Filed 5/27/22 Munoz v. Soto CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Huey P. Cotton, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.

Jay S. Bloom for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Forry Law Group and Craig B. Forry for Defendant and Respondent.

____________________________

Plaintiff and appellant Gabriel Munoz alleges he is the true owner of a property located in North Hills. On June 8, 2020, Munoz filed suit against defendant and respondent Jorge Luis Soto, defendant Mikael Puskulian, and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable interest in the property, averring causes of action for cancellation of written instruments and quiet title. Munoz alleges that in or about October 2013, Puskulian recorded a forged quitclaim deed, which purported to convey the property from Munoz to Puskulian, and that in or about July 2014, Soto recorded a quitclaim deed, which purported to convey the property from Puskulian to Soto. Munoz asserts he first discovered these transactions during a title search in November 2016.

Soto demurred to the operative verified second amended complaint, contending the statute of limitations applicable to fraud claims barred these causes of action. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Munoz appeals from the resulting judgment.[1]

We conclude that Code of Civil Procedure[2] section 338, subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations applies because the gravamen of Munoz’s cancellation of written instruments and quiet title claims is a species of fraud, that is, a forged deed. Further, Munoz does not dispute that the statute of limitations began to run when he discovered the forged deed in November 2016. Accordingly, the three-year limitations period in section 338, subdivision (d) elapsed before Munoz filed suit in June 2020. Lastly, Munoz does not contend his pleading could be further amended to render the action timely. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of dismissal.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We summarize only those aspects of the procedural background that are relevant to this appeal.

On June 8, 2020, Munoz filed his initial verified complaint alleging cancellation of written instruments and quiet title claims against Soto, Puskulian, and all persons unknown claiming any legal or equitable interest in the property at issue. On June 11, 2020, Munoz filed his verified first amended complaint against the same defendants, raising the same causes of action he asserted in the prior pleading.

On August 27, 2020, Soto filed a demurrer to the verified first amended complaint, arguing, inter alia, that both causes of action are time-barred. On October 7, 2020, the trial court sustained Soto’s demurrer but granted Munoz leave to file an amended pleading.

On November 5, 2020, Munoz filed his verified second amended complaint against the same defendants, again alleging claims for cancellation of written instruments and quiet title.[3] Munoz avers he is the “actual and true owner” of real property located in North Hills. On or about October 11, 2013, Puskulian recorded a quitclaim deed to the property, which purported to convey the property from Munoz to Puskulian. This deed is “void and a nullity as [Munoz’s] signature is a forgery and [it] was not executed by” Munoz. On or about July 3, 2014, Soto recorded a quitclaim deed “pursuant to which . . . Puskulian supposedly conveyed said property to . . . Soto.” The two quitclaim deeds are attached to the verified second amended complaint.

Munoz was “unaware of the existence of the two quitclaim deeds . . . until November of 2016, when a title search was performed and [Munoz] discovered that said quitclaim deeds had been recorded.” “By virtue of the forgery of the Quitclaim Deed to . . . Puskulian, [Munoz claims he] is entitled to an Order cancelling and setting aside said Quitclaim Deed, and . . . an Order cancelling and setting aside the Quitclaim Deed from . . . Puskulian to . . . Soto.” Munoz also alleges that, because the forged deed to Puskulian is “void and a nullity” and the deed to Soto “could not[ ] convey legal title to said property to . . . Soto,” Munoz is entitled to an order quieting title in his favor.

On December 4, 2020, Soto filed a demurrer to the verified second amended complaint, again contending Munoz’s claims are time-barred. Munoz opposed the demurrer, and Soto filed a reply to Munoz’s opposition.

On January 14, 2021, the trial court sustained Soto’s demurrer to the verified second amended complaint without leave to amend. The minute order for the hearing indicates the court found that section 338, subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations governs Munoz’s first cause of action for cancellation of written instruments because “an act of forgery” is a type of fraud, and that the claim is time-barred because Munoz discovered the quitclaim deeds in November 2016 but did not file suit until June 8, 2020. As reflected in the minute order, the court also found that, although “[a]n action to quiet title is not barred by the statute of limitations[ ] where the land has remained in possession of plaintiffs and their grantors,” Munoz had not alleged facts showing the property was in his possession. On April 16, 2021, the trial court entered a judgment dismissing the verified second amended complaint as against Soto.

