Filed 2/16/21 In re N.D. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(San Joaquin)

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S.L. (mother) and M.D. (father), parents of the minor, appeal from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 300, 395.)[1] They assert there was insufficient evidence to sustain the allegations in the dependency petition or to support the removal order. Father further asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his motion to represent himself in the proceedings pursuant to Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562]. Father also claims the juvenile court and the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.). Finding none of the parents’ claims have merit, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 14, 2018, the six-month-old minor was admitted to UCSF Medical Center, Benioff Children’s Hospital Oakland (UCSF) with two potentially life-threatening conditions: hemi-megalocephaly and intractable epilepsy. He had left frontal temporal parietal craniotomy surgery on May 15, 2018, and thereafter developed a third potentially life-threatening condition, diabetes insipidus, as a complication of the surgery. The parents were reportedly homeless, and concerns were raised when the minor missed all followup appointments after his surgery, including essential appointments with neurology, neurosurgery, and endocrinology scheduled for June 27, 2018, at the hospital. The social worker spoke with mother who reported she and father had informed UCSF that they would not be returning due to their dissatisfaction with the minor’s care and their belief that mistakes were made during the minor’s brain surgery. Mother requested assistance in transferring the minor’s case from UCSF to either UC Davis or Valley Children’s Hospital. Mother signed the necessary releases of information and the social worker confirmed mother’s statement that the minor had been seen at Kaiser on August 11, 2018. Care for the minor was eventually transferred to Valley Children’s Hospital.

On February 14, 2019, mother took the minor to Golden Valley Health Center in order to refill the minor’s medications, including Diuril. Mother reportedly had a low supply of the minor’s medications and would soon run out. Because the minor’s diabetes medications required a prescription from the endocrinologist, staff at Golden Valley Health Center contacted the minor’s endocrinologist at UCSF to obtain authorization to refill the prescription. However the endocrinologist, who had not seen the minor since June 2018, denied the request without an appointment to see the minor. The parents reportedly refused to see the endocrinologist because they had a differing opinion regarding the minor’s medical condition and care. When the minor’s pediatrician, Dr. Doshi, attempted to contact the endocrinologist to assist the parents in obtaining a medication refill, he was told that since the minor had not been seen since June of 2018, he would need to be reassessed by a specialist before a new prescription would be written. The social worker was informed that several lengthy voicemail messages had been left with the mother regarding Dr. Doshi’s concerns and his recommendation that the family see an endocrinologist to complete blood work and an assessment in order to obtain a refill of the medication. The social worker was also informed that the minor was not up to date on his immunizations and was missing two full series of shots from November 2018 and January 2019, and that the minor had last been seen at Golden Valley Health Center in December 2018 for an acute care visit.

On February 15, 2019, the social worker went to the parents’ home in Manteca and requested to see the minor to conduct an assessment. Father brought the minor to the door but refused to open the security door or let the social worker enter. Father became very agitated and stated he was mad at the way Child Protective Services (CPS) had treated him and his family in the past. Father told the social worker she had no right to see his son or be on his property. After speaking with the social worker’s supervisor on the phone, father agreed to allow the social worker to see the minor. Father explained that the minor’s medication, Diuril, was at CVS and he and mother would be picking it up when mother returned home. Father stated the minor was seen several weeks prior by Dr. Valero at Valley Children’s Hospital. He told the social worker that Dr. Valero was the minor’s neurologist and endocrinologist but refused to provide the doctor’s contact information to her. The social worker explained that she needed to accompany the parents to the pharmacy to confirm they picked up the minor’s medication and stated she would wait in her car until mother returned home.

In the meantime, the social worker confirmed that Dr. Valero’s specialty was neurology but not endocrinology; that the minor was last seen by an endocrinologist on June 13, 2018, and by a neurologist on November 7, 2018; and that a prescription for the minor’s medication had to be written by a specialist in endocrinology and could not be written by a health clinic doctor. A registered nurse at California Children’s Services (CSS) reported she attempted to contact mother several times to discuss the issue of medication and instruct mother to make an appointment with an endocrinologist. The nurse left voicemail messages, but mother had yet to return those messages.

While the social worker waited for mother to return home, father provided her with the name and telephone number of a social worker at Valley Children’s Hospital, Michelle Bravo, who would confirm that the minor had been seen by an endocrinologist. Father also showed the social worker the minor’s medications, including Keppra and Phenobarbital, both of which were prescribed by Dr. Valero, and an eight-ounce bottle of Diuril with no prescription label on it containing approximately one-quarter of an inch of fluid in the bottle. When the social worker contacted Bravo, she was instructed to contact the hospital’s medical records department and make a request for the information.

When mother returned home, she and father agreed to retrieve the minor’s medication from CVS immediately. They went into the home and closed the door. Father came out approximately 10 minutes later and informed the social worker he received a text from the CVS pharmacy that the medication would be delayed in being filled. The social worker then spoke with both parents about her concern that the medication was not being filled and the parents did not know when it would be filled. She requested that the parents take the minor to the emergency room to be assessed for medical needs and concerns. Mother was on her phone and told the social worker she was speaking with Dr. Doshi’s office and was being told the prescription was in the minor’s file and would be sent on Tuesday when Dr. Doshi returned to the office. However, the social worker explained to the parents that it was a three-day holiday weekend and in order to decrease the Agency’s concerns the minor needed to be seen at the emergency room at the local hospital. Father became very angry and began cussing at the social worker and calling her names. When the social worker told father she would not remain if father continued his behavior, father took a step towards her, causing her to retreat to her car.

