Filed 2/23/22 Marriage of Davda and Tejeda CA2/6

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

Laura Tejeda (Wife) appeals an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees from Hasmukh Davda (Husband) in their dissolution proceeding.

This appeal concerns Wife’s objections to the amount of attorney fees awarded her to challenge the legality of her premarital agreement with Husband. In particular, Wife asserts that the premarital agreement’s limitations on spousal support and attorney fees are unconscionable. We conclude that the family law court’s award of $5,000 pendente lite fees is reasonable and not an abuse of discretion, and affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Husband and Wife married on June 1, 2018, and separated following a 22-month marriage. The couple have no minor children. Husband is a business owner with a gross monthly income of approximately $26,000 and significant real estate holdings and investments. Wife, a native of Guatamala, is not fluent in the English language, and is employed as a nanny and assistant earning a monthly income of $2,000.

Several weeks prior to their marriage, Husband and Wife, each represented by independent counsel, executed a premarital agreement in both the English and Spanish languages. Wife now seeks to challenge paragraph 10.3 pertaining to spousal support, and paragraph 26.1 pertaining to attorney fees. Those paragraphs provide:

“10.3 Maximum Limit on Spousal Support Payable to Laura: In the event of a legal separation or dissolution of their contemplated marriage, Hasmukh’s maximum liability of spousal support payable by him to Laura will be $1,200.00 per month, with a maximum duration of one-half the length of marriage measured from date of marriage to date of separation. The actual amount of spousal support would be based on circumstances at the date of separation.”

“FUTURE ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS

RELATING TO AGREEMENT

“26.1 If either party reasonably retains counsel for purposes related to this Agreement, including, but not limited to, enforcing or preventing the breach of any provision, seeking damages for any alleged breach, or seeking a declaration of his or her rights or obligations under this Agreement, and the matter is settled by a judicial determination, including arbitration, in the event the court determines that it is appropriate to order attorney’s fees payable by Hasmukh to Laura, the court’s jurisdiction to order Hasmukh to pay Laura’s attorneys fees shall be limited to 20% of the entire attorneys fees and cost incurred by Laura as a result of any action related to this agreement.”

On October 30, 2020, Wife sought an order of $10,000 attorney fees to litigate the premarital agreement’s limitations on spousal support and attorney fees. The family law court decided to “make a temporary attorney fees award . . . subject to reallocation.” The family law judge stated: “This is just a pendente lite [attorney fees] order. [Wife’s] fees could exceed that amount at the rate that this is going with the discovery and continued proceedings. If it comes out that [Husband] has overpaid, [we] will factor that into any subsequent hearings or reallocation.” The court rejected Husband’s argument that the pendente lite attorney fee award should be limited to 20 percent. The judge stated: “[T]his is not necessarily a final award of attorney’s fees. This is just for right now, without incurring a tremendous amount of time for evidence and testimony. [Wife] is entitled to ask for more. [Husband] is entitled to say it was overpaid.”

Wife appeals the amount of interim attorney fees awarded to allow her to challenge the premarital agreement. (In re Marriage of Weiss (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 106, 119 [appeal lies from pendente lite attorney fee award].) Husband responds that the premarital agreement is enforceable pursuant to Family Code section 1615, and that Wife’s attorney fee award must be limited to 20 percent.[1]

DISCUSSION

Wife argues that the $5,000 attorney fee award does not create parity in the parties’ financial abilities to obtain legal representation in the dissolution proceeding.

Section 2030 authorizes the family law court to order one party to pay the other party’s attorney fees and costs. (In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 529, 532.) We review an attorney fee award for an abuse of discretion. (Ibid.) “The trial court’s order ‘will be overturned only if, considering all the evidence viewed most favorably in support of its order, no judge could reasonably make the order made.’ ” (Ibid.)

The family law court’s order of $5,000 attorney fees was reasonable. The court recognized that discovery was ongoing and stated that Wife may “ask for more” to litigate the premarital agreement. The court emphasized that the award was “just for right now.” Importantly, the court did not decide the validity of the premarital agreement nor did it apply the 20 percent award reduction. There was no abuse of discretion.

Wife also asserts that the family law court did not make express findings as required by section 2030, subdivision (a)(2) regarding the parties’ respective finances and needs. (In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1050.) “If the findings demonstrate disparity in access and ability to pay, the court shall make an order awarding attorney’s fees and costs.” (Ibid.) Wife concedes that she must demonstrate prejudice regarding the lack of express findings. (Id. at p. 1051.)

Here the family law court requested Wife to prepare “findings and orders” regarding the $5,000 attorney fee award. Wife’s “findings and orders” are summary and do not contain the express detail of which she now complains. Moreover, Wife cannot show that it is reasonably probable that she would have obtained a more favorable result had express findings been made. (In re Marriage of Morton, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1051 [harmless error test where express findings pursuant to section 2030 not made].)

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Parties are to bear their own costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

TANGEMAN, J.

Matthew Breddan, Temporary Judge*

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Weisberg Law Group, Devin Weisberg for Appellant.

Robert M. Ostrove for Respondent.

[1] All statutory references are to the Family Code.

* (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)