Filed 3/29/22 BLF v. Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, C. Virginia Keeny, Judge. Affirmed.

Tamborelli Law Group and John V. Tamborelli for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

DeCarlo & Shanley, Daniel M. Shanley and Yuliya S. Mirzoyan for Defendants and Respondents Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee, Inc. and Favian Guillen.

Grant, Genovese & Baratta and Lance D. Orloff for Defendants and Respondents Carpenters Local Union No. 661, Barry Jenkins, and Michael McCarron.

_________________________________

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs BLF Inc., doing business as Larrabure Framing (Larrabure), Cal Coast Construction Specialties Inc. (Cal Coast), and MWL Solutions Inc. (MWL) appeal from an order granting a special motion to strike brought by defendants, Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee Inc. (the Committee) and Favian Guillen (Committee defendants), Carpenters Local Union No. 661 (Local 661), Barry Jenkins, and Michael McCarron (Union defendants), pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute.[1] We affirm.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Complaint

As alleged in the complaint, each plaintiff was a framing contractor licensed by the State of California. The Committee was a California non-profit mutual benefit corporation and Guillen was its business representative and team coordinator. Local 661 was a labor organization that reported 4,146 members to the United State Department of Labor.[2] Jenkins was the president and McCarron was a business representative of Local 661.

Between January 2018 and April 2018, plaintiffs, in various configurations, entered into agreements with three general contractors to perform rough framing work for three projects.[3] By January 2019, plaintiffs had commenced framing work at the three project sites. In early 2019, Larrabure was in negotiations with another general contractor, Hanover Construction, to perform framing work at a project known as “Hanover Warner Center” in Canoga Park.

Beginning in late January 2019, the Committee and its representatives went to the residences of plaintiffs’ employees and trespassed onto project sites in order to solicit plaintiffs’ employees to participate in a “large lawsuit against [p]laintiffs in a fabricated claim concerning false and unsubstantiated claims of unfair labor practices.”

On February 1, 2019, plaintiffs notified the Committee and its representatives that their conduct was interfering with plaintiffs’ existing contractual relations and prospective economic advantage and directed them to cease and desist such conduct.

On July 11, 2019, Local 661, Jenkins, and McCarron sent to “[Larrabure], principal and affiliates” of the Hanover Warner Center project a letter addressed to “Murray Bowden” (the July 11, 2019, letter). The letter advised Mr. Bowden that: “It has come to our attention that [Larrabure][[4]] may be currently bidding and/or performing work on one or more of your current or upcoming projects. Please be informed that [Local 661] has a labor dispute with . . . [Larrabure.] The nature of our dispute with the above referenced subcontractors is over their failure to ensure that Carpenter area standard wage and benefits are paid to all of their employees on all of their projects.”

The letter continued: “Therefore, we are asking that you use your managerial discretion to not allow non-area standard contractors to perform any work on any of your projects unless and until they generally meet area labor standard wages and benefits for all their carpentry craft work. [¶] We want you to be aware that our public information campaign against [Larrabure], unfortunately may impact parties associated with projects where they are employed. The campaign involves the peaceful and lawful display of banners and distribution of handbills at the jobsite and premises of property owners, developers, general contractors, and other firms involved with projects involving, non-area standard contractors. We will work cooperatively with all involved parties and will try to limit any impact on neutral entities or persons, but we cannot sit idly by while these entities condone and/or support the non-area standards contractors.”

On or about August 21, 2019, plaintiffs directed Local 661, Jenkins, and McCarron to cease and desist from interfering with plaintiffs’ existing contractual relations and prospective economic advantages.

On September 11, 2019, the Committee and Guillen sent letters to Larrabure, Cal Coast, and MWL’s principals and affiliates for the three projects where plaintiffs had begun performing framing work. The letters, which were attached to the complaint, were addressed to each of the three general contractors and stated: “please accept this letter as the required 30-day notice notifying you, the general contractor, of unpaid wages at the [respective project]—on the part of your subcontractor [relevant plaintiff]. (Labor Code § 218.7(b)(3).) This notification is, as set forth below, a condition precedent to filing a civil suit for the wage debts of your subcontractors. [¶] . . . [¶] Our organization received information from [relevant plaintiffs’] employees indicating they were not paid all of their wages for work performed at the [respective project]. [¶] It is our understanding that [relevant plaintiff] is part of related companies associated with [Larrabure]. From the extensive worker documentation we received and public records requests, it appears there have been similar labor-related complaints on other projects, including a pending PAGA lawsuit.”[5] The letters continued: “As indicated above, this letter is the legally required first step to file suit under Labor Code section 218.7 against you for your subcontractor’s labor violations. If the alleged wage issues at [the relevant project] are not addressed, [the Committee] will consider all its options, including bringing an action in court to ensure all [the relevant plaintiff’s] workers receive their owed wages.”

