Filed 4/20/22 In re A.C. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Siskiyou)

----

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed in this case on March 22, 2022, be modified as follows:

On page 18, last paragraph, remove the second sentence beginning with “When the social worker” and replace with the following:

When the social worker spoke with D.C., D.C. initially lied about his whereabouts and stated repeatedly that he was currently in treatment at the Visions of the Cross in Redding, and then eventually admitted that he had in fact returned home several times during his treatment period.

This modification does not change the judgment.

The petition for rehearing is denied.

FOR THE COURT:

/S/

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

/S/

MAURO, J.

/S/

RENNER, J.

Filed 3/22/22 In re A.C. CA3 (unmodified opinion)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Siskiyou)

----

Appellant K.C. is married to the half-brother of the minor’s mother, S.K. (mother). Mother had an extensive child welfare history and reportedly did not feel she could provide for the minor. Because K.C. was willing to care for the minor, mother stated she intended for the minor to live with K.C. and the half-brother. K.C. arrived at the hospital shortly after the minor was born and was permitted to take the minor pursuant to a safety plan prohibiting the half-brother from living in the family home due to his substance abuse, mental health concerns, and criminal history. The probate court subsequently issued an ex parte order appointing K.C. the temporary guardian of the minor, but a social worker informed K.C. that the Agency would not support K.C.’s request for guardianship and would be seeking to place the minor into protective custody.

At a detention hearing, the juvenile court appointed counsel for K.C. Later, at a continuation of the hearing, K.C. said she considered herself to be the minor’s mother. She said she had been told that if the father was unknown and she treated the minor as her own she could complete a voluntary declaration of parentage (VDOP) form. She obtained a VDOP form, had mother’s signature notarized, and mailed the signed form to the Department of Child Support Services (DCSS). K.C. said there was an upcoming hearing on her request for guardianship and she hoped to become the minor’s permanent guardian. But the juvenile court ordered the minor detained, finding among other things that continuance of the minor in the home of K.C. was contrary to the minor’s welfare.

Daniel R. (Daniel) came forward and said he was the biological father of the minor. He said he and mother wanted to have an opportunity to receive services in order to gain custody of the minor. He appeared at the contested jurisdiction hearing and testified that he recently signed a VDOP. Over K.C.’s objection, the juvenile court declared Daniel the presumed father and appointed counsel for him. At the continuation of the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court noted the probate court had terminated the temporary guardianship, so K.C. no longer had the rights of a guardian. The juvenile court also determined K.C.’s VDOP was not valid.

The juvenile court ultimately declared the minor a dependent of the court.

K.C. now appeals from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional, dispositional, and postdispositional orders, contending (1) the juvenile court erred in finding she is not the minor’s legal parent and lacks standing to participate in the dependency proceedings; (2) the juvenile court should have found that she is a presumed parent; (3) there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Daniel is the minor’s presumed father; (4) the juvenile court improperly denied her right to be represented by counsel, to contest the minor’s removal from her custody, and to receive reunification services; (5) the juvenile court’s denial of her right to contest the jurisdictional and dispositional orders violated due process; (6) there is insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minor if left in her custody and therefore the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction over the minor; (7) there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s orders detaining the minor and removing the minor from her custody; (8) even if removal of the minor was proper, the juvenile court nevertheless erred when it failed to order the Siskiyou County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to provide her with reunification services and visitation; and (9) even if we conclude she did not have standing as the minor’s parent or guardian, we must nevertheless find the juvenile court abused its discretion when it concluded it could not order visitation between her and the minor.

Finding that none of K.C.’s contentions have merit, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.

BACKGROUND

Mother’s child welfare history included substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of prenatal care, resulting in the removal of seven other children. Mother escaped an abusive relationship and had been living with K.C. and her half-brother D.C. in Siskiyou County for a couple of weeks before giving birth to the minor in Sacramento County in August 2020.

