Filed 5/19/22 In re P.R. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael C. Kelley, Judge. Affirmed.

Elizabeth Klippi, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant T.R.

Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant L.B.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and David Michael Miller, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

L.B. (Mother) and T.R. (Father) challenge the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their sons P.R. and H.R. We are asked to consider whether the juvenile court erred in declining to rely on the parental benefit exception to forgo terminating parental rights.[1] In particular, we consider whether the juvenile court’s discussion of whether Mother and Father’s relationship with the children was of a “parental” character requires reversal under our Supreme Court’s recent explication of the parental benefit exception in Caden C.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Assumption of Dependency Jurisdiction Over P.R.

Dependency proceedings began in October 2017 when the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department) received a referral regarding then two-year-old P.R. He was observed alone outside a hotel near a freeway wearing shorts and a t-shirt in cold weather. When law enforcement arrived, the family’s room smelled of alcohol and marijuana and Father physically resisted the officers’ efforts to check on the child’s welfare. P.R. suffered a facial contusion and abrasions as a result of Father’s resistance, and both Mother and Father were arrested. Mother pled no contest to child endangerment and Father pled no contest to child endangerment and obstructing or resisting an officer.

The Department thereafter filed a multi-count dependency petition asking the juvenile court to assert dependency jurisdiction over P.R. because a lack of supervision, Father’s physical abuse, and Mother’s failure to protect him exposed him to a substantial risk of serious physical harm. In April 2018, the juvenile court sustained the allegations, declared P.R. a dependent child, and ordered him removed from Mother and Father’s custody. The parents were granted monitored visitation.

B. Assumption of Dependency Jurisdiction Over H.R.

H.R. was born in July 2018 and the Department filed a dependency petition about a week later based on the incident that triggered the dependency proceedings concerning P.R. The Department later amended to petition to add an allegation that H.R. was at risk based on Mother and Father’s failure to reunify with three older children in Texas who were found in an “unclean living environment.”

H.R. was placed in foster care beginning when he was three days old and, at all times pertinent to this appeal, M.R. was his caregiver. (In August 2020, P.R. was moved from a different foster home to live with M.R. too. As we shall discuss, the juvenile court would ultimately identify M.R. as the prospective adoptive placement for both children.) In November 2018, the juvenile court declared H.R. a dependent child, continued his foster care placement, and ordered monitored visitation with Mother and Father.

C. Reunification Period

In the first few months after P.R. was adjudicated a dependent child, the Department reported Mother visited regularly but had “limited verbal communication” with P.R. She would “read, talk and play games” with P.R., but “the majority of the visit [was] spent in silence.” Father had “more verbal communication with [P.R.] during the few visits that [he] . . . attended.” The Department reported P.R. would “get[ ] upset” when Mother missed visits, but he did “not remain upset for long periods of time.”

Mother continued to visit the children regularly between late 2018 and 2019. At times, Mother had little engagement with P.R. apart from reading to him and showing him videos on her phone; P.R. “often” played by himself or with the visitation monitor. Although Mother “primarily . . . h[e]ld[ ] [H.R.] in her lap and ha[d] minimal interaction with him,” she “started putting him on the floor to play with him” as he got older. By late 2019, H.R. “seem[ed] to cry when leaving the [caregiver],” but “[M]other eventually calm[ed] [him] down . . . .” P.R. greeted Mother with “hugs and kisses.” Mother watched cartoons with the children on her phone, read books to them, identified objects around the room, and played with toys.

Father was arrested for criminal threats in August 2018 and remained incarcerated through May 2019. He was unable to resume visits until he completed a rehabilitation program a few months later, and he canceled or arrived late to “a number” of visits in 2019 due to transportation issues. In September 2019, the Department reported that a recent visit “went well overall” and Father engaged with both children. In October 2019, the Department reported Father “[would] hold either child in his lap and sometimes engage with them in play and sometimes watch them play.” The children ran to Father and hugged him at the beginning of visits.

