Filed 4/20/22 J.G. v. Superior Court CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

Petitioners J.G. (Mother) and F.C. (Father) petition this court for extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order bypassing reunification services and setting a selection-and-implementation hearing for their son, nearly six-year-old P.B. (Older Brother), and daughter, three-year-old L.B. (Younger Sister).

These proceedings arose after a younger sibling—a baby boy, who is the subject of a separate dependency proceeding—was taken into protective custody. After the baby boy was taken into custody, the parents took Older Brother and Younger Sister out of state, and investigators were initially unaware of them. Once investigators learned of them, these proceedings were initiated by real party in interest Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau), even though the location of the family was at first unknown.

In this writ proceeding, the parents argue that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to proceed in their absence. They alternatively argue that the jurisdictional and dispositional orders are not supported by substantial evidence. They also argue that the juvenile court should not have bypassed reunification services to them or reduced their visitation, and that it should have properly considered the paternal grandmother for placement. We reject these arguments and deny Father’s petition. But we grant Mother’s petition insofar as she seeks a stay of the selection-and-implementation hearing until this court decides the separate appeal of an order terminating her parental rights to the baby boy.

I.
Factual and Procedural
Background

Older Brother and Younger Sister have several older half siblings. Mother has a daughter who was adopted by her grandmother in Mississippi, three children who are in the custody of Mother’s ex-husband in Mississippi, and a daughter who lives with the maternal grandfather in Fairfield. Mother reportedly is bipolar and manic depressive. Father also has a son and a daughter who were the subject of dependency proceedings in Solano County and adopted by a relative. Father has represented he has a disability, and there are references in the record to him possibly having autism.

In March 2020, Mother gave birth to a baby boy, reportedly in a “kiddie pool” in their Concord apartment, after Father beat her and induced labor. She went to the Concord Police Department a few days later to report the abuse, and at that time she had a bruised lip, chipped tooth, abrasions on her left cheek and forehead, and ligature marks on the right side of her neck. Mother at first gave false information about where her infant was located, which led to authorities conducting welfare checks at three separate residences. Mother eventually told police that the baby was with the paternal grandmother, and the baby was taken into protective custody.

The Bureau filed a dependency petition as to the baby boy, and ultimately the parents’ parental rights were terminated as to that child. He is not the subject of these proceeding and is instead the subject of appeal No. A164078. Investigators at first were unaware of Older Brother and Younger Sister.

When the parents learned that the Bureau had custody of the baby boy, and without asking about his status, the parents took Older Brother and Younger Sister to Las Vegas. Mother later claimed that she left the baby with his paternal grandmother and that neither she nor Father knew he was in the Bureau’s custody for the following year and three months.

The parents got into an argument in their Las Vegas motel room on March 25, and during the dispute Mother scratched Father and also grabbed Younger Sister by the arms, then shook her, threw her onto a couch, and threw herself on top of her daughter. Father took both children to the emergency room. Las Vegas police arrested Mother for domestic violence and child abuse.

Las Vegas Child Protective Services (CPS) investigated the matter at the hospital. Father informed a Las Vegas social worker that he would be returning to his mother’s home in California without Mother. The children were not taken into protective custody because the Las Vegas social worker did not know about the circumstances surrounding the baby boy in California. The worker did not observe any bruises on the children, and he (the social worker) believed they would be safe with Father. But according to the CPS specialist, Father obtained a temporary restraining order (TRO) for himself and the children against Mother that listed him as having custody of the children.

Later the same day that the CPS worker had talked to Father and the children in the hospital, a Las Vegas police officer called the worker with concerns about Father’s ability to care for the children. When police went to the family’s motel room for a welfare check, no one was there, and motel management did not know where Father and the children had gone.

The Bureau took several steps to try to locate the family. A social worker and two police officers went to the home of the paternal grandmother in late March. She did not answer the door after several minutes of knocking, but she eventually came to a patio window. She would not answer any questions or provide information about the whereabouts of Father and the children. The social worker later talked to a Las Vegas social worker who reported that Mother had been released from jail, but her current whereabouts were unknown.

The Bureau social worker took additional steps in early April to locate family members. The worker obtained Mother’s calls from the Nevada jail where she was held in order to have them transcribed, she called Father at the telephone number where the Las Vegas social worker had reached him but the number was not in service, she tried calling Mother but her number also was not in service, and she sent letters to the parents’ addresses. The social worker was able at one point to leave a voicemail on Father’s telephone directing him to call the social worker.

In April 2020, the Bureau filed juvenile dependency petitions as to both children. Younger Sister’s petition alleged that she suffered serious physical harm when Mother “forcefully slammed” her onto a couch (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (a)).[1] Both petitions alleged that there was a substantial risk the children would suffer serious physical harm or illness due to Mother’s mental health, the history of the parents’ domestic violence, and the unsafe conditions of the family’s Concord home (id., subd. (b)); and that Mother failed to provide support for the children when she was arrested in March 2020 in Las Vegas for domestic violence and child abuse (id., subd. (g)). The petitions listed the parents’ address as being in Concord.

Neither parent appeared at the April 2020 detention hearing. The children, but not the parents, were appointed counsel, though the children’s whereabouts were still unknown. The juvenile court ordered them detained and issued protective-custody warrants for them.

At a hearing held in May 2020, the juvenile court concluded that the Bureau had exercised due diligence in trying to locate both parents.

The maternal grandfather reported in June that he had heard from Mother and that a Las Vegas court had ordered her to a mental institution. The grandfather reported that the parents and both children were living in a hotel in Nevada, but the social worker was unable to confirm this when she called the hotel. The social worker asked the grandfather to direct Mother to contact the social worker, and the worker also left a voicemail for Father asking him to contact her. The social worker asked Concord police to check if Las Vegas law enforcement knew of the family’s whereabouts, but she did not immediately hear back. The worker did speak to a Las Vegas social worker and sent the worker copies of the protective-custody warrants that had been issued for the children.

The parents were not present at the jurisdictional hearing held in July 2020, and the children’s whereabouts remained unknown. The juvenile court sustained the petitions. And the court again found that the Bureau had exercised due diligence in trying to locate the parents.

The Concord Police filed a missing-person’s report for both children in early November. The parents again were not present at a hearing held in December, and the matter was continued to June 2021.

