Filed 5/24/22 P. v. Kolb CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT*

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. Brian M. McNamara, Judge.

Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Melissa Lipon, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

Defendant Vernon Leroy Kolb appeals from an order extending his commitment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) pursuant to Penal Code sections 2970 and 2972.[1] On appeal, he contends that (1) substantial evidence did not support the findings that (a) defendant was not in remission and (b) defendant remained dangerous, and (2) the trial court misunderstood the law regarding extending commitment for MDOs and failed to make the required findings. The People disagree on both accounts. We affirm.

PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

On January 11, 2021, the Kern County District Attorney filed a petition pursuant to sections 2970 and 2972 to extend defendant’s commitment as an MDO. The petition alleged that on March 27, 2003, defendant was sentenced to six years in prison after having pled guilty to committing lewd and lascivious acts with a child (§ 288, subd. (a)). On November 30, 2007, defendant was “certified as a[n MDO] and admitted to Atascadero State Hospital.” On March 13, 2020, defendant agreed to a one-year extension of his commitment at Coalinga State Hospital (CSH), to expire on April 16, 2021. The petition was filed based on the opinion of the medical director of CSH that defendant’s commitment should be extended pursuant to section 2970.

In support of the petition, the People filed a commitment extension recommendation prepared by the medical director of CSH and a forensic report prepared by one of defendant’s evaluating psychologists at CSH.

On February 19, 2021, the parties waived their right to a jury trial on the petition.[2]

On April 6, 2021, after having heard evidence on the petition on March 17, 2021, and March 18, 2021, the trial court granted the People’s petition to extend defendant’s commitment for one year.

On April 7, 2021, defendant filed a notice of appeal.

FACTUAL SUMMARY[3]

A. The People’s Case

Dr. Jeffrey Neubarth was a physician and surgeon at CSH since 2011. Before February 25, 2018, defendant was assigned to a “downstairs unit” because he had fallen while assigned to an upstairs unit. On February 25, 2018, defendant came into Neubarth’s exam room and asked that he be recommended to be moved back to an “upstairs unit.” Defendant explained that the fall that led to his move to a downstairs unit resulted from alcohol intoxication rather than some other incapacitation or disability.

Dr. Mary Ann Rowe was a staff psychologist at CSH for 13 months. Her job duties included treatment for CSH patients, “teach[ing] management” to the patients, leading sex offender treatment program groups and other groups, and serving on interdisciplinary treatment teams. Rowe saw defendant every day when she worked at CSH. Occasionally defendant asked to see Rowe for a “one[ ]to[ ]one,” but normally their interaction was limited to exchanging greetings. She estimated that she had spoken to defendant one to one at least six times for about 30 to 45 minutes on each occasion. Rowe was assigned to defendant’s treatment team. Her role on defendant’s treatment team included updating his risk assessment for “suicide risk, risk for harm to others, [and] risk for any type of victimization either as the victim or as the perpetrator.” She also reviewed “the progress that the patient has made … within the treatment period.”

As to defendant, Rowe opined that he was doing well and could be considered for release if he finished his sex offender group treatment program. However, defendant had not completed his sex offender group treatment program and Rowe believed completion of that program was necessary for defendant to be released. Nevertheless, when asked if defendant could succeed without completion of the sex offender group treatment program, Rowe testified that she could “only speculate … but generally [she] [did not] … think [defendant] w[ould] be” sexually abusing children again. She explained that, at the time of his offense, “he was doing a lot of drugs and alcohol, hallucinogens, heroin [and] cocaine” and she believed it impacted his judgment. In contrast, she testified that he had “been clean and sober … for a long time now. He has not had any problems at all. He[ is] … remorseful and ashamed of what happened ….” She did not believe defendant had attempted to obtain or tested positive for any drugs or alcohol in the past 13 months. She would know if any such conduct occurred. On that basis, she opined that “he would be at low risk for reoffending.” She further opined that his “behavior … associated with pedophilic disorder is linked to [his] alcohol or substance abuse” and his “cognitive limitations[.]” If defendant’s drug and alcohol use was not under control or if he did not continue his treatment,[4] he could be dangerous. Drug and alcohol abuse and “cognitive impairment secondary” to his history of drug and alcohol abuse were the biggest risk factors.