The social worker reported the incident to her supervisor and suggested a protective custody order was necessary due to the multiple inconsistent stories given by the parents and their inability to understand the minor’s medical needs. As the social worker was talking to her supervisor, father approached her car window and screamed that the medication was being filled at the pharmacy. The social worker left the parents’ residence. Later that day, the court issued a protective custody order on behalf of the social worker. Police assisted the social worker in serving the order on the parents, who were eventually located at Kaiser in Manteca. Once served, the parents refused to sign any documentation and told the social worker to talk to their lawyer. The social worker also spoke with the attending physician, Dr. Chen, who had seen the minor and who expressed concern that the parents had provided her with inconsistent information that did not make sense. Dr. Chen shared the social worker’s concern that the minor was not receiving appropriate medical attention and informed the social worker that the minor was medically cleared but Dr. Chen was unable to refill his medication without a prescription. The minor was subsequently detained.

Dependency Petition

On February 20, 2019, the Agency filed a dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), alleging failure to protect due to the parents’ failure to ensure the urgent and ongoing medical care needed by the medically-fragile minor to regularly monitor and treat his rare form of diabetes. It was alleged that the parents failed to ensure the minor was seen by his specialists (including his neurologist, gastroenterologist, and endocrinologist) on a regular basis and follow through with appointments; were uncooperative during the investigation; and provided inconsistent statements to the Agency social worker. It was further alleged that father had a criminal record and a history and pattern of behavior that placed the minor at increased risk of abuse and neglect, and that father appeared to have unresolved anger management or mental health issues.

Detention Hearing

On February 21, 2019, the parents objected to detention. The Agency informed the court that the parents were unwilling to answer questions. The court expressed concern that the minor needed to be seen on a regular basis and stated the fact that the parents “needed the prompting of other agencies concerns me as to the danger that this child faces.” The court ordered the minor detained.

Jurisdiction Report and Supplemental Jurisdiction Report

The June 2019 jurisdiction report requested several modifications to the dependency petition, including the addition of an allegation pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) regarding father’s history of substance abuse from which he failed to rehabilitate. Attached to the jurisdiction report were a number of documents, including: intake and assessment referrals and chronological notes authored by social workers; a referral to Safety Net Services to assist with the minor’s appointments; reports authored by various law enforcement personnel; statements from 25 medical and mental health personnel (including Dr. Doshi); statements from staff at Valley Mountain Regional Center (VMRC), CCS, and Golden Valley Health Center; and a statement from the paternal grandmother. Also attached to the report were the minor’s medical records from various medical professionals and specialists at UCSF and Dr. Nisperos.

The supplemental jurisdiction report, filed July 19, 2019, provided additional documentation, including medical records from seven UCSF doctors, X-ray and EEG appointment documentation, and records from Dr. Nisperos and Dr. Mallorca.

Contested Jurisdiction Hearing

At the contested jurisdiction hearing on September 10 and 11, 2019, the court admitted the Agency’s reports into evidence and heard testimony from mother and father. Both parents admitted they were informed that the minor needed to see the specialists and be given his medication and tested on a regular basis. While the parents adamantly denied any wrongdoing and insisted they took the minor to regular appointments and had more than enough medication for the minor prior to detention, each parent’s testimony often contradicted itself or the testimony of the other parent and their testimony was inconsistent with the reports, statements of health care professionals, and medical records.

The court continued the hearing to September 30, 2019. The Agency informed the court about a call the social worker received from Dr. Doshi, who reported that during a recent appointment for the minor, father was behaving in a hostile and threatening manner, was extraordinarily disruptive and angry, and was cursing and yelling. The court granted the Agency’s request to prohibit father from attending any of the minor’s appointments until the continued hearing. The Agency also informed the court that at a recent visit, father signed in with the social worker’s name as “Dumb” and wrote “Fuck you” under his own name. Father had also been observed throwing the minor up in the air and catching him, a practice the neurologist confirmed could endanger the minor due to his brain condition. The court admonished father not to continue those behaviors.

The contested jurisdiction hearing continued on September 30, 2019. After considering argument from the parties, the court sustained the allegations in the amended petition and exercised dependency jurisdiction over the minor.

On October 30, 2019, father requested a new attorney pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118. Following a hearing during which father also requested to represent himself, the court granted father’s Marsden motion and appointed new counsel to represent him.

Disposition Report

The October 2019 disposition report detailed portions of an interview with mother in March 2019. During that interview, mother confirmed the Agency assisted her family in transferring the minor’s care from UCSF to Valley Children’s Hospital in August 2018. When asked how many times the minor had seen a neurologist since then, mother stated they had an appointment that Valley Children’s Hospital canceled. When asked how many times the minor had seen an endocrinologist since August 2018, mother stated she was waiting for a referral and for Valley Children’s Hospital to call her with an appointment. Mother stated the minor previously had a followup appointment with a neurologist to have an EEG. When asked if UCSF ever told her how often the minor needed to be seen by a specialist, mother stated it was “all very confusing” and she did not remember but she thought it was every three months. Mother stated she was not aware that VMRC wanted to set up services for the minor and she thought father “probably denied it because he thought it was from UCSF.” She stated she always had extra medication from the minor’s stay in the ICU, and she insisted she went to all appointments except for vaccination appointments.

The report stated both parents had been referred to Valley Community Counseling on April 16, 2019, for individual counseling, but the referral was closed one month later because the parents failed to enroll. A new referral was made on June 14, 2019. The parents completed less than one-quarter of the 20 counseling sessions and made minimal progress. The report showed that, while mother signed all consent forms for physical therapy treatment for the minor at VMRC, father continued to assert he was the most appropriate person to provide physical therapy to the minor despite having no training. When new exercises were introduced, father questioned the need for the exercises, fixated on the minor’s medical diagnosis, and questioned the provider’s capabilities. The report also showed that Dr. Doshi contacted the social worker to express concerns about father yelling and repeatedly cursing at Dr. Doshi and blaming him for removal of the minor. Father told Dr. Doshi, “[Y]ou fucked up Dr.” Dr. Doshi tried to calm father down and explained that he reported the family to CPS because the parents failed to bring the minor to the nine-month and 12-month appointments. Dr. Doshi also explained that when mother came in asking for refills on the minor’s medications, he informed mother he could not write the refills, which could only be done after the parents brought the minor to see a specialist. Father told Dr. Doshi, “[P]eople forget appointments, that shouldn’t go against us.”