When the minor was born, both mother and the minor tested positive for methamphetamine and THC. Mother refused to provide information regarding the minor’s biological father. K.C. took the minor home under a safety plan prohibiting D.C. from living in the family home. The safety plan was agreed to and signed by mother, K.C., D.C., and Sacramento County social worker Hennie Weiss. Among other things, D.C. had 2017 convictions for assault with a deadly weapon after he hit his neighbor with a baseball bat. He also had a recent arrest for driving under the influence and domestic violence. D.C. and K.C. had been involved in a domestic violence incident in June 2020 during which D.C. punched a television and threw a lamp at K.C., hitting her in the arm.

Siskiyou County social worker Tammy Stewart conducted a home visit on August 28, 2020, and noted that D.C. was present in the home contrary to the safety plan. D.C. explained that he was not living in the home but rather sleeping in his truck parked outside the home. D.C. and K.C. informed Stewart they were not separating and intended to stay married.

On October 16, 2020, pursuant to a request from the Siskiyou County Superior Court, the Agency conducted an investigation regarding K.C.’s suitability for guardianship of the minor. D.C. was not present during a home visit conducted by Siskiyou County social worker Aimee Franks on October 21, 2020. K.C. informed Franks that she was filing for presumptive parent status and had only filed for guardianship as a backup. K.C. also informed Franks that D.C., who was on felony probation for the assault conviction, was in voluntary inpatient treatment for relapse prevention and mental health services. She stated D.C. was scheduled to be discharged in December 2020 but, because he was doing so well in treatment, it was possible his stay would be extended or he would look into another program. K.C. noted that she had previously been a foster parent but was no longer eligible due to D.C.’s criminal history. Franks expressed concern over D.C.’s mental health and substance abuse issues and what would happen when he returned home from treatment. K.C. stated she would divorce D.C. if necessary in order to keep the minor in her care. When Franks explained that the concern was D.C. being in the household, not whether they were married, K.C. stated she would do whatever she needed to do to keep the minor in her care. When asked whether she intended to allow the minor to return to mother’s care at some point, K.C. said she would not, noting mother would never get it together and there was no value in making sure the minor had any contact with mother.

Social worker Franks spoke with D.C., who stated he was participating in a 90-day treatment program. D.C. stated he had mental health issues his whole life and had been sober since February 2020. He denied that the recent arrest for battery on a spouse involved domestic violence with K.C. With regard to the minor, D.C. stated he did not know how K.C. ended up bringing the minor home. He agreed he should not be involved in the guardianship due to his participation in the substance abuse treatment program, but he supported the guardianship as to K.C.

On October 23, 2020, two social workers and a police officer went to K.C.’s home. Social worker Franks informed K.C. that, after reviewing all available information, the Agency would be placing the minor into protective custody. K.C. became upset, telling the social worker that, as the presumptive parent, the minor could not be removed from her care. Eventually, K.C. released the minor to the social worker.

K.C. later contacted social worker Franks and asked why she would not be an appropriate guardian of the minor. Franks explained that there were concerns regarding D.C.’s domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental health issues and whether K.C.’s household would be a safe and stable environment for the minor. K.C. turned the telephone over to mother, who said she wanted K.C. to take care of the minor while mother got her life together.

On October 27, 2020, the Agency filed a dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b), alleging among other things failure to protect the minor due to mother’s substance abuse and issues related to K.C. and D.C., including domestic violence and D.C.’s substance abuse and mental health issues.

At the detention hearing on October 28, 2020, the juvenile court adopted the recommended findings and orders, including that continuance of the minor in the home of the parent or temporary guardian was contrary to the minor’s welfare and that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal.

At a continued hearing on October 29, 2020, K.C.’s counsel noted there were two issues at hand: parentage and detention. K.C. testified that she was present during the birth of the minor and that she named the minor using her last name. K.C. left the hospital with the minor pursuant to an infant child release form authorizing release of the minor to her as the authorized caregiver, as well as the safety plan.

