Filed 5/19/22 L.G. v. Super. Ct. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

L.G. (mother) seeks extraordinary writ relief from Alameda County Superior Court orders bypassing her reunification services and setting a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 to select a permanent plan for her daughters S.G. and R.G. Mother seeks to vacate the court’s order and asserts the juvenile court erred in not granting services because: (1) the claim of neglect was too general; (2) mother had made reasonable efforts; and (3) the court did not properly consider the best interests of one of mother’s children.

We conclude the juvenile court did not err and deny the writ petition on the merits.

Background

In August 2021, the police responded to a call from 12-year-old R.G., who was “in fear” for her and her one-year-old sister’s (S.G.) “safety due to their living conditions.” Upon entering the home, Oakland Police Officer Forest Klein was “immediately met with an extremely pungent, strong odor of ammonia and feces.” Officer Klein saw four small dogs and six small cats, “most emaciated with their spines and ribs visible.” The officer “observed visible feces on the floor, significant amounts of ants, fleas and cockroaches on the ground.” S.G. had “visible dirt on her face,” her “teeth were yellowed,” her clothing appeared “dirty, with dust, dirt, and hair,” she “appeared to have some bug bites on the rear of her neck,” and she had “animal feces” in her hair. R.G. also “had apparent flea bites to the rear of her neck.” Both children were transported to the hospital.

After documenting the condition of the home, the minors, and the various animals, officers arrested mother for willful cruelty to a child, failure to provide, cruelty to animals, and a failure to provide animal care. The officers noted mother only “continued to ask the condition of the pets” and “did not inquire on the condition or location” of R.G. and S.G.

The Alameda County Social Services Agency (Agency) filed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition[1] alleging a failure to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)), no provision for support (id., subd. (g)), and abuse of a sibling (id., subd. (j)). Specifically, the petition alleged mother had subjected minors to “an environment that endangers their physical and emotional safety” because mother did not clean the family home which resulted in an “infestation of cockroaches, fleas, and ants”; S.G.’s sleeping area was “covered in feces”; and R.G. felt “unsafe in the home and the condition of the home has caused R.G. to have thoughts of harming herself.” Mother had been “unwilling or unable to provide for the basic needs of the minors” and R.G. had not been to the doctor’s office in four years, and S.G. had not been since birth. Additionally, mother and father had a history of violence in their relationship and R.G. “has been present when the alleged father . . . repeatedly hit the mother,” necessitating R.G. having to call the police. Finally, parents had two other children previously removed and permanently placed by the Agency due to substance use issues and/or neglect. Services were bypassed as to one of those children, and while mother was offered services as to the other child, she “was unable to reunify” with him.

In its detention report, the Agency noted father’s whereabouts remained unknown and mother was currently incarcerated. The social worker had been unable to meet with mother but had left a voicemail message with the jail to schedule a time to speak with her. Past reports indicated mother “has an intellectual delay and learning challenges.” Under the circumstances regarding custody, the Agency indicated past harm included that mother’s home was “uninhabitable,” that mother was “unwilling or unable to provide” access to “routine medical care,” and mother and father had a history of physical violence including one incident where R.G. “had to intervene and call law enforcement.”

R.G. reported the “family home started to get dirty about a year ago.” She confirmed the “allegations and stated” the lack of cleaning “caused an infestation of cockroaches, fleas, and ants.” R.G. reported mother “has a ‘hoarding’ habit and would rearrange furniture but not clean. [R.G.] stated she sometimes wished she could sleep outside because she was scared of all the insects in the home.” Mother “talked to herself on the phone” often “rambling, but that there was no one on the other end of the line.” R.G. was “unaware of any mental health conditions that [mother] has been diagnosed with but stated she was aware that [mother] had some developmental delays.” R.G. “cooked frozen food for herself” and would “eat 1-2 meals a day.” R.G. and mother fed S.G. “fruit, baby food, and low fat milk.” R.G. was “last enrolled in school . . . in 2014” but was “supposed to be in the 7th grade.” She stated she had been “home-schooled since she was four years old.”

The detention report also included information on petitions filed on behalf of M.G. and H.G, the minor’s siblings.