The report also reiterated the social worker’s previous testimony regarding father’s behavior during a recent visit, noting that when visitation staff instructed father not to sign in with the social worker’s name as “Dumb” or write “Fuck you” under his own name, father became angry and yelled, “you don’t tell me what to do, get out of here!” and “I can do whatever I want!” Father was also reportedly observed many times throwing the minor up in the air and catching him, a practice which father continued despite being admonished to stop and despite the danger of serious harm to the minor. The report stated that, as of October 24, 2019, father was not participating in his court-ordered anger management program.

It was also reported that, between May 2019 and June 2019, father sent e-mails to the social worker which became increasingly inappropriate, hostile, angry, abusive, and eventually “out of control,” often times accusing the Agency of lying in order to take the minor away from the parents. The court admonished father about his inappropriate e-mail communications with the social worker on June 26, 2019. Thereafter, mother sent multiple e-mails to the social worker between July and October 2019, eventually becoming hostile as well.

The report noted an October 2019 report from the minor’s foster parents that, following a visit, the foster parents discovered that father had, without any discussion with the foster parents or any direction from medical providers, inserted an anal suppository into the minor which caused the minor to have diarrhea and cramps throughout the weekend.

The Agency concluded the minor could not safely be returned home because the parents continued to be fixated on their belief that UCSF caused the minor’s medical issues, denied any wrongdoing themselves, and failed to demonstrate any protective capacity or show they had ameliorated any of the issues that led to removal.

Disposition Hearing

At the disposition hearing on December 3, 2019, mother’s counsel declared a conflict, explaining that mother wanted to relitigate jurisdiction and was not listening to counsel’s legal advice, and that mother had requested a Marsden hearing. Father’s counsel stated father also wanted to relitigate jurisdiction and wanted to reunify with the minor but did not want to submit on the Agency’s report. Father also requested a Marsden hearing. The court stated: “Let me just tell the parents, we had a hearing on jurisdiction. We don’t relitigate it all over again. It’s been decided. It’s over. It’s done. That part is done. Now, we’re going to the part where it is what you as parents need to do so I can put the child back with you.” When father continued to argue the jurisdictional facts, the court reiterated that the court was the trier of fact and had already made findings in support of jurisdiction. The court also informed the parents that, due to the young age of the minor, failing to proceed within six months and substantially comply with their case plan could result in termination of services and potentially their parental rights. The parents ultimately submitted on the report and accepted the reunification services offered by the Agency in order to reunify with the minor. The court adopted the recommended findings and orders, set the matter for a 90-day interim review hearing, and granted the Agency discretion to increase visits as the parents progressed in their respective case plans.

The parents timely appealed the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders.

DISCUSSION

I

Substantial Evidence for Dependency Jurisdiction

The parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor. They claim: (1) the minor’s medical condition had stabilized such that any issues present when the minor was removed were resolved by the time of the jurisdictional hearing; (2) they had sufficient amounts of the minor’s prescription medications and there was no evidence they would refuse to obtain refills if necessary; (3) there was no evidence to support the position that the minor needed to be seen by an endocrinologist to obtain a refill of Diuril; (4) there was insufficient evidence they failed to ensure the minor saw his specialists on a regular basis or follow-through with all appointments; and (5) the Agency failed to establish a risk of harm to the minor due to the parents’ acts or omissions. As we shall explain, sufficient evidence supports the court’s jurisdiction order.

We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170.) “ ‘If there is any substantial evidence to support the [jurisdictional] findings of the juvenile court, a reviewing court must uphold the trial court’s findings. All reasonable inferences must be in support of the findings and the record must be viewed in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s order. [Citation.]’ ” (Id. at p. 168.) “ssues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court. [Citation.]” ([i]In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.]” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.) If supported by substantial evidence, the judgment or finding must be upheld, even though substantial evidence may also exist that would support a contrary judgment and the dependency court might have reached a different conclusion had it determined the facts and weighed credibility differently. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

A reviewing court may affirm a jurisdictional ruling if the evidence supports any of the counts concerning the children. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Thus, dependency jurisdiction is appropriate where substantial evidence supports at least one jurisdictional finding, even if there are other findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)

The petition alleged the parents’ failure to ensure the urgent and ongoing medical care needed by the medically fragile minor to regularly monitor and treat his rare form of diabetes; their failure to ensure the minor was seen by his specialists (including his neurologist, gastroenterologist, and endocrinologist) on a regular basis and follow through with appointments; their failure to cooperate during the investigation; and their failure to provide consistent statements to the Agency social worker, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petition further alleged that father had a criminal record and a history and pattern of behavior which placed the minor at increased risk of abuse and neglect, and that father appeared to have unresolved anger management or mental health issues.

Subdivision (b) of section 300 applies if the minor “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent . . . to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the willful or negligent failure of the parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or by the inability of the parent . . . to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s . . . mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Here, the requirements for subdivision (b) were met.

The juvenile court considered the Agency’s reports, attached to which were social workers’ notes, statements from over 25 medical and mental health professionals, and copious amounts of the minor’s medical records from various medical specialists and professionals, including Dr. Doshi, Dr. Mallorca, and Dr. Nisperos. The court also heard testimony from both parents.

