Lane v. Dept. of Corrections

Filed 2/13/07  Lane v. Dept. of Corrections CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

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 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

            APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Joan M. Lewis, Judge.  Affirmed.

            We review a judgment of dismissal after demurrer, regarding the " Writ of Mandamus . . . and Motion for Summary Judgment" filed in 2005 in superior court by plaintiff and appellant Michael Anthony Lane (a California prison inmate).  In his pleading (the complaint), Lane seeks relief against respondents California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) and Jeanne S. Woodford (together defendants) for their alleged mishandling of his claims regarding the sum of $797.60, representing reimbursement of amounts taken from his inmate trust account at another prison, to satisfy then-existing restitution orders, between 1995 and 2002.  Previously, in 2004, Lane obtained a small claims court judgment in that amount, which was honored by defendants.  (Lane v. Dept. of Corrections (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2004, No. SC157217).)

            The trial court sustained without leave to amend defendants' demurrer, stating that " plaintiff's complaint seeks to overturn the judgment of the small claims court  .  .  .  , and as such it is specifically barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 116.710, subdivision (a)." ^[1]  Other grounds of demurrer were not reached and since no possibility of amendment to cure the defect existed, the matter was dismissed.

            Plaintiff appeals, contending the superior court should have jurisdiction over the complaint, because his complaint could be considered to be enforcement of a postjudgment order, or the superior court should have recognized that the small claims court could have considered and ruled upon plaintiff's increased damages requests (for punitive damages), such that the small claims judgment should have been vacated pursuant to his motion.  Further, plaintiff complains that the defendants failed to comply adequately with certain administrative procedures for obtaining a written release (regarding lost personal property appeals) from plaintiff.  (Cal. Code Regs., tit.  15, §  3084.7, subd. (e).)

            We agree with the trial court that the complaint fails to state any cognizable claim for relief and it is barred by section 116.710, subdivision (a).  The demurrer was properly sustained without leave to amend.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            For purposes of analyzing the demurrer, the courts will accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  It alleges that in his criminal case, in 1997, plaintiff obtained a reversal of an earlier restitution order and he therefore became entitled to reimbursement of amounts that had previously been deducted from his inmate trust account to satisfy those orders in the criminal matter.  While he was incarcerated on his sentence and also on parole revocation periods, he pursued inmate appeals but was unsuccessful in obtaining this reimbursement. 

A

Small Claims Action

            In October 2004, to obtain reimbursement of the restitution awards that had been vacated, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in small claims court under case number SC157217.  In December 2004, he filed a declaration seeking to amend the pleading to seek punitive damages " for my suffering, stress, mental and physical pain . . . " caused by the delay in reimbursement.^[2]  He thus notified the small claims court that he was seeking

approximately $13,500 in compensatory and punitive damages, costs and fees.  In his reply brief on appeal, he adds that this included about $5,000 each for compensatory, punitive, and fraud damages, as well as attorney fees and costs for his pro per filings.

            In December 2004, representatives of the defendant (prison officials at Chuckawalla Valley State Prison, where plaintiff currently resided) submitted declarations related to their efforts to obtain records and analyze the restitution issues from the earlier periods of his imprisonment and parole revocation at the Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility.  Defendants' accounting specialists concluded that a reimbursement was in order and that it had been made in the amount of $797.60. 

            Since plaintiff was incarcerated, the small claims court resolved the matter on declarations.  (§  116.540, subd. (f).)  On March  7, 2005, plaintiff received a judgment in his favor in the amount of $797.60, without costs.  In addition, the small claims court determined that the " defendant has presented evidence that the judgment has been satisfied."   Plaintiff responded with a notice of motion to vacate the judgment, on the grounds that he was entitled to more compensatory and punitive damages.  This motion was denied for lack of clerical or legal error, and the small claims court commissioner ruled that the matter had properly been resolved on declaration, to award judgment in the sum demanded on plaintiff's claim, and no new arguments were being presented.  The commissioner ruled that " [p]laintiff, by utilizing the Small Claims court, has waived his right to appeal the judgment and cannot now seek to amend the complaint amount post-judgment."  

