Filed 6/14/22 Conservatorship of A.I. CA1/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

Conservatorship of the Person of A.I.,

A.I. appeals from an order appointing respondent (Public Guardian) as the conservator of her person pursuant to the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.; LPS Act).[1] She contends (1) her appeal should not be dismissed as moot; (2) the court erred in admitting psychiatric hospital records at her trial because they contained inadmissible hearsay; and (3) the court violated section 5350 by not commencing the trial within the statutory period. We will affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Public Guardian filed a “Petition for Appointment of Temporary Conservator and Conservator” pursuant to the LPS Act on August 13, 2020. (Capitalization omitted.) The petition, supported by a declaration and a recommendation from the Contra Costa Regional Medical Center for a conservatorship, alleged that A.I. is gravely disabled under section 5008, subdivision (h)(1)(A) as a result of a mental disorder. On that same date, the court appointed the Public Guardian as a temporary conservator.

At the initial hearing on the petition on August 25, 2020, the deputy public defender representing A.I. advised the court that A.I. objected to the petition, did not waive time, and wanted a “Zoom court trial.” A.I.’s counsel requested a trial date of September 15, 2020, which the court granted. After continuances on September 15, September 17, October 6, and October 7, 2020, trial commenced on October 13, 2020. A.I. was present by Zoom videoconference and waived her right to a jury trial.

At the outset of the trial, the Public Guardian presented the court with Exhibit 2–which is at the heart of this appeal–described as “approximately 30 pages of various medical records with the face sheet entitled, ‘Declaration of Custodian of Medical Records.’ ”

A. Testimony of Consuella Williams

Consuella Williams, an associate marriage and family therapist, testified for the Public Guardian. Williams was the case manager for A.I. for the prior three and a half years at East County Mental Health.

In 2019, Williams recounted, A.I. was hospitalized in a residential facility in Modesto. A.I. was the subject of a conservatorship until June 2020, when she was allowed to stay with her aunt. Shortly after Williams saw A.I. in June or July 2020, A.I. reportedly began to decompensate and was admitted to “Unit 4-C,” an in-patient psychiatric unit at Contra Costa Regional Medical Center. In September 2020, A.I. was transferred to California Psychiatric Transitions (CPT), a secure institution for mental disease, and remained there at the time of trial.

Having spoken with personnel at A.I.’s prior facilities, Williams did not believe A.I. was ready to return to her aunt’s house in light of her previous placements, the circumstances of her being discharged, and the fact that A.I. had most recently been in placement for only three months and it was too early to determine if she was ready for a lower level of care. Generally, a patient stays at an institution for medical disease for six months to a year to be stable enough to step down to a board and care facility. A.I. had yet to have her first treatment team meeting at CPT to evaluate her progress and readiness for discharge.

B. Testimony of Dr. Levin

Psychiatrist Michael Levin was accepted by the court as an expert in the field of psychiatry and grave disability. In determining whether A.I. was gravely disabled, Dr. Levin met with A.I. through Zoom interviews on September 15, 2020 and October 12, 2020; spoke to A.I.’s deputy conservator, CPT staff, and A.I.’s treating psychiatrist; reviewed hospital records from Psychiatric Emergency Services and the psychiatric Unit 4-C at Contra Costa Regional Medical Center (Exhibit 2); and considered Williams’ trial testimony.

As to Exhibit 2, Dr. Levin testified that the records were of a type that experts in his area of psychiatry reasonably rely upon. The Public Guardian then moved the exhibit into evidence, explaining that it constituted a subset of the material received from the custodian of records and had been redacted by county counsel. A.I.’s attorney objected “as to certain portions within those records on hearsay and foundation grounds” and asked that the court not admit Exhibit 2 or receive it “subject to objections that [he] would raise to the Court through the course of the testimony.” The court “[took] the request to admit subject to cross-examination” by defense counsel, allowing the Public Guardian to use the records during Dr. Levin’s direct examination.

Referring to entries in Exhibit 2, Dr. Levin testified that while A.I. was in Unit 4-C before her transfer to CPT, her symptoms included extreme agitation, dysphoria, and assaultive and aggressive behavior. She had to be put into restraints and was uncooperative regarding her medications. A.I. had self-reported that she assaulted a peer. On August 26, 2020, A.I. was observed to be internally preoccupied, talking to herself, slightly paranoid, and dismissive; Dr. Levin interpreted this to mean she was reacting to auditory hallucinations.