There was sufficient evidence in the record to support the allegation that the parents failed to ensure the urgent and ongoing medical care needed by the minor to regularly monitor and treat his diabetes and their failure to ensure the minor was seen by his neurologist, gastroenterologist, and endocrinologist on a regular basis or follow through with appointments. No one disputed that the minor’s medical condition was serious or that his condition required him to take certain medications, including Diuril. The Agency’s reports and the attached documentation established that, because of the minor’s medical condition, it was necessary that he be seen by certain specialists (including an endocrinologist who is the doctor who prescribed the minor’s medication) on a regular basis, that he receive his medication as scheduled, and that he be tested regularly. The record also provided sufficient evidence that the parents failed to have the minor seen and assessed by an endocrinologist following his discharge from UCSF and failed to take the minor to regular appointments with the other specialists.

Mother testified the doctors at UCSF informed her about the need for the minor to regularly see specialists. She claimed she did not know how often the minor was supposed to see the endocrinologist and she simply “followed the doctor’s instruction.” She admitted she did not take the minor to see an endocrinologist between July 2018 and February 2019 when the minor was detained. Instead, she took the minor to his primary care physician, Dr. Doshi, who was not an endocrinologist and did not prescribe Diuril. She first testified she did not see the endocrinologist at UCSF because the hospital canceled the appointment. Then she testified she did not return to UCSF because there was no appointment scheduled. She stated she did not schedule a followup appointment with an endocrinologist until September 11, 2018, because the Agency had not yet approved a new endocrinologist and the minor was being checked by Dr. Doshi and Dr. Mallorca. Mother later contradicted herself, first stating she took the minor to see an endocrinologist “[q]uite a few times,” then testifying it took a “couple months” before the minor saw an endocrinologist, and finally testifying she thought the minor was seen by an endocrinologist after July 2018. However, she could not recall the date of the minor’s most recent endocrinology appointment before detention or the name or gender of the endocrinologist at UCSF. She claimed Dr. Doshi found her a new endocrinologist whose name she could not recall. She repeatedly denied statements in the medical records that she failed to show up for followup appointments, claiming either the hospital canceled the appointments or she rescheduled them.

Mother was asked whether it was reasonable for the minor not to be seen by an endocrinologist from June 2018 when he was discharged from UCSF until February 2019 when he was detained. She responded that the minor was being tested every two to three weeks, sometimes every month, to make sure his sodium levels were good “before they approved [him] with the endocrinologist” and, during that time, the minor’s health was “perfect.” However, mother admitted the minor’s lab results were never reviewed by an endocrinologist. Mother testified she was aware of the Agency’s concerns regarding her followup with the minor’s care, but she denied receiving any assistance from the Agency with getting medical care from Valley Children’s Hospital and Dr. Doshi.

Mother also admitted the UCSF doctors and Dr. Doshi told her the minor would need physical and occupational therapy, but she claimed UCSF never made a followup appointment for those services. She admitted she was also told by UCSF staff that the minor would also need services from VMRC due to his epilepsy and associated symptoms. She also admitted she did not follow up with VMRC because she switched to a new doctor, Dr. Doshi. Despite medical records to the contrary, mother denied that Dr. Doshi also referred her to VMRC, stating he only referred her to a neurologist and an endocrinologist. She claimed Dr. Doshi only told her to call VMRC, which she did “probably [in] September or August” but never received a return call. Mother admitted that, from March 2018 to September 2018, she did not follow up with VMRC because she wanted nothing to do with UCSF or their recommendations for care.

Father testified that, prior to the minor being discharged from UCSF, he and mother were informed that the minor would have to see an endocrinologist and would need Diuril to address the diabetes insipidus. He further testified that he and mother brought the minor to his followup appointment at UCSF on June 27, 2018, to see the neurologist, the endocrinologist, and the ophthalmologist, but that the second neurology appointment scheduled for July 12, 2018, was canceled by UCSF and he and mother never brought the minor back despite being contacted by UCSF several times.

Father testified it was not until August 2018 that the minor was seen by Dr. Doshi, who ultimately became the minor’s primary care physician. Between November 2018 and February 2019, however, the only doctors who saw the minor were his new neurologist, Dr. Valero at Valley Children’s Hospital, and Dr. Doshi, who saw the minor for “basic care.” Father admitted the minor did not have a set schedule of appointments with Dr. Doshi. Father testified that, while there were discussions about the need to take the minor to an endocrinologist, “It wasn’t mandatory” and was “actually not recommended” because the minor “was cleared on 6/21” when he was discharged from UCSF. Father claimed the minor only needed to see an endocrinologist to monitor the possibility of the early onset of puberty, a complication of diabetes insipidus. Father denied he was told he needed to see an endocrinologist in order to get the minor’s Diuril prescription refilled, claiming the UCSF doctors stated there was “[n]o further care needed.” He claimed that, after the minor was discharged from UCSF on June 21, 2018, there was no care necessary because the minor was “cleared” by ophthalmology and endocrinology and there were no additional labs needed other than the sodium tests the parents were doing on their own.

Father admitted he was not concerned that the minor was not seeing an endocrinologist, and he and mother were not focused on seeing an endocrinologist because they intended to see one “eventually.” He denied that CCS had an approved endocrinology referral for him, stating “[t]hat was actually for a different patient -- the wrong patient.” He admitted CCS was attempting to contact him regarding the failure to follow up on appointments and that CCS called and left voicemail messages on July 16, July 19, and July 25, 2018, and mailed a letter on July 27, 2018, requesting that the parents reschedule the minor’s physical therapy and occupational therapy appointments that were canceled on July 12, 2018.

The parents claim that they had a sufficient amount of the minor’s prescription medications and were willing to obtain a refill if necessary, and that there was no evidence Diuril required a prescription written by an endocrinologist. The record persuades us otherwise.