The family’s vehicle was stopped in February 2021 in Nevada for a suspended license-plate registration, and Mother was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Father was released with the children, but an after-hours social worker discovered the family had an open case. The worker asked Las Vegas police to do a welfare check and detain the children if they were found. Police could not find record of the family at the “shady hotel” where they were previously reported to have stayed, and police put out an alert for the family’s vehicle. The social worker also contacted the maternal grandfather, who reported he had not heard from Mother in a while but believed the family was still in the Las Vegas area.

Then in April 2021 Concord police contacted a Bureau social worker and told her that a license-plate reader had spotted the family’s car parked at a Las Vegas apartment complex. The social worker contacted social services in Las Vegas and forwarded a copy of the protective-custody warrants issued for the children, along with the dependency petitions and the detention/jurisdiction report. A Clark County court issued a warrant for the children, which Las Vegas police and social workers executed in early May. The children were taken into custody at the apartment after the parents first did not answer the door and a maintenance worker was called to drill the lock. The children were then flown to California and placed together in a foster home. Within an hour of the children being detained, the paternal grandmother called the Bureau social worker requesting placement, though she later claimed she had not known where the family was when the Bureau could not locate them.

According to a jurisdiction/disposition report filed after the family had been located, Mother “ha[d] been working on her case plan prior to [Bureau] involvement due to her legal charges,” a reference to the pending charges against her in Las Vegas. She had participated in 10 of 26 domestic violence counseling classes, and she also had undergone a mental health evaluation, though it was not immediately provided to the Bureau because Mother “ha[d] not paid for the assessment and therefore the agency that completed it will not release it” even though Mother signed a release of the information.

Although Father declined to be interviewed by the social worker for the jurisdiction/disposition report, the social worker provided him with a referral to services, including domestic violence support groups, parenting education, and individual counseling. The social worker received documentation that in May 2021 Father attended two parenting classes offered through Clark County Department of Family Services Parenting Project in Nevada. Father also sought counseling, though not through a provider on a list that Las Vegas Children & Family Services provided to the Bureau.

Both parents indicated they wanted the children placed with the paternal grandmother. But the Bureau had concerns based on issues that arose in the case of the children’s baby brother. The grandmother had given inconsistent information about the circumstances surrounding Mother leaving the baby with her, and the grandmother did not seek immediate medical care for the baby even though she knew Mother had only recently given birth. She also provided the wrong name for Father and said she didn’t know his whereabouts, even though they lived in the same apartment complex. The grandmother had lied on several occasions, including fabricating a story to police in order to have them come to her house. She also had been the victim of domestic violence at least twice, which had led to the removal of one of the children’s older half siblings from her care. The grandmother was currently living in a one-bedroom apartment and would need an exemption to have the children placed with her.

Father emailed the social worker asking her to contact an uncle regarding placement, but the phone number the Bureau had for the man was not in service. When the social worker was ultimately able to contact the uncle, he said he already had two of Father’s other children in his care and could not take additional children at that time. Father also sent an email with 25 names of possible placements, but he did not respond to a request for contact information, and none of the people contacted the Bureau after the Bureau told Father they could reach out to the social worker.

The parents appeared at a hearing in May and were appointed counsel. The juvenile court ordered that the parents receive weekly in-person or virtual visitation and continued the matter for a dispositional hearing.

Later in May the Bureau filed subsequent dependency petitions (§ 342). By this time petitioners’ parental rights had been terminated as to the children’s baby brother, and the parents had not appealed from the order terminating parental rights. The new petitions added counts alleging that the parents had failed to reunify with the brother, and also that Father had failed to reunify with his children who were the subject of dependency proceedings in Solano County. (§ 300, subd. (j) [abuse of sibling].) At a brief hearing in June, counsel for both Mother and Father stated that the parents wanted the children placed with the paternal grandmother. County counsel stated that the Bureau had “a lot of concerns” with the paternal grandmother but that the Bureau would “continue to look into it.” The minors’ counsel opposed placement with the grandmother based on experiences in the baby brother’s case, stating, “The Court knows [the paternal grandmother] well. [She] was allowed to have her say in previous hearings.” The minors’ counsel noted that the baby brother had not been placed with the grandmother and stated that counsel “object[ed] to placement unless there’s been a significant change in [the paternal grandmother’s] circumstances, which I am not aware of.” The court asked that the Bureau consider placement with the paternal grandmother but stressed that “it is a question of what is in the children’s best interests.” The juvenile court continued detention of the children and scheduled a jurisdictional/dispositional hearing on the subsequent petitions.

Mother and Father remained in Las Vegas and visited with the children via Zoom in May and June. Visits went well, with Mother singing songs and Older Brother narrating play with toys Mother held during the video visits. Father talked to the children about their favorite characters and engaged the children in age-appropriate imaginary play. The social worker scheduled a team meeting for early May to discuss possible services for the family, but Father did not attend despite getting notice. In late May, the Las Vegas police were called to the parents’ residence because of a physical confrontation, and Father went to the hospital for injuries.

The Bureau recommended that the juvenile court deny reunification services to the parents because services had been terminated for the children’s siblings and the parents’ parental rights had been terminated for the baby brother. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10) & (11).) The Bureau also had concerns that the parents continued to be in a “dysfunctional” relationship marked by domestic violence.

The paternal grandmother in June 2021 filed a request (§ 388) to have the children placed with her, but the juvenile court denied the request without a hearing because such a change would not be in the children’s best interest.

A social worker was able to speak with a domestic-violence counselor who in June screened Father and deemed him appropriate for a treatment group. But Father withdrew his authorization for the Bureau to speak with the program and told the social worker not to contact anyone from the program. He did, however, share a certificate showing he had completed a parenting class in Nevada.

Visits continued with the parents via Zoom through June and July, though visits with Father frequently ended early because of technical difficulties on his end. Older Brother struggled when visits ended abruptly, and he sometimes had tantrums lasting up to three hours after the visits.

An evaluation revealed that Older Brother was eligible for services to stabilize his mental health and to help him deal with past trauma, and a coordinator was assigned to his case. The coordinator reached out to both parents by phone and email. Mother emailed that she would not sign a consent form because she “needed written proof of any developmental concerns.” The social worker forwarded Mother a copy of a pediatrician’s concern over Older Brother’s mild developmental delays, but Mother stated she wanted a second opinion since she was not included in the pediatrician visit. The parents ultimately signed an authorization form. As for Younger Sister, an evaluation revealed that she also was eligible for services, in her case to improve her communication skills. The parents did not attend a meeting that was scheduled for late July to discuss service options for both children.