K.C. testified that she took the minor into her home, treated the minor as if the minor were her own daughter, and acted as if she were the minor’s mother. K.C. spoke with a pediatrician about some of the minor’s medical issues, took the minor to the emergency room, and kept up on the minor’s vaccinations and wellness checks.

K.C. said her husband D.C. was in residential drug treatment and was participating in drug court. She acknowledged D.C. had certain issues which made it unsafe for him to be around the minor. K.C. was willing to keep D.C. away from the minor if the Agency determined he was not an acceptable parent and she would relocate if necessary. She denied that Siskiyou County Child Protective Services ever asked her to participate in a family maintenance plan that would include keeping D.C. out of the home until he was deemed rehabilitated. She admitted that, on more than one occasion, D.C. was actually in her home while he was telling a social worker he was at residential drug treatment.

The juvenile court said it had several concerns, including that K.C. had problems with D.C. in the past that required her to seek help from law enforcement, D.C. was representing that he was at the drug treatment program when he was not, the residential treatment program’s policy allowed D.C. to leave any time he wanted which created concerns regarding the safety of the minor, and D.C. was not receiving mental health treatment as part of his residential drug treatment program. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, finding that continuance of the minor in the home of K.C. was contrary to the minor’s welfare and that the Agency made reasonable efforts to prevent the need for removal.

According to the Agency in a memorandum to the court dated November 3, 2020, Daniel said he was the biological father of the minor. Daniel reportedly expressed his frustration that K.C. told him twice she would bring the minor to see him but failed to do so. He confirmed his mailing address was the same as mother’s address. Daniel stated he was unaware that he had to be present at the birth of the minor if he wanted his name on the birth certificate, but he claimed the minor as his daughter, he was certain he was the biological father, and he planned to go to Butte County to sign a declaration of parentage to that effect.

Daniel appeared at the November 30, 2020 contested jurisdiction hearing and testified that he was the minor’s biological father and that he recently signed a VDOP. Daniel stated he was not married to mother and had not lived with the minor since birth, but he currently lived with mother and both he and mother wanted to participate in reunification services. He requested that the minor be placed with K.C. under a temporary guardianship and then ultimately returned to his and mother’s custody. He also confirmed that he wanted the minor to live with him in the event mother failed to participate in services. The juvenile court declared Daniel the presumed father.

The jurisdiction/disposition report stated that mother and Daniel were willing to participate in reunification services and that mother, who was a member of the Moorehead Rancheria of Maidu Indians (Tribe), had extensive support through her family and tribal communities. Mother reported that she was advised by K.C. not to contact or trust the Agency and that she did not have enough time to reunify. Mother requested that the case be transferred to her home county of Butte in order for her to participate in services and that the minor be placed in an ICWA[1]-approved home.

During a meeting between the social worker and mother on December 29, 2020, mother said she was in disbelief that K.C. had changed the minor’s last name to K.C.’s last name; mother did not realize K.C. planned to move the minor to Alabama and wipe mother out of the minor’s life.

When the social worker informed K.C. of the intent to transfer the case to Butte County, K.C. expressed her concern that the minor would be placed in another county “ ‘when I live in Siskiyou County and I am the only person that has made any attempts or efforts. . . . You are talking about removing a child from a county where her parents reside and trying to reunify her with a parent who has lost seven children to other people and Daniel is the biological father and has lost 4. I have paperwork of Daniel and [mother] giving me full custody.’ ” K.C. continued, “ ‘I am [the minor’s] legal parent and so is [mother] but she and Daniel have both given us full custody in the guardianship and in the custody case as well. I have been in [the minor’s] life since before she was born. My husband and I are doing all we can to bring her back home.’ ” K.C. and D.C. requested that the minor be returned to their care.

The social worker spoke with a representative of mother’s Tribe, who requested that the case be transferred to Butte County and that mother and Daniel be given reunification services. The Agency recommended the same and noted that, in the event reunification efforts failed, the permanent plan was adoption or a Tribal Customary Adoption with a tribal member. The proposed case plan included services for mother and Daniel but not for K.C.