M.G. had been declared a dependent of the court in June 2006. The court found mother had failed to protect M.G. (§ 300, subd. (b)), that the child had suffered severe physical abuse (id., subd. (e)) and that the child had been “subjected to . . . acts of cruelty” (id., subd. (i)). As relevant, the petition alleged, and the trial court found true, that mother, who “presents as cognitively impaired,” was “charged with [c]ruelty to a [c]hild by [e]ndangering [h]ealth”; when M.G. was removed he “had a strong smell of urine and a very wet diaper, as well as an untreated rash about this face and mouth.” He was “extremely dehydrated, thin and malnourished . . . [and] will suffer significant cognitive impairment and delay as a result of lack of proper nutrition.” Parents had “failed to seek appropriate medical care for the minor after [he] failed to gain weight.” The petition also alleged mother had been the victim of domestic violence by father and minor was “at risk as a result of the parents’ violent relationship and home environment.” The court bypassed services, parents’ rights were terminated in November 2006, and M.G. was subsequently adopted.

The court sustained a petition as to H.G., in June 2008, alleging mother had failed to protect (§ 300, subd. (b)) and that there had been abuse of a sibling (id., subd. (j)). Specifically, the petition alleged, and the court found true, that H.G. had been admitted to the hospital for a failure to thrive after he had “lost over 10% of his body weight since birth.” Mother received services until she indicated she “was no longer interested in pursuing . . . [r]eunification,” “stopped participating in all case plan activities and visitation” and stopped communicating with her social worker. The court subsequently terminated mother’s services and parental rights and H.G. was adopted.

The detention report also contained a prior section 300 petition as to R.G. from 2010. That petition alleged a failure to protect, because of father’s alcohol abuse, mother’s “cognitive delays . . . and . . . a history of untreated trauma,” and parents’ history of “displaying marginal and/or harmful parenting practices,” including their “history of domestic violence.” Parents received family maintenance services until October 2010.

In the instant case, the juvenile court found a prima facie showing had been made that S.G. and R.G. are children described by section 300, continuance in the home was contrary to the minors’ welfare, removal was necessary because there is substantial danger to the physical health of the children or the children are “suffering severe emotional damage, and there are no reasonable means to protect” them without removal.

In its jurisdiction/disposition report, the Agency noted S.G. and R.G. had been placed together and were “both adjusting well to their placement.” The Agency was “working on getting R.G. the necessary immunizations to begin school,” and S.G. “has been observed to be developmentally on track.”

The Agency recommended the allegations in the petition be found true, minors remain out of the home, and mother be bypassed for reunification services. The Agency recommended bypassing services because mother had two other children removed from her care. Mother was “bypassed for services for her oldest [child],” who was later adopted, and although mother “received six months of . . . services for [another child]” and “was in compliance with her case plan,” she later “indicated that she was no longer interested in pursuing . . . services,” and they were terminated. The petitions for those two children included “allegations of neglect, failure to thrive, severe physical abuse, domestic violence, and failure to protect by [mother],” and while the “current circumstance does not include severe physical abuse,” the Agency remained “concerned about neglect and continued domestic violence” between mother and father. Additionally, mother had been incarcerated since the inception of the current dependency proceedings and had “not yet been able to demonstrate that she is willing and able to address the Agency’s safety concerns.”

In an October 2021 addendum report, the Agency stated R.G. and S.G. continued to do well in their placement. After receiving her immunizations, R.G. was able to enroll in school and had begun therapy. R.G. disclosed to her therapist that mother’s former boyfriend “had sexually abused her.” She told mother what happened, and mother “did not let this man return to the home.” The social worker was also referring R.G. to physical therapy. The “hoarding situation in the home caused [R.G.] to constantly have to tip toe,” which “caused her to have some difficulty and pain when walking and running.”

Mother remained incarcerated but had contacted a social worker. Mother explained the “dogs in the home were service dogs that she was training,” and that she “recently got” the cats and dogs. She claimed “she ‘didn’t do anything’ ” as the “pets were the same weight when she got them,” and the “animals had plenty of water and food.” Mother blamed the state of the home on father, stating he “had messed up the home and that is why it was in the state that it was.” When the social worker “referenced the conditions noted in the police report and expressed that it seems that this type of home condition would build up over time, not [as] the result of someone coming over to the home and making a mess,” mother maintained father had come and “ ‘messed up’ the apartment.” Mother was not in agreement with the Agency’s recommendation to bypass services and wanted to reunify with her children. She was trying to enroll in parenting classes offered at the jail. Further, she stated she was “open to getting on medication and doing what she needs to do when she is out of jail.”