The parents did attend a meeting in early August 2021 to discuss Younger Sister’s eligibility for early-intervention services. Two participants found the meeting to be “very challenging” and that the “most difficult” part was having to redirect the parents and the paternal grandmother because they “were focused on addressing issues outside of the scope of the meeting.” The foster mother mentioned that Younger Sister tries to eat or chew nonedible objects (a sign of an eating disorder common in children with developmental disabilities), but Father and the paternal grandmother later misrepresented these statements as meaning the foster mother was allowing Younger Sister to eat paint and plastic. After the meeting, the paternal grandmother contacted several Bureau employees and also called local law enforcement requesting they conduct a welfare check on the children. Police conducted the welfare check and did not find anything that concerned them, but the experience led the foster parents to “feel very unsafe.” Also after the meeting, Father tried to have the case manager with a regional center replaced, and he accused social workers of falsifying the children’s medical records.

It was the Bureau’s position that any further participation by the paternal grandmother would be “completely outside of [Younger Sister’s] best interest.” The parents and the paternal grandmother repeatedly declined further diagnostic testing of Younger Sister even though the Bureau considered services and support for her currently “the most important matter” given signs of an intellectual delay or possibly autism. The Bureau sought to limit the parents’ educational rights because they had “put up barriers to the actual planning of the meetings [regarding services] or services which have delayed them.”

When Older Brother started kindergarten, he suffered daily emotional breakdowns at school and had difficulty with peer relationships.

As of mid-August 2021, Mother had attended 21 of 26 domestic-violence classes, with two unexcused absences. She also had attended parenting classes.

Following a hearing in August 2021, the juvenile court found that the parents and paternal grandmother had “consistently impeded efforts to obtain services” for both children. Over Father’s objection, the children’s educational rights were assigned to the foster mother.

At a hearing the following week, the juvenile court sustained the section 300, subdivision (j), allegations in the subsequent petitions. The court then turned to the issue of disposition. The social worker testified about her communication with the parents and her concerns about placing the children with the paternal grandmother. The Bureau was at that time considering placement with an uncle or with a second cousin, both of whom lived in the southeastern United States. But the worker said she could not take further steps to secure out-of-state placement because under the Interstate Compact on Placement of Children (ICPC, Fam. Code, § 7901 et seq.) she had to wait until after dispositional findings were made. After further testimony, the matter was continued until early October.

At one point around September Older Brother was observed to have scratches on his arm and hand, and when asked what happened he said they were made by the foster mother. The paternal grandmother in early October filed a petition (§ 388) alleging that the foster mother had hit Older Brother. She requested placement of the children in her home. The grandmother also sought findings that “there is a child abuse investigation,” that the Older Brother “had disclosed physical abuse by the foster mother,” and that “the workers haven[’]t been forth coming.” According to the Bureau, an investigation revealed that Older Brother has seasonal allergies that cause sensitive skin, which led to Older Brother scratching himself. The investigator noticed only a slight scratch, which was consistent with a documented history of the child scratching himself. He was treated with a prescription-strength hydrocortisone cream as well as over-the-counter allergy medications. The investigator concluded that there was no abuse or neglect, and that in fact the foster parents “go above and beyond.” The Bureau’s concluded the allegations were unfounded.

The social worker testified briefly at the continued dispositional hearing in early October 2021. She explained that she could not assess the parents for possible services because they did not participate in interviews for the dispositional report. The worker described Father’s erratic behavior “up there toward the highest” of her professional career. He sent her between 20 to 30 emails each day (including weekends) in which he threatened to have her fired, to sue her and that she would be personally responsible for damages, and to report her to a news station and the FBI. The hearing was continued after it was reported that Father was currently in the hospital.

The paternal grandmother continued to claim the foster parents were abusing Older Brother. She called police and asked for another welfare check on the children, but responding officers did not see anything that concerned them. The grandmother also called the district office of Older Brother’s school and accused the foster parents of abusing Older Brother. The juvenile court scheduled a hearing on the grandmother’s request for placement. The Bureau, meanwhile, asked the juvenile court to authorize two trial visits with the paternal grandmother. The Bureau had “significant concerns” about the grandmother as a placement but wanted an in-person assessment of the children’s bond with her.

The Bureau reported at the beginning of November that both children were doing well in their foster home. Neither parent was actively working on reunifying with them. Father was sending several “harassing and threatening emails” each day to the social worker and the Bureau, and he had not signed any releases of information for any providers to show he was engaged in services. Mother stayed in regular contact with the Bureau and informed the social worker she had begun therapy, but she likewise did not sign a release in order for information to be shared, and she did not forward a copy of the mental-health assessment that had been completed. Mother also had not updated the social worker with her current address.

As for possible relative placement, the Bureau stated it was still working with out-of-state family members to prepare them for the process of possible placement, but that the ICPC process could not formally begin until after the disposition hearing.

Neither Mother nor Father appeared for the contested dispositional hearing held in early November 2021.[2] The social worker continued testifying. On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel, the worker testified that other than not signing releases for information, Mother had been cooperative during the dependency process, and she would benefit from reunification services. The Bureau did not know, however, where Mother was currently living and had no way to verify her location.

As for possible placement of the children with relatives, the social worker said that she had not heard of any responses to letters to out-of-state relatives who were asked whether they were interested in having the children placed with them. The only name provided for possible local placement was the paternal grandmother.

After the close of evidence, Father argued that the children should be returned to his care and that he receive services in Nevada. Mother also requested custody and argued that she should receive reunification services.

The juvenile court sided with the Bureau and the minors’ counsel’s recommendation that the parents not receive reunification services. The court first noted that it did not find credible the parents’ claims that they thought their baby son was with the paternal grandmother (as opposed to in Bureau custody) but did not check in with the grandmother for the 15 months they were missing. The juvenile court adjudged both children dependent minors, found that providing reunification services to either parent would not benefit the children, and ordered that reunification services not be provided to either parent. The court scheduled a selection-and-implementation hearing (§ 326.26).[3]

The same day the court issued its order (November 2, 2021), Mother filed a notice of appeal of the April 13, 2021 order terminating her parental rights as to the baby brother. (Father previously had filed a notice of appeal from that order in October.) Father filed his notice of intent to seek writ review in these proceedings on November 10, and Mother filed her notice on December 2.