On May 14, 2021, Munoz timely appealed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal.[4]

STANDARD OF REVIEW

“ ‘When a ground for objection to a complaint, such as the statute of limitations, appears on its face or from matters of which the court may or must take judicial notice, a demurrer on that ground is proper.’ [Citation.]” (Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 746.)

“We independently review the ruling on a demurrer and determine de novo whether the pleading alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action.” (Santa Ana Police Officers Assn. v. City of Santa Ana (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 317, 323.) In conducting this independent review of the trial court’s ruling on the demurrer, “ ‘[w]e are not bound by the trial court’s reasoning and may affirm the judgment if correct on any theory.’ ” (See Nede Mgmt. Inc. v. Aspen American Ins. Co. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1121, 1129–1130 (Nede Mgmt. Inc.).) “[W]e accept as true the well‑pleaded allegations in [the] . . . complaint. ‘ “We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.]” ’ ” (See Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) “We also assume the . . . attachments to the complaint are true . . . .” (Nede Mgmt. Inc., at p. 1127.)

“We review the denial of leave to amend for abuse of discretion, asking whether there is ‘a reasonable possibility that the complaint can be cured by amendment.’ [Citation.]” (Nede Mgmt. Inc., supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 1129.)

“ ‘It is well settled that all presumptions and intendments are in favor of supporting the judgment or order appealed from, and that the appellant has the burden of showing reversible error, and in the absence of such showing, the judgment or order appealed from will be affirmed.’ [Citations.]” (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 104.) “ ‘[T]o demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ [Citation.]” (Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 277.)

The appellant is obligated to rebut the presumption of correctness accorded to the trial court’s ruling, regardless of the applicable standard of review. (See Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Torres Construction Corp. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 480, 492 [noting that the presumption of correctness applies to “ ‘ “an appeal from any judgment” ’ ” and on “ ‘ “[d]e novo review” ’ ”]; see also Orange County Water Dist. v. Sabic Innovative Plastics US, LLC (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 343, 368, 399 [indicating that an appellant must affirmatively show the trial court erred even when the de novo standard of review applies].)

DISCUSSION

1. Munoz Fails to Show the Trial Court Erred in Concluding that His First Cause of Action for Cancellation of Written Instruments Is Time-Barred

“ ‘ “Ordinarily a suit to set aside or cancel a void instrument is governed by section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure.” [Citations.] The only exception to this rule . . . would be as and when fraud or mistake were involved, in which case the three-year period of [Code of Civil Procedure], section 338[, subdivision (d)] would apply. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (See Walters v. Boosinger (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 421, 430 & fn. 10 (Walters), fn. omitted.) Section 338, subdivision (d) provides a three-year statute of limitations for “[a]n action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake.” (§ 338, subd. (d).) This provision further states: “The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.” (Ibid.) As a default limitations period, section 343 provides: “An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” (§ 343.)

Munoz argues the trial court should have found that section 343’s four-year limitations period applies to his first cause of action for cancellation of written instruments, rather than section 338, subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations. We understand Munoz to be contending his cancellation of written instruments claim does not sound in fraud because it does not contain essential elements of such a claim. He argues, “There are no allegations of any false statements made to [Munoz,] [t]here are no allegations of [Munoz’s] reliance on any false statements[, and t]here are no allegations of defendant’s intent that [Munoz] rely on any statements.”[5] Munoz further argues that even if section 338, subdivision (d) applies to his cancellation claim against Puskulian, section 343 governs his cancellation claim against Soto because “there are no allegations that he engaged in any fraudulent act.” For the reasons discussed below, we reject these arguments and conclude section 338, subdivision (d) applies to the first cause of action against Soto.

Section 338, subdivision (d)’s scope is expansive. “It is black letter law that section 338(d) applies regardless of the form of the action a plaintiff chooses or legal theory she [or he] advances. Section 338(d)’s ‘language is comprehensive and the statute, with its favorable accrual rule, is accordingly applied to any form of action, for any kind of relief. In other words, if fraud or mistake is the basis of the legal injury (the “ground” of the action), the section applies regardless of whether the complaint seeks legal or equitable relief or pleads a cause of action in tort or contract.’ [Citation.]” (Vera v. REL-BC, LLC (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 57, 66 (Vera), quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2020) Actions, § 653.)