Numerous entries in Exhibit 2 referred to A.I.’s inconsistency with her medications. On August 11, 2020, she refused to take them. On other dates in August 2020, she was only selectively compliant and was pacing, restless, irritable, argumentative, and mumbling, which Dr. Levin interpreted to confirm the inconsistency of her compliance. At one point, A.I. stated, “I don’t need fucking meds.” Dr. Levin opined that it was necessary for a conservator to be able to consent to medical treatment on A.I.’s behalf.

The Public Guardian’s counsel referred Dr. Levin to an entry in Exhibit 2 that stated A.I. had been verbally abusive and yelled at staff. At that point, defense counsel objected on the ground of hearsay and foundation. Based on the contents of the custodian of records’ declaration accompanying Exhibit 2, the court found the medical records “trustworthy and supported by a sufficient foundation to qualify as business records” under Evidence Code section 1271 and overruled A.I.’s objections.

The Public Guardian’s counsel continued to ask Dr. Levin to interpret entries in Exhibit 2. According to those records, when A.I. arrived at the psychiatric unit in July 2020, she was crying, “RTIS,” and insisting her body was dead, and then rapidly escalated into intense “dysphoria.” Dr. Levin explained that RTIS—“ ‘Responding to Internal Stimuli’ ”—implied she was experiencing auditory hallucinations, A.I.’s statement about her body being dead reflected a delusion, and dysphoria meant despondent, agitated, or crying. The records also stated that A.I. was “yelling at [the] one-on-one nurse profanely saying she doesn’t trust him, then speaking in tongues incoherently, you guys are attacking me, where are the cameras,” which Dr. Levin interpreted as A.I. responding to internal stimuli and experiencing a paranoid delusion. Another record entry stated that A.I. was urinating on herself, yelling, and cursing, and she would not eat.

Aside from his testimony based on Exhibit 2, Dr. Levin reported his personal observations of A.I. during their Zoom interviews. A.I. had displayed limited insight into her situation, stating she was in the psychiatric hospital for a urinary infection. Despite hospital records indicating a psychotic state, she told Dr. Levin it was a mistake for her to go to the psychiatric unit.

Dr. Levin diagnosed A.I. with schizoaffective disorder, which is listed on the DSM-IV and DSM-V. According to Dr. Levin, A.I.’s schizoaffective disorder makes her unable to provide for her shelter, and returning her to her aunt’s care was not a viable option. Based on Williams’ testimony about what occurred when A.I. lived with the aunt, the placement was not safe and secure. The fact that A.I. went into the hospital for two months after staying with her aunt showed that she had decompensated. In Dr. Levin’s view, A.I. needed more time to stabilize and demonstrate medication adherence at CPT. Dr. Levin opined that A.I. is gravely disabled.

On cross-examination, A.I.’s counsel referred Dr. Levin to entries in Exhibit 2, which indicated she was compliant with her medications in September 2020, there had been no noted assaults since August 16, 2020, and A.I. had participated in therapeutic groups.

C. Testimony of A.I.’s Aunt

A.I.’s counsel presented the testimony of A.I.’s aunt M.

M. stated that A.I. could stay with another aunt, who was “disabled” with paranoid schizophrenia, and M. would assist in caring for both of them. M. had helped A.I. after her prior conservatorship ended in June 2020. A.I. had said she was taking her medication, but M. believed this was untrue because A.I. became sick and agitated and ended up in the hospital. While in M.’s care, A.I. was responsible for administering her own medication and claimed not to need it.