At the contested jurisdiction hearing on February 8, 2021, social worker Timber Ortiz testified she never saw the VDOP purportedly signed by Daniel and did not check to confirm Daniel had submitted that document with the DCSS program following the court’s finding of presumed fatherhood.

K.C. testified mother contacted her before the birth of the minor and stated she did not want to keep the baby. Then, mother changed her mind and stated her desire to coparent the minor with K.C. if K.C. would support her. K.C. denied knowing Daniel was the minor’s biological father. K.C. gave the minor her last name and added the minor to her Medi-Cal.

K.C. further testified that, after the November 30, 2020 hearing when Daniel informed the court he had filed a VDOP, K.C. met with mother and Daniel twice to determine the best interests of the minor. The three agreed that they wanted the minor placed with K.C. With K.C.’s encouragement, mother and Daniel signed a parenting agreement. They also agreed that D.C. would need to complete a stepparent adoption and the parents ultimately signed a consent to stepparent adoption in D.C.’s favor.

K.C. testified that she put the minor on her medical insurance and made sure the minor was provided with medical care until the child was detained by the Agency. She took the minor to the hospital and told hospital staff she was the minor’s guardian and a presumptive parent. She treated the minor as if the minor were her own child, told her family about the minor, and referred to the minor as her child. K.C. testified D.C. started residential treatment approximately two weeks after the minor’s birth and was in inpatient treatment for 90 days. She requested that the juvenile court set aside the earlier finding that Daniel was the minor’s presumed father.

On February 22, 2021, at a continuation of the contested jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court heard extensive argument from all counsel. The juvenile court said K.C. did not meet any of the eligibility requirements under Family Code section 7573 for signing a VDOP. The juvenile court said the law does not allow a person to pick anyone they want to be the parent of a child, and that K.C.’s VDOP was not valid.

Regarding presumed parentage under Family Code section 7611, the juvenile court discussed subdivision (d), which requires that a person receive a child into their home and openly hold that child out as their natural child. The juvenile court found that although K.C. received the minor into her home, she did not hold the minor out as her natural child. Rather, she pursued guardianship. The Siskiyou County initial case plan stated that the minor was being placed with a legal guardian. K.C. submitted documentation including a parenting plan and adoption agreement indicating an intent to adopt. K.C.’s written statement indicated her plans prior to or at the minor’s birth were for guardianship. K.C. sought foster care aid that was inconsistent with her belief that she was a parent. According to the trial court, K.C. only started referring to herself as a parent based on the incorrect legal assumption that the VDOP established parentage.

The juvenile court also found that while mother may have indicated she wanted K.C. to take care of the minor while she got her life together, mother denied ever agreeing to allow K.C. to change the minor’s name or to move, and there was nothing in the evidence to suggest mother agreed that K.C. could be a second parent.

The juvenile court said Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) permitted the recognition of more than two parents, but only if limiting recognition to just two parents would be detrimental to the child based on factors including the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with parents who fulfilled the child’s needs for a substantial period of time. The juvenile court found that the stable-placement and substantial-period-of-time elements had not been met.

The juvenile court also addressed whether K.C. was a de facto parent because she assumed the role of the minor’s mother. The juvenile court rejected the contention because K.C. had not assumed the role of the minor’s mother for a substantial period of time. Noting that K.C.’s efforts to step in and be involved in the minor’s life were honorable, the juvenile court nevertheless concluded K.C. was not a legal parent. The juvenile court also denied K.C.’s request to vacate its prior finding that Daniel was a presumed father.

The juvenile court then turned to jurisdiction and disposition. ICWA expert Richard England, social worker Timber, and D.C. all testified. K.C. and her counsel were present during the proceedings and the juvenile court allowed them to cross-examine witnesses and provide the testimony of D.C. Counsel for K.C. was permitted to make arguments. The juvenile court declared the minor a dependent of the court and adopted the Agency’s recommended findings and orders as modified on the record.