The petition alleged the social worker was informed that, as of February 15, 2019, the parents had just four days left of the minor’s Diuril, with no refills and no doctors available on the holiday weekend. Contrary to the claims of both parents that they had enough Diuril—several bottles—after the minor was discharged from UCSF in June 2018, the allegation was supported by information provided to the social worker by Valerie George, a registered nurse at Mary Graham Children’s Center, that the parents did not have sufficient medication to last through the holiday weekend. The social worker also reported that, on February 15, 2019, she spoke with father, who showed her the medication “that he currently has and is giving the minor,” including “[an 8-ounce] bottle of Diuril 250 mg with no prescription label on it” and “with approximately 1/4 of an inch of fluid at the bottom.” Despite the parents’ testimony at the jurisdiction hearing that they had several bottles of the medication, neither parent ever mentioned having several more bottles of Diuril, nor did they produce any additional bottles of the medication.

The petition also alleged the prescription for Diuril had to be written by an endocrinologist. Father claimed the parents were never told the Diuril could only be refilled by an endocrinologist. The record belies that claim. The social worker’s reports demonstrate that CCS registered nurse Eugenia Hudson confirmed a prescription for Diuril “has to be written by an endocrinologist and could not be written by the local health clinic doctor.”

There was sufficient evidence to support the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor.

II

Removal of the Minor

The parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s dispositional order removing the minor from their custody. We disagree.

To support an order removing a child from parental custody, the court must find clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1); see In re Heather A., supra, 52 Cal.App.4th at p. 193; In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) The court also must “make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor” and “state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” (§ 361, subd. (e).)

When reviewing removal findings, “ ‘[w]e review the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's order to determine whether there is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could make the necessary findings based on the clear and convincing evidence standard.’ [Citations.]” (T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, 1239-1240; see also Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1004-1005.)

“A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citation.]” (In re T.W., supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1163.)

At the outset, we reject the parents’ claim that the court failed to specify facts to support its conclusion that removal was necessary. When the court ordered continued out-of-home placement of the minor, it adopted the recommended findings and orders contained in the Agency’s disposition report, including a finding that there was a substantial danger to the minor if returned to the parents and no reasonable means by which to otherwise protect the minor. The findings and orders also included facts supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor. “ ‘The jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that the child cannot safely remain in the home. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1126.)

The court’s removal order was further supported by facts set forth in the disposition report, including that both parents made only minimal progress in services; father continued to assert he was the most appropriate person to provide physical therapy to the minor despite having no training in physical therapy; father questioned the minor’s need for exercises, fixated on the minor’s medical diagnosis, and questioned the provider’s capabilities; father repeatedly threw the minor up in the air and caught him, a practice that father continued despite being admonished not to and despite the potential of serious harm to the minor; father was not participating in his court-ordered anger management program; father repeatedly yelled and cursed at Dr. Doshi and blamed him for removal of the minor, telling Dr. Doshi, “you fucked up Dr.”; father sent inappropriate, hostile, angry, abusive, and eventually “out of control” e-mails to the social worker between May and June 2019 and accused the Agency of lying in order to take the minor away from the parents; after the court admonished father about his inappropriate communication, mother sent multiple e-mails to the social worker between July and October 2019, eventually becoming hostile as well; and, in October 2019, the parents inserted an anal suppository into the minor during a supervised visit without any discussion with the foster parents or any direction from medical providers, causing the minor to have diarrhea and cramps throughout the weekend. There was an abundance of evidence in the record sufficient to support the court’s removal order.

For the same reasons discussed at length above, we reject the parents’ claim that there was insufficient evidence of potential harm to the minor if returned to their care and custody because the evidence showed they appropriately cared for the minor for the eight-month period between his discharge from UCSF until he was taken into protective custody.

The parents argue the removal order was not justified because they had limited means and a limited support system, which was likely the reason they missed appointments. They claim the Agency never made any real effort to provide services to them. To the contrary, the record reflects ongoing efforts by the Agency and medical care personnel and professionals to assist the parents in getting the necessary care for the minor. The parents failed to accept those efforts or cooperate with those attempting to help.

The parents further argue there was insufficient evidence that there were no reasonable alternatives to removal. For example, they argue, the court could have ordered the minor to remain in their custody under strict supervision by the Agency, including reminders to attend followup appointments. But the parents’ behavior had already demonstrated their unwillingness to abide by instructions they disagreed with, as demonstrated by the fact that father continually asserted he should be providing the minor with physical therapy despite that he had no training; questioned the minor’s need for exercises; continued to throw the minor up in the air and catch him despite knowing it was dangerous to the fragile minor’s health; was abusive and hostile to the social worker and medical professionals, including the minor’s primary care physician, Dr. Doshi; and “treated” the minor with a suppository without consulting with medical professionals or the minor’s caretaker. These behaviors demonstrated that placing the minor in the parents’ care, even under the Agency’s strict supervision, would have been untenable.

There was sufficient evidence to support the court’s removal order. That is, “the record, viewed as a whole, contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of high probability demanded by this standard of proof.” (Conservatorship of O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1005.)

III

Denial of Faretta Motion

Father contends the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to represent himself in the dependency proceedings pursuant to Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. 806. The claim lacks merit.

Background

Following the jurisdiction hearing, father requested a Marsden hearing. He initially requested a new attorney but then decided he wanted to represent himself. The court explained that different rules applied in dependency court. Father stated he understood but continued to discuss his ability to “cross-examine witnesses on the initial detention hearing” and his opinion that he was prohibited from doing so because the court simply assumed the allegations were true. The court explained that the decision rested with the judge and a trial had already been completed on the issue of jurisdiction. Father’s counsel informed the court that he tried to explain to father that the parents’ right to cross-examine witnesses was at the contested jurisdictional hearing and that father felt “there should have been another form of process [counsel] could have taken in between those hearings to convince the Court to dismiss this or otherwise.” Father stated he felt he did not “get the right to present evidence or do anything” and that “[e]very bit of evidence I produced was not submitted to the Court,” noting the evidence was “very clear on my behalf and my wife’s behalf.” The court responded, “I know what was presented. What I found was what I found.” Thereafter, the following colloquy took place:

“[FATHER]: Aside from that rule, you know, we have perjury all over this thing. These are a bunch of perjured statements --

“THE COURT: I will tell you, we’ve already been through jurisdiction.