Mother and Father were permitted to visit the children together beginning in 2020. The parents were affectionate and played with both children. “There was laughter . . . and the children appear[ed] to enjoy visiting with both parents . . . together.” Visits occurred once a week, and the parents requested additional visits. In March 2020, the juvenile court authorized two unmonitored visits of two hours each. One such visit was held that month, but in-person visitation was suspended shortly thereafter because of the COVID-19 emergency. Mother and Father were allowed virtual visits during this period, but they cancelled many.

In-person visitation resumed by July 2020.[2] During the first of these visits, the children were excited to see both parents. A Department social worker noted Father “seemed to have a bond” with them. Mother, on the other hand, was “not engaged.” Subsequent visits went better, and both parents played with the children. The Department did, however, note several problems with visitation including: a visit when P.R. said Father was “mean” to him, a visit the social worker had to end early because the parents walked away with the children and Father reacted aggressively when the social worker chased them down, a visit during which a social worker had to ask Father not to play so roughly with P.R., and a visit when Father “challenged” a social worker’s request that he remove his finger from H.R.’s mouth. During a video call visit in October 2020, Father yelled at P.R. when he referred to his foster caregiver as “momma,” which “shocked” P.R. and caused his eyes to “widen[ ].”

The juvenile court terminated family reunification services for both parents in December 2020. Finding the parents had not addressed the issues that originally brought them to the Department’s attention, the juvenile court emphasized, among other things, Father’s untreated mental health issues (manifest in his aggression toward social workers and caregivers and his “outburst” during the virtual visit with P.R.) and both parents’ failure to demonstrate “that they had internalized and could apply what they learned in the programs they had completed.”

D. Period Between Termination of Reunification Services and Termination of Parental Rights

As of March 2021, the parents were receiving one three-hour in-person visit and three 30-45 minute virtual visits each week. Around this time, the Department reduced visits to one in-person and one virtual visit per week “to accommodate the therapy needs of the minors” and due to “concerns with [M]other and [F]ather’s behavior.” In addition to the reduction in visitation it implemented, the Department also asked the juvenile court to terminate all visitation.

As grounds for further restricting or eliminating the parents’ visitation, the Department cited Father’s aggressive behavior toward social workers and caregivers, instances when P.R. said Father was “mean” to him and indicated he was afraid of Father, an occasion when Father “violently snatched” a toy from P.R. and threw it on the ground, another occasion when Father “squeezed [P.R.’s] hand to the point where [P.R.] yelled ‘ouch,’” and times when both parents “yelled at” P.R. during virtual visits. P.R. had also begun “obsessively” telling Mother and Father he loved them during calls and the child had also started “inappropriately [telling] others that he loves them, people that he has no attachment to.” The caregiver further reported P.R. had begun exhibiting violent and defiant behavior at daycare, “lie[d] about the smallest things,” and was “not . . . able to formulate sentences completely as he did before.”

In April 2021, the juvenile court denied the parents’ request to increase the number of visits and ordered three hours of in-person visitation and one hour of virtual visitation each week. Soon thereafter, Mother and Father petitioned the juvenile court to change its order terminating family reunification services. As we shall discuss, the juvenile court ordered a joint hearing to decide these requests and to determine whether to terminate their parental rights.

The parents continued to visit the children in the interim. The Department reported that although “the parents engage and participate in play with minors and give positive feedback and reinforcement when [they] demonstrate good behavior,” there was a “lack of parental guidance when the children need to be redirected from destructive behavior.” This was particularly concerning given behavioral problems observed in H.R.[3]

As of June 2021, when the children were asked whether they wanted to live with Mother and Father, H.R. said he “want[ed] to see mommy and daddy and get candy” and that he “want[ed] his mommy (referring to the caregiver).” P.R. said “yes he want[ed] to live with mommy and daddy, but he want[ed] to also live with [H.R.] and mommy (referring to the caregiver).”