Then on December 7, the First District Appellate Project filed a motion in this court to construe both parents’ late notices of appeal of the order in the baby brother’s case to have been timely filed. (In re A.R. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 234, 257–258 [parent may file late notice of appeal from order terminating parental rights upon certain showing].) Father attested that he had been living in Nevada “[a]t or around” the time of the baby brother’s birth and that Mother did not tell him “information regarding” the baby’s birth or the baby’s current whereabouts or that he was the subject of dependency proceedings. Mother attested that she was not told that her baby son was taken from the paternal grandmother or that dependency proceedings had been initiated as to him. And the paternal grandmother attested that she likewise had not been informed of dependency proceedings and that social workers told her she could not have any information about the baby because he “was dead at the hospital.” No opposition to the motion was filed, and the court granted it on December 27. That separate appeal is still pending.

In these proceedings, Mother filed her writ petition on February 22, 2022, and Father filed his on March 4.

II.
Discussion

1. The Juvenile Court Properly Took Jurisdiction Over the Children.

1. The Juvenile Court Had Jurisdiction Under the UCCJEA.

Mother and Father both contend that the juvenile court erred in not adequately addressing whether it had jurisdiction over the children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.) They are mistaken.

The UCCJEA governs dependency proceedings and provides the means for determining the proper forum for child-custody proceedings involving two states. (In re Aiden L. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 508, 516.) It was adopted in California effective January 1, 2000 (ibid.), and in Nevada in 2003. (Nev. Rev. State. Ann. § 125A.005 et seq.; Kar v. Kar (2016) 132 Nev. 636, 638.) The UCCJEA “embodies an agreement among states on rules to determine which jurisdiction should provide the proper forum.” (In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347, 358.)

Under the UCCJEA a California court “has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following” are true: (1) California is the “home state” of the child when proceedings commenced; (2) a court of another state does not have “home state” jurisdiction, or a home-state court has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that California is more appropriate and both (a) the child and at least one parent has a significant connection with this state and (b) substantial evidence is available in California regarding the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships; or other factors, not present here, exist. (Fam. Code, § 3421, subd. (a).) “Home state” is “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (g).) We look to the jurisdictional facts at the time dependency proceedings began to evaluate whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction and review jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence. (In re Ari S. (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 1125, 1131.)

Under the foregoing definitions, California was the children’s home state when the Bureau initiated these proceedings in April 2020. Younger Sister was born in 2018 in Oakland. At the time Mother gave birth to the children’s baby brother in March 2020, the parents were living in the same Concord apartment building as the paternal grandmother, who claimed to have spent a lot of time with the children in the Bay Area. There is thus no reason to doubt that the family had been living for at least six consecutive months in California at the time proceedings were initiated. (Fam. Code, § 3402, subd. (g).) And while the Bureau learned in March 2020 that the family had left for Nevada, the social worker was told that they were staying at a hotel and that Father had said he was returning to California—more evidence that this was the family’s home state.

At a hearing on the subsequent petitions, Father’s counsel objected that the children were not residents of Contra Costa County when they were removed and that the court thus lacked jurisdiction.[4] But as county counsel noted at the hearing, the juvenile court took jurisdiction not long after the family left California for Nevada, i.e., when California was the family’s home state. (In re Ari S., supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131.) The juvenile court thus found that “I do have original jurisdiction over them from the prior Petition[s]. I also find that the parents did remove them from Contra Costa County in an effort to evade this Court’s jurisdiction, and that is not an appropriate basis for denying the Court to continue jurisdiction over the children.”

The parents direct the court to the part of the UCCJEA that provides that a California court may not exercise jurisdiction if, at the time of the start of the proceeding, a custody proceeding has begun in another state, unless the proceeding has been terminated or is stayed by the other state’s court. (Fam. Code, § 3426, subd. (a).) A California court must examine the out-of-state court documents and other information supplied by the parties to determine whether proceedings in this state should be stayed or dismissed. (Fam. Code, § 3426, subd. (b).) Father points to the TRO he obtained in Nevada against Mother that apparently listed him as having temporary custody of the children. A state certainly may exercise temporary emergency jurisdiction over a child under the UCCJEA, which appears to be what occurred here. (Nev. Rev. State. Ann. § 125A.335, subd. 1 [court has “temporary emergency jurisdiction” under Nevada’s version of UCCJEA if child present in state and it is necessary to protect the child against abuse]; see also Fam. Code, § 3424, subd. (a) [California’s emergency jurisdiction provision], In re Aiden L., supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at pp. 518–519.)

But there was no reason for Nevada authorities to initiate ongoing dependency proceedings, as Father initially told a CPS specialist that he was returning to California. Both the detention and original jurisdiction reports indicate that the Bureau was in touch with Las Vegas CPS, that Nevada authorities were aware of the ongoing dependency proceedings in this state, and that they were assisting the Bureau with locating the children so they could be returned to the Bureau’s care. In other words, there was no indication that Nevada was taking ongoing jurisdiction over the children.

We also note that it is somewhat unclear why the parents are now suggesting that jurisdiction would have been more appropriate in Nevada. True, they and the children were living there at the time the Bureau located the children, as Father’s counsel stated at the hearing on the subsequent petitions. But had Nevada taken jurisdiction, it would have been more difficult to evaluate the paternal grandmother for placement, something both parents have consistently advocated. (Post, § II.E.)

We reject the parents’ jurisdictional arguments under the UCCJEA.

2. The Bureau Exercised Due Diligence in Trying to Locate the Parents.
   

1. Additional Background.

As we have said, the Bureau searched for the parents for at least a year. They contacted the maternal grandfather and the paternal grandmother, and they worked with Nevada social workers as well as police in both Concord and Las Vegas.

Declarations of due diligence were filed in the juvenile court summarizing the additional steps taken to find the absent parents.[5] The Bureau searched several databases, including ones for the Department of Motor Vehicles and one with information about Medi-Cal recipients. Letters were sent to the parents’ last known address in Concord. The Bureau also checked the names of inmates in all the county jails of California, and it checked state prisons in California, Nevada, Arizona, Oregon, and Utah.

2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the Bureau exercised due diligence to locate the parents.
   

Mother and Father both argue that the juvenile court’s July 2020 jurisdictional findings should be reversed because the Bureau did not provide substantial evidence that it exercised due diligence to locate either parent. (In re S.K. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 29, 36 [due diligence findings reviewed for substantial evidence].) They are mistaken.