Current Action; Demurrer and Ruling

            On May 5, 2005, plaintiff filed this " Writ of Mandamus . . . and Motion for Summary Judgment" (the complaint) in superior court.  He seeks reversal of the small claims judgment and an order that the lower court perform its mandatory or ministerial duties correctly, by granting plaintiff further relief, such as compensatory and punitive damages, costs and fees.  Plaintiff argued that the earlier small claims court judgment was not properly dispositive of all his claims and the matter should have been transferred to superior court at that time.  (§  396 [governing transfer of action when court lacks subject matter jurisdiction].)  He also argues he meant to file the case in the appellate division of superior court, but the matter was handled as a civil case instead.

            Defendants demurred to the complaint and sought judicial notice of official documents detailing the reimbursement proceedings, including supporting declarations by prison officials.  These documents included a rejection of an administrative claim by the Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board, dated September 17, 2004; plaintiff's claim in small claims court, filed on or about October  17, 2004, and its accompanying declaration; and notice of entry of judgment of the small claims court, entered on March  7, 2005.  The record also includes plaintiff's notice of motion to vacate the judgment in the small claims court, and the order denying it.

            The superior court issued a ruling on May  26, 2006, sustaining the demurrer, without leave to amend, on the ground that the complaint was barred by section 116.710, subdivision (a), because it incorrectly sought to overturn the judgment of the small claims court.  Since the court found sufficient grounds to grant the defendants' demurrer on that basis, the court did not reach the defendants' additional arguments regarding the untimeliness of the action under the California Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).  Judgment of dismissal was entered and plaintiff appeals.

DISCUSSION

            For purposes of analyzing the ruling on demurrer, we take as true the allegations in the complaint.  (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole, its parts in their context, to determine whether sufficient facts are stated to constitute a cause of action.  (Ibid.)  We review the legal sufficiency of the judgment, and not the reasoning of the trial court.  (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 19.)

            To address the issues presented, we first outline the principles for analyzing the jurisdictional and appellate limitations on the small claims court and the superior court, and then apply them to this factual context as alleged.

I

PRINCIPLES

      In 2 Witkin, California Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Courts, section 314, page 384, basic rules are outlined regarding the conclusiveness of a small claims court judgment.  Ordinarily, such a judgment is " conclusive upon the plaintiff, who has no right to appeal the judgment on the plaintiff's claim.  ([§  116.710, subd. (a)]; see Parada v. Small Claims Court (1977) 70 [Cal.App.3d] 766, 769 [Parada]; [citations] . . . .)"   The reason for this limitation is that it otherwise provides "   'a quick and inexpensive method of trial and judgment'  " to complaining plaintiffs.  (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure, supra, §  314, p. 384.)  In return for this advantage, the small claims court plaintiff must accept the loss of a right of appeal.  (Ibid.)  As further explained in Parada, " [t]hus a plaintiff who elects to proceed in the small claims court is finally bound by an adverse judgment.  This means that the lack of the right of appeal cannot then be relied upon as a basis for a petition for an extraordinary writ which is designed to seek appellate review of an adverse judgment.  Such a procedure would emasculate the prohibition against appeals by plaintiffs from judgments rendered by a small claims court."   (Parada, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d at pp. 769-770.)

            As noted, section 116.710, subdivision (a) provides, " The plaintiff in a small claims action shall have no right to appeal the judgment on the plaintiff's claim, but a plaintiff who did not appear at the hearing may file a motion to vacate the judgment in accordance with Section 116.720."   Here, plaintiff did appear by declaration, but nevertheless moved to vacate the judgment, and a ruling was duly issued.  In subdivision (b) of this section, it is provided that a " defendant with respect to the plaintiff's claim, and a plaintiff with respect to a claim of the defendant, may appeal the judgment to the superior court in the county in which the action was heard."   However, there is no separate claim of the defendant in this case to give this plaintiff any right of appeal from the favorable judgment on his own claim.  We therefore confine our analysis to whether plaintiff can show any reason that the language of section 116.710, subdivision (a) should not apply to him.