“ ‘To prevail on a claim to cancel an instrument, a plaintiff must prove (1) the instrument is void or voidable due to, for example, fraud, and (2) there is a reasonable apprehension of serious injury including pecuniary loss or the prejudicial alteration of one’s position. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1193–1194.) Under Munoz’s legal theory, the two quitclaim deeds at issue are void, and thus should be cancelled, because Puskulian allegedly forged Munoz’s signature on the first deed.[6] Accordingly, the alleged forgery is the “basis” or “ ‘ground’ ” of Munoz’s cause of action for cancellation of the two quitclaim deeds. (Vera, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 66.)

Concerning whether the alleged forgery constitutes “fraud” for the purposes of section 338, subdivision (d), the decision from our high court in Leeper v. Beltrami (1959) 53 Cal.2d 195 (Leeper), that reviewed a trial court’s order sustaining a demurrer is instructive. In a nutshell, a married woman in Leeper suffered a judgment on a bond that was forfeited and was facing the district attorney’s threat to foreclose on her separate property, which was the family home.[7] (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 200–201.) “In order to facilitate the payment of the bond by his wife without the necessity of sacrificing the home property, and for other reasons,” the woman’s husband deeded two other properties (i.e., the Sacramento and Sutter properties) to her. (See id. at p. 201.) Before the wife could sell the Sacramento and Sutter properties to pay that judgment, however, two executors of one of the husband’s former creditors threatened to foreclose on mortgages on those two properties in order to collect on a debt that the executors knew had already been paid. (See id. at pp. 200–201.)

The wife ultimately sold both the Sacramento and the Sutter properties, and used the proceeds of these transactions to pay the bond judgment and the allegedly false claims of the executors; she retained the residue of the proceeds. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 202.) The husband and wife claimed that these sales were “made under compulsion arising out of the extortionary claim of [the two executors] and from fear of [the wife’s] losing her . . . home because of the bond judgment.” (See ibid.) They further alleged that, in part because of the collection tactics employed by the executors, the wife “was compelled to sell” the Sacramento property to a purchaser for a third of its value. (See ibid.)

More than three years after these transactions, the husband and wife filed a complaint that “prayed for recovery of the money paid to [the executors]; recovery of the proceeds of any of that money which had been distributed to legatees of [the husband’s former creditor’s] estate, joined as defendants; recovery of the Sacramento [property] from [the purchaser thereof]; and, other remedies by way of rents and profits from that property.” (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 202.) The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint without leave to amend, and entered a judgment dismissing the action. (Id. at p. 200.) The issue on appeal was whether the husband’s and wife’s claims were timely. (See id. at pp. 202–203, 206–207.)

The Supreme Court held the claims against the executors were subject to section 338, subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations governing actions for fraud or mistake. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 207–208.)[8] In particular, the Leeper court found the executors “were guilty of duress” because they “wrongfully, with knowledge of the falsity of the claim, attempted to foreclose on a mortgage which had already been satisfied.” (See Leeper, at pp. 203–204.) The high court further explained that “[d]uress is a species of fraud” because “duress and fraud[ ] are often factually closely interconnected and indistinguishable,” and “[t]he very pressing of a false claim with knowledge of its falsity constitutes a misrepresentation, which is the backbone of what we know as ordinary fraud.” (See id. at pp. 205, 207–208.)

It is apparent that a forgery, much like the wrongdoing in Leeper amounting to duress, is “a false claim [made] with knowledge of its falsity” that “constitutes a misrepresentation, which is the backbone of what we know as ordinary fraud.” (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 207–208.) This is because “[a] forgery is a ‘ “writing which falsely purports to be the writing of another,” ’ and is executed with the intent to defraud.” (Schiavon v. Arnaudo Brothers (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 374, 382.) Accordingly, forgery is a “species of fraud” covered by section 338, subdivision (d). (See Leeper, at pp. 205, 207; see also O’Bryan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1941) 18 Cal.2d 490, 497 [indicating that “forgery” is a “species of fraud”]; 37 C.J.S. (2008) Forgery, § 1, p. 72 [“While it is true that there is a distinction between fraud and forgery, and forgery contains some elements that are not included in fraud, forgeries are a species of fraud,” fn. omitted].) For these reasons, we conclude that the three-year limitations period in section 338, subdivision (d) applies to Munoz’s cancellation of written instruments claim.