“Parents are entitled to due process notice of juvenile court proceedings affecting the care and custody of their children, and the absence of due process notice to a parent is a ‘fatal defect’ in the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. [Citation.] Due process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’ [Citation.] The means employed to give a party notice for due process purposes must be such as one, desirous of actually informing the party, might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.” (In re Claudia S. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 236, 247.) “If the whereabouts of a parent are unknown, the issue becomes whether due diligence was used to locate the parent. [Citations.] The term ‘reasonable or due diligence’ ‘ “denotes a thorough, systematic investigation and inquiry conducted in good faith.” ’ [Citation.] Due process notice requirements are deemed satisfied where a parent cannot be located despite a reasonable search effort and the failure to give actual notice will not render the proceedings invalid.” (Ibid.)

We begin by observing that substantial circumstantial evidence suggests that the parents were aware of the initiation of dependency proceedings and intentionally did not intervene. After Mother first reported domestic abuse to Concord police, she said she had been “hesitant to make a police report for domestic violence because [Father] had told her that [social services] would take the baby away from her if she was involved in a domestic case.” The parents later claimed that they had no idea the baby had been taken into Bureau custody because Mother had left the baby with the paternal grandmother. The paternal grandmother claimed, though, that she had no idea where the family was during their absence. Yet she created a GoFundMe page for them in April 2020 and also contacted the Bureau within an hour of the family being found to request placement. Assuming the parents were in contact with the paternal grandmother, who herself had been contacted by the Bureau, there is every reason to believe that the parents knew their baby son had been placed in protective custody. To put it differently, it is hard to find people who do not want to be found. At the very least, the Bureau’s repeated contact with the paternal grandmother was evidence of a good faith effort to contact the parents. (In re Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 247.)

The parents downplay the allegations that they fled the state to avoid jurisdiction, and they quibble with some of the many efforts the Bureau took to try to find them. For example, Father faults the Bureau for not obtaining documents from legal proceedings in Nevada that might have revealed the parents’ current address. But the record reveals that the parents were transitory, and that even when the Bureau obtained an address the parents were not present when investigators arrived. Father also claims that no Nevada-specific databases were searched, but in fact the Bureau checked names of people in prison in that state. For her part, Mother complains that the Bureau apparently did not follow up with her relatives in Mississippi, and she claims that the Bureau also did not do enough to track her down using Nevada court records or to coordinate search efforts with Nevada law enforcement. Again, though, the Bureau was in contact with both the maternal grandfather and Nevada authorities but was unable to locate the parents despite diligent efforts.

The cases upon which the parents rely are inapposite, both because they involved parents who had less reason to know there were ongoing dependency proceedings and because the social-services agencies did far less to locate those parents. In In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, for example, the social worker did not reach out to the absent father’s relatives until two months after a dependency petition was filed, and even then did not ask about the father’s whereabouts, only about possible placement with a relative. (Id. at pp. 706, 713.) Only months later, after the mother’s reunification services had been terminated, was the relative asked about where the father was. (Id. at p. 713.) The relative told the social worker that the father was in Mexico and provided a telephone number, and the social worker called and left two voicemails with no response and did not follow up. (Id. at p. 708.) When the father was located after the relative told him to call the social-services agency, he acknowledged that he had not seen his son in more than a year, but only because the mother had not provided him any information about the child’s whereabouts. (Id. at pp. 709, 713.) The appellate court found that the father had made “a prima facie showing that the [social-services agency] made little to no effort to give him notice until it was poised to terminate parental rights” and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the father’s petition under section 388. (Daniel F., at pp. 715–716.) Father in these proceedings says the Bureau’s efforts were similar to those in Daniel F. because there, the social-services agency did not search Mexico-specific databases despite having been told the father was in Mexico. (Id. at p. 713.) But that was only one of many identified shortcomings in that case, whereas here the database searches were one of several active steps that social workers took to find the parents.

Mother and Father rely on other cases where the social-services agencies failed to follow up on the most likely sources of information about a parent’s whereabouts. (In re D.R. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 583, 591–593 [social-services agency failed to ask cooperative relatives to access social-media accounts where they had contact with the missing father, and automatic reversal was required in any event because agency also failed to comply with the Hague Service Convention]; In re Arlyne A. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 591, 598–599 [social-services agency ignored information from a minor’s attorney and grandparents and also “failed to take the simple and most direct step of calling directory assistance”]; David B. v. Superior Court (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1010, 1016 [social-services agency knew that the father was in the Marines yet “failed to take the one step which patently appeared to hold the most promise of locating [him]—an inquiry addressed to that organization”].) Mother apparently claims that the California databases the Bureau searched were inadequate because the Bureau knew that the family was in Nevada. But the available evidence was that the family had only recently located to that state, making it reasonable to search California databases. Mother further claims that the Bureau should have searched Nevada court records regarding her arrest there. It does appear, though, that the Bureau was in contact with Las Vegas authorities and was able to track down possible addresses for Mother by other means, but that the family was leading a transitory life and was hard to contact even with available addresses.

Finally, we reject Mother’s brief argument that notice was insufficient under section 291, subdivision (a)(9), which requires notice to an “adult relative” if the there is no parent residing in California or the parent’s residence is unknown. “An appellate court ordinarily will not consider challenges based on procedural defects or erroneous rulings where an objection could have been but was not made in the trial court,” and dependency proceedings “are not exempt from this forfeiture doctrine.” (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) As both parents were able to participate with counsel at later hearings and could have, but did not, argue that notice had not been properly given, they have forfeited their statutory notice argument. (Ibid.) Although an appellate court has the discretion to address issues not raised in the juvenile court, “in dependency proceedings, where the well-being of the child and stability of placement is of paramount importance, that discretion ‘should be exercised rarely and only in cases presenting an important legal issue.’ ” (Ibid.)

3. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err When It Proceeded While the Parents’ Whereabouts Were Unknown.
   

We also reject the parents’ related argument that the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings should be set aside because the court should not have proceeded while the parents’ whereabouts were unknown.

Mother and Father both rely on In re Baby Boy M. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 588, but that case is distinguishable. There, the only information the social-services agency had about a baby was that his mother had given him to the father at a train station a few days after his birth, and the father intended to take him to Georgia. (Id. at pp. 593–594, 600.) Because the juvenile court thus had no evidence about the baby’s current care, protection, training, and personal relationships (Fam. Code, § 3421, subd. (a)(2)(B)), it was at most unclear whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. (Baby Boy M., at p. 600.) The court nonetheless ordered the baby detained, issued a protective-custody warrant for him, and then proceeded to sustain a petition as to the boy, declare him a dependent minor, and identified foster care as his permanent plan. (Id. at pp. 594–596.) The appellate court held that “prudential considerations” mandated that the juvenile court should not have held jurisdiction or disposition hearings before the baby was located. (Id. at p. 601.) It was proper to issue a protective-custody warrant for the baby, the court held, but the juvenile court should have waited until the baby was present or his location known in order to avoid “decisionmaking by the court that may ultimately prove not in the child’s best interests.” (Id. at p. 601.)

