P. v. Wilson

Filed 1/31/07  P. v. Wilson CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b).  This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

            APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County.  Gary T. Friedman, Judge.

            Rudy Kraft, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

            Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Stan Cross, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Brian Alvarez and Kathleen A. McKenna, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

            This is an appeal from an order committing appellant William Albert Wilson as a sexually violent predator (SVP) pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 6600 et seq. (the SVP law).  Appellant contends his SVP commitment, which runs through December  13, 2007, violates various constitutional protections.  We reject these claims and affirm the order.

Facts and Procedural History

            As appellant's previous SVP commitment order neared its end, the district attorney filed a petition to extend the commitment for another two-year period.  (See former Welf. & Inst. Code, §  6604.1, as amended by Stats. 2000, ch. 420.)  Appellant contested the petition in a trial to the court sitting without a jury.  The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant met the statutory criteria for commitment as an SVP.  (See id. at §  6600, subd. (a)(1).)  By order dated February  16, 2006, the court committed appellant for a period beginning December  13, 2005, and ending December  13, 2007.^[1]  Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

Discussion

            All of appellant's contentions on this appeal uniformly have been resolved against his position by all courts to consider the issues to date.  Appellant recognizes this and, while urging us to disagree with existing case law where there is no binding Supreme Court precedent (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455), he states that his primary goal is to preserve the issues for review in the federal courts.  Because the constitutionality of the SVP law is firmly established, we will state our reasons for rejecting appellant's contentions only briefly.

            Appellant contends the SVP law imposes criminal punishment, despite being denominated a civil commitment law.  As a result, he says, the SVP law violates various constitutional proscriptions, such as the bans on double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.  The California Supreme Court has held that the SVP law is a valid civil commitment program and is not subject to ex post facto constraints on criminal punishments.  (Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1176.)  By parity of reasoning, the SVP law does not implicate double jeopardy prohibitions and does not impose cruel and unusual punishment.  (See People v. Hubbart (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1226; People v. Chambless (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 773, 776, fn. 2.) 

            Appellant next contends the SVP law denies him equal protection of law because the SVP law differs in various ways from the mentally disordered offender (MDO) law.  (See Pen. Code, §  2960 et seq.)  In particular, he contends some persons with personality disorders would not be subject to treatment under the MDO law but would be subject to SVP commitment; that SVP commitment does not require a prior course of mental health treatment as does MDO commitment; and that the SVP law does not require release of persons whose mental disorder is in remission, while the MDO law does provide for such release.

            The first step in equal protection analysis is to determine whether the two groups of persons subject to analysis are â€