The Agency also spoke with the father. He had “been contacting housing to get someone to inspect their unit and determine if it would be safe for [R.G.] and [S.G.] to return there,” but father stated the “unit is uninhabitable, the ‘place is a mess’, and that [mother] is a ‘hoarder.’ ”

Two months later, in December, the Agency filed a second addendum report. Mother had been released from jail a month earlier and was back at home. She shared that she had “a medical appointment and was given some ‘herbal medication,’ ” and that she had completed an assessment but “was told there are no providers available for therapy and that she could seek guidance from a pastor.” The social worker referred mother to some groups to address “the hoarding concerns” and mother agreed to “ ‘check them out.’ ” The following week, mother texted that she was going to get “parent coaching.” The social worker responded that although that was “a great resource,” it was “different from therapy” and inquired about the therapy referral. Mother replied that “she was told therapy would not be available until ‘next year’.” The social worker asked mother for a signed consent form to speak with her providers. Mother responded, “If I need to relate anything back to you. I’ll let you know. But right now I’m doing every program I could at this time. And I have a full schedule the rest of this month in November and December.”

The Agency’s recommendations remained the same—bypass services and set a section 366.26 hearing—as it was concerned about the impact the living conditions had on R.G. and S.G.’s “physical and emotional wellbeing,” the “domestic violence between [father] and [mother] and the impact this has had” on R.G. and S.G., and that mother “has expressed how overwhelmed with services she is at this time, despite only being referred for therapy and parent education.” Additionally, mother stated “she is too busy to allow the undersigned to complete a home assessment.”

Prior to the February jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the social worker spoke to R.G. who expressed she did not want to get mother “in trouble,” but that she wanted to “share what ha[d] happened” in the home. She stated mother did not “ ‘know how to raise a child right,’ ” and that mother and father would “fight with one another and it would turn physical.” She gave multiple examples of mother threatening to kill herself, R.G., father, and S.G. Mother had held a knife to her stomach, tried “to push [father] off the balcony,” “grabbed a knife and threatened to kill [father],” and held S.G. “upside down and [stating] she was going to throw her.” When parents would fight, they would hit each other, and mother would “throw her body on [R.G.] as a way to try to stop the fight” and she would “hold [S.G.] while fighting with [father].” Mother would hit, slap, and push R.G., and tell her “hurtful things . . . , including ‘go to hell’ and ‘die.’ ” She would let S.G. “climb on things, fall off of the bed, and would hit [S.G.] when she cried.” R.G. stated “she does not ever want her and [S.G.] to return to [mother],” and preferred instead to be able to “ ‘see her now and then.’ ” R.G. expressed worry “about how [mother] will feel when she learns that [R.G.] shared all of this.”

The Agency filed an amended petition adding subdivision (b) allegations regarding domestic violence, mother’s “unmet mental health needs,” and mother’s use of “excessive and inappropriate physical discipline with the minors.” Specifically, the petition alleged R.G. “has been present when [father] . . . repeatedly hit the mother. . . . [R.G.] intervened and called law enforcement”; mother “has on multiple occasions threatened to kill [father] . . . in the presence of minor, [R.G.]. [Mother] tried to push [father] off a balcony in [R.G.’s] presence. On or about 2018, [mother] grabbed a knife and threatened to kill [father]”; and mother “has involved minors, [R.G.] and [S.G.], in the violence between [mother] and [father]. [Mother] has thrown her body on [R.G.’s] as a way to try to stop fighting, placing [R.G.] at risk of physical and emotional harm. [Mother] would also hold [S.G.] during physical altercations with [father], placing [S.G.] at risk of physical harm.” Additionally, mother’s “unmet mental health needs” impaired her “ability to provide” for minor’s basic needs. Mother had “repeatedly” told R.G. she was “going to kill herself” and had “grabbed a knife and held it to her stomach” in R.G.’s presence. She had also made “threats to kill the minors.” Finally, mother had “utilized excessive physical discipline” with R.G., including “hitting, slapping, and pushing [R.G.],” holding S.G. “upside down and stat[ing] she was going to throw [S.G.],” and hitting S.G. when she cried.