On March 5, 2021, K.C. filed a request for de facto parent status. The juvenile court scheduled a hearing for March 22, 2021. Meanwhile, on March 12, 2021, the juvenile court ordered the State of California Department of Public Health, Vital Records, to correct the minor’s birth certificate by removing K.C.’s name from the “Name of Parent” portion of the birth certificate so that it reflected only mother’s name, and so that it set forth the minor’s correct full name, date of birth, and place of birth.

On March 22, 2021, the juvenile court conducted a hearing on the parties’ request to transfer the matter to Butte County and on K.C.’s request for de facto parent status. K.C. was present with her counsel. The juvenile court ordered the case transferred, including the de facto parent request.

On March 29, 2021, K.C. filed a timely notice of appeal from the juvenile court’s February 22, 2021 jurisdictional and dispositional orders. On May 11, 2021, K.C. filed an amended notice of appeal to include the juvenile court’s March 12, 2021 order after contested parentage hearing and its March 22, 2021 order transferring the case to Butte County.

DISCUSSION

I

K.C. contends the juvenile court erred when it found that she was not the minor’s legal parent and that she lacked standing to participate in the dependency proceedings. K.C. claims she established parentage by signing the VDOP and filing it with the Agency.

Family Code section 7611 provides that a person is presumed to be the natural parent of a child if the person meets the conditions identified in section 7570 et seq., which address the establishment of parentage by voluntary declaration. In particular, Family Code section 7573 provides that “a completed voluntary declaration of parentage that complies with this chapter and that has been filed with the Department of Child Support Services is equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child and confers on the declarant all rights and duties of a parent.” (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (d); see In re Raphael P. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 716, 722-723; accord, In re Liam L. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 739, 747.)

K.C. claims that, because she signed a VDOP that was properly filed and never formally challenged, the VDOP is equivalent to a judgment of parentage and therefore establishes that she is a legal parent of the minor. We disagree.

Family Code section 7573 provides that the following persons may sign a voluntary declaration of parentage: “(1) An unmarried woman who gave birth to the child and another person who is a genetic parent. [¶] (2) A married or unmarried woman who gave birth to the child and another person who is a parent under Section 7613 of a child conceived through assisted reproduction.” (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (a).) As the juvenile court correctly found, K.C. did not give birth to the minor, is not a genetic parent of the minor, and is not the parent of a child conceived through assisted reproduction, and therefore does not fall into any eligibility category. Thus, K.C. is not the minor’s legal parent by virtue of the VDOP.

K.C. argues the VDOP was accepted by the DCSS, was not challenged by the parties, and was never officially set aside by the juvenile court. The assertion ignores subdivision (d) of Family Code section 7573, which provides, “(d) Except as provided in Sections 7573.5, 7575, 7576, 7577, and 7580, a completed voluntary declaration of parentage that complies with this chapter and that has been filed with the Department of Child Support Services is equivalent to a judgment of parentage of the child and confers on the declarant all rights and duties of a parent.” (Italics added.) As discussed above, the VDOP completed by K.C. did not comply with the mandates of Family Code section 7573, subdivision (a). That the VDOP was not officially set aside is of no consequence. The juvenile court determined that K.C. was not a parent under the VDOP.

K.C. further asserts that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to determine whether the VDOP established her parentage over the minor. She argues the VDOP was equivalent to a parentage judgment pursuant to Family Code section 7573, subdivision (d). Therefore, the VDOP “is entitled to ‘res judicata’ effect” (In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 490). Because it was filed one day before the dependency petition was filed, she urges, the juvenile court was “bound by [the] prior parentage judgment” and was barred from concluding the VDOP did not establish her parentage over the minor. But Alexander P. is inapposite because here there was no prior or concurrent family court action or paternity judgment issued by the family court or any other court; there was only an invalid VDOP. The VDOP was not equivalent to a judgment of parentage because it did not comply with Family Code section 7573, subdivision (a). (Fam. Code, § 7573, subd. (d).)