Here, by contrast, although the juvenile court held a jurisdiction hearing in the parents’ absence, it had detailed information at that time about Mother’s arrest for hurting Younger Sister. (See In re Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 246 [“[a] juvenile court is statutorily empowered to assume dependency jurisdiction over a child any time it determines a minor is described by any one of” subds. (a)–(j) of § 300].) And unlike in Baby Boy M., the juvenile court declined to hold a dispositional hearing until the children were located. And it held a new jurisdictional hearing, based on subsequent petitions, after the family was located.

Because the juvenile court in this case delayed holding a dispositional hearing, this case stands in stark contrast to In re Claudia S., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th 236, cited by both parents. There, a social-services agency contacted a mother after receiving a report of domestic violence with the father, but the mother left for Mexico with her children before the initiation of proceedings. (Id. at p. 242.) Despite having notice that the mother and her children had left the country, the social-services agency proceeded to file dependency petitions, and the juvenile court held a detention hearing, jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, and six-month and twelve-month review hearings. (Id. at pp. 241–242.) When the family was located in the United States more than a year after the start of dependency proceedings, they were all doing well, with no current reports of domestic violence. (Id. at pp. 242–243.) The children were nonetheless placed in foster care, and the juvenile court ordered reunification services and a permanent plan of foster care. (Id. at p. 243.) The appellate court reversed all orders following the detention hearing and directed the juvenile court to conduct a new jurisdiction hearing based on present conditions. (Id. at p. 252.) The court stated that at the jurisdiction hearing, “there was no reason for the court to do anything more than issue citations for the parents to appear and ultimately issue warrants for the parents and the children.” (Id. at p. 250.) The hearings where the juvenile court ordered reunification services and then later terminated them for lack of progress “constituted ‘a fiction . . . to move the case toward final resolution’ because the [social-services agency] never detained the children and the parents never received any services.” (Ibid.) Again, this contrasts with the situation here where the juvenile court issued protective warrants, delayed a dispositional hearing until after the family’s whereabouts were known, and held a new jurisdictional hearing on subsequent petitions after the family was located.

Father seeks reversal so that “the juvenile court [can] conduct a new properly-noticed jurisdiction and disposition hearing in which [he] has the opportunity [to] meaningfully participate therein.” Both parents received such hearings when the juvenile court conducted them on the subsequent petitions. We reject the parents’ arguments that the juvenile court improperly proceeded in their absence.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jurisdictional Findings that the Parents Neglected a Sibling.
   

Mother and Father next argue that Older Brother and Younger Sister were not children described by section 300, subdivision (j), regarding abuse or neglect of a sibling, a question we review for substantial evidence. (In re D.B. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 320, 328.) Because sufficient evidence supports the jurisdictional findings, we reject the parents’ arguments.

1. Applicable law.

A child is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court if “[t]he child’s sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a) [serious physical harm], (b) [failure to protect], (d) [sexual abuse], (e) [severe physical abuse of child under five], or (i) [cruelty], and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions. The court shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (§ 300, subd. (j), italics added.) In other words, the social-services agency must show both that a child’s sibling suffered abuse or neglect as defined by the statute and that the child is currently at risk of abuse. “In enacting section 300, subdivision (j), the Legislature intended ‘ “to expand the grounds for the exercise of jurisdiction as to children whose sibling has been abused or neglected.” ’ ” (In re D.B., supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at p. 328.)

The juvenile court sustained allegations in the subsequent petitions that the parents had failed to reunify with the children’s baby brother and that Father had failed to reunify with two older half siblings. Mother and Father both concede, for purposes of this appeal, that the first prong of section 300, subdivision (j) was met—i.e., that the children had siblings who had been abused as defined by the statute.

Both parents challenge the second prong of the statute. That is, they contend that there was insufficient evidence that Older Brother and Younger Sister were currently at substantial risk of abuse or neglect. In sustaining the subsequent petitions, the juvenile court stated that it relied on evidence in the social worker’s reports. The jurisdiction/disposition report recounted the parents’ history of domestic violence and the fact they were found together with the children when the family was located in Nevada despite claims they were not living together. Las Vegas police had been called to their residence as recently as May 2021 because of a “physical confrontation,” and it was clear they were participating in a “violent relationship.” Given this substantial evidence of violence when the children were in the parents’ custody, there was sufficient evidence that the children were at substantial risk of abuse or neglect under section 300, subdivision (j).

3. Substantial Evidence Supports the Dispositional Order Placing the Children in Out-of-home Care.
   

Mother and Father next argue that that the dispositional orders removing the children from their custody should be reversed because they were not supported by substantial evidence. They are again mistaken.

A child adjudged a dependent minor shall not be taken from the physical custody of his or her parents unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence that there “is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We review a dispositional order removing a child from parental custody for substantial evidence, keeping in mind the juvenile court was required to make its finding based on clear-and-convincing evidence. (In re I.R. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 510, 520.) Removal “is a last resort, to be considered only when the child would be in danger if allowed to reside with the parent. The law requires that a child remain in parental custody pending the resolution of dependency proceedings, despite the problems that led the court to take jurisdiction over the child, unless the court is clearly convinced that such a disposition would harm the child.” (In re Henry V. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 522, 525.)

At the dispositional hearing, the juvenile court found “that the parents have engaged in multiple acts of . . . domestic violence in the presence of [Younger Sister] and [Older Brother].” And Mother continued to place herself at risk for domestic violence, according to the juvenile court: “They [Mother and Father] claim that they were no longer living together, but I don’t find that to be credible. [¶] Throughout this case they have been together, and it is clear that they continue to be in a relationship and, therefore, continue to expose the children to a domestic violence potential.”