At the contested hearing, mother failed to appear. The court found there was no good cause for mother’s absence and declined to continue the matter. The Agency submitted on its reports (detention, jurisdiction, and three addendum reports). The court asked if there was “any updated information,” and the social worker briefly testified. She stated she still had not been allowed to visit the home, mother had not returned any of the releases, and mother had not provided “any additional information about . . . attending therapy.”

Counsel for the Agency asked the court to find all the allegations in the petition true and to bypass services based on “the prior orders terminating their reunification services, . . . terminating their parents’ rights as to previous siblings, and the lack of evidence of subsequent efforts to treat and address the problems, which included substance abuse concerns at those times, but also severe neglect, and cognitive issues for the mother, as well as domestic violence between the parents.”

Counsel for the minors stated that as R.G.’s guardian ad litem, he wanted the court to follow the Agency’s recommendation, however, as the minors’ lawyer he wanted to express R.G. “is opposed to the recommendation.” He explained, R.G. was “very mixed in her feelings, but she does have quite a bond with her mother.” R.G. had earlier stated “she wants to give her mother another chance.” However, “later in the conversation,” once counsel explained “visitation would continue as long as it was safe,” R.G. expressed the wish to go live with her cousin. But given R.G.’s “age and her bond with her mother,” R.G. would not “be in agreement with an adoption in the future,” although counsel acknowledged that could change.

Counsel for mother asserted mother had made reasonable efforts. Mother had “started parenting classes and therapy” at jail, completed an assessment, worked with a “parenting coach,” “accepted a referral, and worked with a parent advocate.” Counsel noted there had been no evidence “the children actually were harmed due to the failure to receive medical care.” Counsel further stated, “the presumption that the bypass provision do apply is not conclusive,” because services may be ordered “if it’s in the children’s best interest to do so.” And here, “[e]ach and every report before the court details [R.G.’s] concern for her mother’s wellbeing.” Finally, counsel maintained that “[p]roviding services to [mother] to help in any way would also help [R.G.]” because it would make R.G. “feel more confident being away from her mom.”

When the court asked why mother’s efforts since her release did not constitute reasonable efforts, the Agency explained, “the problem is that the Agency has not be able to verify any of that. We’ve not received releases from the mother, other than her visitation, and we acknowledge she has been visiting with the children. [¶] But the statement that she’s been engaging in parenting classes, or any kind of classes through Bananas, is not verified, or supported, or consistent with this worker’s understanding of the Bananas’ program.”

The court determined the Agency made “reasonable efforts where this case involves a parent who has not been responsive to the Agency’s efforts, apparently intentionally.”

The court found there was “ample evidence in support of the allegations.” The court rejected the argument that the children were not harmed, citing to the police report and the Agency’s reports that “described the children, and the condition that they were in when they were first encountered by police, including what appeared to be bites, or rashes on their body, they were not clean, teeth were discolored.” The court credited all of R.G.’s “more recent disclosures,” finding R.G. to have “been pretty forthcoming throughout the process.”

Next, the court considered “the basis for a bypass here,” because the Agency “would describe that the children that were subject to the prior petition were subjected to neglect,” but “that felt to me to be almost too broad a word here, neglect.” The court went on to state, in the prior petitions the children suffered “nutritional neglect, to an extent, and that wasn’t necessarily present here. . . . [¶] . . . So, I wonder just how broad of an umbrella can neglect really encompass here.” However, the court added that the “additional information about domestic violence really tipped the scales . . . here. Because there is a description of domestic violence happening in the home, that is longstanding. [¶] . . . [¶] . . . These are not isolated incidents, these are—her comments demonstrate a significant pattern here, and it’s concerning to the Court, because I believe that there were allegations of violence in the home previously, so that, coupled with the neglect, I think is sufficient here.”

Accordingly, the court found pursuant to section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) that “reunification services should be denied” as to both parents and found by clear and convincing evidence that the children must be removed from the physical custody of parents. The trial court then set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.