Given our conclusion that the juvenile court did not err, we need not address K.C.’s assertion of prejudice or her challenge to the juvenile court’s order to remove her from the minor’s birth certificate.

II

K.C. next contends the juvenile court erred by not finding her to be a presumed parent pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).

“[A] woman is presumed to be the natural mother of a child if she ‘receives the child into [her] home and openly holds out the child as [her] natural child.’ (§ 7611[, subd. ](d).) [Footnote omitted.] ‘A [woman] who claims entitlement to presumed [mother] status has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence the facts supporting [her] entitlement. [Citation.] . . . The Family Code section 7611[, subdivision ](d) presumption, once it arises, “may be rebutted in an appropriate action only by clear and convincing evidence.” ’ [Citation.]” (E.C. v. J.V. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1084-1085; see Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).)

It is undisputed that K.C. received the minor into her home immediately after the minor’s birth, from August 2020 until October 23, 2020. Although K.C. took the minor into her home, she allowed D.C. to be in the home and around the minor in contravention of the safety plan. This caused the minor to be removed and placed into protective custody. Nevertheless, the juvenile court acknowledged that K.C. received the minor into her home. The juvenile court found, however, that K.C. did not hold the minor out as her natural child during that time. (Fam. Code, § 7611, subd. (d).)

“In determining whether an alleged parent has held a child out as his or her natural child, courts look to the conduct of the alleged parent: ‘whether the [woman] actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether [s]he paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with [her] ability to do so; whether [s]he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether [s]he sought to have [her] name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how long [s]he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that [s]he had acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom [s]he had acknowledged the child; whether [s]he provided for the child after it no longer resided with [her]; whether, if the child needed public benefits, [s]he had pursued completion of the requisite paperwork; and whether [her] care was merely incidental.’ [Citation.]” (E.C. v. J.V., supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1087.)

While the record makes plain that K.C. took action to obtain custody of the minor, had her name placed on the minor’s birth certificate, and did certain things to care for the minor while the minor was in her brief custody (such as taking the minor to the hospital and placing the minor on her Medi-Cal), there was no evidence she actively helped mother with prenatal care or paid for pregnancy and birth expenses. In addition, there is evidence that K.C. did not hold the minor out as her natural child during the time that the minor was in her care. The safety plan and the initial case plan both stated K.C. would be the minor’s guardian. K.C.’s written statement indicated she planned to be the minor’s guardian. K.C. obtained a temporary guardianship over the minor. The parenting plan and the adoption agreement submitted by K.C. were both inconsistent with her claim of natural parenthood, as was K.C.’s attempt to seek foster care aid.

On this record, the juvenile court did not err in finding that K.C. was not the minor’s presumed parent pursuant to Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).

III

K.C. contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Daniel was the minor’s presumed parent. K.C. cites In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 215, footnote 4, in support of her argument that she has standing to assert this contention because the juvenile court’s recognition of Daniel as a presumed parent can impact whether she should be recognized as a presumed parent. But E.E. is inapposite. It did not involve presumed parent status; instead, the footnote cited by K.C. in turn cited In re R.V. (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 837, 848-849, which stated that until parental rights are terminated, a parent retains a fundamental interest in her child’s custody that can be impacted by removal of a child from another parent. Because no such circumstances are present in this case, K.C. has not established standing to assert her challenge to Daniel’s presumed parent determination.

IV

K.C. further contends the juvenile court erred when it determined she lacked standing to participate in the proceedings, including the right to be represented by counsel, to contest the minor’s removal from her custody, and to receive reunification services. She claims she had standing by virtue of the fact that she was the minor’s legal guardian.

The Agency counters that K.C. forfeited this contention after failing to raise it in the juvenile court and, in any event, K.C. was afforded counsel and took advantage of the opportunities afforded to her and her counsel in the juvenile court.