Rowe was not aware of whether defendant consumed alcohol and fell as a result in 2018 at CSH; whether defendant made comments about how he “would stick someone in an aggressive manner” at CSH; whether defendant told another patient that he would “knock him out” in 2017 at CSH; whether defendant “attempted to stall a room search and was observed snorting a white, powdery substance …”; or whether he told a social worker in 2018 that “he wanted to go to Mexico to find a young girl because the [social] norms about age and dating were different there and … hinted towards women being property to men.” To Rowe’s knowledge, since he arrived at CSH, he had not “acted out” and had “not had any writeups for aggression or violence.” She also noted that, to her knowledge, defendant had worked a job at CSH for five years and patients were not permitted to work jobs if they have disciplinary violations. But, if the misconduct allegations were true, that would change her opinion.[5]

Rowe next testified that defendant does not have a psychotic disorder such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder.[6] Pedophilic disorder, as distinct from pedophilia, is impacted by social factors like “maturity[,] … education, … community and family support, income, an increase in self-awareness, and … abstaining from drugs and alcohol.” She opined that his pedophilic disorder was in remission and he posed no threat based on his pedophilic disorder. However, she also testified that “there is really no way to know for sure if” defendant would reoffend if he was permitted to be around children. If he was not in remission, she would expect to see behaviors such as “masturbation in front of staff,” “sexual acting out with peers,” or seeking out illicit pornographic material depicting children, none of which had occurred. However, Rowe agreed “those actions aren’t necessary in order for a person to … have pedophilic disorder.” When asked whether defendant required treatment to keep his pedophilic disorder in remission, Rowe gave the following answer: “[N]o I don’t think he is at risk for reoffending[,] but I do think that if he were to be considered for release that he should be required to go to a community-based treatment program because he didn’t complete the program here. And from what … I have read in his notes, he … did not disclose the nature of his offense which is a requirement in the [sex offender treatment program] group ….”[7] Rowe testified that a defendant admitting the nature of their offense is “the very first part of the treatment program ….” Defendant began the treatment program but voluntarily stopped attending before the program was shut down due to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, Rowe testified that defendant indicated his willingness to participate if the program was resumed and she believed that he would participate if he was released and ordered to participate. Rowe further opined that the treatment defendant was receiving at CSH was not sufficiently structured to suit his needs. Programs in the community tend to be more structured.

Defendant struggled in the sex offender treatment program because of his cognitive limitations caused by drug use—he cannot read or write. Rowe opined that defendant’s hallucinogen use probably caused permanent brain damage that would not improve. The group had homework assignments and defendant found it embarrassing to not be able to complete them because of his illiteracy. Rowe was unaware of whether anyone offered to help defendant read and write for his treatment program.

Mary Anderson was a registered nurse at CSH for nine years. Based on progress notes maintained by the hospital, between June 21, 2019, and July 25, 2019, defendant chose not to participate in a “12-step study group” and did not enroll in any groups prior to groups being shut down due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Katie Azurdia was a rehabilitation therapist at CSH for about three years. Her role in defendant’s treatment was assisting him in finding productive outlets to replace “bad habits.” On April 27, 2020, she asked defendant if he was interested in participating in a treatment program. At the time, the program had not yet been suspended, but it did require participants to wear face masks and social distance.[8] Defendant declined. On July 29, 2020, Azurdia asked defendant why he was committed to CSH. He minimized his crime, suggesting that it “wasn’t a big deal.” Minimizing the severity of an offense suggested a lack of insight and Azurdia informed the treatment team that prepared defendant’s treatment plan.

