Fear Not Law Articles: PATRICIA SAMPLES v. EDMUND G.BROWN, PART I

PATRICIA SAMPLES v

PATRICIA SAMPLES v. EDMUND G.BROWN,

Filed 1/11/07

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

PATRICIA SAMPLES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., as Attorney General, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

A112343, A112594

(Sonoma County

Super. Ct. No. SCV 231307)

I. INTRODUCTION

The trial court entered a judgment declaring that sections 14602.6 and 23109.2 of the Vehicle Code[1] are unconstitutional on their face. The court also awarded respondent, Patricia Samples (Samples), $249,018.59 in attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The Attorney General appeals both the judgment and the attorney fees order. We reverse.

II. STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Background

In October 2002, Samples commenced this action challenging two distinct statutory schemes: (1) provisions of the Controlled Substances Act relating to the seizure and forfeiture of property (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11469-11495), and (2) provisions of the Vehicle Code pertaining to impoundment of vehicles that are either driven by unlicensed drivers or used in dangerous activities such as speed contests.

Samples filed this action pursuant to section 526a of the Code of Civil Procedure as a tax-paying â€

Description	Vehicle Code Sec. 14602.6(b)'s provision that mitigating circumstances may be considered in determining whether unlicensed drivers may retrieve their impounded vehicles is not unconstitutionally vague on its face nor does it violate non-delegation doctrine where both statute and case law construing it provide examples of mitigating circumstances. Sec. 14602.6 does not violate equal protection clause by authorizing the automatic release of an impounded vehicle to a rental car agency while simultaneously requiring private individuals to appear at a storage hearing and satisfy one of the statutory circumstances for an early release. Sec. 23109.2(a), which provides that a vehicle "may be impounded for not more than 30 days," does not violate non-delegation doctrine.
Rating	0/5 1 2 3 4 5 0/5 based on 0 votes.