Although the juvenile court determined at the contested jurisdiction hearing that the temporary guardianship had been terminated and K.C. no longer had the rights associated with guardianship, it nevertheless appointed counsel for her and allowed K.C. and her attorney to participate in the proceedings thereafter. The record does not support K.C.’s suggestion that she was denied such opportunities.

K.C. nevertheless argues the juvenile court incorrectly found the temporary guardianship had been terminated. She claims that because the probate court no longer had jurisdiction to terminate the guardianship, the guardianship remained in place and she was entitled to reunification services. We agree with her argument in part. It is true the probate court no longer had jurisdiction once the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction; but the guardianship nevertheless terminated by operation of law. K.C. was not entitled to reunification services.

We grant K.C.’s request for judicial notice (filed on July 22, 2021) of, among other things, the probate court’s November 25, 2020 order dismissing the temporary guardianship without prejudice. In that order, the probate court noted: “There is a pending related juvenile dependency proceeding in Siskiyou County.” The probate court’s dismissal of the guardianship occurred after the juvenile court had assumed jurisdiction. But temporary guardianships are governed by Probate Code section 2250 et seq., and section 2257 provides that the powers of a temporary guardian terminate at the earliest of the time the temporary guardian acquires notice that a guardian or conservator is appointed and qualified or “[t]hirty days after the appointment of the temporary guardian . . . or such earlier time as the court may specify in the order of appointment.” (Prob. Code, § 2257, subd. (a)(1)-(2).) The court may for good cause extend the time for the termination. (Prob. Code, § 2257, subd. (b).)

Here, the court issued an ex parte order granting K.C. temporary guardianship on August 27, 2020, and set a hearing to reconsider the temporary guardianship on October 7, 2020. The letters of temporary guardianship, issued that same day, stated the letters would expire “pending further order of the court.” Because the letters did not state an expiration date and the court did not extend the time for termination, K.C.’s temporary guardianship expired by operation of law 30 days after the appointment, on September 28, 2020. (Prob. Code, § 2257, subds. (a), (b).) The termination occurred prior to the filing of the dependency petition on October 27, 2020.

K.C.’s contention lacks merit.

V

In addition, K.C. asserts the juvenile court’s finding that she lacked standing and its denial of her right to contest the jurisdictional and dispositional orders violated her constitutional right to due process of law. But we have already determined that the juvenile court did not err in this regard and that K.C. and her attorney were given opportunities in this proceeding. K.C. has not established a violation of due process.

VI

Moreover, K.C. claims there was insufficient evidence of a substantial risk of serious physical harm to the minor if left in her custody and therefore the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency jurisdiction over the minor. She argues the juvenile court erroneously asserted dependency jurisdiction based on allegations having to do with mother even though the minor was in K.C.’s custody, not mother’s, when removed. The claim lacks merit.

“In reviewing the jurisdictional findings and the disposition, we look to see if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. [Citation.] In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court. [Citation.]” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193; accord, In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re Basilio T. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 155, 170.) If supported by substantial evidence, the judgment or finding must be upheld, even though substantial evidence may also exist that would support a contrary judgment and the dependency court might have reached a different conclusion had it determined the facts and weighed credibility differently. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)

A reviewing court may affirm a jurisdictional ruling if the evidence supports any of the counts concerning the minor. (In re Jonathan B. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 873, 875; In re Alexis E. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 438, 451.) Thus, dependency jurisdiction is appropriate where substantial evidence supports at least one jurisdictional finding, even if there are other findings that are not supported by substantial evidence. (In re Ashley B. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 968, 979.)

The petition alleged failure to protect the minor, under section 300, subdivision (b), due to mother’s substance abuse as well as issues related to K.C. and her husband, D.C., including domestic violence and D.C.’s substance abuse and mental health issues. Section 300, subdivision (b) provides in part that dependency jurisdiction is proper when the “child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, or the willful or negligent failure of the child’s parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child from the conduct of the custodian with whom the child has been left . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse.”