Hope McNutt was a licensed clinical social worker at CSH for about six years. Sometime between 2014 and 2018, defendant made a statement in a group that McNutt led regarding a desire to “go to Mexico to find a young girl … [b]ecause the parameters or the norms about dating and the ages were different” and because he believed that in Mexico women were “essentially … property to men.” McNutt was unsure about the context of the statement. It could have been made regarding defendant’s feelings as a young person rather than how he felt at the time.

Francisco Moreno was an officer with the CSH Police Department on July 15, 2019. On that date, he observed defendant and another patient “standing in a hallway[,] … acting a little bit nervous and a little bit suspicious.” He observed their behavior as being “consistent with … trading, selling, and bartering”—all conduct prohibited at CSH. Defendant admitted to Moreno that he and the other patient were trading or bartering postage stamps.

Jennifer Nava was a unit supervisor at CSH on September 28, 2018. On that date, defendant told Nava that he wanted to be moved from the unit after an incident involving other patients. He told Nava that if she didn’t move him off of the unit that “he would hurt somebody or hit somebody.” In response, Nava placed defendant’s hospital access on hold—he was not permitted to leave his unit until it could be confirmed that he was no longer a threat to others.

Emily Castleman was a psych tech assistant at CSH. Her role included basic nursing care and observation of patients. On November 8, 2018, defendant and another patient argued with each other with raised voices. CSH staff redirected them, telling them to move away from each other. They continued to argue and did not move away from each other. CSH staff activated an alarm. They again attempted to redirect both men, this time successfully. No physical violence resulted from the incident.

Dr. Elizabeth Gates was a consulting psychologist at CSH for five years. Her role at CSH was to “interview patients and review records to develop reports for the Court for … [section] 2970 and [29]72 proceeding[s].” In that role she completed about seven or eight reports per month and conducted “perhaps 400 evaluations.” In performing evaluations, she typically reviewed psychiatry progress notes, social worker notes, therapy progress notes, nursing progress notes, and treatment plans, and, if possible, spoke to the patient and a staff member on the patient’s unit. Gates clarified that her role at CSH was not to treat patients; she was to objectively evaluate them which would be made more difficult if she was a patient’s treating psychologist. Gates conducted an evaluation and prepared a report regarding defendant’s present section 2970 and section 2972 proceeding.[9] She spoke to defendant on the telephone a week before the hearing. However, she had never sat with defendant “for a lengthy period of time to conduct an interview” because he declined interviews or was unavailable. She scheduled an appointment to interview defendant for the present evaluation but, on the date scheduled for the appointment, defendant was out for medical treatment. For the present evaluation, she consulted with defendant’s social worker and Rowe. She explained that it was particularly important in the last year to consult with those treating a patient to determine if any sex offender treatment was conducted because groups were suspended due to the COVID-19 pandemic. She had no estimate regarding when groups would resume except to say that it would resume as soon as it could be conducted safely.

To set the framework for her evaluation of defendant’s readiness for release, Gates considered defendant’s crime of conviction—a violation of section 288, subdivision (a). She considered that he served a term in prison before being classified as an MDO and committed to a state mental hospital pursuant to section 2962. The first criterion in her evaluation was whether defendant had a severe mental illness. She concluded that defendant met the criterion because she presently agreed with the diagnosis of pedophilic disorder. In reaching her diagnosis, she relied upon his prior pedophilic disorder diagnoses, his statement to McNutt about wanting to go to Mexico to find a young girl, his lack of participation and progress in a sex offender treatment program, and his minimization of his offense.

