Malibu-Encinal Homeowners Assn. v. Super
Filed 2/15/06 Malibu-Encinal Homeowners Assn. v. Super. Ct. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
| MALIBU-ENCINAL HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; LECHUZA VILLAS WEST, L.P., Real Party in Interest. | No. B184222 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC327255) |
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. David A. Workman, Judge. Writ granted.
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Michael M. Berger, George M. Soneff, and Lara M. Krieger for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Gaines & Stacey, Fred Gaines, Lisa A. Weinberg, and Alicia B. Bartley for Real Party in Interest.
The issue raised here is whether the doctrine of equitable tolling, which generally allows a trial court to relieve a plaintiff from the bar of the statute of limitations when he or she initially pursues one of several available legal remedies and then later seeks to pursue an alternative, should be expanded to apply where plaintiff claims that the delay in filing litigation was due to pursuit of settlement negotiations with defendant. We conclude it should not. Accordingly, we issue a writ of mandate requiring respondent court to sustain petitioner's demurrer to the underlying complaint for malicious prosecution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In October 2000, petitioner Malibu-Encinal Homeowners Association, Inc. (MEHOA) brought suit against real party Lechuza Villas West, L.P. (Lechuza), recording a lis pendens at the same time.[1] Lechuza's demurrer was sustained on res judicata and collateral estoppel grounds, and the court dismissed the action on April 19, 2001.
Thirty-five days later, on May 24, 2001, MEHOA filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and the remittitur issued January 14, 2003. The underlying action for malicious prosecution based on that litigation was filed January 13, 2005, two years to the day after the remittitur issued.
DISCUSSION
The parties do not dispute that the statute of limitations for malicious prosecution runs in accordance with the formula set forth in Rare Coin Galleries, Inc. v. A-Mark Coin Co., Inc. (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 330.[2] In that case, judgment in the prior action was entered on June 23, 1981; notice of appeal was filed July 29, 1981; the judgment was affirmed by opinion filed October 25, 1983; the Supreme Court denied hearing on February 1, 1984; and the clerk of the Court of Appeal issued the remittitur on February 23, 1984. The Court of Appeal reversed a grant of summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, calculated from the date of the Supreme Court's denial of hearing. The Court of Appeal instead held that the limitations period should be computed as follows: â€