D. Court’s Ruling

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that A.I. was gravely disabled and unable to provide for her food, clothing, or shelter, and set a review hearing for December 2020. The court expressed concern that, if A.I. were released to her aunt at the time of the hearing, A.I. would not take her medications consistently and M. would not be able to help provide for her basic needs. Upon clear and convincing evidence, the court imposed disabilities denying A.I. the right to refuse treatment (including psychotropic medications) related specifically to her grave disability, denying her the right to refuse routine medical treatment, and disqualifying her from possessing or owning a firearm or other deadly weapon. By written order, the court appointed the Public Guardian as the LPS conservator over A.I.’s person for a one-year term starting on October 14, 2020. This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Mootness

Because this appeal is from an order of conservatorship that expired in October 2021, the appeal is moot and the Public Guardian asks us to dismiss it.[2] A.I. urges that dismissal is inappropriate because she continues to be stigmatized by the LPS conservatorship order and because the issues to be resolved are important. We note that nearly every LPS appeal technically becomes moot due to the fact that LPS conservatorships last only a year, and mootness arguments are often rejected in this context because issues that are of general interest and likely to recur would otherwise escape review. (E.g., Conservatorship of George H. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 157, 161, fn. 2; Conservatorship of Manton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 645, 647 fn. 1.) We exercise our discretion and proceed to the merits.

B. Admission of Portions of the Hospital Records

Under section 5008.2, subdivision (a), the trier of fact is required to consider “the historical course of the person’s mental disorder,” including evidence from mental health or related support services and “the patient’s medical records as presented to the court, including psychiatric records,” in determining whether the person is gravely disabled for purposes of ordering a LPS conservatorship. (Italics added.)

In this case, the Public Guardian satisfied this requirement by offering a redacted subset of A.I.’s medical records produced by the Contra Costa Regional Medical Center as Exhibit 2, which was accompanied by a declaration from the medical center’s custodian of records. A.I. contends the court erred by admitting portions of the records because they were not subject to the business records exception to the hearsay rule. We review for an abuse of discretion. (Conservatorship of S.A. (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 438, 447 (S.A.) [“The trial court has wide discretion to determine whether there is a sufficient foundation to qualify evidence as a business record; we will overturn its decision to admit such records only upon a clear showing of abuse.”].)

1. Business Record Exception

Evidence Code section 1271 provides: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered to prove the act, condition, or event if: [¶] (a) The writing was made in the regular course of a business; [¶] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event; [¶] (c) The custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation; and [¶] (d) The sources of information and method and time of preparation were such as to indicate its trustworthiness.” (Italics added.) The requirements may be satisfied by an affidavit or declaration. (See Evid. Code, § 1561; S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 447.)

Here, the records custodian’s declaration stated under penalty of perjury that the records were “ ‘completed by the personnel of Contra Costa Health Services staff, physicians, or persons acting under the control of either in the ordinary course of hospital and health center business at or near the time of the act, condition, or event.’ ” (Italics added.) The court found the records “trustworthy and supported by a sufficient foundation to qualify as business records.” The requirements of the business record exception were met. (S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447–448 [records admissible where accompanied by a declaration attesting they were prepared or compiled by facility personnel in the ordinary course of business at or near the time of the acts, conditions, or events].)

2. A.I.’s Arguments

A.I. nonetheless contends the court erred, arguing that Exhibit 2 did not contain observations of an “act, condition, or event” as required by Evidence Code section 1271, but opinions, judgments and conclusions, as well as hearsay-within-hearsay reports of A.I.’s conduct. According to A.I., Exhibit 2 was filled with opinions and conclusions including phrases such as “ ‘responding to internal stimuli’, ‘paranoia,’ and ‘psychotic.’ ” A.I. also contends that Exhibit 2 was “littered with multiple levels of hearsay without an exception for each underlying level.”

It is true that, even where a hospital record falls within the business record exception, statements within that record that are repeated from a third party must also be considered under the hearsay rule, and if the statements are offered for their truth, there must be a corresponding hearsay exception for each layer of hearsay. (People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 224–225; People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 674–675 [emergency room report may be a business record, and hearsay statements recorded in the report may be, e.g., a statement of the patient's existing mental or physical state (Evid. Code, § 1250, subd. (a))]. Furthermore, the business record exception applies only to the extent that the document records, and is offered to prove, “an act, condition or event.” (Evid. Code, § 1271.) Generally, a psychiatric symptom is an act, condition, or event, while a psychiatric diagnosis, which requires reasoning based on a variety of factors, tends to be an opinion. (People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 503 [diagnosis based on reasoning arrived at from considering different factors, such as psychiatric diagnosis, is inadmissible; diagnosis based on what person has seen is a record of a condition and admissible]; see also People v. Young (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 891, 911–912 [psychiatric records tend to be opinions rather than the record of an act, condition or event].)