Defendant’s minimization of his offense and lack of participation in sex offender treatment programs concerned Gates regarding his ability to be successful if released. Before defendant is released, it is important that he understand the risks and triggers related to his diagnosis and develop coping strategies to prevent relapse. When asked about his sexual urges, fantasies, beliefs, and views, defendant answered that he did not have any sexual urges or fantasies toward children because he was “ ‘too old.’ ” That concerned Gates; she testified that a more thorough assessment of defendant should be conducted before his release. The court asked what impact age had on dissipating sexual urges caused by defendant’s disorder. Gates testified that it could have some impact, but she could not specifically answer the question as to defendant and opined that it required an assessment by a clinician.

Next, regarding the remission criterion, she opined that pedophilic disorder is chronic over time and very difficult to keep in remission. It required management with psychosocial support and cognitive behavioral therapy. She opined that defendant’s pedophilic disorder is not in remission “due to the absence of treatment or involvement in treatment[,]” the absence of coping skills, and his limited insight into his disorder. Further, defendant’s substance and alcohol abuse while in custody suggested a lack of coping skills regarding substance and alcohol abuse, which was believed to have contributed to his crimes. Based on those issues, Gates testified that defendant did not follow his treatment plan. Defendant was not observed engaging in any overt activities that displayed that his pedophilic disorder was not controlled. However, Gates also noted that the passage of time and defendant’s absence of reoffending behavior are not indicators that defendant is in remission if he is not also enrolled in sex offender treatment and drug and alcohol abuse treatment programs; they may simply indicate a lack of triggers in the controlled environment. For those reasons, she opined that defendant was not in remission.

Finally, as to defendant’s present dangerousness due to his pedophilic disorder diagnosis, Gates testified that defendant’s disorder was related to his history of violence. Specifically, she considered defendant’s offense of conviction, his argument with another patient where an alarm was sounded, and his threat to “stick someone in an aggressive manner.” Because defendant’s violent behavior persisted in a controlled environment, Gates opined there was “a likelihood that [offending behavior] could occur again in the future if released in an unsupervised environment.” Defendant’s failure to meet treatment goals and absence of insight and skills necessary to decrease the risk of reoffending caused Gates to conclude that defendant presently represented a substantial risk of physical danger to others due to his severe mental disorder.

Gates opined that if defendant successfully completed a sex offender treatment program, would continue treatment in the community, and one of his treating psychologists opined that he was in remission, she would conclude that he was in remission and did not pose a substantial risk of danger to the public.

B. Defendant’s Case

Rowe testified that she believed defendant’s mental disorder was in remission because he had not “demonstrated some of the behaviors or interests in children … that an individual that’s paraphilic disordered would typically have.” He had no disciplinary actions for drug or alcohol abuse or possession of contraband such as child pornography; he had expressed no sexual interest in children in her mental health groups; and he was married to a woman of a similar age to himself. She opined that he did not presently represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others due to his severe mental disorder.

Rowe opined that even if defendant threatened to “stick” another person, was involved in a verbal altercation with another patient that resulted in an alarm being sounded, and used alcohol to the point that he fell, he did not presently represent a substantial danger of physical harm to others. She explained that “things like that happened in [her] unit on a daily basis.” In the past 13 months, defendant had displayed none of the behaviors described.

DISCUSSION

Defendant first argues that two findings required for the recommitment order—that the mental disorder is not in remission and that the defendant poses a substantial danger to society—were not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he argues that the trial court did not properly apply the law regarding petitions to recommit MDOs. The People disagree on both accounts, as do we.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

“ ‘Enacted in 1985, the MDO Act requires that an offender who has been convicted of a specified felony related to a severe mental disorder and who continues to pose a danger to society receive appropriate treatment until the disorder can be kept in remission.’ [Citation.] The MDO Act provides for treatment at three stages of commitment: as a condition of parole (§ 2962), in conjunction with the extension of parole (§ 2966, subd. (c)), and following release from parole (§§ 2970, 2972). [Citation.] [¶] … [¶]

“Sections 2970 and 2972 govern the third and final phase of MDO commitment, which begins once the offender’s parole term has expired. Section 2970 permits a district attorney, on the recommendation of medical professionals, to petition to recommit an offender as an MDO for an additional one-year term. An offender will be recommitted if ‘the court or jury finds [1] that the patient has a severe mental disorder, [2] that the patient’s severe mental disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and [3] that by reason of his or her severe mental disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.’ (§ 2972, subd. (c).)” (People v. Foster (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1202, 1207–1208.) At a recommitment hearing, the issue is whether the defendant’s “current condition justifie[s] extension of his commitment.” (People v. Cobb (2010) 48 Cal.4th 243, 252.)