Munoz resists this conclusion. He asserts that “even if the three year statute of limitations for fraud applied to the claims against defendant Puskulian, . . . the four year statute would apply to the claims against defendant Soto.” According to Munoz, Leeper held that “where there are two defendants[ ] who did not act jointly, the applicable statute of limitations is determined separately as to each defendant.” Munoz maintains “[t]here is no indication that the defendants named in the Second Amended Complaint acted jointly,” and his “claims against defendant Soto [are] not based on any allegation that said defendant forged any deed or engaged in any fraud.”

As an initial matter, we observe that because Munoz failed to supply a pinpoint citation to Leeper, it is difficult for us to ascertain which part of the decision he contends demonstrates that the statute of limitations is determined separately as to each defendant if they did not act jointly.[9] Insofar as Munoz argues that the Leeper court’s analysis of the husband’s and wife’s claim against the purchaser of the Sacramento property supports his position that the cancellation claim against Soto is subject to a different statute of limitations than his corresponding claim against Puskulian, he is mistaken.

In Leeper, the husband and wife sought rescission of the sale of the Sacramento property to the purchaser, which property they claimed they had to sell at a third of its actual value. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 202, 213.) Munoz is correct that our high court undertook an analysis of the timeliness of the rescission claim that differed from the court’s analysis of the claims against the executors. (See id. at pp. 211–217 [undertaking separate analyses of the claims against the executors and the purchaser, respectively].) However, the Leeper court did not subject the executors and the purchaser to this differential treatment on the ground that these defendants did not act jointly. Rather, the court assessed the claims separately because of a rule peculiar to the “substantive right to . . . . rescind” a contract—i.e., “[t]he requirement that one entitled to rescission must act promptly . . . .” (See id. at p. 216.) In other words, the high court was addressing a condition that must be satisfied in order to recover on a rescission cause of action, and not a different statute of limitations. Indeed, Munoz’s argument is belied by the fact that the Legislature did not “prescribe the limitations period for an action based on the rescission” until after Leeper was decided. (See 11A Cal.Jur.3d (2015) Cancellation and Reformation, § 29 & fn. 11.)

As important, the Leeper decision actually undercuts Munoz’s argument that section 338, subdivision (d) does not apply to the cancellation claim leveled against Soto just because Munoz did not allege Soto participated in the forgery. The Supreme Court held that the rights of the legatees of the former creditor’s estate were “dependent upon the rights of the plaintiffs as against the [executors,]” even though the husband and wife had not alleged that the legatees were accomplices to the executors’ wrongdoing. (See Leeper, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 200–202.)[10] Consequently, the wife’s claims against the executors and the legatees of the former creditor’s estate were barred by the three-year statute of limitations. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 207–209, 217 [“The judgment is affirmed against [the wife] and in favor of [the executors]. The judgment in favor of the residuary legatees against [the wife] is affirmed . . . .”].)

In contrast, the Supreme Court held that the husband’s claims against the executors and the legatees were not time-barred because the statute of limitations was tolled during his incarceration for perjury and conspiracy to commit fraud. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 202, 208–210, 217 [“The judgment in favor of the residuary legatees . . . as against [the husband] is reversed. The judgment against [the husband] and in favor of [the executors] is reversed . . . .”].) Thus, whether the husband’s and wife’s respective claims against the legatees were time-barred hinged entirely on the fate of their corresponding claims against the executors, even though the legatees themselves were not alleged to have played any role in the extortionary plot.

As set forth above, Munoz’s right to cancel the quitclaim deed from Puskulian to Soto is entirely dependent on Munoz’s ability to prove that the prior quitclaim deed from Munoz to Puskulian was a forgery. Just as the plaintiffs’ claims against the legatees in Leeper were subject to section 338, subdivision (d)’s statute of limitations because they were entirely derivative of their claims against the executors, Munoz’s cancellation claim against Soto is governed by the three-year limitations period because it is premised solely on Puskulian’s fraud.