E. Hearing Regarding the Parental Benefit Exception

The juvenile court held a hearing over several days in August and September 2021 to decide Mother and Father’s petitions to reinstate family reunification services and the applicability of the parental benefit exception to law that would otherwise require termination of parental rights. Ten witnesses testified: Mother; Father; Department social worker Lori Leggs (Leggs); visitation monitors Sergio Marin (Marin) and Brian Morris (Morris); a facilitator of a fathers’ education program, Jason Carranza (Carranza); a counselor who observed several visits, Melinda Murphy (Murphy); P.R.’s former foster caregiver, P.D.; an investigator employed by the Children’s Law Center, Robin Kovalsky (Kovalsky); and the children’s current foster parent, M.R.

Father testified regarding the various parenting and substance abuse programs he attended and his visits with the children. At the time of the hearing, he was visiting the children twice each week: one in-person visit lasting three hours and one virtual visit, the length of which varied. At one point several months before the hearing, Father and the children had three three-hour visits per week, but it became difficult to find monitors. Father was aware that H.R. has “a breathing issue” and “some behavior issues.” He testified that he had “been asking” about the children’s doctors and medical appointments but did not receive responsive information. Department social workers declined his requests for additional visits and to participate in educational meetings and other school events.

Father testified he always brought a first aid kit and “some type of activity whether it’s books or toys” to visits with the children. Father and Mother tried to teach the children numbers and spelling, and Father stated these “learning moments” were “a typical activity.” But they also did “a lot of just running around, playing.” The parents brought fruit to the visits, which they cut for the children. They sometimes brought candy, but they “tr[ied] not to bring a lot of anything that’s sweet or sugary.” Father checked on the children when they fell or were hurt during play.

Father testified the children were “always hanging around [Father and Mother], hugging [them], [saying] ‘we love you,’ ‘I want to sit by you,’ [and] ‘come sit by me.’” The children called Father and Mother “Dad” and “Mom.” They were “extremely” excited at the beginning of visits, and ran to hug Father and Mother. They cried and became quiet when visits ended.

Like Father, Mother’s testimony addressed both her case plan and her visits with the children. Mother stated the children called her “mom,” but she acknowledged they would not have known any other name for her. The children were “excited” to see her and Father, “run[ning] and rush[ing]” to hug them. Among other things, they would play with a frisbee, go down slides, read, draw with sidewalk chalk, and watch cartoons. Mother tried to teach the children to share with each other “and not fight one another or anything.” H.R. was not toilet trained, and Mother worked on this during visits. Mother addressed the Department’s concern that she brought unhealthy snacks to visits by bringing fruit instead. The children cried and P.R. said he did not want to leave when visits ended. Mother did not attend medical appointments or day care events because a social worker told her she could not.

Leggs, the social worker, monitored 10 or 11 visits between the parents and the children. She testified the children were “very happy” to see Father and Mother and “affectionate and comfortable” with them. The children called them “daddy” and “mommy.” On one occasion, P.R. was “reluctant” to leave at the end of a visit. The parents generally acted appropriately during visits, with Father “run[ning] and chas[ing]” the children and Mother mostly staying in the shade and drawing with the children. Leggs “could not say that [Father and Mother] demonstrated skills” such as “redirecting the children[ and] recognizing dangerous situations.” Leggs opined that stopping the visits would not be detrimental to the children because, among other things, the children did not react negatively when their virtual visits were reduced or when in-person visits did not take place due to illness or monitor unavailability. She further opined that although H.R.’s behavior during visits was better than in other settings, this was because “it’s three hours of just pure unadulterated fun, running and playing. . . . [T]here are no restrictions placed on the kids, like there would be in school to sit down or at home . . . .”

Marin, one of the visitation monitors, testified that he monitored visits between Mother and Father and the children between September 2020 and April 2021. The visits were held once per week for three hours in 2020, but there were only three in-person visits between January and April 2021. Marin observed the children call Mother and Father “Mommy” and “Daddy,” but they also called their caregiver “Mommy.” Mother and Father brought “lots of toys and activities for the children” and it appeared the children had a good time. The children greeted Mother and Father with hugs, and the parents “were definitely engaged.” Marin saw the parents “teach the kids manners on how to share their toys with one another,” but he did not recall witnessing examples of the parents’ disciplinary techniques. Mother changed H.R.’s diaper multiple times. The parents tended to bring “lots of food with sugar” for the children, but they sometimes brought healthy snacks. P.R. was upset when visits ended but he was generally “over it” by the time they left. H.R. was “typically a lot more calm.”