At the time mother handed over care of the minor to K.C. in the hospital, K.C. was neither a parent nor a guardian. K.C. was, at that point in time, a custodian with whom mother left the minor conditioned on a safety plan requiring that D.C. not reside in the home with K.C. Shortly thereafter, K.C. became the minor’s temporary guardian.

During the Agency’s subsequent guardianship investigation, the Agency learned that D.C. was in K.C.’s home just over a week after the safety plan was put in place. When the social worker spoke with D.C., who was supposed to be at the inpatient treatment facility, D.C. initially lied about his whereabouts and then eventually admitted that he had in fact returned home several times during his treatment period. Due to the Agency’s continuing concerns regarding the potential risk of harm to the minor in K.C.’s home, particularly when D.C. returned home after treatment, the minor was placed into protective custody on October 23, 2020.

By the time of the jurisdiction hearing four months later, however, the minor was in out-of-home placement and, as the juvenile court found, K.C. was neither a guardian nor a parent of the minor. Therefore, the juvenile court properly determined jurisdiction based on whether there was clear and convincing evidence of a substantial risk that the minor would suffer serious physical harm or illness as a result of the failure or inability of mother to adequately supervise or protect him. In that regard, the court relied on the December 2020 jurisdiction/disposition report and the October 2020 detention report, found true the allegations in the petition, and adopted the recommended findings and orders, which included that neither mother nor Daniel had made any progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care. The reports provide sufficient evidence to support those findings. Mother tested positive for methamphetamine at delivery, had limited prenatal care, had a significant child welfare history with seven other children involving the same issues, and had been in a domestically violent relationship with her boyfriend.

We similarly reject K.C.’s claim that there was insufficient evidence of a current risk of harm to the minor at the time of the February 2021 hearing. She argues D.C. had made progress since the minor’s detention in October 2020, and she was providing a safe environment for her one-year-old child. But, as we have previously discussed, the question is whether there was substantial evidence of a current risk of harm to the minor as to mother. The record establishes that there was.

Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings.

VII

K.C. also contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s orders detaining the minor and removing the minor from her custody. To the extent K.C. claims the Agency or the juvenile court failed to state facts in support of detention and removal, she forfeited such claims for failure to raise them in the juvenile court, given that she and her attorney were allowed to participate in the proceedings. (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 291-292; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 403; In re Christopher B. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 551, 558; In re Dakota S. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 494, 501-502.) In any event, as we have previously explained, there was sufficient evidence to detain the minor.

VIII

K.C. contends that, even assuming removal of the minor was proper, the juvenile court nonetheless erred when it failed to order the Agency to provide her with reunification services and visitation. K.C. argues she has not forfeited the issue for failing to raise it below because to do so would have been futile given the juvenile court’s finding that she lacked standing and, in any event, the Agency had an affirmative duty to fashion appropriate reunification and visitation plans.

In light of our conclusions that the juvenile court properly found at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing that K.C. was not the minor’s parent or guardian, she was not entitled to reunification services or visitation. (See § 361.5, subd. (a).)

IX

Finally, K.C. asserts that, even if we conclude she did not have standing as the minor’s parent or guardian, we must nonetheless find the juvenile court abused its discretion when, at the March 22, 2021 transfer-out hearing, it erroneously concluded it could not order visitation between her and the minor. She argues she was permitted to request visitation with the minor as an “other person having an interest in [the minor]” pursuant to section 388, subdivision (a)(1).

Section 388 allows a person having an interest in a dependent child of the juvenile court to petition the court, based on a change of circumstance or new evidence, for a modification of an order. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) Because K.C. filed no such petition, her contention lacks merit.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed. K.C.’s motion to treat the appeal as a writ petition is denied.

/S/

MAURO, J.

We concur:

/S/

BLEASE, Acting P. J.

/S/

RENNER, J.

[1] Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).