On September 27, 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants for intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations.[6] Plaintiffs claimed that defendants’ conduct, specifically, their solicitation of plaintiffs’ employees and sending of the September 11, 2019, and July 11, 2019, letters, disrupted the performance of the construction contracts and/or interfered with prospective contracts.

B. Anti-SLAPP Motion

On December 6, 2019, defendants filed a special motion to strike all the causes of action pursuant to section 425.16. Defendants argued that their conduct was protected under subdivisions (e)(2), (e)(3), and (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute. They also contended that there was no probability of plaintiffs prevailing on their causes of action because they were barred by the litigation privilege set forth at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) and preempted by the federal Labor Management Relations Act. In support of their motion, defendants submitted Guillen’s declaration, in which he explained that on October 31, 2019, he filed a complaint against plaintiffs with the Department of Industrial Relations, alleging wage and other labor issues (DIR complaint). The DIR complaint was attached as an exhibit to the declaration and listed alleged wage issues and lawsuits, including a PAGA claim, filed by others against plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that none of the conduct alleged in plaintiffs’ complaint was protected by the anti-SLAPP statute because defendants’ letters did not reference a specific wage claimant. In plaintiffs’ view, the failure to reference any such claimant ran afoul of Labor Code section 218.7, subdivision (b)(3) and defendants thus could not demonstrate that the letters were made “‘in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body’” as required by subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute. Plaintiffs also argued that subdivision (e)(4) did not apply because the purported dispute was only a “‘matter of concern to the speaker’” and not “‘a matter of public interest.’” Finally, plaintiffs contended that they had a probability of prevailing on their causes of action because the litigation privilege did not apply and their claims were not federally preempted. In support of their opposition, plaintiffs submitted a declaration from Brian Larrabure, the president of Larrabure, who stated that he had reviewed plaintiffs’ files and concluded “there is not any evidence from July 11, 2019 to September 11, 2019 . . . of any alleged employees/wage claimant that was/were not paid all of their wages for work performed on Projects, there is nor was any PAGA lawsuit, nor was there or is there any labor dispute between any of the [p]laintiffs with [Local 661] . . . .”

On January 14, 2020, the trial court issued a written order granting the motion in its entirety. The court concluded that the solicitation of plaintiffs’ employees and the sending of the September 11, 2019, letters were prelitigation conduct protected under subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute. The court also found that the September 11, 2019, and July 11, 2019, letters were statements made in connection with an issue of public interest under subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute.

The trial court additionally concluded that plaintiffs could not demonstrate a probability of success on the merits. For the Committee defendants, the court found that their alleged solicitation of plaintiffs’ employees for a potential lawsuit and sending of prelitigation notices in the September 11, 2019, letters, were protected by the litigation privilege. For the Union defendants, the court determined that plaintiffs’ state tort claims were “preempted by Section 303 [of the Labor Management Relations Act].”

On January 27, 2020, the trial court issued the order of dismissal. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Anti-SLAPP Procedure

“A SLAPP suit—a strategic lawsuit against public participation—seeks to chill or punish a party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. [Citation.] The Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16—known as the anti-SLAPP statute—to provide a procedural remedy to dispose of lawsuits that are brought to chill the valid exercise of constitutional rights.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055–1056 [(Rusheen)]; § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps. First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected by section 425.16. [Citation.] If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384 (Baral).)

At the first step, “[t]he moving defendant’s burden is to demonstrate that the act or acts of which the plaintiff complains were taken ‘in furtherance of the [defendant]’s right of petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection with a public issue,’ as defined in the statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67 (Equilon).) The anti-SLAPP statute identifies four categories of protected activity: “(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e).)

“To satisfy the second prong, ‘a plaintiff responding to an anti-SLAPP motion must “‘state[] and substantiate[] a legally sufficient claim.’” [Citation.] Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’ (Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821 . . . .) ‘We consider “the pleadings, and supporting and opposing affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense is based.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) However, we neither “weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence. Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the plaintiff as a matter of law.”’ (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif [(2006)] 39 Cal.4th [260,] 269, fn. 3 [(Soukup)].)” (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) “We have described this second step as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘[C]laims with the requisite minimal merit may proceed.’ (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94 . . . .)” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 384–385, fn. omitted.)