In sum, the trial court did not err in finding that Munoz’s claim for cancellation of written instruments against Soto is governed by section 338, subdivision (d)’s three-year statute of limitations. Further, Munoz does not contest the court’s ruling that the statute of limitations began to run in November 2016 when he discovered these transactions, and the record shows Munoz did not commence the instant action until approximately three and a half years later on June 8, 2020. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining Soto’s demurrer to the first cause of action on the ground it is time-barred.[11]

2. Munoz Does Not Demonstrate the Trial Court Erred in Concluding His Second Cause of Action to Quiet Title Is Time-Barred

“The Legislature has not established a specific statute of limitations for actions to quiet title. [Citation.] Therefore, courts refer to the underlying theory of relief to determine the applicable period of limitations. [Citations.] An inquiry into the underlying theory requires the court to identify the nature (i.e., the ‘gravamen’) of the cause of action.” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 476 (Salazar).)

“Although the applicable limitations period is determined by looking at the gravamen of the quiet title cause of action, the general principles about when that limitations period commences do not necessarily apply because quiet title actions have special rules for when the limitations period begins to run. [¶] . . . ‘ “[A]s a general rule, the statute of limitations [for a quiet title action] does not run against one in possession of land.” ’ [Citation.]” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 477, fn. omitted.)

Here, Munoz bases his quiet title claim on the factual allegations supporting his claim for cancellation of written instruments. Specifically, the first paragraph of the quiet title cause of action incorporates by reference all the paragraphs constituting the cancellation cause of action. The remainder of the quiet title cause of action simply states that Munoz denies any claims adverse to his title, he seeks to quiet title in his favor, and he is entitled to recover his attorney fees. Thus, the underlying theory of the quiet title claim is the same as that underlying the cancellation claim. It follows from our previous discussion that the gravamen of both causes of action is a species of fraud, and that they are thus subject to section 338, subdivision (d)’s statute of limitations. For this reason, we reject Munoz’s contention that the second cause of action to quiet title is subject to section 343’s four-year statute of limitations because, “[o]n the face of the second cause of action[,] there are no allegations of fraud or mistake, and the gravamen of the cause of action is to quiet title based on a conflicting claim of ownership.”[12] Hence, unless Munoz demonstrates that a “special rule” applicable to quiet title actions applies, his quiet title claim is time-barred for the same reasons his cancellation of written instruments claim fails.

Munoz fails to demonstrate that any such special rule rescues his quiet title claim. The trial court acknowledged that “n actions to recover real property, the holder of legal title is presumed to have been in possession within the time required by law.”[13] The court concluded that this presumption is not available to Munoz because, despite his allegations that “the deeds were void and should be cancelled,” Soto had shown the statute of limitations had run on the cancellation of written instruments cause of action. In essence, the trial court found that Munoz could establish that he had legal title to the property, and thereby trigger the presumption that he possessed the property, only if he could prevail on his first cause of action for cancellation of written instruments, but that he could not prevail on that claim because it was time-barred. Based on its conclusion that the presumption of possession was inapplicable, the court stated that Munoz had to “allege actual possession such as occupancy of the property or tenants of [Munoz] occupying the property or the like.” In sustaining the demurrer, the court tacitly found Munoz did not allege facts establishing his actual possession. (See also [i]Estate of Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 104 [“ ‘It is well settled that all presumptions and intendments are in favor of supporting the judgment or order appealed from . . . .’ ”].)

Munoz does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that he lacked entitlement to the special rule that the statute of limitations on a quiet title action does not run against a person in possession of the land. Accordingly, he has failed to discharge his burden of showing the court erred in that respect. (See Estate of Sapp, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 104 [“ ‘[T]he appellant has the burden of showing reversible error, and in the absence of such showing, the judgment or order appealed from will be affirmed.’ [Citations.]”].) Consequently, Munoz’s quiet title cause of action against Soto is time-barred.

3. Munoz Fails to Establish the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Denying Leave to Amend

“It is the ‘plaintiff’s burden to show the reviewing court how the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action.’ [Citation.]” (Needelman v. DeWolf Realty Co., Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 750, 762.) Munoz has not discharged this burden. He does not argue that even if the trial court correctly sustained Soto’s demurrer to the verified second amended complaint, the court abused its discretion in denying leave to amend. We thus do not address this issue further.