“The term ‘remission’ means a finding that the overt signs and symptoms of the severe mental disorder are controlled either by psychotropic medication or psychosocial support. A person ‘cannot be kept in remission without treatment’ if during the year prior to the question being before … a trial court, the person has been in remission and has been physically violent, except in self-defense, or … has not voluntarily followed the treatment plan. In determining if a person has voluntarily followed the treatment plan, the standard is whether the person has acted as a reasonable person would in following the treatment plan.” (§ 2962, subd. (a)(3).)

While “ ‘ “substantial danger of physical harm” does not require proof of a recent overt act’ ” for purposes of recommitment as an MDO (In re Qawi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1, 24, quoting § 2962, subd. (g)), that does not negate the statutory requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the person currently poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others, before recommitment as an MDO is permitted. (See § 2972, subds. (a)(2), (c), (e).)

Review for sufficiency of the evidence in the MDO recommitment context uses the same standard applied in the criminal conviction context—the substantial evidence rule. (People v. Labelle (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 149, 151.) “In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, an appellate court must determine whether, on the whole record, a rational trier of fact could have found that [a] defendant is an MDO beyond a reasonable doubt, considering all the evidence in the light which is most favorable to the People, and drawing all inferences the trier could reasonably have made to support the finding.” (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082 (Clark).)

A single opinion by a psychiatric expert that a person is currently dangerous due to a severe mental disorder can constitute substantial evidence to support the extension of an MDO commitment. (See People v. Bowers (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 870, 879; People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1165.) An expert’s testimony in civil commitment cases on a person’s dangerousness or likely dangerousness may be the only evidence available on the issue. (People v. Ward (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 368, 374.) However, “[e]xpert opinion testimony constitutes substantial evidence only if based on conclusions or assumptions supported by evidence in the record. Opinion testimony which is conjectural or speculative ‘cannot rise to the dignity of substantial evidence.’ ” (Roddenberry v. Roddenberry (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 634, 651.)

A. Not In Remission or Cannot Be Kept in Remission Without Treatment

Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that defendant’s severe mental disorder was not in remission. The evidence in the record demonstrated that defendant was diagnosed with pedophilic disorder—a chronic condition that required management with psychosocial support and cognitive behavioral therapy. In June or July 2019 (before the COVID-19 pandemic), defendant stopped participating in a 12-step program and thereafter did not enroll in any programming, including a sex offender treatment program. He declined to enroll in a treatment program in April 2020, at a time when facemasks and social distancing were required. He also admitted using alcohol, threatened to “stick” someone, and minimized his offense. As a result, Gates concluded that defendant was not in compliance with his treatment program and was not in remission. She further opined that without successful completion of a sex offender treatment program, he had limited insight into the risks and triggers of his disorder and lacked the skills and tools to regulate his behavior. Although Rowe opined that defendant was in remission, she acknowledged that he must participate in a sex offender treatment program to remain in remission. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant was not in remission or could not be kept in remission without treatment. Defendant’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.

Defendant argues that there is no evidence that he demonstrated any symptoms of pedophilia in the year prior to the hearing. Gates testified that with pedophilic disorder the urges—like those of an alcoholic or other addict—are chronic and require treatment. Even if defendant did not overtly display signs of pedophilic disorder because he is in a controlled environment, the absence of treatment was a strong indicator that defendant would likely be unable to control his urges in an uncontrolled environment. The evidence admitted suggested that, despite the absence of overt pedophilic behavior in the previous year, defendant was not in remission because he declined treatment and support to control his chronic urges.