Morris, the other visitation monitor, was present for three visits in August 2021. The children were comfortable and well-behaved with Father and Mother. They would either play games on their parents’ phones or play on playground equipment. Morris observed the children appeared “sad” when visits ended, but “[t]hey pretty much got over it” during the drive back to their foster placement.

Carranza, the fathers’ education program facilitator, is a Department employee and works with a Department-sponsored program called Father Strong. Father participated in the program between February 2021 and August 2021, and Carranza saw growth in his parenting skills. Carranza did not, however, observe Father’s interactions with the children.

P.D. served as the foster placement for P.R. from the inception of the case in 2017 through August 2020, when P.R. was moved to the same home as H.R. P.R. referred to her as “Auntie P[.]” Between March 2020 and August 2020, P.D. monitored daily video visits lasting between 30 and 45 minutes between P.R., Father, and Mother. P.R. looked forward to the visits and they had “good interaction.” P.R. called Father and Mother “dad” and “mom.” P.R. wanted visits “to go on and on,” but he was “pretty good with knowing” he would speak with Father and Mother again the next day. On the couple of occasions that visits were cancelled, P.R. “was sad, and he wanted his visit.” Outside of visits, P.R. told P.D. he loved Father and Mother.

Murphy, the counselor employed by the attorneys representing Father and Mother, has a degree in educational psychology and was asked to observe three visits in this case.[4] She testified she found the children to be “relaxed,” “content,” and “very in tune with their parents[,] . . . asking them for everything.” Father and Mother demonstrated positive reinforcement and redirected the children when necessary. The parents and children were physically affectionate.

Kovalsky, the Children’s Law Center investigator, was called to testify by the children’s attorney. She observed one visit in April 2021. Marin was the monitor for the visit, and Kovalsky stated the children “ran over to [Marin] several times throughout the visit, especially when they were playing, and they would get excited over a toy they were playing with. They wanted to show him everything and would often go to him and actually seek him out more than the parents.” Father engaged in several different activities with the children, including flying kites, blowing bubbles, and playing ball. There were times when “he would go off by himself and shoot baskets . . . [or] just throw[ ] balls around the field. . . . He would bring out toys and start to play by himself, and then the kids might wander over to him at that point.” Mother participated in these activities and sat with the children, feeding them and talking with them. Mother and P.R. said they loved one another, but Kovalsky did not observe Father behaving affectionately with the children. The children were “fine” and gave “no reaction at all” when the visit ended. P.R. said goodbye and only started to cry when he was asked to stop playing with Mother’s phone.

M.R. testified H.R. had been placed with her since July 2018 (when he was seven days old) and P.R. was placed with her in August 2020 (when he was just shy of age five). M.R. wanted to adopt the children. Both boys called M.R.’s 22-year-old son “brother.” They called M.R. “mommy” and Mother and Father “mommy” and “daddy.” M.R. recounted instances in which Father raised his voice and corrected P.R. when he heard (or thought he heard) P.R. call M.R. “mom” during virtual visits.[5]

When the juvenile court ordered virtual visits reduced in 2021, M.R. noticed P.R. became “[l]ess anxious[ and] nervous.” There was less “twitching the fingers during phone calls and the repeat behaviors, like ‘I love you,’ over and over again on the phone calls because he was nervous . . . .” Neither child asked for more visits. On occasions when one of the children missed a virtual visit, they did not ask about it. The children did not proactively discuss with M.R. their visits with Mother and Father, but when M.R. asked they talked about getting candy and playing with Mother’s phone.

