Madrona v. Madrona

Filed 3/8/07 Madrona v. Madrona CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

This case involves a dispute between a mother and her adult son over ownership of the family home. Seventy-eight-year-old Edith Madrona claims she is the sole owner of the house and that her son, Rhainell Madrona,^[1]defrauded her into granting him a joint tenancy interest in the property. Rhainell, 47 years old, contends that his mother tried to fraudulently remove him from title. Mrs. Madrona portrays herself as a loving parent victimized by a perfidious son; Rhainell characterizes the case as a mothers betrayal.

The trial court nonsuited Mrs. Madronas claims of fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and financial abuse, and quieted title jointly in Mrs. Madrona and her son as joint tenants. We find that Mrs. Madrona presented sufficient evidence to allow her fraud claim to go to a jury. Because those issues are critical to the judgment as a whole, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

BACKGROUND

Mrs. Madrona and her late husband immigrated to the United States in the late 1970s and moved in with their daughter Erlinda, at 300 El Cortez Avenue in South San Francisco. In 1979, five of the Madronas seven children also emigrated and moved in with them. In 1980 Erlinda and her husband transferred title to 300 El Cortez Avenue to Mr. and Mrs. Madrona as joint tenants in exchange for $10,000 and the Madronas assumption of the mortgage. Erlinda testified that her brothers Roberto and Rhainell and her sister Minerva each contributed $2,500 to the $10,000 payment, and that Mrs. Madrona agreed she would later add their names to the title. Rhainells testimony corroborated that he paid his mother $2,500 for his share, but he said after the transfer was complete, Mrs. Madrona told him that there was only enough room on the forms to add Mr. Madrona, Roberto and Minerva on the title. Minerva believed her name was on the deed, as Mrs. Madrona told her, until this litigation erupted. In fact, title to 300 El Cortez Avenue was only in Mr. and Mrs. Madronas name.

In September 1982, the Madronas deeded Roberto an interest as a joint tenant and together they borrowed $40,000 to refinance the outstanding mortgage. Roberto testified that he acquired his interest so he could take tax deductions for his contributions to the mortgage and property taxes. He and his mother agreed he would remove his name from title and relinquish his interest when he moved out of the home.

Roberto and Rhainell also contributed to the mortgage between 1980 and 1990. In 1990 Roberto moved out of the house and executed a quitclaim deed transferring title to his parents and Rhainell as joint tenants.^[2] He testified this was at his mothers behest, because Rhainell was to take his place helping pay the mortgage. He also testified that Mrs. Madrona was aware of his quitclaim deed.

Mrs. Madrona testified alternately that she knew Roberto quitclaimed his interest to her but she was not aware he added Rhainells name to the deed, and that she knew nothing about the quitclaim until she was sued by Rhainell. She also said that she did not see the quitclaim deed, but had heard about it from Roberto. She testified: Q: Did Roberto Madrona pull a trick on you by this quitclaim deed? [] A: No. I heard them talking about it but I didnt see it, okay. [] Q: What did you hear? [] A. That [Roberto]s going to quit. [] Q: Who was he talking to? [] A. Me. He said, Im going to quit, okay. You can have this house all by yourself, he said [it] like that.

In 1994, Rhainell asked Mrs. Madrona^[3]to add his name to the title and mortgage so that he could take a tax deduction for his contributions to the mortgage and property tax. Mrs. Madrona testified that she agreed to put him on the title because he said hes going to quit whenRhainell said hes going to quit when he moves out and get a house and I was confused. At that time, my mother is very sick and I need somebody to help me. On July 22, 1994, Rhainell and Mrs. Madrona executed a grant deed for 300 El Cortez from Mrs. Madrona and Rhainell as individuals to Mrs. Madrona and Rhainell as Joint Tenants. Three days later they borrowed $89,600 from Bank of America, secured by a deed of trust on the property. Approximately $39,000 was used to refinance the outstanding mortgage and the remainder went to Mrs. Madrona. Rhainell made the payments on the $39,000 mortgage with Bank of America and Mrs. Madrona made payments due for the remaining funds.