Next, defendant argues that the testimony regarding his alcohol use, his threat to “stick” someone, and his argument that resulted in sounding of an alarm were all immaterial to whether his pedophilic disorder was in remission because “[n]one of those purported incidents ha[d] any connection to an inappropriate sexual attraction to children.” Gates and Rowe both testified that defendant’s pedophilic disorder was linked to alcohol and substance abuse. Rowe testified that if defendant’s drug or alcohol use was not under control that he would be dangerous as a result of his pedophilic disorder. Gates testified that defendant’s “pedophilic disorder is related to his history of violence ….” Gates opined that if defendant’s inhibitions were lessened, he would be a risk of danger to others. Based on that record, defendant’s alcohol and drug use and threats were properly considered in assessing whether he was in remission.

B. Substantial Danger of Physical Harm to Others

Next, defendant contends that “[t]he government presented no evidence of [defendant]’s engaging in any behavior that showed his alleged pedophilia disorder was still active and still represented a danger.” Instead, he argues, the government proved other misconduct to show that he was dangerous and “claimed that pedophilia is always [present] and … [defendant] will always be dangerous.” Again, the People disagree, as do we.

The People proved that defendant did not attend a sex offender treatment program and continued to minimize his offense. Without defendant successfully completing a sex offender treatment program, Gates opined that defendant would have little insight into his offense (as evidence by his minimization of his offense) and would lack the knowledge and skills necessary to decrease his risk for engaging in future sexual offenses. They also presented evidence to support a finding that defendant used alcohol and threatened others in a controlled environment, both of which were related to his pedophilic disorder. Defendant need not have committed an overt act displaying his sexual proclivity toward children to be determined to pose a substantial danger of physical harm to others. (In re Qawi, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 24.) Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant posed a substantial risk of danger to others due to his severe mental disorder.

II. The Trial Court’s Application of the Correct Legal Standard

Defendant next argues that the trial court’s explanation for its decision suggested that it did not understand the findings necessary for its decision. We disagree.

A. The Trial Court’s Ruling

After outlining the evidence that it considered, the trial court offered the following:

“It is clear from the record that [defendant] has not yet developed a comprehensive understanding of the factors of his criminal behavior and insight into his sexual attraction to children. Children are vulnerable victims. Without [defendant] having a willingness to acknowledge or explore his deviant sexual attraction, he will not succeed.

“He needs to develop skills and tools to manage this attraction in order to prevent further victimization of minors. [Defendant] needs to acknowledge and develop a strong understanding of how his behavior impacts children for the remainder of their life. He must recognize that psychological trauma stays with the child victim. He needs tools and strategies to manage this disorder.

“He must—and I’ll say that again. He needs tools and strategies to manage this disorder. He must recognize that psychological trauma stays with the child victim.

“It is with the above in mind that [defendant] needs to complete the sex offenders treatment program treatment. This would provide a workable relapse prevention program, a plan to deal with attraction triggers, and his ability to manage these triggers when they arise.

“The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that, one, [defendant] has a severe mental disorder of pedophilia or disorder at this time. [Defendant’s] severe mental disorder is not in remission at this time or could not be kept in remission without treatment. [Defendant] is not in remission due to the absence of treatment or involvement in treatment. [Defendant] did not voluntarily follow up the treatment program. Three, because of [defendant’s] severe mental disorder he cannot control his behavior at this time.

“Because there is a severe mental disorder, [defendant] poses a significant risk of physical harm to others. For those reasons, [defendant] the petitioner—I am talking directly to [defendant], the petition for extension pursuant to … section 2970 is now deemed to be true and is now sustained.”