Here, A.I.’s opening brief identifies 32 entries in Exhibit 2 that A.I. believes contain multiple levels of hearsay pertaining to opinions of staff members and conclusions about A.I.’s behaviors rather than acts, conditions or events. For several reasons, A.I.’s contentions are unavailing.

First, for each of the entries that A.I. challenges in her opening brief, A.I. provides citations only to Exhibit 2 itself, which is not in the appellate record. Although counsel stated in footnote 3 on page 24 of the opening brief that she “intend[ed] to request transmission of Exhibit 2 within 10 days of respondent’s brief being filed, as provided in the Rules of Court, rule 8.224,” we have not received the exhibit. Because A.I. has not secured Exhibit 2 as part of the appellate record, she has failed to affirmatively demonstrate error.

Second, of the 32 entries in Exhibit 2 that A.I. raises in her opening brief, few were objected to specifically at trial. While A.I. relies on the fact that her attorney made objections during Dr. Levin’s examination, she fails to link those objections to the issues she raises in her brief: her discussions of the challenged record entries do not cite to the page in the reporter’s transcript where any objection was made.[3] To the extent A.I. has not shown that an adequate objection was made at trial, her challenges are waived.

Third, from what we can glean about Exhibit 2 from the reporter’s transcript of counsel’s statements and discussions with the court, there was no abuse of discretion in the admission of Exhibit 2 and the testimony to which defense counsel objected. Many of the entries of which A.I. complains are “ ‘chart notes and staff report[s],’ ” and reports by staff and licensed professionals as to A.I.’s observed conduct fall within the scope of the business records exception. (S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) Furthermore, the entries to which counsel unsuccessfully objected at trial were not inadmissible opinions or conclusions. As set forth in the factual summary ante, the Public Guardian’s attorney pointed Dr. Levin to record entries that were acts, conditions or events, and then asked Dr. Levin for his interpretation or opinion during his live court testimony.

Finally, any error in admitting Exhibit 2 or Dr. Levin’s testimony about the exhibit was harmless, because there is no reasonable probability A.I. would have obtained a more favorable outcome if the portions of Exhibit 2 now challenged by A.I. (or challenged by her attorney at trial) had been ruled inadmissible. Critically, A.I. does not show that the evidence other than what counsel objected to falls short of substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. For example, there was no objection to entries stating that A.I., after staying with her aunt, was taken to the psychiatric unit in July 2020 and was crying, responding to internal stimuli, insisting her body was dead, and rapidly escalating into intense dysphoria; that she yelled at a nurse profanely, spoke incoherently, claimed staff was attacking her, asked where the cameras were, urinated on herself, and refused to eat; and that in August 2020, A.I. was observed to be internally preoccupied, talking to herself, slightly paranoid, dismissive, and inconsistent with her medications. Nor does A.I. show that the rest of Exhibit 2—which was not discussed in court and to which no specific objection was made—did not provide sufficient evidence. In addition, Dr. Levin did not rely solely on Exhibit 2 in opining that A.I. was gravely disabled due to a mental disease and unable to provide for her own shelter, but also considered his personal interviews with A.I. (in which she displayed a lack of insight into her psychiatric state), discussions with her conservator and facility staff, and Williams’ testimony.

A.I. represents that “[t]he trial court relied on the testimony of [Dr.] Levin in making its decision.” More accurately, the court relied on Williams’ testimony that the important time to assess A.I. would be after three months at CPT (she had only been there for about a month) and Dr. Levin’s testimony “particularly with respect to [A.I.]’s ability now and currently to consistently comply with the medication requirements.” Dr. Levin’s testimony about A.I.’s inconsistency with her medications was based on the observations by medical staff as to whether A.I. was taking her medications or not—which are plainly acts or events within the scope of the business record exception. (S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 448.) These observations included the following: A.I. refused to take her medications on August 11, 2020; on other dates in August 2020, A.I. was only selectively compliant with her medications and acted in ways that confirmed to Dr. Levin the inconsistency of her compliance; and at one point A.I. stated, “ ‘I don’t need fucking meds.’ ” Defense counsel did not object to these observations, which adequately support the trial court’s finding.[4]

C. Trial Setting

Persons facing a LPS conservatorship have a right to a trial on whether they are gravely disabled. (§ 5350, subd. (d).) Section 5350, subdivision (d)(2) provides that the trial “shall commence within 10 days of the date of the demand” for a trial, unless a continuance is requested by counsel for the person facing the conservatorship, in which case the 10-day deadline may be extended by 15 days.