Both Mother and Father urged the juvenile court to find terminating their parental rights would be detrimental to the children. The children’s attorney joined the Department in arguing to the contrary.

F. Ruling Terminating Parental Rights

In September 2021, the juvenile court denied the changed circumstances petition and terminated Mother and Father’s parental rights, explaining its reasons in a 13-page minute order. On the parental benefit exception, the juvenile court cited our Supreme Court’s recent discussion of the exception in Caden C. and analyzed all three elements Mother and Father were required to establish: (1) regular visitation and contact, (2) the existence of a relationship that benefits the children, and (3) detriment to the children if parental rights were terminated.

The juvenile court concluded the parents carried their burden with respect to the first element. The court found “[Mother and Father were] making efforts to visit with regularity. While there are some missed visits, they generally kept up contact with the boys and have pressed for more visits on more than one occasion.”

As to the second element described in Caden C. that requires assessment of any benefit to the children from the relationship, the juvenile court determined that Mother and Father had not established the visits “maintain[ed] or create[d] a significant positive emotional attachment.” The juvenile court noted “[t]he visits are pleasant and fun” and “[t]he children enjoy the visits,” but the court found “the enjoyment and attachment fade quickly.” Citing In re Brittany C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 847, the juvenile court observed (in language that is in large part the grounds on which Mother and Father now seek reversal): “[T]he relationship must be a parental one, rather than that of a friendly adult . . . . [E]ven if parents and a child enjoy friendly visits, if they ‘do not resemble the daily nurturing that is characteristic of parental relationship,’ the exception has not been established. This is the situation here as the evidence does not demonstrate that the parents have developed or maintained such a relationship with the boys.”

As to the third element discussed in Caden C., the juvenile court found insufficient evidence that terminating the parental relationship would be detrimental to the children. The court stated “much of [its] discussion of Mother and Father’s [changed circumstances] petition was relevant”[6] and emphasized “the relationship the minors have with the parents is a friendly one but not such as to constitute the significant, positive emotional relationship contemplated in [the] exception. They recover quickly from understandable sadness at the end of visits. [¶] In addition, the current caretaker, who is committed to adoption has demonstrated that she could provide a permanent home that will satisfy the children’s needs for shelter, care, nourishment, security and belonging. They have been in her care for a meaningful time. They have in her other son an older ‘brother’ to whom they seem bonded, and the caretaker has also proven capable of meeting their special needs. [¶] Finally, the caretaker’s efforts to support the parent[s’] efforts at reunification, through monitoring visits and even making suggestions to [M]other about how she could improve the quality of the virtual visits by including the children’s favorite books (which seems not to have been done), provides evidence of [the caretaker’s] selfless care for the boys[’] best interests that warrants special notice.”

Mother and Father noticed appeals from the orders denying their changed circumstances petitions and terminating their parental rights. The parents do not now challenge the changed circumstance petition rulings, however; they seek reversal of only the parental rights termination orders.

II. DISCUSSION

The juvenile court made twin findings that were dispositive: Mother and Father failed to establish the requisite beneficial relationship and terminating their parental rights would not be detrimental to the children. The latter finding was not an abuse of discretion and the former is supported by substantial evidence.

The parents’ primary counterargument on appeal is directed only at one of these two findings; they assert the juvenile court erred in assessing the existence of a beneficial relationship when it drew on an older Court of Appeal case that holds a “relationship must be a parental one” that “‘resemble[s] the daily nurturing that is characteristic of parental relationship.’” We do not read the juvenile court’s citation in the same manner, however. In context, the juvenile court’s discussion of a “parental” relationship was principally if not solely meant as a counterpoint to what it believed was shown and insufficient: a mere “friendly” relationship. That remains true after Caden C. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 632; In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 864-865 (J.D.); see also In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 (Autumn H.) [“The significant attachment from child to parent results from the adult’s attention to the child’s needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection and stimulation”].) Further, even if the parents’ contrary view of the record were persuasive, the juvenile court’s finding that terminating parental rights would not be detrimental (especially when considered along with the benefits of adoption) would still stand and justify the court’s decision.