We review an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 425.16 de novo. (Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 269, fn. 3.)

B. First Prong: Protected Activity

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in finding that defendants satisfied their burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. We disagree.

Pursuant to section 425.16, protected conduct includes “any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body . . . .” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2), italics added.) “[O]ur Supreme Court has explained that communications that are ‘“preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of an action or other official proceeding”’ are within the scope of protected conduct under . . . section 425.16 just as they are within the protection of the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b). (Briggs[ v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999)] 19 Cal.4th [1106,] 1115; see Neville v. Chudacoff (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1268 . . . .)” (Bel Air Internet, LLC v. Morales (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 924, 940 (Bel Air).) “A statement has a sufficient ‘connection’ with anticipated litigation if the person making the statement is engaged in a serious effort to encourage or counsel litigation by another.” (Id. at p. 943.)

The causes of action premised on defendants’ solicitation of plaintiffs’ employees for anticipated litigation plainly arose from speech protected by subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Bel Air, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 943.)

The causes of action premised on defendants’ sending of the September 11, 2019, letters also arose from conduct protected by subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute. Indeed, Labor Code section 218.7[7] requires a joint labor-management cooperation committee, such as the Committee, to provide the general contractor or subcontractor with 30-day notice of the general nature of the wage claim prior to commencing litigation. Where, as here, “it is necessary to serve or record a document prior to the commencement of litigation . . . the satisfaction of the statutory prerequisite is considered to constitute protected prelitigation conduct. (Salma v. Capon (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1285 . . . [recording of a notice of rescission as a necessary prerequisite to filing a rescission action]; Feldman v. 1100 Park Lane Associates[ (2008)] 160 Cal.App.4th [1467,] 1480 [service of a three-day notice to quit as a statutory prerequisite to filing an unlawful detainer action]; Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, [282] . . . [service of a notice terminating tenancy as a legal prerequisite to filing an unlawful detainer action].)” (People ex rel. Fire Ins. Exchange v. Anapol (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 809, 824–825; accord, RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 413, 429 (RGC Gaslamp).)

Plaintiffs nevertheless contend that defendants cannot meet their first prong burden because they did not satisfy Labor Code section 218.7’s purported requirement to name a specific wage claimant in the September 11, 2019, letters. Even if we were to conclude that defendants’ September 11, 2019, letters did not comply with Labor Code section 218.7—an issue we do not reach—we would still reject plaintiffs’ contention. Prelitigation conduct, such as advising recipients of a party’s intent to sue, is protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 67 [Proposition 65 intent-to-sue notice protected activity under first prong].) Thus, plaintiffs’ sending of the September 11, 2019, letters, which stated that plaintiffs were sending it as a “condition precedent to filing a civil suit” was protected under subdivision (e)(2) of the anti-SLAPP statute.

Finally, we consider whether defendants met their burden of demonstrating that their sending of the July 11, 2019, letter was protected under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4), which protects “any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) “In articulating what constitutes a matter of public interest, courts look to certain specific considerations, such as whether the subject of the speech or activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants’ (Wilbanks v. Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 898 . . . (Wilbanks)); and whether the activity ‘occur[red] in the context of an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion’ (Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107, 119 . . .), or ‘affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity’ (Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479 . . .).” (FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 145–146 (FilmOn).) “The inquiry under the catchall provision . . . calls for a two-part analysis rooted in the statute’s purpose and internal logic. First, we ask what ‘public issue or [ ] issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the speech and the public conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at the latter stage that context proves useful.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150.)

“[T]he catchall provision demands ‘some degree of closeness’ between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest. (Weinberg[ v. Feisel (2003)] 110 Cal.App.4th [1122,] 1132.) . . . [W]e agree with the court in Wilbanks that ‘it is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public debate.’ (Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898; see also Dyer v. Childress (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1280 . . . [‘[t]he fact that “a broad and amorphous public interest” can be connected to a specific dispute’ is not enough].) [¶] What it means to ‘contribute to the public debate’ (Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 898) will perhaps differ based on the state of public discourse at a given time, and the topic of contention. But ultimately, our inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance of the speech. We are not concerned with the social utility of the speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine whether a defendant—through public or private speech or conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 150–151.)