“[FATHER]: I understand.

“THE COURT: That’s done.

“[FATHER]: I understand.

“THE COURT: It’s over with. Okay. Now it is disposition. I can tell you, you have a very competent attorney that has been practicing in this field for a long time.”

Father argued he did not feel his attorney’s interests were aligned with the parents’ interests and stated he wanted counsel to explain why “what I was asking for was not going to be in his best interest.” The colloquy continued:

“[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: I am not sure what he means other than asking me to file a demurrer or to file a motion to set aside, things to that effect, which I tried to explain to him are issues in civil court, maybe in criminal court, but -- also he was asking about appealing, which I informed him before that an appeal would not come up. That issue wouldn’t arise until after disposition is dealt with.

“[FATHER]: He told me you can’t appeal after jurisdiction.

“[FATHER’S COUNSEL]: After disposition.

“[FATHER]: Not true, what I understand. The idea is not just to appeal it with not enough on record obviously. I was looking for habeas corpus relief running concurrent with the appeal, but that wasn’t the route he felt was best either.

“THE COURT: See, you’re -- you’re looking at different parts of the code and trying to put it to juvenile court what other areas of the law provide --

“[FATHER]: Can you explain.

“THE COURT: And it’s different. That’s what I’ve been trying to tell you.

“[FATHER]: I am looking at case law here, and what I am reading case law and opinion of high court judges that’s what -- where I am getting all of my information from. I really don’t think it’s wrong. No one actually explained to me and said this specific direction that you want is wrong. You can’t -- so far I was told, you can’t do this; you can’t do this. I simply found cases that . . .

“THE COURT: Well, he’s an experienced attorney.

“[FATHER]: He is.

“THE COURT: He is, and he has appealed, and he has filed writs and other things in the --

“[FATHER]: I’ve researched him too.

“THE COURT: -- and in different matters. Are you an attorney?

“[FATHER]: I am not an attorney, no, sir.

“THE COURT: Even attorneys I have them come and let me know to what extent they have practiced because I am not going to let any attorney practice in this courtroom --

“[FATHER]: I understand.

“THE COURT: -- who has no experience in juvenile court.

“[FATHER]: It’s a very different set of rules. I do understand that. I do -- really do understand that very well. Again --

“[THE COURT]: But what I am finding is you have a different opinion as to how he should pursue it.

“[FATHER]: Well, no, it’s not really about opinion. It’s about -- it’s about clear evidence, though nothing has been done. There’s a lot of tools that could have been used. He simply didn’t do it. It’s hard for him as his role to go and ask the Court to do the things that I feel are necessary, but I don’t feel they are necessary; I know they are necessary. This is what I lived. Everything is way off. I’m sorry, but it’s way off.

“THE COURT: I’m sorry too, but I am not going to litigate your jurisdiction that I already addressed, and I already found true --

“[FATHER]: That’s wrong, sir --

“THE COURT: Look --

“[FATHER]: -- present evidence against it.

“THE COURT: Look, I am not going to relitigate it.

“[FATHER]: Well, I feel like that’s a violation of my procedural and due process rights.”

The court explained that father should “pursue whatever you have to pursue” but the court did not find it was proper to relieve him of counsel and appoint another attorney to represent him. Father continued to argue his attorney failed to offer certain evidence and failed to follow the standard attorneys must follow in dependency cases, noting his attorney did not “speak up when there were records to be said in the -- early in court” and failed to bring up “the Kaiser report.” The court interrupted stating, “I will not get into what documents” and asked father’s counsel if he wished to respond. Counsel stated he discussed with father the primary issue from the Agency’s viewpoint and had father bring to court the evidence that would address that issue. Counsel stated he discussed with father that the other issues father wanted to discuss were more appropriate for disposition and were not pertinent to the jurisdictional issue. The colloquy continued:

“[FATHER]: If we’re waiting for the dispositional issue, I am challenging the merits of the case --

“THE COURT: I will not continue this. This is really your different perspective --

“[FATHER]: It is not --

“THE COURT: Yes, it is. It’s different than mine. It’s different than mine, and I made a finding based on the evidence that was presented.”

Father again attempted to argue the evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional findings, at which point the court stated, “I am not getting into the evidence that I’ve just told you that. This is not a hearing for that purpose. It’s strictly whether or not I have [father’s counsel] continue representing you or appoint a different attorney.” Father requested “a different attorney” and then stated, “I would rather represent myself pro per.” The court responded that “it’s not going to happen” and “I will not take a bunch of judicial time continuing to explain and explain and explain. I will not do that.” Father complained that it was “the wrong decision and violates my due process rights,” to which the court responded that father had been afforded due process. Father continued to argue with the court and complain that the process had not been “even-handed.” When the court asked counsel whether he was able to get along with father and represent him, father responded, “No.” Based on father’s response, counsel responded, “I guess not.” The court granted father’s Marsden motion and appointed him new counsel, stating the court would not go “over jurisdiction again. It’s done.”

Law and Analysis

While there is no constitutional right to self-representation in dependency proceedings, a parent does have a statutory right to self-representation under section 317. (In re Angel W. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1082-1084.) The right to self-representation, however, is not absolute. (Id. at p. 1084.) It is balanced against the rights of other parties, such as the child’s right to prompt resolution of his or her custody status. (In re A.M. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 914, 924-925.)

