Gomes v.
Ukiah Unified Scghool Dist.
Filed 1/30/07 Gomes v. Ukiah Unified Scghool Dist. CA1/4
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of
Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as
specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
STEVEN L. GOMES et al. Plaintiffs and v. UKIAH UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT Defendants and |
A113062
(Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUKCVPT 01-86587)
|
Appellants
Steven L. Gomes and Premier Design & Construction, Inc. (Gomes), real
estate developers, challenged a school facilities fee imposed by respondent Ukiah Unified School District
(District). In a prior appeal, we reversed because the District had failed to
identify the use to which the fee would be put, as required by law. (Gomes
v. Ukiah Unified School Dist. (Nov. 10, 2004, A104744) [nonpub. opn.] at pp.
10-13, 15 (Gomes II).) The District's fee resolution did, however,
recite that the fees would be used for â€
Description
Appellants Steven L. Gomes and Premier Design & Construction, Inc. (Gomes), real estate developers, challenged a school facilities fee imposed by respondent Ukiah Unified School District (District). In a prior appeal, court reversed because the District had failed to identify the use to which the fee would be put, as required by law. (Gomes v. Ukiah Unified School Dist. (Nov. 10, 2004, A104744) [nonpub. opn.] at pp. 10 to 13, 15 (Gomes II).) The District's fee resolution did, however, recite that the fees would be used for "construction and/or reconstruction of school facilities as identified in the plan," and made reference to "applications and related documents filed with the State Allocation Board . . . (. . . referred to as the 'Plan.')" Because "the Plan" was not in the record we could not determine what it was, or whether the fee exceeded the reasonable cost of the facilities for which it was imposed. We therefore remanded for the limited purpose of giving the District the opportunity to produce the plan referred to in the resolution; court directed the trial court to determine whether there was a "Plan," and whether the fees exceeded the reasonable costs of the "Plan." (Id. at pp. 13-14, 15.)
The trial court should not have permitted the introduction of testimony and a new set of documents to prove a newly minted theory to justify the District's fee. This kind of post hoc rationalization fails to conform to the procedures required by law. Moreover, although the District is entitled to rely on public documents to identify the facilities for which the fee will be used, the "applications and related documents filed with the State Allocation Board" (relied upon by the District in adopting the fee) do not comprise any decipherable "Plan" for any facilities. Accordingly, court reverse the judgment and remand the matter to the trial court with orders to issue the peremptory writ of mandate.
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