Filed 4/6/22 Eddines v. County of L.A. CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
LUCAS DAVID EDDINES,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Defendant and Respondent.
| B307395
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. CSD006278)
|
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Frank W. Chen, Temporary Judge. Affirmed.
Lucas David Eddines, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryle L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General, Gregory D. Brown and Jennifer C. Addams, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and Respondent.
Lucas David Eddines (Eddines) appeals from an order of the superior court directing that approximately $84,000 in child support arrears be paid from his employer retirement plan. We find no error, and thus we will affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
A. Paternity and Child Support Judgment (November 1981)
Eddines and Patricia Eddines were married in September 1979 and separated in February 1981. Micah Eddines (Micah) was born in November 1980.
In October 1981, Eddines entered into an agreement with the Los Angeles District Attorney for the entry of a judgment determining paternity and child support. In that agreement, Eddines stipulated that he was Micah’s father and would pay child support of $250 per month until Micah reached the age of 18 years.
On November 3, 1981, the Los Angeles County Superior Court held a hearing at which Eddines appeared and testified. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that Eddines had been advised of his due process rights and had “knowingly, willingly, and intelligently waived said rights and agree[d] to entry of judgment.” On that basis, the court entered a paternity and child support judgment, as well as a wage assignment order.
B. Motion for Qualified Domestic Relations Order (January 2020)
Nearly 39 years later, in January 2020, the Los Angeles County Child Support Services Department (County) filed a motion seeking a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO). The County asserted that Eddines owed child support arrears, including interest, in the amount of $88,644, and it sought an order directing the Boeing Company Voluntary Investment Plan Administrator to pay that amount from Eddines’ retirement plan.
Eddines filed an answer opposing the proposed order. He stated that he did not believe Micah was his child, and he asked the court to order genetic testing. He urged that he should be ordered to pay the child support arrears only if Micah was determined by genetic testing to be his biological child.
Eddines appeared for the hearing before Commissioner Frank Chen on July 8, 2020. Eddines argued that he was not living with his wife when Micah was conceived, and he had been abusing substances when he signed the voluntary acknowledgement. Although he acknowledged that the case was very old, he asked the court to order a paternity test to “get to the truth” of Micah’s paternity.
The court denied Eddines’s request for genetic testing as untimely and granted the motion for a QDRO. After the court announced its ruling, Eddines objected to having the matter heard by a commissioner and sought a hearing de novo. The court denied the request as untimely. Eddines filed an objection to the commissioner’s findings on July 14, 2020, and on August 10, 2020, he filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Eddines contends (1) he was under duress when he signed the agreement for entry of judgment in 1981, (2) he is entitled to genetic testing under Family Code section 7551, (3) he was not personally served with the QDRO motion, and (4) he objected to having the matter heard by a commissioner, and thus he is entitled to a hearing de novo. For the reasons that follow, Eddines’ contentions are without merit.
A. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the paternity judgment or child support order.
Eddines asserts that Micah is not his biological child and that he was unrepresented by counsel and under duress when he signed the paternity and child support agreement in 1981. He thus contends that the judgment should not be enforced against him, and he should be required to pay child support arrears only if Micah is determined through genetic testing to be his child.
Family Code[1] section 7575 provides that either parent “may rescind [a] voluntary declaration of parentage by filing a rescission form with the Department of Child Support Services within 60 days of the date of execution of the declaration by the attesting parents, whichever signature is later.” (Italics added.) After the period for rescission provided in section 7575 expires, “but not later than two years after the effective date,” a signatory of a voluntary declaration of parentage may commence a proceeding to challenge the declaration on the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact. (§ 7576, italics added.)
In the present case, Eddines did not seek to set aside the voluntary declaration of paternity within either the 60-day or two-year periods provided by statute. Instead, he now seeks to do so nearly 39 years later. Manifestly, his request is untimely.
Eddines’s request to set aside the child support arrearages is similarly untimely. “ ‘The Legislature has established a bright-line rule that accrued child support vests and may not be adjusted up or down. [Citations.] If a parent feels the amount ordered is too high—or too low—he or she must seek prospective modification.’ (In re Marriage of Tavares (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 620, 625–626.) ‘Accordingly, a trial court has no discretion to absolve an obligor of support arrearages, or interest thereon.’ ” (Stover v. Bruntz (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 19, 26, italics added; see also S.C. v. G.S. (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 591, 598–599 [same].)
Here, Eddines does not seek a “prospective” modification of support––rather, he seeks to set aside arrearages that occurred decades ago. The trial court was wholly without power to grant Eddines’s request
B. The trial court properly denied Eddines’s request for a DNA test.
Eddines next contends the trial court erred in denying his request for a DNA test. Although in some circumstances a court may set aside or vacate a judgment establishing parentage “upon a motion by a previously established parent . . . if genetic testing indicates that the previously established father of a child is not the genetic father of the child,” such motion must be brought “[w]ithin a two-year period commencing with the date on which the previously established father knew or should have known of a judgment that established the father’s parentage.” (§ 7646, subd. (a), italics added.) In this case, Eddines was present when the trial court entered the paternity judgment on November 3, 1981, and thus his time to challenge the judgment by seeking a DNA test ran from that date. His request for a DNA test in 2020, therefore, was untimely.
C. Eddines has not demonstrated that he was not properly served with the QDRO motion.
Eddines contends he was not personally served with the QDRO motion, and thus the motion should have been denied. Eddines failed to raise this issue below, and thus it has been forfeited. (E.g., Ocean Street Extension Neighborhood Association v. City of Santa Cruz (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 985, 1008 [appellant forfeited argument by failing to raise it in the superior court].) In any event, although a request for an order in a family law case must be personally served if a party has not yet appeared, all subsequent requests may be served by mail. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.92(f)(2); § 215, subd. (b).) Here, Eddines appeared in this action in 1981, and thus personal service of the QDRO motion was not required. Further, the County filed a proof of service by mail on Eddines, and Eddines had actual notice of (and appeared at) the hearing. Service therefore was proper.
D. Eddines failed to timely object to having a commissioner hear this case.
Eddines contends that he was entitled to a de novo hearing because he objected to having the County’s motion for a QDRO heard by a commissioner. Not so. Section 4251 provides that all proceedings filed by local child support agencies to enforce support orders “shall be referred for hearing to a child support commissioner.” (§ 4251, subd. (a).) The commissioner “shall act as a temporary judge unless an objection is made by the local child support agency or any other party.” (Id., subd. (b).) Such objection must be made “before . . . the commissioner rules in the case . . . to have the matter reviewed by a superior court judge.” (County of Orange v. Smith (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 955, 961; see also Kern County Dept. of Child Support Services v. Camacho (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1035 [same].)
In the present case, prior to the hearing on the motion, Eddines signed an acknowledgement that the matter would be referred to a court commissioner who would act as a temporary judge “unless, before the hearing, you or any other party objects to the commissioner acting as a temporary judge. . . . You must object before the hearing in your case begins.” (Italics in original.) Eddines did not object to having the matter heard by a court commissioner prior to the hearing; he made such objection only after the commissioner had ruled on the motion. His objection therefore was untimely, and he was not entitled to a hearing de novo.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. The County is awarded its appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
EDMON, P. J.
We concur:
LAVIN, J.
EGERTON, J.
[1] All subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.