II

APPLICATION

            As a threshold matter, we may not accept plaintiff's argument that as a layperson, he should not be held to have technical knowledge of applicable legal requirements regarding claims presentation and jurisdiction.  For this point, he cites to, e.g., Lekse v. Municipal Court (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 188, 191, in which the court analyzed the small claims court statutory scheme and its nature and purpose.  (§  116.110 et seq.)  " Our Supreme Court has explained that, '[t]he theory behind [the small claims court's] organization is that only by escaping from the complexity and delay of the normal course of litigation could anything be gained in a legal proceeding which may involve a small sum.  Consequently, the small claims court functions informally and expeditiously.  The chief characteristics of its proceedings are that there are no attorneys, no pleadings and no legal rules of evidence; . . . [Citations.]'  (Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 17 Cal.2d 563, 573-574.)"   (Lekse, supra, at p. 191.)  These salutary principles, however, cannot obviate the requirement that the superior court may entertain actions only in which it has jurisdiction.  The limits of monetary relief available in small claims court may be ascertained by a diligent layperson, such as plaintiff (normally up to $7,500; §  116.210 et seq.).

            Plaintiff believes that he falls under an exception to the principles limiting the availability of appellate review of a plaintiff's small claims judgment, on the grounds that his current complaint could be considered to be enforcement of a postjudgment order stemming out of the small claims court judgment.  He cites to General Electric Capital Auto Financial Services, Inc. v. Appellate Division (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 136, 144-145 (General Electric).  There, the court read the statutory scheme as requiring " a conclusion that the appellate division of the superior court has appellate and extraordinary writ jurisdiction of postjudgment enforcement orders of the small claims court."   (Ibid.) Plaintiff further seeks to argue that under Parada, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 766, even if he should be bound by an adverse small claims judgment, he should be able to bring a writ, such as this one, to challenge a favorable judgment.

            From these authorities (General Electric, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th 136; Parada, supra, 70 Cal.App.3d 766), plaintiff would seek to show that he can challenge, by way of writ proceedings in the superior court, his small claims judgment as insufficient in amount.  In his reply brief, he contends that his damages requests before the small claims court, by way of declaration intended to amend the pleadings, included not only the $797.60 actual damages, but also $5,000 each for compensatory, punitive, and fraud damages, as well as attorney fees and costs for his pro per filings.  However, he has supplied only an unconformed copy of his declaration to the small claims court and it is not clear that any actual amendment to the pleadings was allowed or understood by the small claims court, since its postjudgment order recited that it had awarded judgment to plaintiff in the sum demanded on plaintiff's claim.  Even if plaintiff meant to file the current case in the appellate division of superior court, he is not allowed to appeal the judgment in his favor under section 116.710, subdivision (a).

            We must also reject plaintiff's contentions that the superior court should have recognized that the small claims court could have considered plaintiff's increased damages requests (for punitive damages) and the matter could have been transferred to a higher court pursuant to section 396, or likewise, the small claims judgment could have been vacated pursuant to his motion.  Defendants point out in their respondents' brief that the record is at best inconclusive on the issues of the amount of damages sought, and in any case, these issues were not raised below and should not be dispositive of this appeal.  (Also see Gov. Code, §  818 [providing that public entities are not liable for punitive damages].)  We agree that this matter is more appropriately handled by analyzing the actual terms of the pleading and argument according to what was before the superior court.

            In any case, plaintiff's theories are not well taken, because he cannot show the small claims court properly had the increased damages claims before it when it issued its judgment.  That  judgment is now final in nature, and nothing remains to be enforced on a postjudgment basis.  The small claims court was not under any ministerial duty to award punitive damages pursuant to any declaration that plaintiff filed there.  The record is not sufficiently clear to compel this court to determine that the superior court should have ruled as a matter of law that the small claims court came under a duty to transfer the case under section 396, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  Rather, plaintiff properly appeared at trial through his declaration, and the small claims judgment was in accordance with the pleadings and has already been satisfied, according to the ruling on the postjudgment motion in the small claims court.  (§  116.540, subd. (f).)