Here, defendants sent the July 11, 2019, letter on behalf of Local 661. Thus, at a minimum, the issues raised in that letter were of interest to Local 661’s 4,146 members. (See Grenier v. Taylor (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 471, 483 [statements about pastor of church were an issue of public interest for 550 to 1,000 church members]; Hailstone v. Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [statements that union officials allegedly misappropriated union funds were issues of public interest for over 10,000 union members].) Further, the letter’s content, which sought to make the recipient aware of Local 661’s “public information campaign[,]” involving “the peaceful and lawful display of banners and distribution of handbills at the jobsite and premises of property owners, developers, general contracts, and other firms involved with projects” was sent in the context of an ongoing controversy, albeit during its early stages and prior to the filing of the DIR complaint on October 31, 2019. The letter therefore implicated an issue of public interest, namely, Local 661’s dispute with plaintiffs and its desire to have carpenter employees receive certain minimum wages and benefits.

Moreover, the letter not only advised the recipient about the labor dispute but specifically requested that Mr. Bowden “use his managerial discretion” to require that contractors be paid “labor standard wages and benefits for all their carpentry craft work.” The challenged letter therefore contributed in some way to the public debate and was protected by subdivision (e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP statute.

C. Second Prong—Probability of Success

Plaintiffs contend that they have a probability of prevailing on their causes of action because the litigation privilege does not apply to the conduct at issue in their complaint and their causes of action are not preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act.

1. Litigation Privilege

“Civil Code section 47 provides, in relevant part: ‘A privileged publication or broadcast is one made: [¶] . . . [¶] . . . In any . . . judicial proceeding, [and/or] in any other official proceeding authorized by law . . . .’ (Id., subd. (b).)” (Trinity Risk Management, LLC v. Simplified Labor Staffing Solutions, Inc. (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 995, 1006 (Trinity).) “The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of harassment in subsequent derivative actions. (Action Apartment[ Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007)] 41 Cal.4th [1232,] 1241.) The usual formulation is that the privilege applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation and (4) that have some connection or logical relation to the action. (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 . . . .) The privilege is ‘not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.’ (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057.)” (Trinity, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1006–1007.)

According to plaintiffs, the litigation privilege did not bar their causes of action premised on the September 11, 2019, letters because Labor Code section 218.7, subdivision (b)(3) required the Committee to identify specific wage claimants in any right-to sue letter, which the Committee failed to do. We disagree as any such purported noncompliance would not undermine the application of the litigation privilege. (See Frank Pisano & Associates v. Taggart (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 1, 25 [finding deficient filing of mechanic’s lien still protected by litigation privilege; “Any deficiencies in the lien procedure were a matter of defense to the action and did not militate against the privilege”].) Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the minimal merit of their causes of action premised on the September 11, 2019, letters.

2. Labor Management Relations Act

Plaintiffs next contend that they met their second-prong burden of demonstrating the minimal merit of their causes of action premised on the July 11, 2019, letter. Defendants disagree and maintain that plaintiffs’ causes of action were preempted by section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, codified at section 187 title 29 of the United States Code.

Section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful, for the purpose of this section only, in an industry or activity affecting commerce, for any labor organization to engage in any activity or conduct defined as an unfair labor practice in section 158(b)(4) of this title. [¶] (b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason [of] any violation of subsection (a) may sue therefor in any district court of the United States subject to the limitations and provisions of section 185 of this title without respect to the amount in controversy, or in any other court having jurisdiction of the parties, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit.” (29 U.S.C. § 187.) Title 29 United States Code section 158, subdivision (b)(4) provides in pertinent part: “It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . . [¶] . . . to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is . . . [¶] (B) forcing or requiring any person . . . to cease doing business with any other person . . . .” Here, plaintiffs alleged that the Union defendants had interfered with their business relationship with Hanover Construction by threatening and coercing Hanover Construction into ceasing its business with Larrabure. Such conduct falls squarely within the category of conduct regulated by section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act.[8]

The United States Supreme Court has held that by proscribing specific union activities under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, “‘Congress occupied this field and closed it to state regulation.’” (Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton (1964) 377 U.S. 252, 258 (Teamsters); see California Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 198–199 [citing Teamsters and noting that “preemption . . . was traceable in part to specific statutory language evincing a congressional intent to regulate only at the federal level”].) Accordingly, section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act preempts plaintiffs’ state tort claims of intentional interference with contractual relations, intentional interference with prospective economic relations, and negligent interference with prospective economic relations. (San Antonio Community Hosp. v. Southern California Dist. Council of Carpenters (9th Cir. 1997) 125 F.3d 1230, 1235; accord, Retail Property Trust v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (9th Cir. 2014) 768 F.3d 938, 957.) Plaintiffs therefore have failed to demonstrate a probability of success on their causes of action against the Union defendants.