Rhainell moved out from 300 El Cortez in November 1999. In October 2000, Mrs. Madrona recorded a grant deed conveying to herself the right of survivorship, as the original transferor, transfer return property to the person who created the joint tenancy. Rhainell found out about this in December 2000, when Erlinda and Roberto told him their mother had removed his name from the title. In late January 2001, he confronted Mrs. Madrona and asked her to restore his title. She refused. Then, on November 14, 2001, Mrs. Madrona executed and recorded a quitclaim deed transferring all of her interest in 300 El Cortez from Edith A. Madrona, a widow as Sole property owner to Edith A. Madrona, as Trustee of the Edith A. Madrona Trust. Mrs. Madrona testified she removed Rhainells name from the deed and transferred title to her trust because she wanted all of her children to inherit the house. Rhainell is the only one of Mrs. Madronas children who is not clearly named as a beneficiary of her trust. The trust document identified all of his siblings and a Renato Madrona, as beneficiaries, but Rhainell said he was never known as Renato and his birth date is different than the date of birth for Renato shown in the trust instrument. Mrs. Madrona testified that Renato referred to Rhainell.

Mrs. Madrona testified that Rhainell had been abusing her since 1999. Although she had him reported to adult protective services, Mrs. Madrona would not sign a complaint and family members never witnessed any abuse.^[4]

In March 2002 Mrs. Madrona filed a petition for a protective order against Rhainell and his wife pursuant to Californias elder abuse statutes. She said that Rhainell had tricked her into adding his name to the title; that he wanted to take the property for himself; that he verbally and mentally abused her; and that he threatened her with a gun and threatened to burn her house. The court issued a stay-away order after an evidentiary hearing. It noted that the testimony was conflicting, but also that there was a great potential for violence here. It seems like everybody is yelling and calling each other names.

Two months later Rhainell filed this action to cancel the 2000 and 2001 deeds, to quiet title in himself and his mother as joint tenants, for an accounting and declaratory relief, and for partition and sale of the property. Mrs. Madrona cross-complained to quiet title in her name alone and for damages on account of fraud in the 1994 deed, elder abuse, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary duty.

Mrs. Madrona sought to give collateral estoppel effect to the finding of elder abuse made in the restraining order proceedings. The court denied her motion on the ground that it was unclear the factual issues litigated under the elder abuse statutes were identical to those raised in the lawsuit.

At the conclusion of trial Rhainell moved for a nonsuit on Mrs. Madronas fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and financial abuse claims, on the grounds there was insufficient evidence to send them to the jury. Counsel for Mrs. Madrona stated the claims were supported by his clients testimony that she only put Rhainell on the deed for tax purposes and that he promised to relinquish title when he moved out. The court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to warrant consideration by the jury and granted nonsuit on the three causes of action. The court concluded that the 1994 deed granting Mrs. Madrona and Rhainell joint tenancy was a belated but nevertheless effective way of implementing the original intent of the parties. It issued a declaratory judgment that the two are joint tenants with joint responsibilities, quieted title to reflect the joint tenancy, and cancelled the 2000 and 2001 deeds.

The court then denied Rhainells claims for an accounting and partition and sale, granted Mrs. Madrona the right to sole possession of the home for the remainder of her life, and required her to make all mortgage and tax payments. Partition, in view of the age of the defendant, even though I think that her conduct as well as her testimony, in my view, is totally lacking in credibility, would justify a different order. But in view of the age and the fact that shes the defendants mother and mother of the other parties, Im not going to allow the property to be sold.

The remainder of the case went to the jury, which found in favor of Rhainell on Mrs. Madronas claims for elder abuse and intentional infliction of emotional distress. After unsuccessfully moving for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, Mrs. Madrona appealed and Rhainell cross-appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Erred in Granting Nonsuit on the Fraud and Related Claims

A. Standard of Review

 A motion for nonsuit or demurrer to the evidence concedes the truth of the facts proved, but denies as a matter of law that they sustain the plaintiffs case. A trial court may grant a nonsuit only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in every legitimate inference which may be drawn from the evidence, it determines there is no substantial evidence to support a judgment in the plaintiffs favor. [Citation.] [] On appeal, [w]e are bound by the same rules as the trial court. Therefore, on this appeal we must view the evidence most favorably to appellants, resolving all presumptions, inferences and doubts in their favor, and uphold the judgment for respondents only if it was required as a matter of law.  (Cossman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 370, 375-376.)