A. The Parental Benefit Exception

When a parent is unable to remedy the issues giving rise to dependency jurisdiction, the juvenile court holds a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[7] to determine “whether to terminate parental rights, making way for adoption, or to maintain parental rights and select another permanent plan.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 625.) “To ease the court’s difficult task in making this important decision, the statute provides a carefully calibrated process. Even if a court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the child is likely to be adopted, the parent may avoid termination of parental rights by establishing at least one of a series of enumerated exceptions.” (Ibid.)

One of these exceptions, set forth at section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), is the parental benefit exception. The exception is “limited in scope” and applies where “‘[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) From the statute, [our Supreme Court] readily discern[ed] three elements the parent must prove to establish the exception: (1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 631.) Only the second and third of these elements are at issue in this appeal.

The second element—whether the child would benefit from continuing the relationship—depends on “a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 632, citing Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 576.) As emphasized in Autumn H., which Caden C. cited as “the seminal decision interpreting the exception,” the parental benefit exception is not concerned with the “incidental benefit” that “nteraction between natural parent and child will always confer.” ([i]Autumn H., supra, at 575-576 [holding that a relationship comparable to that of a “‘friendly visitor’” or “‘family friend’” is insufficient to trigger the exception]; see also Caden C., supra, at 631.) Nonetheless, juvenile courts “must remain mindful that rarely do ‘[p]arent-child relationships’ conform to an entirely consistent pattern. [Citations.]” (Caden C., supra, at 632.) In other words, there is no specific threshold “‘amount of “comfort, nourishment or physical care”’” needed to establish a beneficial relationship. (Ibid.)

The third element—whether terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child—requires the juvenile court to determine “whether the harm of severing the relationship outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer.’ [Citation.] ‘If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that,’ even considering the benefits of a new adoptive home, termination would ‘harm[ ]’ the child, the court should not terminate parental rights. [Citation.]” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633, citing Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 575.) Relevant factual determinations include “the specific features of the child’s relationship with the parent and the harm that would come from losing those specific features,” “how harmful in total that loss would be,” and “for the particular child, how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms.” (Caden C., supra, at 640.)

A reviewing court uses the substantial evidence standard to evaluate a juvenile court’s determination of the existence vel non of a beneficial relationship. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 639.) “[T]he ultimate decision—whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child due to the child’s relationship with his parent—is discretionary and properly reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Id. at 640.)

B. Analysis

1. Beneficial relationship

Both Mother and Father focus their challenge on the juvenile court’s analysis of whether they established the second element—the existence of a beneficial relationship. Noting that our Supreme Court did not characterize the required relationship as a “parental” one in Caden C., they rely on several recent opinions discussing ways in which the concept of a parental relationship may operate as shorthand for considerations inconsistent with Caden C. These cases do not, however, demonstrate that the words “parental relationship” taint every ruling in which they appear. Nor do they demonstrate that any positive relationship is sufficient to establish this element.

In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218 considered a challenge to an order terminating parental rights based on the juvenile court’s reasoning that “the parents ‘failed to demonstrate the existence of . . . [a] parental relationship with the children,’” because, among other things, “the paternal grandmother met the children’s daily needs” and the parents’ untreated substance abuse impeded their ability to “‘safely and reliabl[y] parent.’” (Id. at 1226-1227.) The Court of Appeal reversed, emphasizing that considerations relevant to the parents’ ability to care for the children on a full-time basis do not bear on the existence of a beneficial relationship. (Id. at 1229-1230.)