Mother and Father point to evidence they were at times cooperative with social workers and accuse the Bureau of failing to provide a less restrictive placement. But at the dispositional hearing the juvenile court observed that the Bureau at that time did “not know where [Mother] live[d] and [was] unable to reach her or contact her by phone, so they are not able to evaluate any services effectively that she has engaged in. And, more importantly, whether she has learned anything from those services, and they cannot verify the safety of the children if they were to be returned.” (Italics added.) Given the totality of the evidence before the juvenile court and the parents’ general lack of cooperativeness, it was reasonable to infer that the children could not be safely placed with either parent “in the hope that [they] would comply with court orders or [Bureau] supervision.” (In re John M. (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 1117, 1127.) Substantial evidence supports the dispositional order.

4. Although the Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Bypassing Services for the Parents, Mother’s Separate Appeal May Undermine the Ruling as to Her.

Mother and Father also argue that the juvenile court erred when it opted to bypass reunification services for them under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) (Father) and (11) (both parents), a question we review for substantial evidence. (In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 196.)

1. Applicable law.

When a child is removed from the custody of his or her parents, the juvenile court must order reunification services to the parents unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (§ 361.5, subds. (a) & (b).) Section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11) provide exceptions to the provision of services where a parent has failed to reunify with another child (subd. (b)(10)) or where the parental rights to another child were terminated (subd. (b)(11)) if the court finds that the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent.” There are thus two findings that must be made for the exceptions to apply: A parent has failed to reunify or had parental rights terminated as to another child and the parent has not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the other child’s removal. “The ‘no reasonable effort’ clause provides a means of mitigating a harsh rule that would allow the court to deny services based only upon the parent’s prior failure to reunify with the child’s sibling ‘when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked toward correcting the underlying problems.’ ” (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.) The focus on whether the parent has “subsequently” made reasonable efforts to treat problems that led to removal of the sibling “refers to reasonable efforts made since the removal of the sibling,” and not to reasonable efforts made since reunification services or parental rights were terminated as to the sibling. (Id. at p. 98.)

When an exception applies under subdivision (b)(10) or (b)(11), the court shall not order reunification services unless it finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) In other words, “ ‘ “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources,” ’ ” and it is the parent’s burden to change that assumption. (In re William B. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1220, 1227.)

Mother and Father both argue that the exceptions do not apply to them and that, even if they did apply, they nonetheless showed that reunification would be in the children’s best interest.

2. The Parents Did Not Make Reasonable Efforts to Address Problems Leading to the Removal of the Baby Brother or Older Half Siblings.
   

1. Bypass of Services to Mother.

The juvenile court found that the exception to providing reunification services applied to Mother because her parental rights had been terminated as to the children’s baby brother and because she had not made a reasonable effort to address the problems that led to the brother’s removal. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) Without conceding the validity of the order terminating her parental rights over the baby brother, Mother acknowledges that there was substantial evidence of the first prong of the exception to reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11). She notes, however, that her appeal from that order is currently pending before this court (supra, No. A164078). She argues that if this court were to reverse the order, the order bypassing services in these proceedings would be “without a legal basis.”

The Bureau argues that Mother waived the issue by failing to raise it below. But her trial attorney specifically stated that Mother objected to the bypass of reunification services. On the merits, the Bureau stresses that the juvenile court was permitted to rely on the order terminating parental rights to the baby brother when it ordered that services be bypassed in these proceedings. (Riverside County Dept. of Public Social Services v. Superior Court (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 483, 488–489.) To be clear, the juvenile court properly relied on the order terminating Mother’s parental rights to the baby brother, which was unchallenged and had been final for months at the time of the order bypassing services. (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11) [bypass provision applies where parental rights have been “permanently severed” as to a sibling or half sibling].) But that was no longer true after this court permitted the parents to file a late notice of appeal based on their representations that their parental rights had been terminated as to the baby brother in their absence and without their knowledge, and that social workers told the paternal grandmother she could not participate in proceedings because the baby had died. (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App. 4th 976, 988, fn. 5 [finality required for application of bypass provision based on termination of parental rights].) We appreciate the need for prompt resolution of dependency proceedings and regret that our decision will delay permanency for Older Brother and Younger Sister. But under the unique circumstances of this case we agree with Mother that no selection-and-implementation hearing should be held until the appeal regarding the baby brother is resolved. We direct that no selection-and-implementation hearing be held regarding Mother until the remittitur issues in A164078. We nonetheless address her other arguments, as they are relevant to issues that will likely arise on remand.

Mother also contends that the second prong of the bypass exception did not apply. That is, she argues there was insufficient evidence that she had not “made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling.” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) In ordering that reunification services be bypassed for Mother, the juvenile court noted that the court had sustained a dependency petition as to the children’s baby brother because Mother’s untreated bipolar condition posed a severe risk to the infant, she had not sought prenatal care, and she had engaged in ongoing domestic violence with Father. Then in these proceedings, the original petitions were sustained based in part on Mother’s arrest for domestic violence and abuse of Younger Sister. Yet Mother had not addressed these issue, as demonstrated by her arrest for domestic violence as recently as May 2021. The court further observed that although Mother had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, she “ha[d] not engaged in, at least verifiable or adequate, mental health services.”

Mother now points to evidence that she “had in fact completed at least one domestic violence course as well as [a] mental health evaluation, and . . . she had at least engaged in parenting classes.” But “the ‘reasonable effort’ language in the bypass provisions . . . [do not] mean that any effort by a parent, even if clearly genuine, to address the problems leading to removal will constitute a reasonable effort and as such render these [bypass] provisions inapplicable. It is certainly appropriate for the juvenile court to consider the duration, extent and context of the parent’s efforts, as well as any other factors relating to the quality and quantity of those efforts, when evaluating the effort for reasonableness. And while the degree of progress is not the focus of the inquiry, a parent’s progress, or lack of progress, both in the short and long term, may be considered to the extent it bears on the reasonableness of the effort made.” (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) Under this standard, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s decision to bypass reunification services for Mother.

2. Bypass of Services to Father.

The juvenile court bypassed services to Father based on the fact his parental rights had been terminated as to the children’s baby brother (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11)) and because he failed to reunify with two older half siblings (id., subd. (b)(10)), and because he had not made a reasonable effort to address the problems that led to the baby brother’s and half siblings’ removal. Father does not challenge the finding that he failed to reunify with the older half siblings, and therefore bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), would be appropriate even if we were to reverse the termination of Father’s parental rights as to the baby brother.