Although a judgment of nonsuit must not be reversed if plaintiffs proof raises nothing more than speculation, suspicion, or conjecture, reversal is warranted if there is some substance to plaintiffs evidence upon which reasonable minds could differ . . . .   (Claxton v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 327, 335 (Claxton).)

B. Application

Fundamental to the courts construction of the various deeds was its rejection of Mrs. Madronas testimony and argument that her son assured her he would relinquish his interest in 300 El Cortez Avenue when he moved out. Nonsuit on the fraud, breach of fiduciary duty and financial abuse claims all turn to whether there was some substance to her claims. If Mrs. Madrona presented sufficient evidence on these issues, they should have gone to the jury. We conclude she did.

Mrs. Madrona testified that after Roberto moved out, Rhainell asked to be added to the deed so he could take a tax deduction for his mortgage and property tax payments. Mrs. Madrona also adduced evidence that she and her husband previously added Roberto to the deed for the same reason; that it was understood Roberto would take his name off the deed when he moved out of the home; and that he quitclaimed his interest in 1990 because he had moved out and Rhainell was going to take over helping his mother make her payments. Arguably, this evidence might only raise  speculation, suspicion, or conjecture  (Claxton, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 335) that Rhainell was to remain on title only while he was living in the house and paying a share of the mortgage and property tax. But there was more. Mrs. Madrona testified as follows: Q: Miss [sic] Madrona, did Rhainell Madrona tell you anything? [] A: Yeah, he said hes going to quit whenRhainell said hes going to quit when he moves out and get a house. [] Q: Is that why you signed this deed? [] A: Yes. Construing this testimony in favor of Mrs. Madrona and most strongly against Rhainell (Nally v. Grace Community Church (1988) 47 Cal.3d 278, 291) and abjuring any attempt to assess her credibility (Leno v. Young Mens Christian Assn. (1971) 17 Cal.App.3d 651, 657), there was adequate evidence to allow the jury to determine whether Rhainell falsely represented to Mrs. Madrona that he would relinquish his interest in 300 El Cortez when he moved out.^[5]

Rhainell argues that when Mrs. Madrona used the term quit she was referring only to Rhainells promise that he would vacate the house, and it has nothing to do with quitclaiming in the legal sense. The trial court had also questioned her use of the word, when it asked counsel at the nonsuit argument No, he said he would quit. Hes going to quit making payments or quit what? Mrs. Madronas counsel replied that it was reasonable to infer that Mrs. Madrona, who is apparently not a native English speaker, used the word quit to refer to a quitclaim deed. He pointed out that Mrs. Madrona used quit when she referred in her testimony to the quitclaim deed executed by Roberto [b]ecause he said he needs a tax shelter and, when he gets his house, hes going to quit. A few minutes later, when asked whether Roberto removed his name from the deed when he moved out, Mrs. Madrona answered, Yes. [] . . . [] He quitclaimed. . . . But later still, she again used quit when she answered a question about the quitclaim deed signed by Roberto. A jury could reasonably infer that Mrs. Madrona used quit and quitclaim interchangeably to refer to a quitclaim deed or relinquishment of an interest in the property. At a minimum, there is substance to this evidence on which reasonable minds could differ. (See Claxton, supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 335.) Accordingly, the fraud related claims should have gone to the jury.