Discussion

After a dependent child is removed from parental custody, a juvenile court is ordinarily required to provide the parent with reunification services. (§ 361.5, subd. (a); see Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 303.) The purpose of providing reunification services is to “eliminate the conditions leading to loss of custody and facilitate reunification of parent and child. This furthers the goal of preservation of family, whenever possible.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 478 (Baby Boy H.).) These services are significant, “[b]ut reunification services constitute a benefit; there is no constitutional ‘ “entitlement” ’ to those services.” (In re Aryanna C. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1242, superseded by statute on another ground as stated in M.C. v. Superior Court (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 838, 847.)

When the juvenile court denies reunification services, it “ ‘ “fast tracks” ’ ” the dependent minor to permanency planning so that a permanent placement can be arranged. (Jennifer S. v. Superior Court (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1113, 1121 (Jennifer S.).) “The statutory sections authorizing denial of reunification services are sometimes referred to as ‘bypass’ provisions.” (In re T.G. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 976, 986 (T.G.).) “These bypass provisions represent the Legislature’s recognition that it may be fruitless to provide reunification services under certain circumstances.” (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 597; see Baby Boy H., supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 478 [if a bypass provision under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 applies, “the general rule favoring reunification is replaced by a legislative assumption that offering services would be an unwise use of governmental resources”].)

In the present case, the juvenile court denied reunification services to mother based on two such bypass provisions, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) of section 361.5. These subdivisions provide that courts may deny services if there is clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the court ordered termination of reunification services for any sibling or half-sibling because the parent failed to reunify with the sibling after they had been removed (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10)(A)) or “[t]hat the parental rights of a parent over any sibling or half sibling of the child had been permanently severed, and this parent is the same parent” (id., subd. (b)(11)(A)) and (2) “that, according to the findings of the court, this parent . . . has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half sibling of that child from that parent.” (Id., subd. (b)(10) & (11).)

“We review an order denying reunification services under subdivision (b) of section 361.5 for substantial evidence. [Citation.] Under such circumstances, we do not make credibility determinations or reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] Rather, we ‘review the entire record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s findings to determine if there is substantial evidence in the record to support those findings.’ ” (T.G., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 987.)

Claim of Neglect Too General

Mother, relying on In re Albert T. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 207 (Albert T.), contends the “juvenile court erred in not granting services to the mother because the claim of neglect was too general.” (Capitalization omitted.) She points to the juvenile court’s question of whether the prior claims of neglect, which the court categorized as involving “nutritional neglect,” were “specific enough to now apply [to] a bypass provision.”

In Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 207, the juvenile court denied the mother reunification services under the bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10). (Albert T., at p. 210.) On appeal, the mother asserted that although the juvenile court had previously terminated reunification services for the child’s older sibling, the “evidence at the disposition hearing for [minor] was insufficient to support the court’s implied finding she had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to [older child’s] removal.” (Ibid.) The Department asserted the record supported an “implied finding [the mother] had not made reasonable efforts to treat her issue with domestic violence, which it contends was a ‘concern’ at the time of [older brother’s] removal.” (Id. at p. 219.)

In reversing the order denying services, the Court of Appeal held, even assuming the propriety of implying findings from an otherwise silent record, there was insufficient evidence. (Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 219.) First, the court noted the older child was removed from the home “ ‘because his parents could not cope with his behavior’ ” not because of domestic violence. (Id. at p. 220.) Indeed, the domestic violence count had been dismissed from the petition, “belying any contention that domestic violence made [the mother’s] home unsafe at that time or that [the child’s] removal was predicated, even in part, on concerns about domestic violence.” (Ibid.) Next, the evidence demonstrated mother had addressed, but not “resolved,” the issue of domestic violence by the disposition hearing. (Id. at pp. 213, 220–221.)

The situation in the case at hand is not remotely similar to that presented in Albert T. To begin with, here the record shows that across all of the relevant dependency petitions (M.G.’s, H.G.’s and the current petitions for R.G. and S.G.), mother has shown an inability meet the minors’ basic needs of safe and sanitary housing, hygiene, and routine medical care, and the petitions also evidence a longstanding history of domestic violence. Indeed, in all of those petitions, the Agency checked the boxes indicating the minors were at risk due to parents “willful or negligent failure . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or medical treatment.”

