Filed 6/3/22 In re J.S. CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
In re J.S. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B313242 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19CCJP07655A–B)
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LOS ANGELES COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
J.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Mary E. Kelly, Judge. Affirmed.
Joseph D. MacKenzie, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Veronica Randazzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Father J.S. (father) appeals from an order taking jurisdiction over his children, daughter Jessica S. and son J.S., pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code[1] section 300 (section 300). Father contends that substantial evidence did not support the counts that alleged he struck Jessica with a belt. He does not, however, challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the counts that alleged he sexually abused Jessica. We affirm.
II. DISCUSSION[2]
Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting counts a-1, b-2, and j-2 of the Department’s petition. These counts alleged, as sustained by the juvenile court:
“a-1 [and b-2 and j-2]
“The children[’s] father . . . physically abused the child Jessica. On a prior occasion, . . . father struck the child’s stomach with a belt. On prior occasions, . . . father struck the child. Such physical abuse was excessive and caused the child Jessica unreasonable pain and suffering. [M]other . . . failed to protect the child in that . . . mother knew or should have reasonably known of the physical abuse and allowed . . . father to have unlimited access to the child. Such physical abuse of the child Jessica by . . . father and . . . mother’s failure to protect the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child and the child’s sibling [J.S.] at risk of serious physical harm, damage, and failure to protect.”[3]
Father does not, however, challenge the juvenile court’s sustaining of the following additional counts:
“b-1 [and d-1 and j-1]
“The children[’s] father . . . sexually abused the child Jessica. On prior occasions, . . . father fondled the child’s vagina underneath the child’s clothes. [M]other . . . failed to protect the child when [she] told the child the sexual abuse did not occur. Such sexual abuse of the child Jessica by . . . father and . . . mother’s failure to protect the child endangers the child’s physical health and safety and places the child and the child’s sibling [J.S.] at serious risk of physical harm, damage, sexual abuse and failure to protect.” He therefore concedes that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the children based on these additional counts.
“It is a fundamental principle of appellate practice that an appeal will not be entertained unless it presents a justiciable issue. [Citation.]” (In re I.A. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489.) “An important requirement for justiciability is the availability of ‘effective’ relief—that is, the prospect of a remedy that can have a practical, tangible impact on the parties’ conduct or legal status.” (Id. at p. 1490.)
“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court’s jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773; In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492 [“an appellate court may decline to address the evidentiary support for any remaining jurisdictional findings once a single finding has been found to be supported by the evidence”].)
Courts of Appeal have exercised their discretion to consider challenges to jurisdictional findings notwithstanding other bases for jurisdiction when “(1) the jurisdictional finding serves as the basis for dispositional orders that are also challenged on appeal; (2) the findings could be prejudicial to the appellant or could impact the current or any future dependency proceedings; [or] (3) the finding could have consequences for the appellant beyond jurisdiction.” (In re A.R. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1146, 1150.) Father does not challenge the dispositional order; does not assert how the findings as to counts a-1, b-2, and j-2 could prejudice him or impact him in future or current dependency proceedings; and does not argue that the finding could have any consequences for him beyond jurisdiction. “Under these circumstances, the issues [f]ather’s appeal raises are ‘“abstract or academic questions of law”’ [citation], since we cannot render any relief to [f]ather that would have a practical, tangible impact on his position in the dependency proceeding. Even if we found no adequate evidentiary support for the juvenile court’s findings with respect to his conduct, we would not reverse the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional orders nor vacate the court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over his parental rights.” (In re I.A., supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1492; accord, In re Briana V. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 297, 308.) On these facts, father has not raised a justiciable issue and we affirm the juvenile court’s order taking jurisdiction over the children.
III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM, J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
[1] Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
[2] Because we hold that father has not presented a justiciable issue, we dispense with a summary of the facts underlying his substantial evidence challenge to the section 300 counts.
[3] Mother is not a party to this appeal.