Here, on August 25, 2020, A.I.’s attorney requested that a Zoom trial be set for September 15, 2020—beyond the statutory 10-day period but within the 25-day period—and the court agreed. Due to a series of continuances, trial did not start until October 13, 2020, which was 49 days after the trial request (28 days after the original trial date), and 24 days after the statute’s 25-day deadline.

Although the trial therefore did not begin within the period described in section 5350, subdivision (d)(2), that deadline is merely directory, rather than mandatory, since the statute does not provide for a remedy of dismissal. (Conservatorship of M.M. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 496, 500 (M.M.); Conservatorship of Jose B. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 963, 967, 971–972 (Jose B.) [failure to hold LPS trial within the statutory time limit, without any justification for most of the 137-day delay, did not require dismissal because section 5350 timelines are directory rather than mandatory].) Thus, even though a trial court must follow the statute because it uses the word “shall,” the court’s failure to do so does not divest the court of jurisdiction or compel dismissal. (Jose B., supra, at pp. 972–973.)

A.I. nonetheless contends there was no good cause justifying the court’s continuances of the trial date. In particular, she urges, good cause cannot be based on a court’s overcrowded calendar. We disagree.

As a threshold matter, we point out that defense counsel not only suggested the initial September 15 trial date, but also stipulated to some of the ensuing continuances. On September 15, Dr. Levin had not yet evaluated A.I. (apparently due to her move from CCRMC to CPT) and no courtrooms were available, so with A.I.’s stipulation the matter was trailed for two days to allow Dr. Levin to meet with A.I. via Zoom. On September 17, Dr. Levin was not available and, over A.I.’s objection, the court found good cause and continued the case to October 6. On October 6, the case was continued until October 7 by the parties’ stipulation. On October 7, the case was continued to October 13 due to courtroom unavailability over A.I.’s objection: A.I.’s counsel proposed that trial occur on October 8, 9, or 12 (a holiday), but the courtrooms were booked with trials until October 13.[5]

Furthermore, A.I. fails to establish a lack of good cause for the 19-day and 6-day continuances to which her counsel did not stipulate. In this regard, A.I. relies on Conservatorship of James M. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 293, in which a four-day continuance was upheld because a snowstorm preventing the conservatee’s transportation to court was “an act of nature beyond the control of the court or other local officials.” (Id. at p. 299.) In dictum, the appellate court added that the “strong interest in a prompt determination of issues raised by a reappointment petition” could support a court’s dismissal of a petition under other circumstances. (Ibid.)

While there may be circumstances that could support the dismissal of a petition due to an unwarranted delay, those circumstances are not present here. Snowstorms are not the only thing outside of a court’s control. In this case, the court was within its discretion to continue the trial 19 days, and then 6 days, due to the unquestioned unavailability of a key witness (Dr. Levin) and the stated unavailability of courtrooms around the time of A.I.’s trial in the fall of 2020 (during the COVID-19 pandemic). (Jose B. supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 967, 974 [court did not exceed its jurisdiction in commencing the trial 137 days after the initial trial request, even though the court stated no justification for most of the delay].)

Insisting that the liberty interests involved in a civil commitment are “no less fundamental than those in criminal proceedings” (In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 307; see Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 225), A.I. points us to criminal cases which, in her view, hold that insufficient courtroom availability does not constitute good cause.