DISPOSITION

The judgment dismissing the verified second amended complaint as to defendant Jose Luis Soto is affirmed. Soto is awarded his costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

MORI, J.*

[1] Puskulian is not a party to this appeal.

[2] Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

[3] The factual summary provided in the textual paragraph accompanying this footnote and in the following textual paragraph is derived from the allegations of the verified second amended complaint.

[4] Although the judgment did not adjudicate Munoz’s causes of action against the other defendants, the judgment is nonetheless appealable because it dismissed the action as to Soto. (See Ram v. OneWest Bank, FSB (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“ ‘Under the “one final judgment” rule, an order or judgment that fails to dispose of all claims between the litigants is not appealable under . . . section 904.1, subdivision (a).’ [Citation.] This rule does not apply, however, ‘ “when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]”].)

[5] Although Munoz also suggests that particular elements of deceit and concealment causes of action are absent from the verified second amended complaint, he waives that argument by failing to develop it further in his briefing. (See Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“ ‘Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the positions taken. . . . The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’ [Citations.]”].)

[6] It is well established that “ ‘[a] forged deed is completely void and ineffective to transfer any title to the grantee[,]’ ” and that “ ‘[a] subsequent title derived through a forged instrument is completely unenforceable . . . .’ ” (See WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 890; see also 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Real Property, § 282 [“A forged deed is, of course, a nullity . . . .”].)

[7] Because the high court was reviewing a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer, it assumed the truth of most of the operative complaint’s factual allegations. (See Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 201–203 [summarizing the operative complaint’s allegations, and indicating the issue on appeal was whether those averments stated time-barred causes of action].) Accordingly, our recitation of the facts of that case likewise assumes the truth of those averments.

[8] Although Leeper construed former section 338, subdivision (4) (see Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 207–208), that provision “is now . . . section 338, subdivision (d).” (Walters, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 430, fn. 10.)

[9] For that reason alone, we could reject Munoz’s reliance on the Leeper decision. (See Handyman Connection of Sacramento, Inc. v. Sands (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 867, 880, fn. 14 [rejecting an appellant’s reliance on case authority because that party “fail[ed] to provide a pinpoint cite to” that decision]; Hodjat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1, 10 [“[A]n appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case.”].)

[10] Although this portion of the Leeper opinion actually identified these individuals as “distributees of the estate” (see Leeper, supra, 53 Cal.2d at pp. 200–201), the decision later referred to them as “legatees of [the] estate . . . .” (See id. at pp. 202, 217; see also Black’s Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) [“legal distributee” means “[a] person lawfully entitled to take property under a will,” and “legatee” similarly means “[s]omeone who is named in a will to take personal property”].)

[11] Because Munoz’s cause of action for cancellation of written instruments would be time-barred even if the verified second amended complaint related back to the date of filing of his initial verified complaint, we need not resolve whether Munoz is in fact entitled to the benefit of the relation back doctrine. (See generally Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 276 [“An amended complaint is considered a new action for purposes of the statute of limitations only if the claims do not ‘relate back’ to an earlier timely filed complaint.”].)

[12] Munoz cites Salazar for the proposition that “[t]he statute of limitations for an action for Quiet Title, which is based on the cancellation of a written instrument, is four years.” We note that although Salazar recognized that the four-year limitations period can apply to a quiet title action based on the cancellation of a written instrument, the court did not hold that all such quiet title actions are subject to this limitations period regardless of whether the cancellation claim is predicated on a forged deed. (See Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 476–477; see also Kim v. Reins International California, Inc. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 73, 85, fn. 4 [“ ‘[C]ases are not authority for propositions that are not considered.’ [Citation.]”].) Instead, Salazar recognized that in applying the “gravamen” approach to determining the statute of limitations, a court may conclude that “the three-year limitations period for claims based on fraud or mistake” governs a particular quiet title action. (See Salazar, at pp. 476–477.)

[13] (See also Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1095 [“[S]ection 321 . . . provides: ‘In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law, and the occupation of the property by any other person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for five years before the commencement of the action.’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘ “[s]ection 321 . . . establishes the presumption of possession in the legal owner, unless such presumption is rebutted by the actual adverse possession . . . of another . . . .” ’ [Citation.]”].)

* Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.