In J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 833, a mother challenged an order terminating her parental rights that included “few explicit factual findings concerning the parental benefit exception.” (Id. at 851.) The juvenile court “acknowledged [the child] ha[d] a relationship with [the] mother and that it [was] a positive one,” but found the relationship “did not ‘amount to [a] parental bond’ . . . .” (Ibid.) The Court of Appeal determined the juvenile court’s finding that no beneficial relationship existed was not supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at 870.) In addition to contrary evidence that the child was “clearly bonded” to the mother when he was removed from her care, there was “abundant evidence” that the attachment “continued throughout the case.” (Id. at 855.) “[S]tanding alone,” then, the juvenile court’s “conclusory” finding that the mother did not occupy a parental role was “vague and unhelpful.” (Id. at 864.) The J.D. court recognized a beneficial relationship “is surely more significant than that of a ‘mere friend or playmate,’” but the court reversed because it “[could not] be sure” the juvenile court’s analysis did not “encompass[ ] factors that Caden C. deems irrelevant,” e.g., whether the child was primarily bonded to the mother or whether the mother was capable of providing for the child’s everyday needs. (Id. at 864-865.)

In In re L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197 (L.A.-O), the juvenile court found the parental benefit exception did not apply because, among other things, the parents had “‘not acted in a parental role in a long time.’” (Id. at 205.) The Court of Appeal emphasized the “several different meanings” this rationale might have—some innocuous, but some incompatible with Caden C. (Id. at 210.) To the extent that a “parental role” means “being a good parent,” “giving parental care,” or being “the person whom the child regards as his or her parent (or at least as more his or her parent than any other caregiver),” that is not required by Caden C. (Ibid.) And because the permissible uses of this concept only address what is insufficient to establish a beneficial relationship—“t is not merely frequent and loving contact; it is not merely pleasant visits; it is not being merely a friendly visitor; and it is not merely an emotional bond”—“it tells us nothing about the mysterious X factor that will boost the parent up from being merely a friendly visitor and into the requisite parental role.” ([i]Id. at 211.) Because the juvenile court’s “terse” analysis did not make clear whether it applied this concept in a permissible manner, the Court of Appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights.[8] (Ibid.)

There are no “terse” (L.A.-O., supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at 211) or “conclusory” (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 864) references to the existence of a parental relationship here. The full context of the juvenile court’s ruling in this case reveals the court was not alluding to considerations inconsistent with Caden C. The juvenile court expressly framed its discussion around Caden C. and nothing in the juvenile court’s discussion indicates that it considered a “parental relationship” to be one in which a parent has completed their case plan, is capable of resuming custody, performs specific tasks, and/or is the child’s primary attachment. Instead, we read the record to indicate the juvenile court used the concept solely to emphasize that although the children “enjoy[ed]” their “pleasant and fun” visits with Mother and Father, this was not sufficient to establish a beneficial relationship. That is consistent with Caden C.’s directive that parents must show more than pleasant and fun visits. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 636 [“the parent must show that the child has a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to the parent”].)

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the children related to Mother and Father as playmates. The parents had no opportunity to form a relationship with H.R. before he was removed from their care days after his birth and P.R. had spent most of his life—from age two—in foster care. (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at 576 [relevant considerations include the “age of the child[ and] the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody”].) Mother and Father made commendable efforts to build a relationship with the children, who were excited to see them, but the record indicates the benefits of this relationship were transitory—several hours of pleasant diversion each week. The children called them Mommy and Daddy, but Mother acknowledged they would not have known anything else to call them and, regardless, both children called M.R. “mommy” too. The children’s sadness at the end of visits was fleeting, and one witness suggested P.R. was mostly upset that he had to stop playing with Mother’s phone.[9] There is accordingly substantial evidence in the record supporting the juvenile court’s finding that a beneficial relationship had not been proven (even without considering the other evidence, which we have already summarized, that the interactions between the parents and children were not uniformly positive).

2. Detriment

The juvenile court’s detriment analysis focused principally on the prospective adoptive parent’s “selfless care” and the fact that the children “recover quickly from understandable sadness at the end of visits.” Both were proper considerations supporting the juvenile court’s exercise of its discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 640 [holding that courts should consider “how harmful” the loss of the parental relationship would be and “how a prospective adoptive placement may offset and even counterbalance those harms”]; In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1157 [“it was proper for the juvenile court to consider whether, and the extent to which, the caregivers and [the] father occupied parental roles with the minor”].) The juvenile court’s remark that “much” of its discussion of the parents’ changed circumstances petitions was “relevant” was also correct and, contrary to Mother’s contention, does not suggest the juvenile court took irrelevant matters (such as their fitness as parents) into consideration. Rather, it is clear from the juvenile court’s other remarks that it was appropriately focused on the mere “friendly” nature of the interaction between the children and parents during visits.