Contrary to A.I.’s assertion, the cases on which she relies do not hold that insufficient courtroom availability cannot constitute good cause, but that in circumstances of chronic courtroom unavailability a judge may decide that there is no good cause for starting a trial after the mandatory deadline. (See People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 570–571 [questioning decisions that assume court congestion or excessive public defender caseloads necessarily constitute good cause to deny dismissal for failure to comply with speedy trial rights]; People v. Engram (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1131,1163 [court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the unavailability of a judge or courtroom was the state’s fault due to the Legislature’s failure to provide a sufficient number of judges and courtrooms]; People v. Hajjaj (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1184, 1190 [where the unavailability of a judge and a courtroom to commence trial within the statutory period resulted from chronic court congestion attributable to the state, the trial court did not err in concluding there was no good cause for delay under Penal Code section 1382].)

Here, the court did not make any finding of chronic congestion attributable to the state. Moreover, the fact that judges in other cases had acted within their discretion in dismissing a matter due to chronic courtroom unavailability does not compel the conclusion that the judge in this case abused her discretion in continuing the matter. A.I. has not demonstrated either a statutory error or a denial of due process. (Jose B., supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at p. 974.)

A.I. lastly argues that, due to the delay in the start of trial, she was “conserved for forty days longer than she would have been had the court complied with the statute,” so “[c]ommon sense dictates the remedy is to order her conservatorship to expire on September 4, 2021, the last date for hearing her trial within the parameters set by the statute.” A.I. provides no legal authority for this proposition, and we do not find it justified by “[c]ommon sense.” Because the continuances were within the trial court’s sound discretion, A.I. provides no basis for this court to interject itself in the timing of a conservatorship that expired roughly eight months ago. (M.M., supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 500–501 [similarly rejecting a proposed remedy of limiting the conservatorship term to what it would have been if the trial had started earlier].)

III. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NEEDHAM, .J. *

We concur.

JACKSON, P.J.

SIMONS, J.

Public Guardian of Contra Costa County v. A.I. / A161160

[1] Except where otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] In this regard, the Public Guardian filed a request for this court to take judicial notice, or to take further evidence, as to a petition for reappointment of the conservator filed in September 2021, the court’s order finding A.I. to be gravely disabled with A.I.’s acceptance of the conservatorship pending trial, and orders setting the trial for March 2022. We deferred our ruling on the request pending our consideration of the merits of the appeal. We now grant the unopposed request as relevant to the issue of mootness.

[3] The reporter’s transcript reflects counsel’s objections to questions regarding entries of A.I. being verbally abusive, yelling at staff, and slapping a nurse, but it is unclear whether these are entries challenged in her brief. At any rate, the entries indicate staff observations of A.I.’s acts, which fall within the scope of Evidence Code section 1271. Trial counsel also objected to a statement in Exhibit 2 that A.I. had reported assaulting a peer; the court construed that to be a statement by A.I. herself, thus establishing a hearsay exception for an admission of a party opponent (Evid. Code, § 1220). We also note that defense counsel at one point objected to an entry on the ground it referred to a diagnosis; the court sustained that objection.

[4] We also note that, even if parts of Exhibit 2 were inadmissible, Dr. Levin could properly base his opinion on that material, given his undisputed testimony that it was the type of material that experts in his field reasonably rely upon. (Evid. Code, § 801.) A.I. does not contend that Dr. Levin disclosed case-specific facts in violation of People v. Sanchez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 685–686; in any event, the case-specific statements related by Dr. Levin at trial were covered by the business records exception. (S.A., supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447–448.)

[5] The minute order and the reporter’s transcript of the October 7 hearing differ. The minute order states: “Matter called at 3:00 p.m. due to court and counsel being engaged in trial on a separate matter. [Defense counsel] states that he is ‘ready’ and would object to a continuance beyond this week. Counsel requests that the proposed conservatee be released/petition dismissed if the trial is not heard this week. The objection is noted for the record. The court finds good cause to continue the trial to the next available LPS trial calendar on 10/13/2020.” (Capitalization omitted.) According to the reporter’s transcript, defense counsel stated he was ready to proceed with trial but, knowing there was little time for trial that day, asked the court to consider starting the trial the following Thursday, Friday or Monday. The court replied: “I would wish I could do that, but since we’re not the only department that does LPS, but we are one of two departments that handles probate matters and so we are booked on our probate trials and hearings and that’s why we can’t accommodate it until next Tuesday.”

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.