The circumstances leading to removal of minors in the prior cases and the current circumstances were similar. For example, the substantiated allegations in M.G.’s petition included that the minor was found in a urine-soaked diaper, had an untreated rash on his mouth and face, and was severely malnourished and dehydrated and that parents “failed to seek appropriate medical care for the minor after [he] failed to gain weight.” Here too, mother failed to seek any medical care for minors having not taken R.G. to the doctors in four years and S.G. had not received medical care since birth. Both children had bites, smelled strongly of urine and feces, S.G. had yellowing teeth, and R.G. told the social worker mother had not treated S.G.’s diaper rash either herself or by taking S.G. to the doctors. This is more than sufficient to support the trial court’s findings.

Additionally, all of the petitions related parents’ longstanding history of domestic violence. And, unlike the case of Albert T., here there is no evidence to suggest the trial court struck the domestic violence allegations from the prior dependency petitions, or that mother took classes addressing domestic violence. (Albert T., supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 212–213.)

Mother has not pointed to any evidence that she addressed the concerns which led to removal in the prior cases, including domestic violence. Mother states she received “services when R.G. was a toddler, benefitted from them and R.G. remained in her care until the current removal.” However, we note the Agency did not check the box in the prior petition for R.G. indicating she was at risk because of parents’ “negligent failure of the marginal parent . . . to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment.” That is because the allegations then centered around father’s alcohol abuse, mother’s cognitive delays, and parent’s history of “marginal and/or harmful parenting practices,” which while including parents “history of domestic violence” also included parents’ failure to supervise R.G. properly leading to her swallowing a watch battery, and the fact that father was “overpowering and has control over all household and parenting decisions.”

In short, although parents may have received services which benefitted them in that situation, it is not at all evident, and mother does not contend otherwise, that those services related to the circumstances which led to the removal of H.G. or M.G.

Reasonable Efforts

Next, mother contends the court erred “in not granting services to [her] because [she] had shown she could benefit from services.” (Capitalization omitted.) “In fact,” mother asserts, “the record shows substantial evidence that [she] had made reasonable efforts in this case.” She contends: the “problems that were occurring were relatively recent issues,” and that it was not necessary for her to “cure the earlier problems” but rather that she had made reasonable efforts and here she notes that she “texted pictures of counseling/parent coaching she had done at Bananas and medical appointments she had attended” and completed family maintenance services back in 2010 with regard to R.G.’s earlier petition.

The reasonable effort requirement found in section 361.5, subdivisions (b)(10) and (b)(11) “focuses on the extent of a parent’s efforts, not whether he or she has attained ‘a certain level of progress.’ ” (R.T. v. Superior Court (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 908, 914.) However, while the requirement “is not synonymous with ‘cure,’ ” (Renee J. v. Superior Court (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464) a parent’s effort’s “must . . . be more than ‘ “lackadaisical or half-hearted.” ’ ” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1121.)

As noted above, there is no evidence in the record that the services mother received in 2010 were related to the circumstances which led to removal of minors’ siblings. With regard to mother’s photographic evidence, as the Agency noted at the disposition hearing, mother never signed release forms so the social worker could not verify mother’s claims or that the “coaching” she was attending, if any, was at all relevant to any of the issues mother needed to address. The social worker repeatedly tried to get mother to give her a release form, but mother refused to do so and by the time of disposition had cut off all communication with the Agency.

In any event, these photos amounted to a series of screenshots of: “what appears to be a letter or email signed by Melissa Elkema, MD, a photo of a St. John’s Wort bottle and Spectravite vitamin bottle on a counter, a sheet with Urgent Care follow up phone numbers, and an appointment reminder for Eastmont Wellness Center Adult Medicine,” as well as a picture of “an Alameda County Probation Department slip indicating her probation officer,” a “letter from Alameda County Behavioral Health stating [mother] was seen . . . for [an] assessment and connected to outpatient services,” an e-mail from a doctor with “Bananas,” and a certificate from that same doctor “stating [mother] participated in six sessions of ‘Parent Therapy’, ‘Understanding her kids’, ‘Also her situation in life’, and a Certificate of Completion from Bananas indicating she completed virtual training/workshop session.”