The courts rejection of Mrs. Madronas fraud and related claims is undeniably central to its conclusion that the 1994 deed represented a valid expression of the parties intent and, indeed, it infects the judgment as a whole. Because the error requires reversal of the judgment, we do not reach Mrs. Madronas additional contentions regarding the courts construction of the deeds or the assertion in Rhainells cross-appeal that the court abused its discretion in declining to order that the property be partitioned and sold, both of which are intrinsically tied to the fraud claims and must be addressed anew on remand to the trial court in light of our conclusion that those fraud claims are to be decided by a jury.^[6]

II. The Ruling on Collateral Estoppel

In order to provide the parties with guidance upon remand, we will address the courts refusal to apply collateral estoppel to the earlier finding of elder abuse. Mrs. Madrona contends that the finding of abuse made in the restraining order proceedings estops Rhainell from opposing her statutory cause of action for elder abuse because the parties were identical, the abuse issues the same, and the restraining order is final. (See generally Hight v. Hight (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 498, 502.) Rhainell asserts the court was correct, pointing to differences between the two proceedings and impediments to his ability to fully and fairly litigate the abuse issue in the restraining order proceedings. We agree that the court properly rejected the application of collateral estoppel.

Rhainell correctly points out that restraining order proceedings and civil actions filed under the elder abuse statutes have different burdens of proof. The difference precludes giving estoppel effect to the restraining order proceedings. The relevant principle is embodied in the Restatement Second of Judgments, section 28, subdivision (4), which states that collateral estoppel does not preclude relitigation of an issue where the party attempting to assert the doctrine has a significantly heavier burden than he had in the first action. In applying this principle, the court in In re Nathaniel P. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 660 held that a finding of child abuse made at a jurisdictional hearing could not be given collateral estoppel effect at a later hearing to determine whether to terminate parental rights because the finding at the jurisdictional hearing was by the preponderance of the evidence, and termination findings require clear and convincing evidence. (Id. at pp. 670, 672, citing People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 485.) The difference in burdens was dispositive even though the court was to address the same factual question. (Accord, Wimsatt v. Beverly Hills Weight Etc. Internat., Inc. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1523 [no collateral estoppel effect where burden was on plaintiffs in earlier proceeding and on defendant in subsequent litigation]; In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 563; 7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997 & 2006 supp.) Judgment,  378.)

The same holds true here, and the same result obtains. The elder abuse statutes authorize the court to issue a protective order to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of abuse if the petitioner shows to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act of abuse.^[7] (Welf. & Inst. Code,  15657.03, subd. (c).) In contrast, Mrs. Madronas cause of action for elder abuse under section 15657 requires her to prove physical abuse, fiduciary abuse or neglect by clear and convincing evidence. ( 15657.) For this reason, collateral estoppel does not apply to the earlier finding made under a lighter burden of proof. (See DAmico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 22 [a ruling will be sustained, whether or not given for a correct reason, if correct on any legal ground].)^[8]

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Each party to bear its own costs.

_________________________

Siggins, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P.J.

_________________________

Pollak, J.

Publication courtesy of California pro bono legal advice.

Analysis and review provided by La Mesa Property line attorney.

^[1] Because many of the parties share the same last name, we will refer to Rhainell Madrona and his siblings by their first names. No disrespect is intended.

^[2] Minerva also moved out sometime after Roberto.

^[3] Mr. Madrona passed away in 1991.

^[4] Mrs. Madrona stayed with her son Rolando for about 30 days over the course of several months in 1999 because, she told him, Rhainell and Erlinda were abusing her. Rolando did not personally witness any abuse and never discussed his mothers accusations with Erlinda or Rhainell.

^[5] As her counsel agreed at argument, to prevail on her fraud claim, Mrs. Madrona is required to prove that Rhainells promise to relinquish his interest in 300 El Cortez was false at the time it was made and he made it without any intention to perform. (Lazar v.Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.)

^[6] Mrs. Madronas request for judicial notice is denied as it is irrelevant to the dispositive issues on appeal.

^[7] Counsel for Mrs. Madrona asserted at oral argument that subdivision (d) of Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 imposes a clear and convincing evidence standard for issuance of a protective order. Not so. Section 527.6, subdivision (d) addresses procedures for obtaining injunctions, not protective orders. The applicable statute here is Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03, which specifically provides for the issuance of protective orders to protect elders and dependent adults from abuse. Nothing in that provision calls for proof by clear and convincing evidence.

^[8] We therefore need not and do not resolve whether the factual issues litigated in the restraining order proceedings were identical to those raised in the lawsuit, the stated ground on which the court denied Mrs. Madronas motionand a point on which Rhainell has barely touched.