            Moreover, to the extent that plaintiff seeks to divide his claims regarding reimbursement of the same restitution funds into several causes of action (such as adding fraud claims), this would violate well accepted rules defining a primary right of action.  For example, the Supreme Court in Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 904-905 (Mycogen) summarized the basis of the res judicata doctrine, the primary right theory, as follows:

" As we explained in Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681-682:  'The primary right theory is a theory of code pleading that has long been followed in California.  It provides that a " cause of action" is comprised of a " primary right" of the plaintiff, a corresponding " primary duty" of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.  [Citation.]  The most salient characteristic of a primary right is that it is indivisible:  the violation of a single primary right gives rise to but a single cause of action.  [Citation.] . . .  [¶]  As far as its content is concerned, the primary right is simply the plaintiff's right to be free from the particular injury suffered.  [Citation.]  It must therefore be distinguished from the legal theory on which liability for that injury is premised:  " Even where there are multiple legal theories upon which recovery might be predicated, one injury gives rise to only one claim for relief."  [Citation.]  The primary right must also be distinguished from the remedy sought:  " The violation of one primary right constitutes a single cause of action, though it may entitle the injured party to many forms of relief, and the relief is not to be confounded with the cause of action, one not being determinative of the other."  [Citation.]' "  (Ibid.)

            Plaintiff's filing of his current case in superior court, after the litigation of the same reimbursement issues in small claims court, violates these principles:  "   'The primary right theory . . . is invoked . . . when a plaintiff attempts to divide a primary right and enforce it in two suits.  The theory prevents this result by either of two means:  (1) if the first suit is still pending when the second is filed, the defendant in the second suit may plead that fact in abatement [citations]; or (2) if the first suit has terminated in a judgment on the merits adverse to the plaintiff, the defendant in the second suit may set up that judgment as a bar under the principles of res judicata.'  "  (Mycogen, supra, 28 Cal.4th 888, 904-905.)  Here, plaintiff cannot show why the latter theory should not apply.  The only allegations he makes deal with the right to reimbursement of funds that were taken between 1995 and 2002 for restitution purposes, but that became subject to the later resentencing which did not include restitution orders.  The small claims court judgment is final and complete and bars the present action.

            Further, plaintiff has no grounds to object that under California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3084.7, subdivision (e)(4), the proper administrative procedures were not followed.  That section governs " lost or damaged personal property appeals," with regard to reimbursement for loss.  Under subdivision (e)(4)(C) of this regulation, the following procedures are provided:  " Before payment of any granted claim, the appellant shall sign an Inmate/Parolee Board of Control Release Form, CDC Form 813 (rev. 2-86), discharging the state from further liability for the claim pursuant to Government Code section 965.  The appellant shall be provided with a copy of the completed form."   Apparently, plaintiff contends the reimbursement into his trust account was not an adequate settlement of his claims, since he believed additional damages should have been added, and therefore he should have had the opportunity to receive such a form.  However, he cannot show how the resolution of his claim was the kind of settlement falling within the type of proceeding in which such a release was required.  Rather, the small claims court read the pleadings as framing the issues before it, and relied on the evidence to conclude that adequate reimbursement had been made at the administrative level, such that the judgment was satisfied.  Plaintiff's reliance on this regulatory provision does not give rise to any right to damages or other relief.

            Finally, we agree with the trial court that no further analysis need be presented regarding an additional limitations defense, that an action against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim must be presented must be commenced within six months after written notice of rejection of claim is given.  (Gov. Code, § 945.6; County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267-1268.)  The order sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the complaint is correct as a matter of law.

DISPOSITION

            The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.  Each party shall bear its own costs of appeal.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

                                       HALLER, J.

                                         AARON, J.

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^[1]           All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless noted.  Section 116.710, subdivision (a) provides, " The plaintiff in a small claims action shall have no right to appeal the judgment on the plaintiff's claim  .  .  .  ."

^[2]           In appellant's appendix, including the exhibits to his opening brief, nonconformed documents are included and it is difficult to determine which records were filed in the small claims court.  However, the record as a whole is sufficient to address these issues on the merits.