Plaintiffs additionally argue that state courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over Labor Management Relations Act causes of action and therefore the trial court erred by finding they had not demonstrated a probability of success on their causes of action. Plaintiffs’ contention is inapposite because they did not allege a cause of action under section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, and “section 425.16 provides no mechanism for granting anti-SLAPP motions with leave to amend.” (Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611, 629; accord, Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 869, 900.)[9]

IV. DISPOSITION

The order granting the special motion to strike is affirmed. Defendants Carpenters-Contractors Cooperation Committee, Inc., Favian Guillen, Carpenters Local Union No. 661, Barry Jenkins, and Michael McCarron are entitled to costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

KIM, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

BAKER, J.

[1] Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

“A ‘SLAPP’ is a ‘“strategic lawsuit against public participation”’ [citation], and special motions to strike under section 425.16 are commonly referred to as ‘[a]nti-SLAPP motions’ [citation].” (Bonni v. St. John Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1007, fn. 1 (Bonni).)

[2] Although plaintiffs disputed in the trial court that Local 661 was a labor organization, the court judicially noticed that Local 661 had filed an annual report with the United States Department of Labor. On appeal, plaintiffs do not dispute that Local 661 is a labor organization.

[3] In January 2018, Larrabure and Cal Coast entered into a written subcontract agreement with general contractor Snyder Langston Builders, for the construction and installation of rough framing for a project known as “Shea Northridge” in Northridge. In March 2018, Larrabure and MWL entered into a written subcontract agreement with general contractor McCormick Evolution Builders, for the construction and installation of rough framing for a project known as “Evolution” located in Canoga Park. In April 2018, Larrabure and MWL entered into a written subcontract agreement with general contractor California Home Builders, for construction and installation of rough framing for a project known as “Warner Center” in Woodland Hills.

[4] The letter specifically referenced “Rockwell Drywall INC.,Larrabure Framing & Reliance Company.” We will assume for purposes of this appeal that this was a reference to either Larrabure or a related entity.

[5] Only the letter addressed to Snyder Langston Builders included a reference to a PAGA lawsuit.

[6] Plaintiffs also alleged a fourth cause of action for “injunctive relief.” They do not challenge on appeal the trial court’s striking of that purported cause of action.

[7] Labor Code section 218.7, subdivision (b)(3) provides in full: “A joint labor-management cooperation committee established pursuant to the federal Labor Management Cooperation Act of 1978 (29 U.S.C. Sec. 175a) may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction against a direct contractor or subcontractor at any tier for unpaid wages owed to a wage claimant by the direct contractor or subcontractor for the performance of private work, including unpaid wages owed by the direct contractor, pursuant to subdivision (a). The court shall award a prevailing plaintiff in such an action its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including expert witness fees. Prior to commencement of an action against a direct contractor to enforce the liability created by subdivision (a), the committee shall provide the direct contractor and subcontractor that employed the wage claimant with at least 30 days’ notice by first-class mail. The notice need only describe the general nature of the claim and shall not limit the liability of the direct contractor or preclude subsequent amendments of an action to encompass additional wage claimants employed by the subcontractor.” The parties do not dispute that the Committee is a joint labor-management cooperation committee.

[8] This conduct is referred to as a “secondary boycott,” which is “‘a combination not merely to refrain from dealing with [the business], or to advise or by peaceful means persuade [the business]’s customers to refrain (“primary boycott”), but to exercise coercive pressure upon such customers, actual or prospective, in order to cause them to withhold or withdraw patronage from [the business] through fear or loss or damage to themselves should they deal with it.’” (National Woodworkers Manufacturers Ass’n. v. NLRB (1967) 386 U.S. 612, 621–622.)

[9] Plaintiffs have forfeited any argument that they can prevail on their causes of action based on defendants’ solicitation of plaintiffs’ employees by failing to address it in their appellate briefs. (Long Beach Unified School Dist. v. Margaret Williams, LLC (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 87, 107.)