B. Analysis

As a preliminary matter, a “trial court is presumed to know and understand the applicable law.” (Cardinal Health 301, Inc. v. Tyco Electronics Corp. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 116, 155; see People v. Hajek and Vo (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1144, 1220 [triers of fact are afforded the same presumption], overruled on another ground in People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216.) We presume that the trial court applied the correct standard unless it is proven otherwise.

Next, the trial court explicitly applied the appropriate standard. As described above, an offender will be recommitted if “the court … finds [1] that the patient has a severe mental health disorder, [2] that the patient’s severe mental health disorder is not in remission or cannot be kept in remission without treatment, and [3] that by reason of the patient’s severe mental health disorder, the patient represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 2972, subd. (c).) Here, the trial court very clearly outlined the correct standard in making its determination. The trial court’s decision to highlight the need for defendant to complete a sex offender treatment program before he can be released does not suggest that it did not understand the legal standard and cannot overcome the presumption that the trial court understands and correctly applies the law. Moreover, the evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that defendant’s decision to decline treatment was an indication that he did not have insight into his disorder, was not in remission, and posed a danger of physical harm to others. As discussed in the previous section, we find no error in that conclusion.

Insofar as defendant suggests that the trial court was required to expressly summarize the evidence in support of each finding, we disagree.[10] As the People correctly argue, after a defendant has waived his right to a jury trial, a trial court presiding over an MDO recommitment proceeding sits as trier of fact, and is not required to make explicit findings of fact or conclusions of law. (§ 1167 [a trial court sitting in place of a jury may enter a general verdict]; People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 572; see § 2972, subd. (a)(1) [MDOs have the right to a jury trial at which the People bear the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt]; People v. Williams (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th 436 [MDO recommitment proceedings are civil proceedings, incorporating both civil and criminal procedural rules].)

We find no error.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Poochigian, J. and DeSantos, J.

[1] All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

[2] The record reflects that the parties again waived their right to a jury trial on March 17, 2021.

[3] Because defendant raises only a suppression issue on appeal, we provide a summary only of the facts presented at the hearing on defendant’s initial motion to suppress.

[4] The record does not specify the kind of treatment that defendant required in order not to be dangerous.

[5] In response to whether her opinion of defendant’s dangerousness might change based on alcohol and controlled substance consumption and threats of violence, Rowe noted a “complicating factor”—CSH had “not been offering those types of groups[.]” Based on the context, it appears that Rowe was referring to sex offender treatment groups for MDOs.

[6] Rowe also testified that defendant was diagnosed with pedophilia but later acknowledged that the DSM-5 distinguishes between pedophilia and pedophilic disorder.

[7] Later, Rowe testified both that defendant “is able to speak about [his offense] and just nod his head in shame and say … that wasn’t him, not meaning that it literally wasn’t him but that emotionally it wasn’t him[,]” and that although he is ashamed about his offenses, “he can’t even admit what he did ….” (Italics added.)

[8] Defendant asks us to take judicial notice of the Governor’s COVID-19 state of emergency proclamation on March 4, 2020, and related subsequent executive orders on March 19, 2020, and May 4, 2020, reflecting the state of the COVID-19 pandemic. We take judicial notice of those executive orders pursuant to Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (c), and 459, subdivision (a).

[9] She had also evaluated defendant about five times between 2016 and 2020.

[10] In his reply, defendant suggests that the People mischaracterize his argument. He was not arguing that the trial court erred because it failed to explain its reasoning; he was, instead, arguing that the trial court’s explanation of defendant’s need for treatment suggested that it did not understand the law. As noted above, we disagree.

Insofar as defendant intended to raise a separate issue on this topic, his argument was not completely developed and cited no authority. The People correctly note that defendant’s presentation of an underdeveloped argument without any citation to authority is an appropriate ground for a finding of forfeiture of the argument. (See People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 482, fn. 2; In re Groundwater Cases (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 659, 690, fn. 18; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B), (C).) Regardless, we address defendant’s claim on its merits.