The only seemingly relevant photographs involved the assessment and the six sessions mother completed at Bananas. However, the social worker had already explained to mother that her six sessions at Bananas were not a “replacement for the Agency approved” parenting classes or the therapy to which mother had been referred, and mother had not engaged in individual therapy. Indeed, while mother told the social worker that she had been “ ‘denied’ ” from the parent education program to which she had been referred, when the social worker followed up with the program she learned they had reached out to mother three times and could not get a hold of her. Further, the provider stated, “We would never deny access to classes.” (Italics omitted.) Mother similarly told the social worker that she “was told that therapy would not be available until ‘next year,’ ” but when the social worker followed up with the therapy referral, they noted they had been unable to reach mother and “they have openings and she never made a statement about providers not being available until next year.”

In short, the record does not show mother made reasonable efforts in the time between removal of the siblings and the current disposition.[2]

Best Interest of R.G.[3]

Finally, mother contends the trial court erred in not granting services because “it did not properly consider the best interest of R.G.” (Capitalization omitted.) Specifically, mother contends that R.G., “despite the circumstances that brought her into dependency, wants to maintain a bond with her mother,” “is concerned her mother receive services to get better,” and “[e]ven minor’s counsel suggested that moving to adoption in this case is not likely to occur for R.G. at this time.”

Pursuant to section 361.5, once the juvenile court determines that a parent is described by subdivision (b)(10) or (b)(11) of that statute, “it shall not order reunification services for that parent ‘unless the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that reunification is in the best interest of the child.’ (§ 361.5, subd. (c)(2).) ‘ “The concept of a child’s best interest ‘is an elusive guideline that belies rigid definition. Its purpose is to maximize a child’s opportunity to develop into a stable, well-adjusted adult.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Nevertheless, precedent supplies certain relevant considerations when making a best interests determination. For instance, ‘[t]o determine whether reunification is in the child’s best interests, the court considers the parent’s current efforts, fitness, and history; the seriousness of the problem that led to the dependency; the strength of the parent-child and caretaker-child bonds; and the child’s need for stability and continuity.’ [Citations.] It is the parent’s burden to prove that the minor would benefit from the provision of court-ordered services. [Citation.] We review a juvenile court’s best interest determination in this context for abuse of discretion.” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1124–1125.)

Given mother’s longstanding inability to meet minors’ basic needs of safe and sanitary housing, hygiene, and routine medical care, parents’ longstanding history of domestic violence, and R.G.’s most recent disclosures, including that mother held S.G. while parents physically engaged with each other and jumping on R.G. to end the fighting, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in its analysis of R.G.’s best interests.

Disposition

The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(1)(C), (4)(B).) The request for stay is denied, and this decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i) & 8.490(b)(2)(A).)

_________________________

Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________

Humes, P.J.

_________________________

Margulies, J.

A164536, LG v. Superior Court

[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] The juvenile court expressed some frustration as to the amount of documentation on the extent of mother’s efforts, commenting this was “a close call.” But as we have discussed, the extent of the record is largely due to mother’s refusal to cooperate with the Agency’s efforts to obtain detailed information and her failure to appear at the hearing. Nevertheless, the court’s comments in Jennifer S. bear mention: “[W]e take this opportunity to express our continued frustration at the state of the evidentiary record regularly provided to us by many child welfare departments in bypass cases under subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5. It is true that, pursuant to this subdivision, a prior termination of reunification services or parental rights is required, and thus court orders memorializing those outcomes are undoubtedly useful in a later dependency matter where bypass is requested. However, the existence of these readily ascertainable facts are rarely the focus of any bypass dispute. Rather, parents invariably argue that they have since made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the previous sibling removal. [Citation.] In order to meet the burden to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, a lack of reasonable efforts in this regard, child welfare workers must focus on the facts underlying the previous dependency action and its resolution, as well as on any efforts made by the parent since the sibling removal. [Citation.] In particular, copies of all relevant reports, especially dispositional reports and the reports upon which any terminations of services were based, should be attached to the social worker’s dispositional report in the current matter to provide necessary background. Moreover, at any contested hearing seeking bypass, the testifying social worker should have thoroughly reviewed the prior records, interviewed the parents regarding past efforts, and be able to speak authoritatively as to why the parent at issue failed to make reasonable efforts during the relevant timeframe.” (Jennifer S., supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1126.)

[3] Mother makes no argument as to S.G.