Father contends, however, that he “made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the . . . half sibling[s].” (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(11).) The juvenile court noted that in the older half siblings’ case, the court substantiated allegations of domestic violence. The court stated it was “disturbing to note that [Father] has been engaging in domestic violence with intimate partners for almost a decade.” And the court concluded that Father “continues his dysfunctional relationship with [Mother] despite multiple acts of domestic violence. As I’ve articulated already, I believe they are still together and have been the entire time despite their denials.” Father’s relationship with the older half siblings’ mother “mirror[ed] his relationship” with Mother, according to the juvenile court, yet there was no evidence that Father had completed a domestic violence class.

Father now points to isolated actions he took to address the problems that led to his other children’s removal. But when we consider the duration, extent and context of those efforts, they fall far short of showing he took reasonable efforts under the bypass provisions. (R.T. v. Superior Court, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 914.) The juvenile court did not err in bypassing reunification services for Father.

3. Providing Services Would Not Be in the Children’s Best Interest.
   

The parents argue that even if the bypass provisions applied to them, the juvenile court nonetheless should have ordered that services be provided because they were in the children’s best interest. (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) Again, once the juvenile court found that the bypass provisions applied, it was the parents’ burden to change the legislative assumption that services should not be provided by showing that services would serve the children’s best interests. (In re William B., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) The parents did not provide any affirmative evidence that this would be the case.

Mother and Father now essentially repeat the evidence of attempts they made to work on issues related to the siblings’ removal, as well as positive visitation experiences, and argue that this also shows it would be in the children’s best interest to provide services. We disagree and reject their arguments.

5. There Was No Error in Declining to Place the Children with the Paternal Grandmother.
   

Mother and Father next argue that the Bureau somehow failed to properly evaluate the paternal grandmother for relative placement, but they are mistaken.

True, where a child is removed from a parent’s physical custody, “preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement.” (§ 361.3, subd. (a).) In determining whether relative placement is appropriate, the social worker and juvenile court shall consider several factors, including the child’s best interest, the parents’ and relative’s wishes, placement of siblings in the same home, the nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the safety of the relative’s home. (§ 361.3, subd. (a)(1)–(8); In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 11–12.) But there is every indication that the Bureau did, in fact, evaluate the paternal grandmother for placement.

Mother and Father both stress that they requested placement with the paternal grandmother and that the grandmother likewise requested placement of the children with her. But “[t]he relative placement preference . . . is not a relative placement guarantee.” (In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 798.) The jurisdiction/disposition report prepared after the family was located summarized the evaluation of the grandmother’s home for possible placement of the children’s baby brother and listed all the reasons the Bureau was concerned about placement of the brother with her. Both parents apparently fault the Bureau for not doing a more thorough assessment in this case and the juvenile court for not making findings on the record why it was not placing the children with the paternal grandmother. (Cf. § 361.3, subd. (e).) To the extent there was any error in the procedures used, the error was harmless because “the record contains ample evidence that the preference [for relative placement] was overridden in this case.” (In re Joseph T., supra, at p. 798 [failure to afford relative-placement preference to aunt and failure of court to state on record reasons for denying placement were harmless errors because of “compelling reasons” not to place child with relative regardless of her qualifications].)

There was ample evidence that the paternal grandmother provided inconsistent and false information to the Bureau and did not seek immediate medical care for the baby brother. Father’s two older sons had been removed from the grandmother’s care because of two incidents of domestic violence that she had not reported to the Bureau, and she also denied there was domestic violence between Mother and Father even though Mother had a chipped tooth, bruised lip, and other signs of injury when she gave the grandmother custody of the baby brother. Given all this information, it is not reasonably probable that any findings on the relative-placement preference would have been favorable to appellants. (In re Joseph T., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 798.)

We also reject Mother’s argument that the Bureau and juvenile court did not adequately consider an uncle Father identified as a possible placement. The social worker testified that she had been in touch with him and other relatives but had been told not to start the formal ICPC process until after the disposition hearing. Mother complains that nothing was preventing the Bureau from initiating the process before the disposition hearing. But even if we assume error, reversal of the disposition order would not help the parents since presumably the Bureau already has begun the process following disposition.

6. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When Reducing Visitation.
   

Finally, we reject the parents’ arguments that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it reduced their visitation with the children from twice a week to one hour per month. As they both acknowledge, where a juvenile court bypasses reunification services, continued visitation with the parents is discretionary (§ 361.5, subd. (f)), and we review the court’s visitation order for abuse of discretion. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 459.) Both parents point to evidence of the positive experience with visitation. But this evidence falls far short of showing that the juvenile court’s visitation order was inappropriate, let alone that it fell outside the bounds of reason.

III.
Disposition

Father’s petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. The stay of the juvenile court’s selection-and-implementation hearing is dissolved as to Father only upon finality of the opinion as to this court.

Mother’s petition for an extraordinary writ is granted as follows. No selection-and-implementation hearing shall be held as to Mother’s parental rights until after the remittitur issues in A164078 or until after the consideration of any additional evidence that would establish other grounds for bypass of reunification services. If the order terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed in the separate appeal, any stay of the hearing shall be lifted upon the issuance of the remittitur. If, however, it is reversed, the juvenile court shall hold a further hearing to determine the appropriate action to take. To be clear, nothing in this opinion shall preclude the juvenile court from further proceedings against Mother pending the outcome of A164078.

This opinion shall become final within three court days after it is filed. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Banke, J.

_________________________

East, J. *

*Judge of the Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

J.G. v. Superior Court A163895

[1] All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

[2] The paternal grandmother appeared, and the parties briefly discussed her pending section 388 petition. The juvenile court continued the hearing on her petition so that the Bureau could hold visitation sessions between the children and the grandmother. The court ultimately denied the grandmother’s petition, and the denial is the subject of No. A164484.

[3] By order filed on February 23, 2022, this court issued a stay of the scheduled March 1 hearing so that the court could rule on the petitions before any hearing is held.

[4] The Bureau contends that the parents forfeited the UCCJEA argument by failing to raise it in the juvenile court. (E.g., In re J.W., supra, 53 Cal.App.5th at p. 367 [because UCCJEA does not govern fundamental jurisdiction, UCCJEA cannot be raised for first time on appeal].) Although Father’s counsel did not specify the UCCJEA, counsel did raise the issue of jurisdiction and we thus conclude he sufficiently preserved the issue for appellate review.

[5] The record in these proceedings includes only the due diligence report conducted on Mother. On its own motion, the court takes judicial notice of the due diligence report conducted on Father, which is filed in No. A164078, regarding the children’s baby brother.