“[A] parent’s statutory rights, including the right to self-representation, must always be weighed against the child’s right to a prompt resolution of the dependency proceeding. The juvenile court must consider this right in deciding whether to accept a parent’s waiver of counsel and request for self-representation. Thus, the juvenile court has discretion to deny the request for self-representation when it is reasonably probable that granting the request would impair the child’s right to a prompt resolution of custody status or unduly disrupt the proceedings. A parent’s disruptive behavior may be sufficient to deny a request for self-representation, but it is not necessary. If it is reasonably probable that granting a parent’s request for self-representation will lead to undue delay in the proceedings that would impair the child’s right to a prompt resolution of custody, the juvenile court has discretion to deny the request regardless whether the parent has ever behaved disruptively.” (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925-926, citing D.E. v. Superior Court (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 502, 513, italics omitted.)

“Certainly, to comply with section 317, subdivision (b), the court must take a waiver of the right to counsel. There is no requirement, however, that the court engage in a full Faretta-type admonition and inquiry, although similar admonitions have occurred in civil cases. [Citation.]” (In re Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.)

Father claims the court applied the wrong legal test when it denied his request to represent himself on the basis that he was not an attorney. We disagree. The record makes plain that, despite the court’s constant efforts to explain that different rules apply in dependency proceedings and the issue of jurisdiction had already been decided, father repeatedly attempted to reargue the evidence in support of jurisdiction. Father persisted in his claims that he and mother were not permitted to present evidence at the jurisdiction hearing, the evidence that was admitted was “perjured,” and his attorney failed to pursue “another form of process” in order to get the result he wanted or convince the court to dismiss the dependency, and claimed he understood dependency law and all of its procedural aspects and requirements despite having no training in the law.

Father’s conduct during the hearing and throughout the proceedings, including his verbal harassment of Agency staff, his failure to cooperate, and his unrelenting attempts to relitigate the jurisdictional issues, made clear that he was not equipped to represent himself in a dependency proceeding, and allowing him to do so would likely result in undue delay in the proceedings thereby depriving the minor of his right to a prompt resolution of his custody status. (In re A.M., supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at pp. 925-926.) There was no error.

Even if the court had erred in denying father’s request, the error was harmless. “Since the right of self-representation in a dependency proceeding is statutory rather than constitutional, denial of the right is analyzed under the ordinary principles of harmless error.” (In re Angel W., supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1085.) Father was represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, and particularly during the jurisdictional hearing where he presented his own testimony and that of mother, as well as evidence associated with the minor’s medications. On a review of the record, it is not reasonably probable that the result would have been more favorable to father had he represented himself. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837.)

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying father’s request for self-representation.

IV

ICWA

Father contends the court’s ICWA findings must be reversed because the Agency failed to comply with the ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements. He argues the Agency failed to interview all of his extended family members who were known to the Agency and failed to document its efforts in that regard. The claim lacks merit.

Background

The February 2019 detention report stated the “parents were uncooperative and did not answer questions regarding [ICWA].” At the detention hearing on February 21, 2019, the court asked both parents if they had Indian ancestry and both responded in the negative. The court advised the parents of the ICWA requirements and provided them with parental notifications of Indian status (ICWA-020 form) to be completed. On February 28, 2019, mother filed her ICWA-020 form stating she had no known Indian ancestry. On March 21, 2019, father filed his ICWA-020 form stating the minor “is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a federally recognized Indian tribe” but indicated the name of the tribe was “unknown.”

The social worker reported that on May 3, 2019, due to difficulties engaging with father, the social worker met with father in person and handed him a blank copy of the family history interview and the notice of child custody proceeding for Indian child (ICWA-030 form), along with instructions for completion. Father stated, “[Y]ou can forget about that stuff” and tossed the envelope into a stroller. The social worker never received the document back from father, thus preventing a formal background interview. Notwithstanding father’s refusal to cooperate, the Agency conducted an internet search to determine viable relatives or non-related extended family members and identified several individuals, including L.D. (paternal grandmother) and C.D. (paternal uncle). The social worker reported that while there was “insufficient information or lack of contact information for [C.D.],” she was able to contact the paternal grandmother to obtain family ancestry information for father’s side of the family.

The July 2019 jurisdiction report stated as follow: “There is a claim of Native American Heritage but there is not sufficient information for there to be ‘reason to know’ the child/family is ICWA eligible. Notice will be given by ICWA-030 after the petition is filed to all federally recognized tribes and the [Bureau of Indian Affairs] based upon the information described above.” That information included the parents’ respective names, birthdates, and addresses. The report stated the social worker attempted to engage father in obtaining ancestry information in order to complete the ICWA-030 form, “to no avail.” It was also noted that the social worker would make further efforts in that regard and notify the BIA. The paternal grandmother’s name and address were identified in the report.

On July 24, 2019, the Agency filed an ICWA-030 form. The form included information about both parents, including their dates and places of birth, as well as potential tribes with which father was possibly affiliated, including the Cherokee Nation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee. The form also included information about the paternal grandparents and the paternal great-grandparents. The form had been sent to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Secretary of the Interior, the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.

On September 24, 2019, the Agency filed a declaration of efforts to identify tribal affiliation stating the Agency had not yet received responses from the BIA, the Cherokee Nation, or the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma and 60 days had passed since the notices were mailed to those entities. Attached to the declaration was a letter dated August 9, 2019, from the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians stating the minor was neither registered nor eligible to register as a member of the tribe.

The Agency subsequently received letters from the Cherokee Nation (dated October 12, 2019) and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians (dated October 22, 2019) stating the minor did not meet the definition of “Indian Child” with respect to the tribe for purpose of the ICWA.

At the December 3, 2019 disposition hearing, the court adopted the Agency’s recommended findings and orders, including the finding that the ICWA did not apply.

