father as a “petitioner” “mischaracterizes what is happening” here. Counsel also acknowledged, however, “Father has a right to ask for a hearing on jurisdiction and the Court is empowered to conform the petition to the facts that is hears.”
Confirming that it had “the authority to make findings in conformance with the evidence that has been presented,” the court then detailed the facts presented, including that (1) Mother had “consistently made allegations that Father was violent with her, yet an evidentiary hearing on that issue was conducted” in 2012 and the court found “Mother had not met the preponderance standard” to issue a permanent restraining order; (2) Mother had made allegations Father had physically abused the boys and while Father acknowledged employing “physical discipline with the children,” the court “did not find [Mother’s] allegations to be credible in terms of the extent of the physical disciple exercised by Father”; and (3) Mother had made “consistent allegations that Father sexually abused the children and that they were examined by at least 12 professionals,” and “[n]one of those professionals substantiated Mother’s claims and the universal response was that there was no evidence.”
The court also did not find Mother’s account of the therapy minors had received credible. Citing to a therapist’s report, the court found the minors’ response to seeing Father was indicative of emotional abuse. The therapist had reported there was a “massive hysteria around Father,” which was “bizarre and out of proportion.” The therapist also “described it as one of the worst cases he has ever seen and believed that Mother was projecting her own” past abuse onto minors. Finally, the court observed there was “no indication” Mother had followed previous court orders to keep Father apprised of minors’ whereabouts and to engage the boys in therapeutic visits with Father.
The court went on to find that the evidence supported a section 300 subdivision (c) allegation, citing the minors’ recent physical reactions to potential visits with Father and supervised visits with Mother—i.e., their becoming catatonic and curling into the fetal position—as the physical manifestations required for a subdivision (c) allegation. The court then found by a preponderance of the evidence that the subdivision (b) count as alleged and the subdivision (c) count as urged by Father’s counsel were sustained, and set the matter for a contested dispositional hearing.
A week before the dispositional hearing, the department filed a fifth amended section 300 petition which included both the subdivision (b) and (c) allegations.
At that point, the minors finally attended a therapy program with Father. K.N. stated it was “ ‘actually fine’ ” to see Father; L.N. stated it was “ ‘weird’ ” seeing Father after so much time. The minors agreed to a second session.
The parties subsequently agreed on disposition, with counsel for the Department reporting that all parties were “extremely engaged and will remain working” with the program for another year. The court then declared minors dependents under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c), found reasonable efforts had been made to eliminate the need for removal, and ordered the minors placed with Mother under county supervision. The court further ordered Father could have unsupervised phone and text contact with minors, and scheduled a status review hearing pursuant to section 364.[b][3]
Discussion
“ ‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the [trial] court’s finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ ” (In re Drake M. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 754, 762 (Drake M.); accord In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1492 (I.A.).)
Courts will nevertheless be inclined to reach the merits of an additional jurisdictional finding when it “(1) serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal (see, e.g., In re Alexis E. [(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438,] 454 . . . ; (2) could be prejudicial to the appellant or could potentially impact the current or future dependency proceedings (In re D.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1015 . . .); or (3) ‘could have other consequences for [the appellant], beyond jurisdiction’ (In re I.A., supra, [201 Cal.App.4th] at p. 1493, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 441 [not reaching the merits of an appeal where an alleged father ‘has not suggested a single specific legal or practical consequence from this finding, either within or outside the dependency proceedings’]).” (Drake M., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at pp. 762–763.)
Still, “Drake M. provides a narrow exception to the general rule that we will not address the merits of challenges to jurisdictional findings that do not affect the child’s status as a dependent of the court.” (In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 310.)
Mother urges that the Drake M. exception applies. She claims the section 300 subdivision (c) finding could be “used against [her] in the future to support a risk of harm argument” and could, in a future case, lead to “a bypass of reunification services” and “a speedy termination of parental rights” or cause her to “have an uphill” battle as to custody or visitation. These speculative and conclusory assertions do not persuade us there is a need to review the merits of the alternative subdivision (c) finding.
She also claims the “suffering . . . serious emotional damage” section 300 subdivision (c) finding is “much more serious” than the subdivision (b) finding, and she will be treated “differently in terms of treatment modalities and in risk assessments” than a parent who has only “ ‘neglected’ ” a child (the subdivision (b) finding was phrased only in terms of “neglect” attributable to Mother’s mental illness). However, the section 300 subdivision (c) finding, like the subdivision (b) finding, is based on the delusional and paranoid behaviors that have marked Mother’s mental illness. Furthermore, even had the court made only a subdivision (b) finding, it is clear the court would have ordered the Department to provide, and Mother to attend and to ensure her children attend, the same mental health services that squarely must be provided in connection with the subdivision (c) finding.
Mother additionally claims a parent subject to a section 300 subdivision (c) finding “could be listed on the Child Abuse Central Index as someone who is a known child abuser.” However, such listing could also be based on subjecting a child to a “substantial risk” the child “will suffer serious physical harm or illness,” i.e., the basis for a subdivision (b) finding. (See Pen. Code, §§ 11165.3 [reportable severe neglect, as defined in Pen. Code, § 11165.2, can be based on “ ‘the willful harming or injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child,’ ” which “means a situation in which any person willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon, unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be placed in a situation in which his or her person or health is endangered”]; 11165.6 [reportable “ ‘child abuse or neglect’ includes physical injury or death inflicted by other than accidental means upon a child by another person, sexual abuse as defined in Section 11165.1, neglect as defined in Section 11165.2, the willful harming or injuring of a child or the endangering of the person or health of a child, as defined in Section 11165.3, and unlawful corporal punishment or injury as defined in Section 11165.4”].) And, as we observed above, the subdivision (c) finding, like the subdivision (b) finding, while attributing the minors’ “serious emotional damage” or “risk” thereof to Mother’s conduct, that conduct is expressly based on Mother’s mental illness and its manifesting delusional and paranoid behaviors.
In short, given the record in this case, there is a substantial overlap between the section 300 subdivision (b) and subdivision (c) jurisdictional findings, and the latter expressly finds that in addition to having suffered, or being at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm, the minors are also continuing to suffer, or at substantial risk of suffering, serious emotional damage, as well.
“Because we find no threatened prejudice” to Mother from the additional section 300 subdivision (c) jurisdictional finding, “we decline to exercise our discretion to review it.” (I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.)
Disposition
The appeal is dismissed. Parties to bear their own costs on appeal.
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Banke, J.
We concur:
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Humes, P.J.
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Kelly, J.*
*Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
A153286 & A153879, In re K.N.
[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
[2] Section 300 provides, “A child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent child of the court: [¶] . . .[¶] (c) The child is suffering serious emotional damage, or is at substantial risk of suffering serious emotional damage, evidenced by severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal, or untoward aggressive behavior toward self or others, as a result of the conduct of the parent or guardian . . . .” (§ 300, subd. (c).)
[3] Although Mother ostensibly appealed from both the court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional order, she makes no separate argument as to the dispositional order. We therefore deem that part of her appeal abandoned. (See Aptos Council v. County of Santa Cruz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 266, 296, fn. 7 [“Issues not raised in the appellant’s opening brief are deemed waived or abandoned.”].)