Father, however, asserts that evidence of positive visits between the parents and the children shifted the burden to the Department to furnish evidence that terminating the relationship would not harm the children. But there is no presumption that terminating a friendly relationship is harmful to children. (J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at 861 [“To be clear, it was not the agency’s burden to disprove the existence of the beneficial relationship exception”].) Rather, Caden C. confirms that “‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer’” weighs in favor of terminating parental rights. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at 633.) Here, the juvenile court properly emphasized the ample evidence that adoption would strongly benefit P.R. and H.R. and balanced this against the enjoyment the children derived from their visits with Mother and Father.

Because the parents bore the burden of establishing all elements of the parental benefit exception, the juvenile court’s appropriate discretionary determination concerning the detriment to the children precludes reversal even independent of the court’s findings on the existence of a beneficial relationship.

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

RUBIN, P. J.

MOOR, J.

[1] We will elaborate, but the statute authorizes a juvenile court to refrain from terminating a parent’s rights when the parent proves “(1) regular visitation and contact [with his or her child], and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631 (Caden C.).)

[2] The record does not reveal the precise date that in-person visits resumed. The juvenile court denied requests by both parents to resume in-person visitation in May 2020.

[3] A psychological evaluation determined H.R. “presents with all aspects of prenatal exposure to drugs, including language, learning, and impulse control problems.” A more definitive conclusion, however, would have to await an in-person evaluation because H.R. did not cooperate during a telehealth appointment.

[4] In addition to her live testimony, Murphy provided three written declarations.

[5] Father denied this.

[6] That discussion included, in pertinent part, the following findings: “Father’s conduct during visits can be most accurately characterized as playful, sometimes playing on his own without direct interaction with the children (throwing balls on the baseball field or shooting baskets) or entertaining the children (e.g.[,] operating a RC car) without meaningful interaction of a parental nature with the children. His conduct as an adult playmate has also on occasion led to slight injuries to the children . . . . The monitor/social worker were the adults who attended promptly to the children’s modest injuries on these occasions, not the father. Father did display some concerning conduct during virtual visits, most notable chastising [P.R.] for referring to the foster mother as ‘mom’ which upset the child. [¶] . . . [¶] “[M]other has been the one parent who predominately cares for the children’s feeding needs, but much of her other interaction during visits has entailed allowing the children to watch videos on her phone. Mother has also caused some distress to the children during virtual visits on one occasion challenging [P.R.]’s statement that he had to go to the bathroom during a visit and being disengaged for extended periods during another visit.” The juvenile court believed “the environment created by the parents during visits (lots of play and high energy interaction with [F]ather and extended consumption of videos on [M]other’s phone) does not require meaningful regulation by the children and thus less need for redirection in a manner that might trigger resistant behavior. Thus, rather than constituting evidence of parents’ positive parenting, it actually is indicative of conduct that contributes to degrading the children’s ability to progress and thrive in the more structured environments in which they will have to learn to exist if they are to develop in a positive way.”

[7] Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[8] The parents also cite In re D.M. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 261, but that was a case where the juvenile court made its findings before Caden C. had been decided. (Id. at 271.) That, of course, is not the scenario here.

[9] Although the Department reported P.R. was upset when Mother missed visits early in the proceedings, the caregiver M.R. testified the children were not upset when the parents missed virtual visits. When expressing his preference as to whom he wanted to live with, H.R. associated Mother and Father with candy. P.R. was conflicted, but, given his eagerness to please with “obsessive[ ]” declarations of love, the juvenile court was entitled to find this was not indicative of a substantial, positive, emotional attachment.