Law and Analysis

“The juvenile court and social services agencies have an affirmative duty to inquire at the outset of the proceedings whether a child who is subject to the proceedings is, or may be, an Indian child. [Citation.]” (In re K.M. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 115, 118-119.) When the juvenile court knows or has reason to know that a child involved in a dependency proceeding is an Indian child, the ICWA requires that notice of the proceedings be given to any federally recognized Indian tribe of which the child might be a member or eligible for membership. (25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(8), 1912(a); In re Robert A. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 982, 989.) “At that point, the social worker is required, as soon as practicable, to interview the child’s parents, extended family members, the Indian custodian, if any, and any other person who can reasonably be expected to have information concerning the child’s membership status or eligibility.” (In re Michael V. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 225, 233; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4)(A).)

ICWA notice must include all of the following information, if known: the child’s name, birthplace, and birth date; the name of the tribe in which the child is enrolled or may be eligible for membership; names and addresses (including former addresses) of the child’s parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents, and other identifying information; and a copy of the dependency petition. (§ 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(A)-(D); In re D.W. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 413, 417; In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 209.)

Here, father initially stated he had no Indian ancestry, and then indicated the minor “is or may be a member of, or eligible for membership in,” a tribe he could not identify. Based on that information, the Agency attempted to obtain information from father regarding his ancestry and family history. However, father refused to cooperate with the Agency and never provided any additional information thereafter.

The Agency’s duty of ICWA inquiry extends to the minor’s extended family, if known. (§ 224.2, subd. (b); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4).) Despite father’s refusal to cooperate, the Agency was able to obtain information by conducting research regarding father’s extended family and identifying relatives including the paternal grandmother and the paternal uncle.

The social worker was able to contact the paternal grandmother and, based on the information obtained from her, was able to provide information about father’s extended family in the ICWA notices filed July 24, 2019. In addition to detailed information about father, including potential Cherokee tribes with which he might be connected, the form also included the names, current and/or former addresses, dates and places of birth, and dates and places of death (if known) for the paternal grandparents. The form also included information for the paternal great-grandparents, including their names, former addresses (paternal great-grandmother only), birthdates, birthplace (paternal great-grandfather only), dates of death, and place of death (paternal great-grandfather only). The form was sent to the BIA, the Cherokee Nation, the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma.

Thereafter, the Agency filed several reports indicating it received responses from all three Cherokee tribes stating the minor was neither a member nor eligible for membership in the respective tribe. Based on the documentation provided by the Agency, the juvenile court found the Agency complied with the ICWA notice provisions and that the ICWA did not apply.

Father claims the Agency failed to fulfill its duty to interview his extended family members and document its efforts in that regard. He argues the Agency reported having discovered a paternal uncle, C.D., and two other relatives, N.D. and C.C., but failed to provide a record detailing its efforts to contact those individuals.

“[E]rrors in an ICWA notice are subject to review under a harmless error analysis.” (In re Brandon T. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1415.) Error is not presumed. It is father’s obligation to present a record that affirmatively demonstrates error. (In re D.W., supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 417-418.) Father has not done so here.

The Agency reported it conducted an internet search to determine if the parents had any “relatives or non-related extended family members.” That search identified the paternal grandmother, the paternal uncle (C.D.), and several other individuals, including N.D. and C.C., whose relationship to father was not specified in the report. The social worker reported there was “insufficient information or lack of contact information” for the paternal uncle. She was however able to contact the paternal grandmother and obtain sufficient ancestry information for father’s side of the family with which to notice the Cherokee tribes notwithstanding father’s refusal to provide information. ICWA notices sent to Indian tribes must contain enough identifying information to be meaningful. (In re Robert A., supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 989.) As previously discussed, the social worker obtained detailed information about father, the paternal grandparents, and the paternal great-grandparents. From the information provided in the ICWA notices, the three Cherokee tribes were able to confirm the minor was not an Indian child for purposes of the ICWA.

Father argues the Agency should have provided a record of any attempts to contact the other relatives, N.D. and C.C. The purported Indian ancestry was through the paternal line. Even assuming N.D. and C.C. were both paternal relatives, it is unclear what additional information they could have provided, as the notices already included detailed information about father, the paternal grandparents, and the paternal great-grandparents. Although it may have been error to omit information about the Agency’s attempts to contact N.D. and C.C., any error was harmless because, as we have explained, the notices included the required information about known parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents on the paternal side. Thus, conditional reversal for ICWA compliance is not required.

Finally, we note that while father asserts error, he refused to cooperate during the pendency of the proceedings or provide any familial history or ICWA-related information at all. Here, on appeal, he makes no offer of proof or other affirmative representation that there was some additional information available with which to supplement the information already provided by the Agency in the ICWA notices. “In the absence of such a representation, the matter amounts to nothing more than trifling with the courts. [Citation.] The knowledge of any Indian connection is a matter wholly within the appealing parent’s knowledge and disclosure is a matter entirely within the parent’s present control. The ICWA is not a ‘get out of jail free’ card dealt to parents of non-Indian children, allowing them to avoid a termination order by withholding secret knowledge, keeping an extra ace up their sleeves. Parents cannot spring the matter for the first time on appeal without at least showing their hands. Parents unable to reunify with their children have already caused the children serious harm; the rules do not permit them to cause additional unwarranted delay and hardship, without any showing whatsoever that the interests protected by the ICWA are implicated in any way.” (In re Rebecca R. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1431.) “The burden on an appealing parent to make an affirmative representation of Indian heritage is de minimis. In the absence of such a representation, there can be no prejudice and no miscarriage of justice requiring reversal.” (Ibid.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

/s/

RAYE, P. J.

We concur:

/s/

BLEASE, J.

/s/

ROBIE, J.

[1] Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.