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A.C. Investments v. Gordon

A.C. Investments v. Gordon
02:22:2007

A


A.C. Investments v. Gordon


Filed 2/20/07  A.C. Investments v. Gordon CA2/2


 


 


 


 


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS


California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b).  This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT


DIVISION TWO







A.C. INVESTMENTS, INC., et al.,


            Plaintiffs and Respondents,


            v.


TOD W. GORDON,


            Defendant and Appellant.



      B186421


      (Los Angeles County


      Super. Ct. No. VC041332)



            APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.  Raul A. Sahagun, Judge.  Affirmed.


            Law Offices of Michael J. Buley and Michael J. Buley for Defendant and Appellant.


            Curd, Galindo & Smith and Alexis Galindo for Plaintiffs and Respondents.


* * * * * *


            Defendant and appellant Tod W. Gordon appeals from a judgment entered against him following a bench trial on a breach of contract claim brought by plaintiffs and respondents A.C. Investments, Inc.  The trial court ordered appellant, as the seller, to specifically perform a residential purchase agreement (purchase agreement).  Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support the judgment.  Specifically, he contends the evidence does not support the trial court's findings that appellant's real estate agent satisfied her fiduciary obligations to appellant and that the purchase agreement had not been rescinded.  Because substantial evidence supported the judgment, we affirm.


FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND


            This action involves a residential property located at 9422 Houghton Avenue in Santa Fe Springs (residence).  Dorothy Lee Buck, appellant's mother, owned the residence.  In March 2003, she executed a power of attorney in favor of appellant, giving him the responsibility to sell the home for his own and his siblings' benefit.  In April 2003, appellant's mother quitclaimed the residence to herself and appellant as joint tenants.  That same month, appellant listed the residence for sale with Castle Real Estate and signed a listing agreement.  Julie Yeomans-Moradi (Moradi), who owned Castle Real Estate, was appellant's exclusive agent.  She and appellant had been friends for many years.


            Appellant was in some financial distress and was anxious to sell the property.  On April 24, 2003, he accepted an offer in the amount of $288,000, which he believed would result in a net amount of $260,000.  The offer fell through when the buyers could not obtain financing.  Due to the poor condition of the property, conventional financing was unavailable, meaning that any buyer would either need to pay cash or locate a nontraditional financing source.


            Thereafter, appellant and Moradi discussed the possibility of Moradi purchasing the residence herself.  Moradi agreed to buy the residence for $260,000 and also agreed to forego her commission so that appellant would yield about the same amount he would have had the earlier sale gone through.  Because Moradi did not have the amount of cash required for the sales price--a fact which she discussed with appellant--she brought in Rene Moya, owner of A.C. Investments (collectively A.C. Investments), as a partner in the purchase.  Appellant signed a purchase agreement that listed Castle Real Estate as the buyer, but did not have A.C. Investments listed as an additional buyer.  Although Moradi told appellant that she had an investor in the purchase, she did not discuss with appellant that she was acting as a dual agent.  The purchase agreement, however, listed Moradi as an agent for both the buyer and seller.  Without appellant's knowledge, Moradi added A.C. Investments to the purchase agreement after appellant signed it.  According to appellant, he would not have sold the residence at the agreed price had he known that a buyer other than Moradi was involved.


            In mid-June 2003, appellant received escrow instructions that included A.C. Investments as a named buyer.  Appellant kept the escrow instructions for two weeks and then signed them; though he initialed each page of the instructions, he did not notice that A.C. Investments was listed as a buyer and that Castle Real Estate was identified as being a dual agent.  Appellant did not take the time to review the documents as he signed them.  On or about July 8, 2003, Moradi received another offer for the residence which she relayed to appellant.  On or about July 9, 2003, appellant signed a grant deed transferring his interest in the property to Castle Real Estate and A.C. Investments.  Appellant did not notice that A.C. Investments also appeared on the grant deed.  Although appellant had also executed a form indicating that there were no liens on the residence, Del Sol Escrow advised appellant on or about July 10, 2003 that he needed to sign a corrected grant deed and resolve a lien that was on the title.  Appellant did nothing because he thought Moradi would handle these issues.


            Appellant's mother died at the end of June 2003.  Appellant told Moradi about this, and she told A.C. Investments both about the death and appellant's financial problems.  Escrow was scheduled to close on July 15, 2003.  In mid-July 2003, Moradi asked appellant to remove his personal items from the house, but appellant refused because the sale was â€





Description Defendant appeals from a judgment entered against him following a bench trial on a breach of contract claim brought by plaintiffs and respondents A.C. Investments, Inc. The trial court ordered appellant, as the seller, to specifically perform a residential purchase agreement (purchase agreement). Appellant contends that substantial evidence does not support the judgment. Specifically, he contends the evidence does not support the trial court's findings that appellant's real estate agent satisfied her fiduciary obligations to appellant and that the purchase agreement had not been rescinded. Because substantial evidence supported the judgment, court affirm.
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